Posted August 13, 2014

     Among the opponents of the progressive government of 100 days was the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC for its initials in Spanish).  This has been analyzed by Lionel Soto, who was part of the leadership of the Popular Socialist Party (the name of the Communist Party at the time) from 1947 to 1960.  After the triumph of the revolution, Soto became a member of the Central Committee of the reconstituted Communist Party of Cuba, and he occupied many important positions in the government.

     Soto maintains that the opposition of the Communist Party of Cuba to the Grau government of 1933 was an error.  In his analysis, the error was rooted in the application of a political line, according to which the working class was to take power through the formation of soviets or popular councils of workers, peasants and soldiers, which would replace the political structures of representative democracy.  To accomplish this transition to popular power, alliances should be formed among the various popular sectors, under the direction of the Communist Party, which was to function as a revolutionary vanguard (Soto 1995:447-48).  

      In accordance with the “extreme Left” and “sectarian” political line, during the Cuban popular revolution of 1930-33 in opposition to the governments of Machado and Céspedes, the Communist Party of Cuba considered any popular organization that did not place itself under its direction to be part of the “bourgeois opposition” to the government. Thus, the PCC interpreted the movement against the government as consisting of two sectors: the popular councils and parties directed by the PCC; and everyone else, dismissed as pertaining to the “bourgeois opposition.”  Soto writes that “the PCC conceived the popular triumph as a struggle between two well-defined poles: ‘soviet’ power, and the power of the landowning bourgeois oligarchy.  There did not exist the possibility of a transitional power formed by a radical or radicalizable petit bourgeoisie” (Soto 1995:448). In Soto’s view, this conception devalued alliances with popular organizations that were democratically less advanced than the popular councils led by the PCC, alliances that could have opened the road to a more advanced development within these popular organizations. José A. Tabares (1998:301) concurs, noting that, in dividing the popular sectors into those that followed PCC and those that did not, the PCC undermined the possibility of putting into practice an effective policy of alliances among popular organizations (Tabares 1998:301).  According to Soto, this political line had the effect of isolating the proletarian struggle, because in Cuba, the revolutionary peasant movement was weak, and the number of socialists from the petty bourgeoisie was small (Soto 1995:448).

      In accordance with the sectarian political line, the Communist Party of Cuba considered the government of 1933 to be a landholding bourgeois government, and it attacked all sectors of the government, without making any distinction among the factions led by Batista, Grau, and Guiteras (Soto 1995:737).  As we have seen (“Guiteras & the ‘government of 100 days’” 8/11/2014), there were significant differences and conflicts among the right, reformist, and revolutionary factions of the government, led by Batista, Grau, and Guiteras respectively.

      PCC opposition to the revolutionary government of 1933 was in part fueled by the repressiveness of the government with respect to the PCC, which occurred in spite of the efforts of the revolutionary faction of Guiteras to prevent it.  PCC opposition, therefore, was understandable to a certain extent.  Nevertheless, it was an error, for it undermined the possibility of an alliance between the Revolutionary Union of Guiteras and the Communist Party of Cuba, a possibility that could have derailed Batista’s consolidation of power.  As Soto concludes, “the PC struggled sincerely and hard for the agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution and the socialist revolution. . . .  But it was wrong, and its erroneous concept impeded working for its unity with the Guiterist forces in order to give battle—which would have been truly historic—to the Batistist right” (Soto:1995:737).

     Our task is to learn from historic errors, and not to discredit or dismiss our heroes.  And they were indeed heroes, taking into account their sacrifices for a most just world.  They confronted difficult decisions over complex issues, decisions that had to be made in the heat of battle. Certainly, the Revolutionary Union and the Communist Party of Cuba should have become allies.  But the differences between them were deep.  The PCC was seeking power through the formation of popular councils, having success particularly among workers; the Revolutionary Union sought to take power, first, by a guerilla struggles from the country to the city, fought mostly by peasants, and later, by participating in a government that included representatives of bourgeois interests.  And the Revolutionary Union had adopted a policy of execution of government officials, a controversial practice that was not supported by the PCC (Tabares 1998: 287, 294-97, 301, 310-12, and 325-28; Arboleya 2008:99).

     The issue would revisit the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s.  In the tradition of Guiteras, Fidel Castro led a guerrilla struggle with a strategy of taking power from the country to the city, and with the intention of establishing a government of national liberation as a first step toward socialism.  This was not the approach of the Popular Socialist Party. But the exceptional theoretical and practical insight of Fidel enabled his 26 of July Movement to become the leading force of the revolution, which facilitated tactics of cooperation.  Following the triumph of the revolution in 1959, a new Communist Party was formed through the integration of the three principal organizations that had combated the Batista dictatorship: the 26 of July Movement, the Popular Socialist Party, and the 13 of March Revolutionary Directory (a student organization, named for an assault on the Presidential Palace on March 13, 1957).  As a result of the charismatic authority of Fidel, the revolutionary factions would become unified, a necessary precondition for their success and sustainability.  We will be discussing these developments in future posts.  Further information on the reconstituted Communist Party can be found at “The Cuban revolutionary project and its development in historical and global context.” 


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Soto, Lionel.  1995.  La Revolución Precursora de 1933: Un momento trascendental en la continuidad revolucionaria de José Martí.  La Habana: Editorial Si-Mar.

Tabares del Real, José A.  1998.  “Proceso revolucionario: ascenso y reflujo (1930-35)” in Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Guiteras, Revolution of 1933, Communist Party of Cuba

Posted August 15, 2014

     We have seen that the Communist Party of Cuba during the 1930s rejected a strategy of alliances with popular organizations that would not subordinate themselves to the direction of the party, and it was opposed to the government of 1933, even though this government included a revolutionary faction headed by Antonio Guiteras (see “Guiteras and the ‘government of 100 days’” 8/11/2014; and “The Communist Party of Cuba in the 1930s” 8/13/2014).  In accordance with this sectarian approach, the PCC published harsh criticisms of Joven Cuba, the revolutionary organization developed by Antonio Guiteras and his followers after the fall of the Grau government (Tábares 1998:327; see “Guiteras and Joven Cuba” 8/12/2014). 

     At the same time, Guiteras and Joven Cuba also committed the error of sectarianism.  They insisted that the unity of the popular organizations in opposition to the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government be formed on a base of compliance with the perspective and methods of Joven Cuba and be under the leadership of Guiteras (Tábares 1998:327). 

      Moreover, the problem of sectarianism was evident not only with respect to the principal popular organizations, the PCC and Joven Cuba.  A wide variety of small revolutionary groups emerged during 1934 and 1935, with different programs and tactics, giving rise to “constant antagonism and frequent confrontations among them” (Tábares 1998:328).

      José Tábaras maintains that the antagonism among the popular organizations was an important factor in enabling the government to consolidate its power.  He writes, “The contradictions and disunity among the different organizations that were opposed to the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government contributed much to its survival and consolidation” (Tábares 1998:328).  He concludes:

     In its most profound sense, the error was not appreciating the dialectics of theory and practice.  Revolutionary theory is formulated on the basis of practice, and it develops through reflection on experience in practice.  When there are divergent understandings within the revolutionary process, we must ask, which understanding is correct?  The answer emerges in experience.  As the revolutionary process advances, the insight and the oversight of different understandings will become clear.  In the meantime, until the answer emerges in practice, the two sides have to develop tactics of cooperation, which strengthen the force of the revolutionary process and enable it to advance.

