September 22, 2015 (revised April 25, 2019)

      When capitalism entered the stage of imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century, the foundation was being laid for the passing of the torch of leadership of the global socialist revolution from Russia and Western Europe to the colonized and semi-colonized peoples of the Third World.  So writes Cuban scholar and former diplomat Jesus Arboleya (2008:3-24) in his insightful book, La Revolución del Otro Mundo (The Revolution of the Other World), which analyzes the parallel histories of the United States and Cuba. 

     Cuba indeed is emblematic of the revolutions of the Third World.  One finds in Cuba the dynamics that everywhere are present in the Third World: colonial conquest and peripheralization, anti-colonial movement, transition to neocolonial republic, and anti-neocolonial revolution.  But furthermore, it can be said that one finds these dynamics in their most advanced expression.  As a result, from Cuba, one can obtain a profound grasp of the meaning of domination, revolution, and socialism.

     In this section of the blog, Cuban History, are found fifty blog posts that were initially published from June 12 to September 29, 2014.  They point to seven important lessons to be learned from the Cuban Revolution, understood as a project of popular social reconstruction that has been continually evolving from 1868 to the present.

     (1) Third World revolutions are defined fundamentally by the colonial/neocolonial situation.  They seek to transform those structures that have been imposed by colonialism and sustained by neocolonialism, particularly economic structures that ensure the super-exploitation of labor and the exploitation of natural resources by the colonial/neocolonial powers.  They therefore above all seek true independence and the development of a just and democratic world-system that respects the equal sovereignty of all nations.

     (2) Whereas Western historians have retreated from “great man” interpretations of history, careful observation of unfolding revolutionary processes cannot avoid recognition of the importance of charismatic leaders in revolutionary processes, leaders with an exceptional capacity to understanding structures of domination and the road to liberation, and with a gift for the art of politics.  In the case of Cuba, these charismatic leaders have included José Martí, Julio Antonio Mella, Rubén Martínez Villena, Anontio Guiteras and Fidel Castro.

     (3)  Whereas classical Marxism emphasized the role of the proletariat in the vanguard of socialist revolutions, careful observation reveals that revolutionary leaders emerge principally from the radical wing of the petit bourgeoisie.  Moreover, popular organizations central to mass action and movement include not only workers’ organizations but also those of students, women, and peasants.  The socialist revolution is not exactly a workers’ revolution, but more precisely, a popular revolution.

      (4) Cuba was the first US experience in neocolonial domination.  The Cuban Republic of 1902 to 1959 was the model for US neocolonial domination on a world-scale following 1946.  When neocolonial domination is functioning well, direct military intervention is not necessary.  However, with the relative decline of the United States since 1968 and the re-emergence of Third World movements since 1995, the United States has had to increasing turn to neofascist military interventions.  Neocolonialism is eroding, and the neocolonial world-system confronts a profound crisis that it cannot resolve.  But an alternative world-system, more just and democratic, is emerging in the Third World.

      (5)  Third World revolutions are integral and comprehensive.  Their charismatic leaders appropriate from different social and historical contexts, including the bourgeois and proletarian revolutions of the West.  They have a tendency to incorporate new insights as they emerge, such as the principle of gender equality and the need to respect nature.  Third World revolutions have accomplished the integration of issues of race, ethnicity, class, gender and ecology; and they have done so on a foundation of both theory and practice.

     (6) Third World revolutions have expanded and deepened the meaning of democracy.  For the Third World, political democracy is popular, and not merely representative.  And democracy includes social and economic rights as well as the rights of nations to sovereignty and development.  Western “democratic” governments accuse Third World revolutionary governments of being undemocratic and violating human rights, basing the claims on the fact that they have developed alternative structures.  But this is mere demagogy, designed to confuse the peoples of the North, and to some extent, the South.

     (7) Third World revolutions today have reached their most advanced stage.  They are constructing an alternative world-system is theory and practice precisely at an historic moment in which the world-system is experiencing terminal structural crisis and is spiraling toward chaos.  Therefore, Cuba and the Third World revolution is showing humanity the way.  We intellectuals and activists of the North have much to learn from Cuba, Latin America and the Third World.  

