​     We have seen in recent posts that Cuba has been developing a new Constitution, with the active participation of the people, the National Assembly, and the Party.  See “Constitutional Democracy in Cuba” 1/9/2019; “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019; “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019; “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019; “The Cuban National Assembly debates” 1/24/2018; “The new Cuban Constitution: Continuity” 1/28/2019; “A more inclusive Cuban Revolution” 2/1/2019; “A more pragmatic Cuban Revolution” 2/7/2019; and “Cuba seeks greater state efficiency” 2/11/2019.
 
      On February 24, 2019, the Cuban people, in a direct and secret vote by each citizen, approved the new Constitution that they have been constructing.  Some 84.4% of resident citizens voted, with 86.8% voting “Yes,” 9% voting “No,” 2.5% blank ballots, and 1.6% annulled. 
 
     The Preamble to the Cuban Constitution of 2019 states:

The Constitution proceeds to affirm the civil, political, social, and economic rights of all, regardless of race, color, sex, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, religious belief, or disability.  It reconfirms that structures of popular democracy that have been evolving since the early 1960s, including the role of the Communist Party as the vanguard party that guides and educates the people.  It affirms the right of all nations to sovereignty and self-determination, in resistance to the imperialist policies of the global powers.  It defines the role of the state as the author of a development plan and as director and regulator in the economy, necessary for the protection of the rights of the citizens and the nation.  It confirms the duty of the nation to protect the natural environment.  It maintains that Cuba is and will be socialist.
 
      As we observe the fragmentation, division, and confusion that reigns in many representative democracies of the world, it is difficult to imagine that many of them would be capable of coming close to Cuba in forging a popular consensus with respect to the history of the nation, the concepts and values that ought to guide its development, and its political-economic structures.  The problem with the representative democracies, born from the bourgeois revolutions of the last decades of the eighteenth century, is that they pretend to give power to the people, but in reality, power is in the hands of the elite and its representatives; they have the appearance of democracy, but not the substance.  As a result, the popular revolutions of the twentieth century have assumed the duty of forging the political and economic processes that would give power to the people and establish their social emancipation.  The fruits of that labor are beginning to appear, such that, in the first decades of the twenty-first century, the advantages of popular democracy, with its structures of popular power, its mass organizations, and its vanguard party that is of the people and that educates the people, has become a self-evident truth.

  December 18, 2015 (Revised February 25, 2019)
 
      During the 1990s, I began a process of encounter with the Cuban revolutionary project, living among the people, listening to the commentaries of Cuban journalists on television, reading the works of Cuban academics and intellectuals, and reading the speeches and writings of Fidel Castro.  I soon came to learn that Fidel is a man of exceptional qualities, possessing a high level of understanding of the structures of colonial and neocolonial domination and of the strategies that are necessary for national liberation.  And I came to appreciate that he has a high level of commitment to the Cuban nation and people.  Fidel is loved by the Cuban people, who appreciate his exceptional qualities.
 
      As a pre-university student, Fidel was formed in the tradition of the Cuban struggle for national liberation.  He was a great admirer of the Cuban nineteenth century nationalist José Martí, as were many Cuban youth, and he read all of the books that had been written on the two Cuban wars of independence.  During his third year at the University of Havana, he began to read the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, using the library of the communist party.  He appropriated their concepts from the vantage point of the Cuban situation, thus forging a creative synthesis of the Cuban struggle for national liberation with Marxism-Leninism.  In accordance with this creative adaptation, he conceived a revolution of the people rather than a proletarian revolution. 
 