     In the 1930-35 stage of the of Cuban Revolution, there were two competing theories: the taking of power through the creation of popular councils, which would replace the structures of representative democracy; and the taking of power through a guerrilla war emerging in the country and advancing to the city.  The Cuban Communist Party practiced the former concept; and the Revolutionary Union and Joven Cuba implemented the latter.  These organizations were by far the most influential popular organizations of the period.  The proponents of both conceptions had many beliefs and commitments in common: opposition to the existing government, on the basis of its representation of imperialist and national bourgeois interests; the taking of power by a vanguard organization in the name of the people; and the formation of a government of national liberation as a first step toward socialism.  But they disagreed concerning the strategy through which power is to be taken.  It was not a trivial disagreement, for different understandings of the road to power can imply different forms of exercising power, once the revolution triumphs.  Which was correct?  Should the people take power through the formation of popular councils, or through armed struggle?  The answer emerges in practice: one of the two approaches will have more success, and this greater success in achieving goals demonstrates its greater insight in the context of particular conditions.  

      An example of the answer emerging in practice is provided by the case of Cuba in the 1950s.  Although the Cuban revolutionary process was aborted in 1935 by the consolidation of the power of Batista, the revolution continued.  Division within the revolutionary process remained, principally in the form of conflict between a strategy of alliance with reformist sectors, including bourgeois parties, and the strategy of armed struggle.   But on July 26, 1953, an attack on Moncada Barracks by Fidel Castro and his followers announced a renewed armed struggle and a revitalization of the concept of the taking of power from the country to the city.  This heroic action was effective in galvanizing the people, freeing them from a pervasive sense of powerlessness, and renewing the hope of the people in a more just and democratic nation.  Thus, the insight of the strategy of armed struggle, in relation to the particular conditions of Cuba in the 1950s, could not be denied.  The evident superiority of this approach made possible the unification of the popular revolutionary forces on a basis of support for the guerrilla struggle emerging in the mountains of Sierra Maestra in 1957 and 1958 and spreading to the cities in late 1958, culminating in the triumph of the Cuban Revolution on January 1, 1959.  

     In retrospect, we can see that the strategy of armed struggle was appropriate for the conditions of the Cuban neocolonial republic of the 1950s.  To be sure, the Communist Party strategy of 1930-35, involving the formation of popular councils, had much to recommend it, inasmuch as it involved the people actively in self-government, thus promoting practical education in the meaning of democracy, and it had been the successful strategy of the October Revolution.  And the Communist Party strategy, beginning in October 1935, of forming alliances with various sectors, including bourgeois parties, made possible certain concrete gains.  But the particular conditions of Cuba in the 1950s made the armed struggle a viable strategy for the taking of power: the repressiveness of the second Batista dictatorship, creating serious obstacles to the more open and visible forms of political opposition; the long history of armed conflict in the political affairs of Cuba, giving legitimacy to the tactic of armed struggle; and the willingness of the rural people to support the guerrilla struggle in practical ways. 

     With the restoration of the project of the Right on a global scale, a process that began in 1979, the post-World War II era of revolution came to an end.  The imposition of the neoliberal project and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist bloc would soon follow.  After this setback for the revolutionary forces, there emerged a period a profound critical evaluation of the errors of the revolution.  Among the conclusions was recognition of the error of sectarianism, defined as the malady in which popular organizations with common goals refuse to cooperate, because of differences in tactics or concepts.  Since the reemergence of popular movements, beginning in 1995, principally on the basis of popular world-wide rejection of the neoliberal project, the various emerging revolutionary organizations have been conscious of the need to avoid sectarianism.  They have been oriented to cooperation with one another, seeking to include in collective action the various organizations that are committed to the creation of a more just and democratic world.

     The revolution today that seeks to establish socialism for the XXI century has learned the historic lesson of the absolute practical necessity of overcoming sectarianism.  It has learned the need for unity, not a unity imposed from above, but a horizontal cooperation that respects differences and that becomes in practice a unity with pluralism and diversity.  A unity and diversity that has a base in universal human values (see “Universal human values” 4/16/2014) and in the knowledge of errors of the past, errors made by persons of good intentions who continue to be our heroes, even as we seek to overcome their limitations.  And a unity with diversity that has faith that, when there are sincere differences among us, rooted in different understandings, our experience together in common struggle will teach us the way.

 
References

Tabares del Real, José A.  1998.  “Proceso revolucionario: ascenso y reflujo (1930-35)” in Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Guiteras, Cuban Communist Party, sectarianism

Posted August 18, 2014

     We have seen that divisions and sectarianism among the various revolutionary organizations enabled the establishment in January 1934 of a government delivered by US Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, controlled by the sergeant-named-coronel Fulgencio Batista, and represented by President Carlos Mendieta (see “Guiteras and the ‘government of 100 days’” 8/11/2014; “The Communist Party of Cuba in the 1930s” 8/13/2014).  And we have seen that continuing divisions among the revolutionary forces was an important factor in enabling the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government to survive (“The lesson of sectarianism” 8/15/2014).

     Prior to the overthrow of Machado, “the chiefs of the armed forces were subordinate, in law and in fact, to civil authority, and they did not participate in the taking of political decisions” (Chang 1998:320).  The role of the armed forces of the neo-colonial republic prior to 1934 was limited to carrying out repressive measures authorized by the president and other civil authorities, in exchange for which the chiefs were granted participation in the looting of the public treasury.  But the coup d’etat of September 4, 1933, which led to the Grau “government of 100 days,” and the coup of January 15, 1934, which established the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government, greatly strengthened the role of the military in political affairs, inasmuch as the military had played a central role in both events.  Accordingly, after the fall of Machado, “Batista and his army emerged as the true arbiters of the situation.  The traditional political parties, fragmented and involved in endless fights that promoted their ambitions, only would occupy the space in governmental management that the formal maintenance of republican institutions required.  Real power would be in the hands of the military chiefs, with Batista at the head” (Chang 1998:346).  

      Through a series of laws and decrees between February and April of 1936, a number of institutions were created, all under the direction of the chief of the army and dedicated to such tasks as the creation and operation of rural schools and the providing of social services and services of public health.  By virtue of a law of August 28, 1936, these various institutions were united in the Corporative Council of Education, Health, and Welfare, which pertained to the military.  These measures increased the power of Batista and the military, by giving them control over areas that ought to be under the civilian authority of the government.  The Corporative Council, for example, and not the office under the direction of the Secretary of Education, appointed teachers to the rural schools.  Similarly, the Corporative Council appointed health specialists, social workers, and administrators necessary for the various programs of social and health services (Instituto 1998:348-50).

     In addition to increasing his power, the Corporative Council also enabled Batista to improve his image, which had been severely damaged by his “well-earned fame as an oppressor of the people” (Chang 1998:349), earned during the Grau government.  The programs of the Corporative Council involved the military with the rural peasantry, converting officers and soldiers into agents of social change that were improving the conditions of life (Chang 1998:349).  However, Federico Chang Pon considers the program to be demagoguery, in that it sought to attain social support for the personal ambitions of Batista (see also Arboleya 2008:109).    In his view, the paternalistic character of the program, its idealistic solutions, and its lack of technical support reveal its essentially demographic character (Chang 1998: 350).

     The usurpation of power by the military led to constant tension between Batista and President Mendieta.  The conflict came to a head in a dispute concerning the management of the state budget.  On December 14, 1936, Batista met with the chiefs of the armed forces, and it was decided to make an accusation against the president before the House of Representatives, accusing him of threatening members of the Congress in order to coerce them to support the legislation that he supported.  On December 24, the Senate, presided by the Supreme Court, declared the president guilty of violating the free functioning of the legislative power, and he was removed from office, replaced by Vice-President Federico Laredo Brú.  The removal of the president demonstrated and reinforced the power and ambitions of Batista (Chang 1998:352-55).