       This category of Cuban History also includes two more recent posts.  (1)  The first of two posts occasioned by the proclamation by Raul Castro of the new Cuban Constitution at an Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly on April 10, 2019.  The post reflects on the influence of the historic Cuban struggle for national liberation and social transformation on the remarkable generation that led the Cuban Revolution for six decades.  (2)  A post on the Cuban “Special Period” of the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc.  It was published on August 1, 2016, as part of a series of posts on the Third World project (found in the category Third World).  These two more recent posts appear first, followed by the fifty posts of June 12 to September 29, 2014, which are in chronological order.


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

​      The generation that led the revolutionary triumph in Cuba on January 1, 1959 were the heirs to a historic revolutionary struggle for national independence and social transformation, initiated in 1868, which had formulated an advanced political thought on the basis of a synthesis of concepts emerging from the Cuban struggle for national liberation with revolutionary theories from Western Europe, Russia, and Latin America.  They forged an anti-neocolonial revolution that was led by the radical wing of the petit bourgeoisie and by an exceptional leader.  They have demonstrated a remarkable political intelligence, marked by an intimate knowledge and respect for the people, and a capacity to adopt strategies that are adjusted to changing and challenging conditions (see “The social sources of revolutionary leadership” 4/22/2019).
 
     During their six decades in power, they have been attentive to the question of the transition of leadership in two senses: transition from individual charismatic leadership to leadership by a vanguard political party; and the passing of leadership to subsequent generations.  The transition of leadership in both senses is to considerable extent complete.  The State and the Party have been developed as separate institutions with complementary roles.  The highest positions in the State are elected by the people in a system of direct and indirect elections; whereas Party membership is self-selected, with leaders elected by members.  The State and principle social institutions are in the hands of leaders born after the triumph of the Revolution.  The Party remains in the hands of the generation of the Revolution at the highest level, with subsequent generations holding various positions of authority at various levels. 
 
     In recent years, the Party has dedicated itself to the development of the new Constitution, with the intention of building a solid statutory foundation for the policies and social changes of the past thirty years, which also would provide a constitutional guide for the future.  Based on 150 years of struggle and on the revolutionary practice and theoretical development of the last six decades, the new Constitution can be seen as the final will and testament of the generation of the Revolution.
 
     The new Cuban constitution was proclaimed by Raúl Castro on April 10, 2019, at the Second Extraordinary Session of the Ninth Legislature of the National Assembly of Popular Power.
Miguel Díaz-Canel, since his election as President of the Council of State and Ministers by the National Assembly of Popular Power on April 19, 2018, as been more visible than Raúl at affairs of state and public events.  However, Raúl, General Secretary of the Communist Party, was assigned the duty of proclaiming the new constitution, inasmuch as the Party has been the guiding force behind the new constitution.
 
       Cuban revolutionary leaders have created a custom in which political leaders, mass organization leaders, journalists, professionals, and public figures provide pedagogical public discourses, constantly striving to educate the people in historical and social consciousness.  In accordance with this custom, Raúl pointed out that the new Constitution is rooted in past Cuban constitutions, and especially important were the constitutions of 1869, 1940, and 1975.  The Constitution of the Republic in Arms of April 10, 1869, he explained, proclaimed the independence of Cuba from Spain and the objective of unity on a basis of recognition of the equality of all.  During the neocolonial republic, the Constitution of 1940 emerged in the context of an opening established by the international situation of a world struggle against fascism, which enabled the active participation in the Constitutional Assembly of delegates with progressive ideas, including the participation of the first Communist Party of Cuba.  The result was a constitution advanced for its time, which included the proclamation of social and economic rights; the rejection of discrimination for reasons of race, color, or sex; a limit of the working day to eight hours; and the prohibition of large-scale agricultural estates.  He noted that many of these postulates were not implemented, because the necessary complementary laws were not implemented.
 
      He stressed that the Republic of 1902-1958 was a U.S. neocolony, with Cuban sovereignty subordinated to the interests of the USA.  U.S. imperialist intervention in 1898, he observed, robbed victory from the victorious military campaign of the Army of Liberation, preventing a true independence that would have established a progressive and democratic republic.  The progressive Constitution of 1940, never implemented, was nullified by the Batista coup d’état of March 10, 1952.
 
      Raúl noted that on February 7, 1959, the Revolutionary Government promulgated the Fundamental Law, which was based on the Constitution of 1940.  However, the Revolutionary Government modified the 1940 Constitution by establishing its Council of Ministers as the highest legislative and executive body, and with authority to interpret the constitution.  Raul observed that it could not have been done in any other way.  It was a choice between, on the one hand, interrupting the revolutionary process in order to concentrate on the making of a new constitution; or on the other hand, proceeding forward in accordance with what was already decided by the leadership with the overwhelming support of the people.
 