      Fidel possessed an instinctive exceptional capacity for the art of politics.  He grasped that the bold attack on the Moncada Barracks of July 26, 1956 was the kind of action that was needed to galvanize the people.  In calling the people to revolution, he understood the necessity of making declarations that take into account the perceptions and values of the people.  He realized that the Cuban people of the 1950s were rebellious, but they had not yet developed revolutionary consciousness; so it was necessary to focus on concrete problems.  In addition, during the revolutionary war and after its triumph, he discerned the need for the unity of the diverse revolutionary forces, and he possessed the capacity to forge it.  During his many years as the Cuban chief of state, he also demonstrated an exceptional understanding of global dynamics, and he became an important voice defending a radical Third World agenda in the international arena.  In the 1980s, in a series of speeches on the causes and the consequences of the Third World debt, he showed a greater understanding of the world-economy than the great majority of economists.
 
      Fidel also has possessed a remarkable faith in the ultimate triumph of the socialist revolution.  It is a faith that is rooted in the conviction of the justice of the socialist cause, and it is inspired by the examples of the great revolutionaries in human history.  In contrast to the skepticism of the intellectual who can see only the objective conditions and the subjective correlation of forces, Fidel’s revolutionary faith sees the possibility of changing these conditions and forces, through analysis that discerns hidden possibilities within the existing conditions and forces.
 
       The phenomenon of the charismatic gifts of Fidel brings to mind the concept of charismatic authority, formulated in the early twentieth century by the German sociologist Max Weber.  For Weber, persons can possess authority, defined as the capacity to influence others, because of an office that they hold in a bureaucratic structure, such as the president of a country; or a position that they hold in a traditional system, such as a king.  But there are others who hold no office, yet they possess authority because of their exceptional gifts.  Often they are innovators who reform tradition.
 
     In addition to encountering the Cuban revolutionary project, I also have been reading of revolutions in other lands.  I found that other revolutions possessed charismatic leaders, not merely persons who led the revolutions, but persons with exceptional gifts, whose leadership was a necessary and decisive factor in the gains of the revolution.  As a result of this study of various revolutions, I have come to the conclusion that the emergence of charismatic leaders is a general characteristic of revolutionary processes.
 
     In Haiti, Toussaint L’Ouverture was a military genius who also mastered the art of politics, gifts that enabled him to command a black army and control nearly all of the territory.  As a result, he was recognized as Governor of the French colony of San Domingo, as it was then known.  As Governor, he maintained the sugar plantations, converting the slaves into free wage workers.  He stabilized the economy and enjoyed support among blacks, whites and mulattos.  He correctly understood that, as a result of the legacy of slavery, the development of the nation needed French support and cooperation, on the basis of Jacobin principles.  But this vision was not realized.  The Jacobins lost power in France, and the revolution in San Domingo that had been led by Toussaint was brought to an end by the invasion of Napoleon.  Toussaint was arrested, and he died in prison shortly afterward.  Napoleon tried to restore slavery in San Domingo, without success, due to the revolutionary resistance of the people.  An independent nation of Haiti, without slavery, was declared.  But independent Haiti was not the Haiti that Toussaint envisioned.  It went in a different direction: ties with France were severed, whites were massacred, and the plantations were divided into subsistence plots.  It endured isolation and poverty for decades, a legacy from which it still suffers.
 
      In the Mexican Revolution, a charismatic leader capable of unifying the revolution on the basis of a national plan that united the forces of peasants, workers, and the petit bourgeoisie did not emerge.  Zapata and Villa possessed charismatic gifts, but their vision was limited to the perspective of the peasant and the countryside, and not the nation as a whole.  Ricardo Flores Magón was able to envision the necessary national plan, but he did not master the art of politics.  The Mexican Revolution triumphed not as a popular revolution but as a revolution by a rising petit bourgeoisie, based in the military.
 
      In the case of the Russian Revolution of 1917, Lenin adapted Marxism to the conditions of Russia, discerning that the unfolding revolution was not precisely a proletarian revolution, but a peasant and proletarian revolution, led by a proletarian vanguard.  Appreciating the need for the support of the peasantry, Lenin put forth a slogan for the distribution of land to peasants.  In addition, Lenin discerned the importance of the soviets (workers,’ peasants’ and soldiers’ councils), as the expression of an advanced form of democracy and as an indication that the Russian Revolution represented a transition to socialism.
 