      In August 1937, Batista launched the Plan for Social-Economic Reconstruction, a program dedicated to improving the conditions of life in the countryside.  The program was launched by Batista personally, and it was accompanied by an ample propaganda campaign that proclaimed its benefits to the people.  However, the proposed program did not touch the large landholdings, which was the principal structural source of rural poverty.  And although the proposed program would have provided some support to small and middle peasants dedicated to sugar production, it provide no support for landless peasants or for peasants who were not tied to sugar production.  In fact, analyses of the proposal maintain that, if it had been implemented, it would have led to loss of land and pauperization for 60% of peasant small landholders (Chang 1998:357-560).

     Chang considers the Plan for Social-Economic Reconstruction to have been another example of Batista’s demagoguery.  He maintains that the astute Batista understood that he could not obtain the support of the workers and students through such deception, as a result of his previous repression against these sectors.  So he was attempting to establish a social base of support in the rural population, which had less developed political consciousness and had been less directly repressed by the armed forces under his command (Chang 1998:359; see also Arboleya 2008:109).

      But the demagogic maneuver did not work.  The plan never attained necessary popular support.  Leaders of the popular movement provided penetrating analyses of the plan, exposing its deceptions and contradictions.  At the same time, the international situation was changing, which was establishing conditions for a different road for Batista, namely, cooperation with the progressive and revolutionary popular forces of the nation.  So in May 1938, Batista announced a postponement of the plan, which was actually the first step in its abandonment.  Batista was moving toward an alternative strategy of a democratic opening, as we will see in a subsequent post.    


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Chang Pon, Federico.  1998.  “Reajustes para la estabilización del sistema neocolonial” in Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Batista

Posted August 19, 2014

     The US economic recovery plan of the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, conceived at the depths of the Great Depression, included the signing of commercial agreements with Latin America governments, with the intention of increasing access to foreign markets for the industrial and agricultural products of the United States (see “FDR and US mediation in Cuba” 8/7/2014).  The Reciprocal Agreement between Cuba and the United States of 1934 reduced the tariffs on thirty-five articles exported from Cuba to the United States and 400 articles proceeding from the United States to Cuba (Instituto de Cuba 1998:336-39).

     The agreement deepened Cuba’s peripheral role as an exporter of sugar.  It increased the Cuban percentage of US imports of sugar, facilitating a recovery for Cuban sugar producers. However, the recovery was merely partial, because the Cuban share was still only half of what it had been in the period 1925-29, before US sugar producers began to lobby the US government to reduce the Cuban share, in response to the effects of the Great Depression.  The Cuban recovery, moreover, had limited advantages for Cuba, for it was on the base of the historic peripheral role of sugar exportation; sugar comprised four-fifths of Cuban exports (Instituto de Cuba 1998:339-41; see “The peripheralization of Cuba” 6/16/2014). 

    In addition, the 1934 reciprocal trade agreement deepened dependency on the United States.  By the end of the 1930s, Cuban trade with the United States reached three-fourths of Cuban foreign commerce (Instituto de Cuba 1998:341).

    Furthermore, the 1934 trade agreement, by reducing tariffs for US manufactured goods, failed to defend the development of Cuban national industry.  Federico Chang notes that, in this respect, Cuba was different from other Latin American countries of the period, which had a “solidly defined policy of import-substitution,” seeking to develop national industry.  He notes that the Cuban oligarchy delivered “without reserve” the Cuban internal market, thus demonstrating its “complete subordination to the United States”.  Its “most abject servility” was revealed in its declarations that “praised the negotiations with the US government as ‘beneficial for the country’” (Chang 1998:338-39, 342).

      Similarly, Francisco López Segrera (1972:274) maintains that the 1934 commercial agreement frustrated possibilities for industrial development, reinforcing the position of Cuba as a consumer of manufactured products and producer of sugar.  The agreement represented the mutual interests of US imperialism and the Cuban sugar oligarchy.  The agreement deepened the core-peripheral relation between the United States and Cuba, in spite of the formal political independence of the island, thus exemplifying the process of neocolonialism.   

      Since the times of José Martí, the Cuban revolutionary movement sought to break the core-peripheral relation and the neocolonial structures that sustained it.  But in the era of Batista, the revolutionary movement was unable to overcome its divisions, in spite of its considerable advances in theory and practice during the 1920s and 1930s.  At the same time, Batista astutely combined repression of the revolutionary movement with concessions to the masses, adopting rhetoric that “integrated the revolutionary and nationalist protest into a counterrevolutionary and anti-nationalist neo-populism, disguised as democracy and worker concessions” (López Segrera 1972:274).  Thus, neocolonialism in Cuba was moving toward its full expression: superexploitation of labor; access to sugar at low prices; access to needed markets for surplus manufactured goods; maintenance of the system through repression of the revolutionary movements that seek to transform it; and the pretense of democracy. 

     The characteristics of neocolonial Cuba during the era of Batista are integral to the world-system today: super-exploitation of labor; cheap raw materials; markets for the surplus manufactured goods of the core; the pretense to democracy; and revolutionary movements in the neocolonies, seeking to break the neocolonial relation.  Our task today is to expose the fictions of neocolonialism: a “free market” and free-trade agreements create not economic liberty but structures of economic and financial domination; representative government, rather than empowering the people, creates structures that facilitate the manipulation of the people.  The unmasking of the fictions of the neocolonial world-system is a necessary precondition for the taking of power by the people, itself a necessary precondition for the survival of humanity.  The taking of power by the people is well underway in Latin America, a process that began in 1995.  We in the North have the duty to join in this emerging world revolution by humanity in defense of itself.


References

Chang Pon, Federico.  1998.  “Reajustes para la estabilización del sistema neocolonial” in Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 

López Segrera, Francisco.  1972.  Cuba: Capitalismo Dependiente y Subdesarrollo (1510-1959).  La Habana: Casa de las Américas.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Batista

Posted August 20, 2014

     In 1935, a number of organizations formed the popular opposition to the Batista government.  There were significant differences among them with respect to conceptions and tactics.  There was disagreement, for example, concerning whether or not to participate in the elections convoked by the government for 1936.  There were differences concerning how to unite the opposition groups, with some advocating an alliance based on defined propositions and objectives, with each organization maintaining full independence; and others favoring an organizational unity through the creation of a single party, but without a clear programmatic definition.  The opposition groups were anti-imperialist, but their conceptions ranged, on the one hand, from clear opposition to US imperialist interests and the Cuban oligarchy; and on the other hand, to a mere rejection of US interference in Cuban affairs and the seeking of an accommodation between the popular movement and the Cuban oligarchy (Chang 1998:361-62).

     At its Sixth Plenary of Central Committee, held on October 21-22, 1935, the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) adopted a policy of the formation of a united popular anti-imperialist front.  This represented an about-face from its policy since 1930, when the PCC refused to cooperate with organizations that did not subordinate themselves to its direction.  At the Sixth Plenary, the party proposed to create a broad popular front for “the complete political and economic independence of Cuba, for democracy and social progress.”  It also called for the strengthening of unions and the unification of all workers, regardless of ideology or political affiliation.  And it called for a great mass mobilization to obligate Batista to comply with his demagogic promises (Chang 1998:362).

     In accordance with the policy for the formation of a popular front, party leaders met with the leaders of various organizations of the popular opposition.  The PCC proposed participation in the 1936 elections, with the popular organizations united behind the candidacy of Ramón Grau San Martín, using the slogan, “Vote for Cuba and against imperialism.”  PCC proposed a platform that advocated: complete Cuban independence, without foreign interference; nationalization of foreign telephone, electric, railroad, mining and sugar companies; repudiation of the debt to Chase National Bank (see “Machado and the promise of reform” 7/16/2014) and a moratorium on all debt payments; elimination of the 1934 reciprocal treaty with the United States (see “The US-Cuba neocolonial relation deepens” 8/19/2014); ample guarantees for democratic freedoms; measures for the improvement of the social and economic conditions of workers and peasants; political, economic, and social equality for women and blacks; and the convoking of a democratic and popular Constitutional Assembly.  As can be seen, the proposal was a radical proposal for national liberation.  But it was rejected by Grau and his important party, the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party, which favored non-participation in the elections; and it was rejected by the organizations that were following the road of armed insurrection. With the rejection of the proposal for unity around the candidacy of Grau, the PCC proposed united action in support of a boycott of the elections.  But this proposal also failed to attain the united support of the opposition organizations (Chang 1998:362-63). 