     In retrospect, we can see the wisdom of the course of action taken by the Revolutionary Government in 1959.  If a constitutional assembly had been convened, many issues would have been debated, but the participants would not have had the experiential basis for their ideas.  The revolution was just beginning, as Fidel had proclaimed on January 1.  Many experiences lay ahead:  the Agrarian Reform Law, and the hostile reaction to it on the part of the U.S. government and the Cuban national bourgeoisie; the nationalizations of U.S. property; the sabotage of production by the Cuban industrial bourgeoisie, and its increasing participation in the counterrevolution; the nationalizations of Cuban large-scale industrial, commercial, and banking enterprises; the organization of mass assemblies, an alternative to the structures of representative democracy; the development of mass organizations, which came to be seen as integral to an alternative concept of popular democracy;  and the proclamation of the socialist character of the revolution on the eve of an invasion by Cuban counterrevolutionaries financed and supplied by the U.S. government.  All of these experiences of the leadership and the people in forging ahead with the revolutionary process became the basis for reflection on an alternative constitutionality, in which the issues could be debated with greater maturity, established through experience.  It was a question of revolutionary practice first, which provided the foundation for an alternative theory and revolutionary constitutionality. 
 
      Raúl observed that in 1975, in his report to the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, Fidel proclaimed the need to develop a socialist constitution, which reflects the consciousness, convictions, and the social-economic-political transformations of the revolutionary process.  The result was the Constitution of 1976, developed with an ample popular consultation and approved overwhelmingly in popular referendum, which reaffirmed the socialist character of the Revolution; provided a constitutional foundation of the rights that had been attained through the revolutionary process; and established an alternative system of popular democracy, based on the experiences of the mass assemblies and mass organizations.
 
       Raúl further explained that developments in recent years in Cuba made necessary a new Constitution, and especially important were new economic policies developed in response to the need to improve production.  In 2011, the Sixth Congress of the Party approved Guidelines for the Social and Economic Policy of the Party and the Revolution.  The Party led the people in a popular consultation, and presented the modified guidelines to the National Assembly, which approved them.  The Seventh Congress of the Party in 2016 developed documents for a Cuban Social and Economic Model of Socialist Development.  Recognizing the constitutional implications of the Guidelines and the Model, the Party expressed the need for the development of a new constitution. 
 
      On June 2, 2018, the National Assembly approved the establishment of a Constitutional Commission composed 33 deputies of the National Assembly, naming Raúl as chair of the Commission.  On July 22, after various sessions of debate, the National Assembly approved a draft of the text for submission to the people.  From August 13 to November 15, some 133,681 meetings were held in places of residence, work, and study, in which 1,706,872 commentaries were made (all noted by members of the Constitutional Committee), and 783,174 specific proposals were made; thereby converting the entire people into a constitutional assembly.  On the basis of analysis of the popular consultation, the Commission modified nearly 60% of the articles of the first draft.  Following an analysis, debate, and further revision of the text, the National Assembly approved a draft for popular referendum.  On February 24, some 90.15% of resident citizens voted in the referendum, of which 86.85% voted Yes, 9% voted No, and 4.15% submitted invalid ballots.  (For further description of the constitutional process in Cuba, see various posts from January 9, 2019 to February 26, 2019 in this category Cuba Today).
 
      Raúl maintained that the new Constitution assures the continuity of the Cuban Revolution and the irrevocability of socialism.  It expresses the aspirations of those who have struggled for 150 years for a sovereign Cuba, characterized by social justice.  At the same time, it reflects the new historic circumstances of the Revolution, and it reflects the current aspirations of the people to attain a socialism that is increasingly prosperous, sustainable, inclusive, and participatory.  He asserts that as the USA renews its old desire to overthrow the Cuban Revolution through the suffocating of the economy and the creation of shortages, the U.S. administration should understand the unshakable determination of Cuba to defend its sovereign right to decide the future of the nation, without any foreign interference.
 
      The generation of the Revolution, a product of a historic struggle, has fulfilled its duty, to the nation, to the people, to humanity, and to the future.