     Lenin understood that the consolidation and development of the Russian Revolution would require the triumph of the proletarian revolution in Western Europe, in order that Western European governments would provide necessary technical support, inasmuch as Russia was relatively underdeveloped.  The failure of the proletarian revolution in Western Europe doomed the Russian Revolution.  Instead of support from the West, it was victimized by Western military invasion and support for counterrevolutionary opposition sectors.  With the death of Lenin, the Russian Revolution fell to a petit bourgeois bureaucratic class, so that it was no longer a peasant-worker revolution.  Subsequently, the bureaucratic class ruled with repression under Stalin.
 
     Lenin possessed an exceptional understanding of global dynamics.  He discerned that with the failure of the proletariat revolution in the Western Europe, the vanguard of the revolution would move to the East, that is, to the colonized and oppressed peoples of the world. 
 
     The Haitian, Mexican and Russian revolutions inspired the world.  But none of them ultimately triumphed as revolutions of the people guided by charismatic leadership.  In contrast, popular revolutions in the colonized and peripheralized regions of the Third World would triumph and would sustain themselves, thus placing themselves in the vanguard of the global socialist revolution, as Lenin had anticipated.  During the twentieth century, the two most important expressions of this were the revolutions led by Fidel Castro and Ho Chi Minh.
 
     Ho Chi Minh adapted Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of Vietnam.  He forged in practice a synthesis of Marxism-Leninism and the political-intellectual tradition of Vietnamese nationalism, which had been developed by Confucian scholars, and in which he had been formed as a young man.  He understood that national liberation of the colonized peoples could not be attained without socialism, and that socialism in the West could not be attained without the liberation of the colonized peoples.  He thus saw the dual character of the revolution as both a social and class revolution and an anti-colonial revolution of national liberation.  He discerned the revolutionary spontaneity of the peasant, setting aside the distrust of the peasantry that had been a strong component of the tradition of Marxism-Leninism.  Moreover, he mastered the art of politics, knowing when to implement revolutionary measures.  These exceptional qualities enabled him to lead the Vietnamese people through two long wars against French colonialism and US imperialism, ultimately leading to the establishment of an independent nation that to this day follows an autonomous socialist path to economic, political and cultural development.
 
      During the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, in reaction to the imposition of the neoliberal project by the global powers, popular movements in Latin America assumed the vanguard in the global socialist movement.  Charismatic leaders emerged, calling the people in various nations to autonomous national projects that sought definitive independence from the neocolonial powers, and discerning the objective possibilities for Latin American and Caribbean unity and integration.  Especially important in the new Latin America have been Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Rafael Correa of Ecuador.
 
      There are charismatic leaders who directed movements that could not take and consolidate power, such as Simon Bolívar and José Martí, the two giants of the nineteenth century Latin American struggles for independence; and Julio Antonio Mella and Antonio Guiteras, leaders of the Cuban popular movement in the 1920s and early 1930s.  There are, in addition, charismatic leaders who led movements that took power for a relatively short period of time, such as Salvador Allende in Chile.  And there are charismatic leaders whose charisma is a consequence of a connection with a charismatic leader, as is the case with Raúl Castro in Cuba and Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela.  All of these leaders have had exceptional capacities to understand and to formulate courses of action, qualities that have been discerned by the people, who have lifted them up, thus providing them with political and teaching authority.
 