     In July 1936, the PCC again tried to create a united anti-imperialist popular front.  It convoked a meeting of eight opposition organizations, and several work sessions were held in Miami.  The conference adopted flexible positions, maintaining that all questions concerning strategy and tactics should be decided by a leadership structure representing the various organizations, in accordance with the conditions in a particular moment and the opinions of the member organizations.  This flexible approach made possible an agreement for the formation of the National Liberation Front (NLF), with a leadership directorate formed by three members from each organization.   Its platform was less revolutionary and more reformist than the PCC proposal with respect to the Grau candidacy.  The proposed NLF platform included defense of national industry, the protection of democratic rights, the organizing of peasants, the reconstruction of workers’ organizations, the satisfaction of student demands, and full social and political equality for blacks and women (Chang 1988:364).

     The NLF was aborted, however.  During the third work session, the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC-A) of Grau rejected the proposal and abandoned the conference.  Subsequently, the PRC-A, seeking a different popular front strategy, established the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BRP), which sought to forge a united electoral bloc with respect to elections for a Constitutional Assembly.  The formation of BRP effectively brought to an end the PCC initiative of the National Liberation Front (Chang 1988:364-65). 

    At the same time, the BRP was not successful.  Inasmuch as it limited the popular front to the issue of the Constitutional Assembly, some opposition organizations did not participate.  Moreover, unlike the NLF, in which all member organizations had equal power, the BRP was under the control of Grau’s PRC-A.  When a dialogue with representatives of the bourgeois political parties was announced, the BRP came to an end (Chang 1998:365-66).

    In contrast to the failure of the National Liberation Front initiated by the Communist Party of Cuba, a united popular front was forged successfully on three occasions in Vietnam by the communist party under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh: the Democratic United Front of Indochina, formed in 1936; the Vietminh Front, established in 1941; and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, created in 1960 (see “The Vietminh and the taking of power” 5/13/2014; “The National Liberation Front (NLF)” 5/21/2014).  Why was the formation of a united popular front for national liberation by the Communist Party of Cuba unsuccessful, in contrast to the success of the strategy in Vietnam?  Two factors were can be identified.  First, the processes of colonialism and neocolonialism were much older and far more developed in Cuba than in Vietnam.  Cuba already was beginning its transition to neocolonialism during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when the process of French colonialism in Indochina was initiated.  By the 1930s, US neocolonialism in Cuba had attained a degree of sophistication, including the forging of important bourgeois and petty bourgeois sectors that were aligned with US imperialism, and the extensive penetration of anti-communist ideology.  These dynamics made possible an undermining of the popular front by various pro-imperialist but reformist actors, most clearly represented by Grau.  Secondly, in contrast to the situation in Vietnam, Cuba in 1936-37 lacked a charismatic leader.  Its principal charismatic leaders were gone:  Julio Antonio Mella and Antonio Guiteras had been assassinated, and Rubén Martínez Villena had died of tuberculosis.  Charismatic leaders play an important and necessary role in exposing the distortions and deceptions of the allies of imperialism and in forging unity among the various currents within the revolutionary movement.  This vital role was fulfilled in Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh from 1930 to 1968, as it would be fulfilled later in Cuba by Fidel Castro, as well will explore in subsequent posts.  For various posts on the role of charismatic leaders in revolutionary processes, see the section on Charismatic Leaders..


References

Chang Pon, Federico.  1998.  “Reajustes para la estabilización del sistema neocolonial” in Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 

López Segrera, Francisco.  1972.  Cuba: Capitalismo Dependiente y Subdesarrollo (1510-1959).  La Habana: Casa de las Américas.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Batista

Posted August 22, 2014

     During 1938, the Batista government initiated a series of reforms that involved the restitution of political and civil rights that are central to the functioning of representative democracy.  The process began in December 1937, when a government decree of amnesty resulted in the release of 3,000 political prisoners.  In 1938, the government ratified the autonomy of the University of Havana, a long-standing demand of the student movement; announced the postponement of the Plan for Social-Economic Reconstruction, which had been rejected as demagoguery by the popular movement (see “Batista takes control” 8/18/2014); and announced its decision to convoke a Constitutional Assembly, another long-standing demand of the popular movement.  In addition, Batista met with Ramón Grau San Martín, the head of the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party, and Grau agreed that his party would abandon its persistent policy of abstaining from elections.  And on September 13, 1938, the Communist Party of Cuba and other organizations were legalized, so that the PCC could now conduct its work of organization and popular education openly and without fear of repression (Chang 1998:372).

     Various factors pushed Batista toward a democratic opening.  First, the usurpation of power by Batista and the military had generated opposition from the Cuban oligarchy, on whom he was dependent for support.  He therefore needed to make concessions to the civilian political actors that represented the interests of the bourgeoisie.  Secondly, during 1936 and 1937, Batista had been developing fascist structures.  But this move toward fascism could not reach its culmination, as a result of the changing world situation.  The emergence of fascism in Europe was giving rise to a global conflict between fascism and democracy.  Cuba, totally dependent on the United States, had to ally itself with the democratic camp and participate in the emerging global anti-fascist front.  Thirdly, on August 17, 1937, Jefferson Caffery was replaced by J. Butler Wright as US ambassador to Cuba.  Whereas Caffery had close ties with Batista, Wright was more attentive to the interests of other sectors in the development of US policy.  Fourthly, the popular movement was growing in strength, in spite of the repression and demagoguery of the regime.  The opening of political space for the popular movement was necessary for political stabilization (Chang 1998:371-72).

     Elections for the Constitutional Assembly were held on November 15, 1939.  The elections were complicated by the continuing divisions among the opposition parties.  Eleven parties nominated candidates. They were grouped in two electoral blocs: the Democratic Socialist Coalition, headed by Batista; and the opposition bloc, led by the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC-A) of Grau.  The Communist Party, then known as the Communist Revolutionary Union, proposed to incorporate itself into the PRC-A, but this proposal for the fusion of the parties was rejected, with Grau maintaining that the communist party candidates ought to be presented in the elections as members of the Communist Revolutionary Union.  At the same time, the bourgeois political parties that belonged to the Batista coalition proposed the inclusion of a popular program in its platform and an alliance with the Communist Revolutionary Union.  Thus, the voters were presented with a confusing scenario.  There was, on the one hand, the opposition bloc headed by the well-known reformer but anti-communist Grau; and the bloc headed by the dictator Batista, who had been cultivating a democratic image and who was now allied with the communist party.  In the end, of the seventy-six delegates elected, forty-one belonged to the four parties of the opposition bloc; and thirty-five pertained to five parties of the Batista bloc, including the Communist Revolutionary Union (Chang 1998:376-77).     

       The Constitutional Convention was convened on February 9, 1940.  With delegates of nine parties participating in the debates, and with all delegates free to express their personal views, a wide variety of positions were expressed.  Juan Marinello, Blas Roca, and Salvador García Aguero, three of the six delegates of the Communist Revolutionary Union, provided important defenses of the rights of workers, peasants, and other popular sectors.  The new constitution was approved by the Constitutional Convention on June 8, 1940, and it was signed on July 1, 1940, in a ceremony held in Guáimaro, in the place of the signing of the first Constitution of an independent Cuba, establishing the Republic of Cuba in Arms, on April 10, 1869 (Chang 1998:378-81).