     The generation of leaders that took political power in Cuba on January 1, 1959 were known as the centenarians, because of their determination to take political action in 1953, the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of José Martí, in order to show that the ideas of the apostle remained alive, in spite of the corruption of the neocolonial republic and the Batista dictatorship.  The July 26, 1953 armed attack on Moncada Barracks galvanized the people, and it gave the authors of that heroic action the right to claim leadership of a popular struggle against the dictatorship and the established neocolonial order.  Unable to forget the maneuverings and intrigues that had blocked revolutionary triumphs in three moments in Cuban history, they possessed a singular determination that, this time, the revolution will not be frustrated.
 
     They took power on January 1, 1959 amidst enormous popular acclaim, on the basis of a guerrilla struggle that moved from the mountains to the cities, forcing the dictator to flee the country.  In their first two years in power, the young leaders of the revolution took decisive steps that would demonstrate its anti-neocolonial intention, culminating in a declaration of its socialist character.  For more than six decades, they guided the people through various stages, but with constancy in commitment to basic principles: the commitment of resources to the social and economic needs of the people on a basis of full equality, regardless of class, race, or gender; and an international projection of commercial relations, political alliance, and solidarity with the socialist governments and neocolonized nations and peoples.  In order to ensure that political power remained in the hands of the delegates of the people, they developed alternative structures of popular democracy, characterized by mass assemblies, mass organizations, assemblies of popular power, a vanguard political party, and a public media attentive to the political education of the people. 
 
     There are many subjective and objective factors that create possibilities for an advanced generation of leaders to emerge in a particular time and place.  In observing advanced and sustained revolutionary processes, a common characteristic is the phenomenon of a generalized popular identification with the nation and a self-sacrificing commitment to its defense.  In the case of Cuba, nationalist consciousness emerged during the nineteenth century, forged by Cuban intellectuals of the Seminary of San Carlos in Havana.  They synthesized religious concepts of social justice with modern republican notions in standing against colonial Spain and the Spanish monarchy.  They initiated an awakening of consciousness among the Cuban privileged class that represented an alternative to subordination to Spain and envisioned a secular and progressive republic, with modern systems of production, moving beyond economic dependence on slavery.  Formed by these progressive notions, the Cuban landholders that declared independence in 1868 were able to discern the necessity of forging not only the independence of the nation, but also a national social transformation that would eliminate the social inequalities rooted in colonialism.  However, as a result of class, regional, civilian/military, and ideological differences and divisions, the war of independence of 1868-1878 ended without attaining independence or the abolition of slavery. 
 
       The vision of the 1868 revolution of a sovereign and socially transformed nation has guided Cuban revolutionary practice since that date, but continually evolving.  Reflecting on the failure of the War of Independence of 1868-1878, José Martí was able to see the importance of politically unifying all the popular sectors, on the basis of a promise to establish a republic of all and for all, regardless of race or class, and implicitly, gender.  The outstanding writer, poet, journalist, and diplomat politically implemented his vision, forming in 1892 the Cuban Revolutionary Party, which launched a war of independence in 1895.  However, the 1898 U.S. military intervention prevented the taking of power by the militarily victorious Cuban Army of Liberation.  The revolutionary army, party, and congress were dismantled, and the 1901 constitution had a “Made in the USA” character.  The republic of all and for all, as envisioned by Martí, was eclipsed by the neocolonial republic, and U.S. economic, commercial, and financial penetration was unleashed. 
 
      Twenty years later, reflecting on the neocolonial situation, and influenced by the examples of the Russian and Mexican revolutions, a new generation of revolutionaries emerged to struggle against the Machado dictatorship of the 1920s and early 1930s, synthesizing revolutionary currents of thought from other lands with the thought of Martí, and making more explicit the inclusion of women in the revolutionary process.  Sustained popular protests against the Machado dictatorship combined with urban sabotage and armed struggle in the countryside brought down the Machado government and led to the formation in 1933 of the “government of 100 days,” which included a revolutionary wing and was established without U.S. approval.  However, the short-lived independent government was brought to an end by U.S. mediation, leading to the first Batista dictatorship of 1934-1937.
 