      The lack of understanding in the North of the necessary role of charismatic leaders in revolutionary processes leads us to misinterpretations.  We tend to think that the long-term presence of a single leader is a result of a move of the leader toward authoritarian control, thus confirming that “power corrupts.”  And we tend to think that the people support the authoritarian leader, because they have limited education, and because they are manipulated and/or fearful.  With this false assumption, we cannot see that the charismatic leader is an indispensable resource in the ongoing struggle against the global powers.  And we are not aware that the most educated and informed of the people are among the most fervent supporters of the charismatic leader, on the basis of their understanding of the essential role of the charismatic leader in sustaining a revolutionary process under continuous attack by powerful enemies.  When people in the North, in the name of democracy, call upon Third World governments to establish “term limits,” they are proposing a structure that is alien to revolutionary processes.  In order for revolutionary processes to sustain themselves, the continuing wisdom and unifying presence of the charismatic leader is indispensable.  When we propose “term limits,” we are suggesting to the poor and the colonized that they not use their most powerful weapon, as they struggle to survive the onslaught of hostile actions by the global powers.
 
      In the case of Cuba and Fidel, the charismatic authority of Fidel has been institutionalized in two ways.  First, when Fidel was named Prime Minister in the Revolutionary Government on February 13, 1959, his political authority was converted from charismatic to legal authority.  Subsequently, the Cuban Constitution of 1976 established structures of Popular Power, which include popular election of the National Assembly to five-year terms, which elects the Council of State and Ministers, including the President of the Council of State.  This represented a reorganization of the structures of legal authority.  Fidel was President of the Council of State through 2008, when he stepped down for reasons of health.  This office is currently held by Raúl Castro, who also possesses charismatic authority.  When Raúl no longer holds the office, others will be elected to five-year terms.  The long-term institutionalization of charismatic authority could involve the election of persons to the office of President of the Council of State who possess charismatic authority, exceptional gifts to analyze and explain, discerned by the people.  Such charismatic leaders would be among the people, because they are called forth by revolutionary process.  Our charismatic leaders are gifts from God, in that they are born with exceptional qualities.  But the revolutionary process nourishes them, and calls them to fulfillment of their potential and their duty.
 
     Secondly, the teaching authority of Fidel has been institutionalized through the creation of the Cuban Communist Party.  The charismatic authority of Fidel, in addition to political authority, included teaching authority, and in fulfillment of this function, Fidel in his speeches was constantly educating the people.  The Party, which consists of approximately 15% of the people, plays the role of forming the consciousness of the people and developing the political culture of the nation, rooted in the teachings of Fidel.  The transferring of Fidel’s teaching authority to the Party has been a slow process, because every time that Fidel spoke with insight, the authority to teach stayed with him, rather than being transferred to the Party.  But since his retirement in 2008, the process of institutionalization has accelerated.  The new social and economic model submitted to the National Assembly in 2012 was initiated by the Party, which led a mass popular consultation; Fidel played a minor, although supportive, role.
 
       A number of the blog posts that I have written on revolutionary processes in various nations have discussed the phenomenon of charismatic leaders.  These posts, in addition to being categorized in particular revolutions, also have been placed in the separate category of Charismatic Leaders.
 
      The posts in the category of Charismatic Leaders are as follows:
 
“A tribute to Fidel” 08/13/2017;
           
“Nicolás Maduro” 06/07/2017;
           
“Fidel speaks on the global crisis, 1983” 07/25/2016;
“Fidel proposes new global structures, 1983” 07/27/2016;
           
“Thank you, Fidel” 08/13/2016;
           
“Hugo Chávez Frías” 08/04/2016;
“The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela” 08/05/2016;
“The Movement toward Socialism in Bolivia” 08/11/2016;
“The citizen revolution in Ecuador” 09/19/2016;
“The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua” 09/20/2016;
“Latin American and Caribbean unity” 09/21/2016;
           
“The Cuban tradition of heroism” 09/01/2014;
“Moncada: a great and heroic act” 09/02/2014;
“Fidel: ‘History will absolve me’” 09/04/2014;
“The Moncada program for the people” 09/05/2014;
“Reflections on “History will absolve me” 09/08/2014;
“Fidel adapts Marxism-Leninism to Cuba” 09/09/2014;
“Fidel’s social roots” 09/10/2014;
“Fidel becomes revolutionary at the university” 09/11/2014;
“The revolutionary faith of Fidel” 09/15/2014;
“Unifying the Cuban revolutionary process”            09/17/2014;
“The pluralism of revolutionary unity” 09/18/2014;
“The defining moment of the Cuban Revolution” 09/24/2014;
“Radicalization of the revolutionary government” 09/25/2014;
           