     A product of the advances in theory and in practice of the Cuban popular movement, the Constitution of 1940 was advanced for its time. It recognized the full equality of all, regardless of race, color, sex, class, or similar social condition, and it affirmed the rights of women to vote and hold public office.  It included articles on the regulation of work, including the obligation of the Cuban state to provide employment, the establishment of a maximum work day of eight hours and a maximum work week of forty-four hours, and the recognition of the right of workers to form unions.  It recognized the principle of state intervention in the economy, and it declared natural resources to be state property. It proscribed large-scale landholdings, and it established restrictions on the possession of land by foreigners.  It established protections for small rural landholders, and it obligated taxes on sugar companies (Chang 1940:379-80). 

     With respect to the restrictions of foreign ownership of land, it should be noted that the US government and its Cuban allies had attempted to limit the scope of the Constitutional Convention, concerned that it could establish restrictions on foreign ownership.  But these interventionist maneuvers were denounced and repudiated by the popular sectors (Chang 1998:376).  At the insistence of the people, the story of the Platt Amendment would not be repeated (see “The ‘democratic’ constitution of 1901” 6/30/2014). 

     In accordance with the democratic opening, general elections were convoked in 1940.  Batista and Grau were the contenders for the presidency.  With the support of the alliance of the bourgeois parties and the communist party, Batista attained a solid victory, with 800,000 votes, as against 300,000 for Grau.  (The population of Cuba at the time was four million and one-quarter).  The election was accepted by all as clean and fair (Arboleya 2008:111-12).

       With the re-establishment of representative democracy in Cuba, and with a deepening of the core-peripheral relation with the United States (see “The US-Cuba neocolonial relation deepens” 8/19/2014), Cuba arrived to be a “perfect neocolonial system” (Arboleya 2008:112).  During the Cold War, the global powers would establish the Cuban neocolonial system as the general model for world capitalist domination (Arobleya 2008:114).  Today, as in Cuba three-quarters of a century ago, the neocolonial world-system seeks to develop structures that promote “representative democracy,” “human rights,” “free trade” and “the free market.”   These political-economic structures and ideologically-rooted terminology obscure the true character of the world-system as colonialism in a different form.  But the peoples of the Third World today are seeing through the fictions of neocolonialism, for they experience the poverty that is deepened by free trade agreements and other components of neoliberal packages, and they see that representative government responds not to their concrete needs but to the interests of national and international elites.  They are forming movements that seek to transform their neocolonial reality and establish a more just and democratic world-system.  

     In Cuba, the conditions that made possible the emergence of a perfect neocolonial system in 1940 never would be repeated in the history of Cuba (Arboleya 2008:112).  The Cuban system would again fall into crisis, giving rise to a renewal of the Cuban revolution and its triumph, establishing the island nation as a symbol of dignity for the peoples of the world who today struggle against global structures of neocolonial domination.  We will pursue these themes in subsequent posts.

References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Chang Pon, Federico.  1998.  “Reajustes para la estabilización del sistema neocolonial” in Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Batista, Constitution of 1940

Posted August 25, 2014

     We have seen that with the deepening of the US-Cuba core-peripheral economic relation from 1934 to 1940, and with the return of representative democracy during the period 1937-40, Cuba became a model neocolonial nation and the ideal for the development of the neocolonial world-system during the post-World War II era (“The US-Cuba neocolonial relation deepens” 8/19/2014; “The return of “democracy,” 1937-40” 8/22/2014).

     During the Batista presidency of 1940-44, economic conditions in Cuba were more favorable than they had been since the “crack” of 1920 (see “Instability in the neocolonial republic” 7/2/2014).  World War II halted sugar production in many countries, provoking an increase in sugar prices.  At the same time, the war disrupted the flow of US manufactured goods to Cuba, creating a degree of space for Cuban national industry.  However, serious economic problems continued: the expansion of unemployment in some sectors; and an increase in the cost of living, as a result of decline in the purchasing power of the national currency.  These dynamics had significant negative repercussions for the people, generating popular discontent with the Batista government (Arboleya 2008:114, 116; Le Riverend 1975:324-26).

     Capitalizing on the struggle in opposition to the dictatorships of Machado and Batista, the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party emerged as the “great hope” of the people.  Ramón Grau San Martín won the elections of 1944, defeating Carlos Saladrigas, the presidential candidate selected by Batista.  True to the reformist orientation that characterized Grau’s political career, Grau promised support for all sectors.  He proposed to harmonize labor-management relations, without necessarily implying support for the workers in just demands that impinge on the interests of the national bourgeoisie.  He promised agrarian reform, without specifying how, and without challenging the interests of the landed oligarchy.  Recognizing an international context defined by a global conflict between democracy and fascism, he pointed to Cuba’s system of representative democracy, and he proposed to increase economic and cultural relations with the United States (Arboleya 2008:114-15; Vitier 2006:147).

     The Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party was a party of the reformist national bourgeoisie, formed principally by an emerging industrial bourgeoisie.  But the industrial bourgeoisie continued to be weak with respect to the landed estate bourgeoisie that controlled sugar production and that was allied with US capital.  New industrial enterprises were created as a result of the decline of manufactured imports during World War II, but the number of new companies was not great, and some of the new investments in industry came from the landed oligarchy.  Thus, the Cuban national industrial bourgeoisie continued to be subordinate to the Cuban landed estate bourgeoisie and to foreign capital.  Its political party was in no position to propose a project of ascent through the protection of national industry and through the strengthening of the domestic market by increasing the purchasing power of the people.  Although some members of the national industrial bourgeoisie proposed such reforms, the Authentic Party was not in a position to propose a combination of import-substitution industrialization and concessions to popular demands, thereby placing its interests in tension with those of the Cuban estate bourgeoisie and foreign capital, as was occurring in other countries of Latin America at the time (Arboleya 2008:115-16).     

       When political actors who have recently arrived to power are unable to pursue a national project for economic and social development, they tend to focus energy on satisfying personal ambitions through newly available opportunities for enriching themselves.  Accordingly, the Grau government turned to corruption, creating new forms of plundering the public treasury, surpassing what had been previously established by Machado and Batista.  The Italian-American mafia in the United States, which had entered Cuba in the 1920s and had concluded lucrative agreements with Batista, found a new partner in the Authentic Party (Arboleya 2008:116).  This turn of the Grau government to corruption was disheartening to the people, given the role that Grau had played in the Revolution of 1930-33.  The corruption of the neocolonial republic had arrived to be so pervasive that even the ideals of the revolution had become corrupted.  Vitier writes:

     With election of Carlos Prío Socarrás to the presidency in 1948, the unresponsiveness of the Cuban system of representative democracy to the needs of the people continued.  Prío had been a prominent member of the University Student Directorate of 1930, a member of the Grau “government of 100 days” of 1933, and a prominent member of the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party.  But in spite of his previous connections to reformist and revolutionary tendencies, the economic program of the Prío government supported the interests of the Cuban oligarchy and foreign capital.  And in spite of Prío’s campaign promise to reduce corruption, unrestrained corruption continued during his presidency (Arboleya 2008:116-17; Virtier 2006:148; Le Riverend 1975:333).

     In reaction to the corruption of the Authentic Party government of Grau, the Orthodox Party of the Cuban People was established in 1946.  When Grau selected Prío as his successor, Eduardo Chibás, who had been a prominent member of the Authentic Party, accepted leadership of the Orthodox Party (Arobleya 2008:117).  Arboleya writes of Chibás:

     The Orthodox program proposed important economic and political reforms rooted in the Constitution of 1940 (see “The return of ‘democracy,’ 1937-40” 8/22/2014), but Chibás’ speeches were superficial and lacked an informed analysis of the causes and the solutions of the problems of the neocolonial republic.  However, he was enormously popular among the people.  Backed by the pseudo-industrial national bourgeoisie, and with the slogan of “shame on money,” he likely was headed toward winning the presidential elections at the time of his suicide (Aboleya 2008:117-18; Le Riverend 1975:332-33, 336).