     In the twenty years following the fall of the Revolution of 1933, disillusionment and fatalism prevailed among the people, but the soul of the nation hope was kept alive by intellectuals, social scientists, poets, and artists, who studied Cuban culture and the multifaceted work of Martí, and who reminded the people of the revolutionary ideal that was central to the Cuban sense of nationality.  The revolutionaries who came of age in the 1950s were made of the stuff that inclined them toward the dreams of the poets, rather than the seemingly more practical conclusion that the republic of Martí was impossible.  Martí himself had said that the task was to make possible what appeared impossible.  To the radical Cuban youth of the 1950s, the republic of Martí did not seem so impractical.  They were aware of the enormous reserve of revolutionary spirit among the people, who were the heirs to an advanced political thought and a history of political/military resistance.  They discerned the possibility of galvanizing the popular revolutionary spirit through decisive, bold, and courageous action, calling the people to the defense of national honor and dignity.  Theirs was an idealism guided by an intimate knowledge of the people and a practical political intelligence. 
 
      The neocolonial situation is defined by a pattern of betrayal of the nation through subordination to the interests of a foreign neocolonial power, and in this national debasement of the soul, the national bourgeoisie and the dominant political class are the most culpable.  Political leaders and government officials become habituated to using their positions to enrich themselves, having abandoned a dignified and purposeful road at the outset of their careers.  In Cuba in the 1950s, the indignity of the neocolonial situation never had been more evident.  Corrupt politicians invoked the ideals of Martí, thus corrupting the revolutionary vision itself.  To this national pattern of corruption, the Batista dictatorship added the disgrace of political repression, torture, and brutality.  And the visible presence of the Italian-American mafia, with its gambling and prostitution, compounded the national shame.
 
      In popular revolutions, the middle class is disproportionately represented in the revolution as well as in the counterrevolution that it unleashes.  Therefore, the possibilities for revolution are influenced by the conditions that the middle class confronts.  In the case of Cuba, the neocolonial situation, with political control by a figurehead bourgeoisie, created conditions unfavorable for the middle class.  As a result of the subordination of Cuban industry and commerce to U.S. capital, middle-class aspirations for advancement required an undignified accommodation to a foreign nation and culture.  As a result of generalized corruption, small business persons were overburdened with debt and harassed by corrupt government officials.  Reflecting the disconnection of education from economic development, young people with professional degrees found their opportunities for employment limited. 
 
      Accordingly, university students took a central role in the leadership of the revitalized revolution in the 1950s.  University students had the privileged opportunity to reflect on the conditions of the neocolonial republic; and those informed by the Cuban tradition of revolutionary and political thought could envision the republic of Martí.  The most politically astute among them could discern that, on the basis of a platform that would seek to address the desperate economic and social conditions of the countryside, an effective political-military alliance could be forged with the great mass of tenant farmers and agricultural workers.  This radicalized sector of the petit bourgeoisie played a central leadership role in the revolutionary process, and it is impossible to imagine the triumph of the revolution without them.
 
     It is equally impossible to imagine the triumph and persistence of the Cuban Revolution without the presence of Fidel.  To understand the successes of the revolution, we have to appreciate the exceptional capacity of Fidel to understand the correct course of action in pivotal moments: the creation of an anti-Batista coalition that included reformist sectors in 1958; the inclusion of representatives of the national bourgeoisie in the initial revolutionary government, creating the possibility for the inclusion of an independent national bourgeoisie in the revolutionary project; the necessity for the nationalization of U.S. properties in Cuba in order to break the core-peripheral neocolonial relation with the USA; the breaking with the national bourgeoisie through the nationalization of Cuban big industry, once the Cuban figurehead bourgeoisie demonstrated its incapacity to remake itself as an independent national bourgeoisie, not tutored by U.S. capital; the development of alternatives to representative democracy in the form of structures of popular democracy, including mass assemblies, a vanguard political party, mass organizations, and popular power; the seeking of Third World unity in working toward the establishment of a New International Economic Order, providing exceptional analyses of the contradictions of the unsustainable capitalist world-economy; the making of the necessary adjustments of the Special Period, redefining the revolutionary road in the context of new conditions; and at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the participation of Cuba in the process of Latin American unity and integration.   However, as the history of Cuban revolutionary movement makes evident, Fidel was not nurtured in a political vacuum; he was formed in a historical and social context shaped by revolutionary thought and political praxis.
 