“On the charismatic leader” 04/30/2014;
“Ho’s practical theoretical synthesis” 05/09/2014;
           
“The dream renewed” 03/06/2014;
“Is Marx today fulfilled?” 03/20/2014;
           
“Zapata” 02/06/2014;
“Lessons of the Mexican Revolution” 02/19/2014;
           
“Reflections on the Russian Revolution” 01/29/2014;
           
“Toussaint L’Ouverture” 12/10/2013;
“The problem of dependency” 12/11/2013;
“Toussaint seeks North-South cooperation” 12/12/2013;
“The isolation and poverty of Haiti” 12/17/2013.
 
To find the posts, scroll down.
​

​     Cuba calls upon the governments, organizations, and social movements of the world to mobilize for peace and against U.S. military intervention in Venezuela.  At a press conference on February 19, 2019, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, Minister of Foreign Relations of Cuba, declared:

​     The press conference was a response to the February 18 speech of President Trump in Florida, and it reiterated the February 13 Declaration of the Cuban Revolutionary Government that the United States is preparing a military aggression against Venezuela under the pretext of humanitarian aid (see “Cuba declares on Venezuela” 2/18/2019).
 
      In the February 19 press conference, Rodríguez noted that the United States has set a deadline for penetrating Venezuelan territory with the “humanitarian aid” by means of force.  He declared this posture to be a contradiction in terms, because aid that is truly humanitarian cannot possibly rest on violence, on the force of arms, and on the violation of international law. 
 
     Rodríguez further observed that the government of the United States has been continually pressuring members of the Security Council of the United Nations in order to force the adoption of a resolution in support of a “humanitarian intervention.”  He noted that, in the past, resolutions of this kind are prelude to the establishment of “no-fly zones” and “humanitarian corridors” in order to justify the use of force, with the pretext of protecting civilians.  “We hope,” he declared, “that the Security Council of the United Nations will be true to its vocation and its responsibility as the principal guarantor of peace and international security and will not lend service to military ventures.  We call upon its members to act with fidelity to international law and to defend peace.”
 
     Rodríguez described Trump’s speech as characterized by “extraordinary cynicism, extraordinary hypocrisy.”  Trump speaks of democracy, Rodríguez observes, but ignores the injustice and the exploitation that are the legacy of U.S. imperialism in Latin America.  He overlooks that the U.S. political system is ruled by special interests and corporate contributions, with elections that are won through the manipulation of the people.  He does not mention the millions of poor persons in the United States, the five hundred thousand homeless persons, the racially differentiated system of criminal justice, and the low level of unionization among U.S. workers.
 
      Trump proclaims that the hemisphere will be free of socialism for the first time in history.  It is not the first time that the United States has decreed the “end of socialism,” Rodríguez maintains.  Trump said in Florida that “we have seen the future of Cuba here in Miami.”  But he is wrong, Rodríguez states, because “the future of Cuba is here” in Cuba, where “we reiterate that our loyalty to Fidel and Raúl will be invariable, and that the process of continuity headed by President Díaz-Canel is permanent and irreversible.”

February 18, 2019
 
     The Revolutionary Government of Cuba has denounced the pressure and actions of the government of the United States in preparation for a military venture disguised as “humanitarian intervention” in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  It called upon the international community to mobilize in order to prevent the U.S. plan from being implemented.
 
     The Declaration of the Revolutionary Government, emitted on February 13, 2019, notes that from February 6 to February 10, military transport planes, originating from U.S. military installations utilized by the Special Operations Forces and the U.S. Marines for covert operations, have been flying toward military bases in Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and other islands of the Caribbean.
 