     Meanwhile, Batista was preparing for a return to power.  He had formed the Unitary Action Party and had been campaigning for president in the 1952 elections.  However, it was evident that the Orthodox Party was headed to victory, in spite of the death of Chibás.  Accordingly, in order to check the popular movement, and with the support of the national bourgeoisie and international capital, Batista carried out a coup d’état on March 10, 1952, shortly before the presidential elections.  The chiefs of the army and the police were replaced with the military officers who had been involved in the coup. The Congress was dissolved.  The Constitution of 1940 was abolished.  The presidential elections of 1952 were cancelled (Arboleya 2008:119-20; LeRiverend 1975:336-37; López Segrera 1972:275; Vitier 2006:150).

      For decades, the Cuban system of representative democracy had been characterized by the pursuit of particular interests, deception, robbery of the public treasury, repression of popular movements, assassination of charismatic leaders, and the replacement of representative democracy by dictatorships when the popular movement emerged as a serious threat.  By 1952, the people were disgusted and disheartened.  They rejected the Batista coup of March 1952, but they also received it with indifference.  As Arboleya comments, “Nearly no one would cry for the loss” of representative democracy (2008:119).

     There were exceptions to the popular indifference.  University students demonstrated their rejection of the coup, and they asked Prío for arms to defend his constitutional government.  But Prío did not give the students arms; he instead boarded a plane for the United States in order to enjoy his millions.  Cuba went from representative democracy to military dictatorship without a single shot being fired (Arboleya 2008:119).

     A remembered exception to the popular indifference was a document submitted to the Emergency Court of Havana on March 12, two days after the coup.  The document maintains that Batista had committed crimes for which, if he were to be sanctioned according to the law, would deserve a punishment of more than 100 years.  And the document maintains that society requires a legal order rooted in historical and philosophical principles.  The author of the document was a 25-year-old lawyer, whose name was Fidel Castro (Virtier 2006:180).


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Le Riverend, Julio.  1975.  La República: Dependencia y Revolución, cuarta edición revisada.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.  Reimpresión, 2001.

López Segrera, Francisco.  1972.  Cuba: Capitalismo Dependiente y Subdesarrollo (1510-1959).  La Habana: Casa de las Américas.

Vitier, Cintio.  2006.  Ese Sol del Mundo Moral.  La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Batista, Grau, Prío

Posted August 26, 2014

     The career of Ramón Grau San Martín is a good example of a kind of reformism that functions to undermine popular revolution.  It reveals the cynical character that reformism sometimes has.

     Grau was among the founders of the University Student Directorate (DEU), established in 1930.  DEU condemned the repression and the corruption of the Machado dictatorship and called for the restoration of constitutional democracy.  Its program was essentially reformist rather than revolutionary, in that it did not advocate the popular taking of power nor the breaking of the neocolonial relation with the United States (see “The Cuban popular revolution of 1930-33” 8/5/2014).

     Grau was named the President of Cuba on September 10, 1933, in the aftermath of the sergeant’s revolt of September 5.   His government, which lasted only until January 15, 1934, was the only government during the neocolonial republic that was independent of the United States.  As we have seen, the government was divided into three factions, and Grau headed the reformist faction, which proposed the distribution of land to peasants, but not in a manner that conflicted with the interests of Cuban or foreign landholders; and which defended the sovereignty of the nation, but not in a form that would threaten US neocolonial interests (see “Guiteras & the ‘government of 100 days’” 8/11/2014).

     In February 1934, in the wake of his resignation from the presidency and the de facto taking of power by Batista, Grau formed the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party.  The program of the Authentic Party was reformist, calling for respect for the interests of the Cuban large landholders and foreign investors in Cuba; the honest management of public funds; the improvement of labor-management relations; and the convoking of a Constitutional Assembly.  It was opposed to the revolutionary program of Joven Cuba and Antonio Guiteras, who had headed the revolutionary faction in Grau’s “government of 100 days” (Instituto de Cuba 1998:324-25; see “Guiteras and Joven Cuba” 8/12/2014).

    Consistent with its reformist orientation, Grau and the Authentic Party were resolutely anti-communist.  The Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) advocated not merely concessions to working class but the taking of power and the formation of a government composed of popular councils of workers, peasants, soldiers, and sailors; and its anti-imperialist perspective involved not merely non-interventionism but the breaking of the neocolonial relation with the United States (see “The Cuban popular revolution of 1930-33” 8/5/2014).

      When the Communist Party of Cuba attempted to form a united anti-imperialist front (National Liberation Front, NLF) of Cuban popular organizations in 1936, the Authentic Party played a negative role in undermining the initiative.  First, it abandoned the talks for the formation of the NLF, even though significant progress had been made in defining its parameters.  Subsequently, in 1937, the Authentic Party in 1937 formed another front around elections for a Constitutional Assembly, effectively killing the NLF (see “The failure of the Cuban NLF, 1936-37” 8/20/2014).

      In spite of Grau’s opposition to the program of the Communist Party and to the Joven Cuba of Guiteras, and in spite of his anti-revolutionary perspective, Grau astutely cultivated a popular image of commitment to the Cuban revolutionary process.  This was possible for two reasons.  First, because Grau’s “government of 100 days” had implemented significant measures in defense of popular interests, as a result of initiatives undertaken by Guiteras and his revolutionary faction.  The people were aware that Guiteras was the force behind these popular measures, but the image of Grau also benefitted from his government’s implementation of popular measures.  Secondly, the people did not have a fully developed understanding of the difference between reform and revolution, and they therefore could not fully understand the long-range issues that were at stake in the divisions between the Authentic Party, on the one hand, and the PCC and Joven Cuba, on the other.  Accordingly, as Arboleya writes,

In essence, Grau and the Authentic Party were revolutionaries in rhetoric but not in substance.

     Utilizing the rhetorical strategy of appearing to be revolutionary, and capitalizing on the memory of Guiteras and on the tradition of popular revolutionary struggle, the Authentic Party won the elections of 1944.  But the government, as we have seen, was defined by corruption (“The failure of “democracy,” 1940-52” 8/25/2014).  And the Minister of Work in the Grau government, Carlos Prío, in accordance with the shift in the international scene from the “popular front” to McCarthyism, expelled communists from leadership positions in the workers’ movement and replaced them with reactionary leaders (Arboleya 2008:117; Vitier 2006:148).

    The kind of reformism represented by Grau is cynical, for it pretends to be what it is not.  It plays with the sentiments and hopes of the people, giving the impression of being on the side of the people, when in fact it seeks to protect the interests of elites.  It pretends to possess revolutionary virtues, when in fact it is anti-revolutionary.  It is deliberately ambiguous with respect to the difference between reform and revolution, but recognizing that a true popular revolution would cast reformism aside, it attacks revolutionary projects and leaders. Reformism confuses and divides the people, and it plays a central role in preventing revolutions from taking power.

     In the next post, we will pursue further this issue of the characteristics of reformism and its relation to revolution.


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 

Vitier, Cintio.  2006.  Ese Sol del Mundo Moral.  La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Grau, reformism

Posted August 27, 2014

      When I was a young man encountering the student anti-war and black power movements at Penn State from 1965 to 1969, I thought that reform was a good thing, for it made changes for the good of the people.  We young radical students understood in a general sense that there was a difference between reform and revolution: revolution involves fundamental structural change and a change in who exercises power; reform involves significant changes, but it does not change fundamental structures or who governs.  Revolutionaries, we thought, were antagonistic to reform because they wanted to change things more deeply and more quickly.  However, during twenty years of listening to Cuban revolutionaries, I have come to understand that revolutionaries are against reform not only because it is not fundamental and does not change who governs.  But also because it often has a cynical and sinister character, formulated from above with the deliberate intention of braking the revolution from below. 