      The emergence of charismatic leaders is a general pattern in revolutionary processes.  One cannot imagine the Haitian Revolution without Toussaint, the Russian Revolution without Lenin, the Chinese Revolution without Mao, the Vietnamese Revolution without Ho Chi Minh, and the Bolivarian Revolution with Chávez.  The emergence of charismatic leaders is indispensable in revolutionary processes, not only because their exceptional capacity to understand is itself an important resource for the revolution, but also because the leaders and the people discern these exceptional gifts, thus empowering the charismatic leader with the capacity to unify the various and sometimes contradictory tendencies within the revolutionary process.  At the same time, we also should appreciate that charismatic leadership emerged in a social and historic context, and it is formed and shaped by this context, as the case of Cuba makes evident.  In general, charismatic leaders have the capacity to lead the revolutionary process to a move advanced stage, even as they affirm and identify with the previous revolutionary achievements.
 
     The Cuban Revolution is presently in a process of transition from charismatic individual leadership to vanguard party leadership.  For more than five decades, Raúl Castro served as a second-in-command to the charismatic leader, substituting for Fidel when, for one reason or another, Fidel could not be present.  Raúl has assumed this substitute role on a relatively permanent basis in 2009, when Fidel step down as head of state for reasons of health.  In 2018, a further step in the transition was taken, when Miguel Díaz-Canel was elected President of the Council of State and Ministers by the National Assembly of Popular Power, while Raúl continues as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba.  Since his election, Díaz-Canel has been the more visible of the two, as he carries out his duties as head of state. 
 
     As the transition proceeds, many of the generation of the revolution continue to be present, fulfilling various duties in the state, the party, or various institutions.  Among the tasks that they have assigned themselves in recent years has been the development of a new constitution, so that the people and the nation will have a guide for the future.  It is their final will and testament, as we will discuss further in the next post.

​     Some believe that the cycle of Leftist governments in Latin America, evident during the last twenty years, has come to an end.  They point to the 2014 parliamentary victory of the opposition in Venezuela, and the current conflicts and problems in that country; the victory of Macri in Argentina; the inability of the Alliance Party to maintain the agenda of Correa in Ecuador; and the fall of the Workers’ Party and the subsequent electoral victory of the ultra-Right in Brazil. 
 
    Those who believe that the Leftist cycles has come to an end are likely to think that blog posts that I wrote in 2014 are overly optimistic, and that their excessive optimism is demonstrated by recent political developments in Latin America.  In March 2014, I wrote a series of ten posts on the process of Latin American and Caribbean unity and integration (“The dream of ​La Patria Grande” 3/4/2014; “The dream deferred” 3/5/2014; “The dream renewed” 3/6/2014; “The fall of FTAA” 3/7/2014; “The rise of ALBA” 3/11/2014; “Latin American union and integration” 3/13/2014; “The Declaration of Havana 2014” 3/14/2014; “The erosion of neocolonialism” 3/17/2014; “A change of epoch?” 3/18/2014; “Is Marx today fulfilled?” 3/20/2014, found in the category Latin American Unity).
 
     In these posts, I maintained that the process of Latin American and Caribbean union and integration is part of an effort emerging from the Third World plus China, with the cooperation of Russia, to construct an alternative, more just world-system.  In “A change of epoch?” (March 18, 2014), I wrote:

    I maintained that the alternative process is based in fundamental principles and values that have been formulated by the popular movements of the world in the last two and one-half centuries, including the bourgeois revolutions, the socialist and communist movements, the Third World movements of national liberation, the women’s movement, and the ecology movement.  The alternative process is formulating the universal human values that must be the foundation of a just, democratic, and sustainable world-system, necessary for preventing humanity from fall further into chaos, division, and confusion.
 
     A later post (“OAS: Transformed from below” June 10, 2014 in the category Latin American Unity) was stimulated by the Forty-Fourth General Assembly of OAS held in Asunción, Paraguay from June 3 to June 5, 2014.  I noted the repeated interventions by the representatives protesting the exclusion of Cuba from the Summit of the Americas; and the declarations emitted by the Assembly in support of Venezuela and Argentina.  And I observed that the Paraguay Assembly reaffirmed the CELAC Declaration of Havana, proclaiming Latin America and Caribbean to be a zone of peace; and it condemned torture in secret prisons at the US base in Guantanamo.  The Paraguay Assembly reconfirmed that the OAS is no longer under the control of US interests.
 
      I would like to affirm that I continue to believe that the alternative, more just world-system is being constructed from below, and that there are many objective reasons for believing that a more just and democratic world-system has a good possibility of coming into being.  In defense of this claim, I make the following arguments.
 