     The Declaration observes that the mass media, including those of the United States, have revealed that extremist elements in the U.S. government have designed and have directly organized and managed the attempted coup d’état in Venezuela, which has included an illegal self-proclamation of a president.  It further observes that the Venezuelan people are resisting, as is made evident by the loyalty of the armed forces and the massive demonstrations in support of President Maduro.  The United States, however, is intensifying its international political and media campaign and is hardening economic measures.  The unilateral coercive economic measures include the blocking of millions of dollars belonging to Venezuela in banks in third countries and the robbery of income from the sale of petroleum.  Said measures are provoking harsh deprivations and serious humanitarian damage, which the United States is using as a humanitarian pretext to initiate a military aggression against Venezuela.  The humanitarian aid that it intends to introduce in Venezuelan territory is a thousand times less than the economic damage caused by the coercive measures unilaterally imposed from Washington, the Declaration asserts.  The cynical and hypocritical intention is to establish an “international corridor” under “international protection” as a base on Venezuelan territory for its military operations, justified with a pretext of “protecting civilians.”
 
     The Declaration recalls that similar conduct and pretexts were adopted by the United States as a prelude to the wars that it undertook in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya, resulting in an immense loss of human life and enormous suffering.  And it maintains that the sad and painful history of U.S. military interventions cannot be forgotten, including more than once in Mexico, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba, and Honduras; and most recently, in Grenada and Panama. 
 
      The Declaration maintains that the U.S. government undertakes these actions because the Chavist and Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela constitutes the greatest threat to the exercise of its imperialist domination over Latin America and the Caribbean and to its intention of dispossessing the Venezuelan people of the largest petroleum reserve on earth as well as other strategic natural resources.
 
     The Declaration supports the Montevideo Mechanism; initiated by Mexico, Uruguay, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and Bolivia; which seeks to preserve peace in Venezuela on the basis of the principles of non-intervention in the affairs of states and of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.  The Declaration applauds the fact that the government of Nicolas Maduro and the international community have welcomed the initiative, and it expresses concern with the categorical rejection by the government of the United States of this as well as other initiatives of dialogue proposed by various countries.
 
     The Declaration reiterates the firm and unwavering solidarity of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba with the Constitutional President Nicolás Maduro and with the Chavist and Bolivarian Revolution.  It declares that Venezuela is determined to defend the sovereignty and dignity of Latin America and the Caribbean and the peoples of the South.  It warns that history will judge severely a new imperialist military intervention in the region.
 
      For the full text of the Declaration, in English and Spanish, see: “Declaration of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba on Venezuela,” April 13, 2019.

     In eight recent posts, we have been reflecting on the new Cuban Constitution.  We have seen that, on the basis of an extensive popular consultation with a high level of participation by the people, the National Assembly has submitted to the people a proposed constitution that reaffirms the socialist character of the Revolution, the State, and the society; and that preserves the basic structures of popular democracy, which are distinct from representative democracy and are characteristic of nations constructing socialism.  At the same time, the proposed constitution is more inclusive than the Constitution of 1976 with respect to religious beliefs, sexual orientation, and gender identity.  And it also differs from the 1976 Constitution in that it provides a constitutional foundation for a pragmatic socialism that that has space for private capital and foreign investment, under planning and regulation by the State.  The popular referendum on the proposed constitution will occur on February 24, 2019.  See “Constitutional Democracy in Cuba” 1/9/2019; “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019; “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019; “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019; “The Cuban National Assembly debates” 1/24/2018; “The new Cuban Constitution: Continuity” 1/28/2019; “A more inclusive Cuban Revolution” 2/1/2019; “A more pragmatic Cuban Revolution” 2/7/2019.
 