     So let us distinguish reform from below and reform from above.  Reform from below seeks to improve the conditions of the people, and it places no limits on these improvements, and they can include changes in structures and in who governs.  When reform from below accepts limited changes, it does so because of its perception of what is possible, taking into account the existing arrangement of political forces.  Reform from below accepts changes that do not touch structures or power, not because it is fully satisfied, but because it believes that nothing more is politically possible at the moment; if it were possible, reform from below would want deeper changes. 

     In contrast, reform from above does not want deeper changes in structure and power.  Reform from above wants to maintain the established structures and the prevailing distribution of power in the established economic-political-social system.  Therefore, reform from above seeks to undercut the popular movement, by offering significant concessions that do not change structures or power.  When reform from above has success, some of the people are seduced and confused by its maneuvers, and divisions in the popular movement occur, weakening its force.

     We have seen important examples of reform from above in the political careers of Ramón Grau and Carlos Prío, who were the presidents of the Cuban neocolonial republic from 1944-48 and 1948-52, respectively.  They pretended to be inheritors of a revolutionary tradition that dated backed to 1868, but their legacy was to deliver eight years of unprecedented corruption, dashing the hopes of a people that was seeking to develop a more just and dignified nation, in accordance with the dreams of Martí (“The failure of ‘democracy,’ 1940-52” 8/25/2014).

      The difference between reform from above and reform from below can be difficult to see in practice, because both include concrete measures designed to increase the level of education, health and housing of the people.  The difference can be discerned when we observe the packages of which these measures are part.  The reform from above package includes no specific measures that adversely affect the interests of the ruling elite; it sometime pretends to be opposed to elite interests, but careful analysis reveals that its measures are superficial or full of loopholes.  Reform from above sees specific measures in defense of popular interests as having satisfied the demands of the people, and it often turns to repression of the popular organizations that push for more changes.  In contrast, the reform from below package sees the specific measures in defense of popular interests as small but important steps in the empowerment of the people in a process that could lead to fundamental structural change.  For reform from below, the specific measures are most important not in the needs that they satisfy, but in teaching the people the power that they possess, if they act collectively. 

     Reform from above is cynical, for it pretends to be revolutionary, when it is not.  And it is pernicious, because it confuses and divides the people, thus weakening the revolutionary movement.  In moments of crisis, reform from above often allies with the reactionary sector of the bourgeoisie or with fascism.

     Whereas reform from above is cynical and pernicious, reform from below has good intentions.  But it is wrong-headed.  Although reform from below sees itself as part of the revolution and always is opposed to the oppression of the revolution, it is not revolutionary.  It mistakenly believes that fundamental structural change and the taking of power by the people are not possible.  It lacks revolutionary faith, a belief that the people through united action, rooted in understanding, can take power and establish an alternative political-economic-social system. Lacking the clearly-defined goal of the taking of power by the people, reform from below often allies with reform from above in important moments of confrontation, undermining the popular revolution when it stands ready to take power.  Reform from below lacks the clear understanding and revolutionary faith that are necessary for the taking of decisive steps at critical moments.   

     On a global scale, reform from above has been tried on various occasions: the New Deal and Keynesian economics, the Good Neighbor policy of FDR, the important-substitution project of the Latin American urban and industrial national bourgeoisie, the Alliance for Progress of Kennedy, and the Human Rights policy of Jimmy Carter (see “Imperialism and the FDR New Deal” 9/20/2013; “The Alliance for Progress” 9/26/2013; “Jimmy Carter” 10/1/2013).  FDR’s reformist vision of a peaceful neocolonial world-system characterized by cooperation among the global powers and significant concessions to newly-independent governments of Africa and Asia as well as to Latin American governments was not implemented following the death of FDR, as it was cast aside by the ideology of the Cold War (see “Post-war militarization of economy & society” 9/23/2014).  These examples of reform from above are all characterized by the making of concession to the popular sectors without undermining the interests of the elite. 

    But reform from above on a global scale is not workable.  The structures of the world-system are designed to super-exploit the workers and peasants of the peripheral and semi-peripheral zones, generating profits for the elite and a higher standing of living for the working and middle classes of the core.  The concessions that can be made to the superexploited global masses, without affecting the benefits to the core, are necessarily limited, and they will not be enough to politically satisfy the global masses and establish global political stability, particularly in a time in which the world-system has reached the geographical limits of the earth, reducing its capacity to expand.  Reform of the neocolonial world-system is not possible.  A stable world-system can be developed only on a foundation of structures that respect the social and economic rights of all persons and the sovereignty of all nations.  This requires not the reform of neocolonialism, but its abolition.

      With the historically demonstrated failure of the reform of the world-system from above, and with the devastating consequences of the turn of the global powers to a neoliberal economic war against the poor and to imperialist militarism, a global popular revolution has emerged in our time.  It is constituted by an alliance, on a global scale, between reform from below and revolution.  It seeks to construct an alternative, more just, democratic and sustainable world-system, in which neocolonialism would be eradicated, for its structures would defend the sovereignty and true independence of all nations.
      

Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Grau, reformism

Posted August 28, 2014

     In the elections of delegates to the Constitutional Assembly in November 1939, the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) was part of a bloc headed by Fulgencio Batista; and in the presidential elections of 1940, the PCC supported the presidential candidacy of Batista.  The Cuban scholar and diplomat Jesús Arboleya maintains that the alliance was politically costly for the PCC, and that many Cuban historians consider it to have been a “strategic error,” a phrase that implies an error from which there is no recovery (Arboleya 2008:110).

     The alliance between the Cuban dictator and the Communist Party of Cuba was rooted in factors that were both national and international.  At the national level, Batista had been moving since 1937 to a democratic opening, which resulted in the PCC being declared a legal political party, able to engage openly in its work of organization and education.  In addition, the bourgeois political parties that belonged to the Batista bloc offered the incorporation of important popular measures of the PCC program into the Batista bloc platform. At the same time, a proposal for the fusion of the PCC and the Authentic Party of Grau with respect to the Constitutional Assembly was rebuffed by the Authentic Party.  Grau represented a kind of reformism that was anti-communist and that was opposed to fundamental structural change and to the taking of power by the popular sectors (see “Grau and reformism” 8/26/2014).

     The Batista turn to democracy was pushed in part by international developments.  With the taking of power by fascist parties in Germany, Italy, and Spain, a global division between democratic and fascist camps were emerging.  On an international plane, there was a growing tendency toward a “popular front” alliance between bourgeois political parties and the communist parties, in opposition to the forces of fascism.  With the democratic reforms that began in late 1937, Batista was becoming a part of the democratic camp, and his government was recognized as such by the United States.  This interplay of national and international dynamics established the context for the alliance between the PCC and Batista during 1939-40, and it was to a considerable extent accepted by the people as a necessary consequence of the exceptional dynamics of the time, defined by a World War in Europe that would soon include the Soviet Union and the United States (Arboleya 2008:110-11).

     The strategies and tactics of the Communist Party of Cuba also can be understood as influenced by the directives of the Communist International.  The Third (Communist) International had been formed in 1919 by the Russian (Bolshevik) Communist Party, with the intention of combatting the Second International and the reformist tendencies of European social democracy.  The Third International was composed of the communist parties from many nations.  At the Congresses of the International, delegates from the various national parties debated a wide variety of issues and informed the leadership concerning the particular conditions in their nations.  However, a condition of membership in the International was acceptance of its directives (Ramos 2010:17-19). 