     First, the road to triumph is never a straight line.  There are always setbacks and reverses, even as conditions favor the continued movement forward of the revolutionary process.  That such is the general pattern is evident upon study of the various revolutions that have triumphed in various countries of the world during the last 100 years.  The recent setbacks in the four mentioned nations had different dynamics in each case; they do not reflect a general pattern, other than that interested sectors will resist change.  In Venezuela, the prominence of the Right in the import trade sector enabled it to block the importation of goods, blaming the government for the shortage; and the United States is waging unconventional war.  In Argentina, Macri made vague promises of change, taking advantage a normal pattern of some degree of popular dissatisfaction following four terms of Kirchner governments.  In Ecuador, a Trojan Horse captured the Alliance Party nomination.  And in Brazil, the coalition of the Workers’ Party fell apart, enabling false charges of corruption against Workers’ Party leaders, provoking the rise of the ultra-Right.
 
     Secondly, there are not cycles in history, but more precisely, cyclical rhythms.  When we experience setback, we do not go back to where we were.  In the Latin American struggle against imperialism and for its sovereignty, for example, the recent setbacks in the four mentioned nations have regional manifestations.  A group of Latin American nations, the “Group of Lima,” joined the United States in recent efforts to adopt actions against Venezuela.  Clearly, this represents a reversal from the political situation of 2014, when the voice of Latin American independence was unchallenged in the General Assembly of OAS.  However, in the recent Extraordinary Session of the OAS, the forces of reaction could not obtain a majority.  So, if 2018 is not 2014, neither is it 1954, when OAS declared communism illegitimate in Latin America; nor 1962, when Cuba was expelled from OAS; nor 1992, when a new anti-Cuban resolution was adopted.  In 2018, the United States could not obtain backing for a declaration against the “evil nation” of the moment, a nation that, like Cuba, is sanctioned for its audacity to insist, in word and in deed, on its right to an autonomous road, seeking to break from neocolonial structures.
 
      Thirdly, we have to look at things in the long term.  Clearly, in the short term, especially at this moment in which the government of the United States is under partial control of ultra-Right elements, the United States is capable of doing much damage in Latin America.  However, we have to keep in mind that none of the sectors of the U.S. power elite, from liberal to Right to ultra-Right, have the capacity to formulate solutions to the relative economic decline of the nation or the sustained structural crisis of the world-system.  They can only create more problems.  They could, of course, lead humanity to chaos, but they also are making their incapacity more and more evident, thus granting increasing legitimacy to the alternative theory and practice emerging from below.
 
       Fourthly, what is likely to happen from here?  The US-directed Latin American Right is incapable of forging a program that could project it to a consolidated position of power, on the basis of consensual popular support.  It does not have an effective political response to the post-1995 popular revolution.  Its intention is to restore the hegemony of US capital and the dominance of those national sectors tied to it; it wants to return to neoliberal recipes.  This is evident in the policies adopted by the governments of Brazil and Argentina, under the restored Right.  They enacted an unannounced return to neoliberalism, and their measures provoked popular protest.  The problem with these governments is that want to enact a program that the people already have rejected, and that the people have arrived to sufficient political maturity to know to reject.  If the forces of reaction cannot be more politically creative, they will not be able to sustain themselves in power, which would require the formulation of some kind of post-neoliberal and post-socialist political program that would have popular support.  I do not know what such a program would look like, and apparently, neither do they.  It indeed may be beyond human capacities for creativity to conceptualize a such a program, taking into account that the road being forged by the socialist/progressive governments was the necessary response to neoliberalism, when analyzed from the vantage point of the needs of the people and the sovereignty of the nation.
 
     Fifthly, the affirmation of the good possibility of a sustainable future for humanity is a moral duty.  One of the principal teachings of Fidel is that the revolutionary must never surrender to despair, and most continually affirm the possibility of a world that is founded in universal human values.  “No one has the right,” he repeatedly declared, “to lose faith in the future of humanity.”  Sometimes, when Leftist academics say, “I wish that a better, more just world were possible, but unfortunately it is not possible,” they are reflecting not so much an objective analysis of the situation, but their own adaptation to unjust structures, which has become a bad habit during the course of their careers.  Not believing in the future of humanity is a convenient form of making peace with the established unjust world order.
 
      For further reflection on these themes, see “Venezuela and world-systemic tendencies” (3/8/2016) in the category Venezuela.