     As a result of the limited experience of the communist parties in many nations, the battle initiated against social democracy led to a form of extremism that Lenin denounced as the “infantile disorder of Leftism in communism,” and the Second Congress of the Third International in 1920 was dedicated to overcoming the errors of “Leftism.”  Such errors included the dictating of ultimatums to the workers, disdaining patient organization and education; engaging in electoral boycotts rather than participating in parliamentary elections; and abandoning workers’ unions in order to form separate “red unions.” In opposition to these negative tendencies, Lenin and the Second Congress called for the patient education and organization of the working masses, and participation of the party members in the unions formed by the working masses (Ramos 2010:20-22). 

     Benefitting from the revolutionary wave in Europe of 1917-20, the Communist International had sixty national sections by 1922.  But the subsiding of the revolutionary wave created a new international situation, which led the Third Congress of the International in 1921 to direct the communist parties of the various nations to adopt the tactic of the “united front” with social democratic and socialist parties in opposition to the bourgeois political parties, on the basis of common political, economic, and social demands (Ramos 2010:22-24).

     With the death of Lenin in 1924 and the fall of the Russian Revolution to a petit bourgeois bureaucratic counterrevolution that put Stalin at the head (see “Reflections on the Russian Revolution” 1/29/2014), the Communist International began to assume the role of appendage to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which above all was oriented to seeking global allies in the protection of Soviet borders against foreign attack.  In the Fifth Congress of the Third International in 1924, the perspective of supporting a world proletarian revolution was abandoned, and the concept of “socialism in a single country” was adopted.  This indifference to global revolution defined the Communist International in the period 1925 to 1927 (Ramos 2010:30-31; Grant 1997:146-51).

    In 1928, with the theoretical formulation by Stalin of a new stage in the world revolution, the Communist International did an about face.  It adopted an extreme Left position, directing the parties to avoid alliances with social democracy, which according to Stalin’s theory, had evolved into “social fascism.”  This policy has disastrous and tragic consequences for Germany, in that the extreme Leftist direction of the Communist International prevented the German Communist Party from joining forces with German social democracy in order to prevent the taking of power by fascism, even though communism and social democracy together had twice the number of the Nazi party.  This dysfunctional extreme Leftism of the Communist International guided its directions to the national communist parties from 1928 to 1934 (Grant 1997:151-53; Ramos 2010:31-33).

     The triumph of fascism in Germany in 1933 constituted a serious threat to the Soviet Union and to the world, and Stalin sought the support of Western powers in opposition to Nazi Germany.  Accordingly, the Seventh Congress of the Communist International of 1935 adopted the policy of the “popular front,” and it directed the national communist parties to seek alliances with the parties of the bourgeoisie in opposition to fascism.  The popular front continued to be the policy of the Communist International until 1943, when the International was abolished by Stalin, at the insistence of the Western powers (Ramos 2010:33-34; Grant 1997:154-58).  

     We can see the negative consequences of the zigzag policies of the Communist International for the Communist Party of Cuba.  Intense popular activity erupted in Cuba during the period 1930-33, coinciding with the Stalinist turn to extreme Leftism of 1928 to 1934.  During this period, consistent with the directives of the Communist International, the Communist Party of Cuba refused to cooperate with parties that would not subordinate itself to its direction.  This dysfunctional position prevented the PPC from allying with the Revolutionary Union and the Joven Cuba of Antonio Guiteras, and it led to PPC opposition to the “government of 100 days,” which included the revolutionary faction of Guiteras.  This division between the PPC and the forces of Guiteras permitted the rise of Batista and his consolidation of power (see “The Cuban Communist Party of the 1930s” 8/13/2014; “The lesson of sectarianism” 8/15/2014).  Thus, the consequences of the directives of the International for Cuba were similar to what occurred in Germany. 

     After the Communist International adopted its popular front strategy in 1935, the Communist Party of Cuba attempted to form in 1936-37 a popular anti-imperialist front that included the bourgeois reformist party of Grau.  The front, however, failed to materialize as a result of the sabotage of the bourgeois party (“The failure of the Cuban NLF, 1936-37” 8/20/2014).  And in the period 1939-40, the PCC allied with the dictator Batista, who united behind him the forces of the national bourgeoisie, a strategic error that was politically costly for the Communist Party of Cuba. 

     For Cuba, the zigzags of the Communist International, the rigid attitude of the party toward alliance with progressive popular organizations in the early 1930s, and the popular front strategy of alliance with bourgeois political parties that resulted in alliance with the dictator in 1939-40, destroyed the capacity of the Communist Party of Cuba to lead the popular struggle, even though the Party,  founded in 1925, had arrived at the forefront of the popular movement by 1930 (see “Julio A. Mella and the student movement” 7/8/2014; “The Cuban popular revolution of 1930-33” 8/5/2014).  The old Communist Party of Cuba never recovered from these errors.  In the 1960s, a new Communist Party of Cuba was formed through an integration of the 26 of July Movement (directed by Fidel), the Popular Socialist Party (the name of the old communist party at the time), and the 13 of March Revolutionary Directory (a student organization).

     The fate of the Party in Cuba was very different from what occurred in Vietnam.  The Indochinese Communist Party, founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930, was so weak in the early 1930s, as a result of repression and limited popular consciousness, that the International’s rigid policy of disdaining alliances with social democracy, implemented by Ho, did not negatively affect Party’s popular image.  In 1936, the Indochinese Communist Party turned to the popular front strategy and effectively used it in leading the Vietnamese Revolution to triumph in 1945 (see “The Indochinese Communist Party” 5/12/2014; “The Vietminh and the taking of power” 5/13/2014).  The conditions in Vietnam were favorable to the success of the popular front strategy.  French colonialism and Japanese occupation were the defining factors, and neocolonial structures of economic and ideological penetration were much less developed than in Cuba.  AS a result, a bourgeois nationalist and reformist party allied with imperialism and able to undermine the popular front had not emerged as a decisive political force, except in the area of Saigon.  In Vietnam, the popular front strategy was not only directed by the Communist International, but it was also forged in theory and practice by Ho Chi Minh, who even before its adoption by the International, understood it to be an intelligent policy in the Vietnamese context.  In Vietnam, a broad-based alliance that included progressive sectors of the bourgeoisie was successfully implemented by the Party, and it earned the Party the high respect of the people and placed it at the head of a triumphant revolutionary movement.   

      There were two fundamental errors of the Communist International. First, it was an error for the International to function in service of the foreign policy interests of one particular nation, thus distorting the revolutionary practices of communist parties in other nations. Secondly, it was an error for the International to formulate directives with respect to strategy and tactics, for the most intelligent and effective strategy depends on particular national conditions.  These errors were a consequence of two factors: the triumph of Stalinism in the Soviet Union, and the general world-wide tendency toward sectarianism in movements of the Left during the twentieth century.

      Today, the Soviet Union and the Third International are gone.  The popular movement in Latin America, however, has moved to a more advanced stage, and it has developed a new style of international with characteristics that are appropriate for global conditions today.  The Sao Paulo Forum was founded in 1990 in Brazil, as an organization of political parties of the Left, on the initiative of Fidel Castro and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who later would become President of Brazil.  The Sao Paulo Forum today consists of political parties of the Left and social organizations.  It defines a fundamental program for the Left, avoiding directives, divisions, and sectarianism.  Its tenth meeting is being held this week in Bolivia.  We will be discussing the Sao Paulo Forum in subsequent posts, seeking to understand its similarities with and differences from the Communist International.


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Grant, Ted.  1997.  Rusia—De la revolución a la contrarrevolución: Un análisis marxista.  Traducción de Jordi Martorell.  Madrid: Fundación Federico Engels.

Ramos, Juan Ignacio.  2010.  “Introducción” in La Internacional Comunista: Tesis, manifiestos, y resoluciones de los cuatro primeros congresos (1919-1922).  Madrid: Fundación Federico Engels.


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