     In accordance with its orientation to provide a constitutional foundation for economic measures and policies that are designed to increase productivity, the new constitution also seeks to found a greater administrative efficiency of the State.  To this end, the new constitution makes changes in the structure of the State, without in any way changing or modifying the logic of popular power.  As we have seen, in the Cuban structures of popular political power, the people elect directly and indirectly the deputies of the National Assembly; said National Assembly is the highest authority in the State and the nation, inasmuch as it elects the highest members of the executive and judicial branches, and it possesses the authority to legislate, to interpret the Constitution, and to make constitutional reforms (see “The new Cuban Constitution: Continuity” 1/28/2019).  The intention of the changes in the structure of the State is not to change its base in popular power, but to increase its effectiveness in responding to the daily and concrete needs of the people.
 
      Whereas the 1976 Constitution established a Council of State and Ministers elected by the National Assembly, the new Constitution divides functions, creating a Council of State (which represents the National Assembly) and a Council of Ministers (which is the executive branch).  The members of the Council of State are elected by the National Assembly from among its members.  The Council of State is the legislative branch; it represents the National Assembly between sessions of the Assembly, inasmuch as the Assembly has three or four sessions a year, since the majority of its deputies continue to work in their respective professions or occupations or continue with their studies.  The decrees of the Council of State are subject to the ratification of the National Assembly at its next session.  The President of the National Assembly presides over both the National Assembly and the Council of State.  The President, Vice-President, and Secretary of the National Assembly have the same charges in the Council of State. 
 
      The Council of Ministers is the Executive Branch.  It is directed and formed by the President of the Republic, who is the Chief of State.  The President of the Republic is elected by the National Assembly for a term of five years, with a maximum of two consecutive periods.  The President of the Republic presents the members of the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, to the National Assembly for approval.  The Prime Minister is designated by the National Assembly, upon the recommendation of the President of the Republic, for a period of five years. 
 
     The President of the Republic represents the State, directs foreign policy, presides over the Council of Ministers, presides over the Council of National Defense, and declares states of emergency.  The Prime Minister reports to President and manages the Council of Ministers.  The Council of Ministers organizes and directs the execution of the political, economic, cultural, scientific, social, and defense activities agreed to by the National Assembly; approves and submits international treaties to the Council of State; directs and controls foreign commerce and foreign investment; and develops legislative proposals for submission to the National Assembly or the Council of State.  The Council of Ministers renders account of its activities to the National Assembly. 
 
      Thus, the new constitution seeks to improve governmental effectiveness by creating two offices in the executive branch.  First, the President of the Republic, who is the chief of state.  Secondly, a Prime Minister, who is responsible for managing the various ministries of the government.  The President is the higher authority of the two, in that the President designates the Prime Minister and presides of the Council of Ministers, which the Prime Minister manages.  Both the President and the Prime Minister are elected by the National Assembly; and both report and must answer to the National Assembly, which, to remind, is elected by the people in a system of direct and indirect elections, and which is the highest authority in the nation.
 
     Changes were also made in the structures of local government, seeking to improve governmental responsiveness at the local level.  The new Constitution replaces the fourteen provincial assemblies of the nation with provincial governments.  The provincial governments are directed by governors, who are elected by the municipal assemblies in their respective provinces.  The provincial governors convoke and preside over meetings of the Provincial Council, which are composed of the Provincial Governor, Provincial Vice-Governor, and the presidents of the municipal assemblies of popular power in the province.  (To remind, the delegates of the 169 municipal assemblies of the nation are elected by the people in a direct and secret vote, in which voters choose from among two or three candidates that emerge from neighborhood nomination assemblies).
 
     As in the Constitution of 1976, the new constitution defines the Municipal Assembly of Popular Power as the highest local organ.  In the new Constitution, delegates of the 169 municipal assemblies of the nation are elected for terms of five years, changing the 1976 Constitution, which established terms of two and one-half years for delegates of the municipal assemblies. 
 
     As is evident, the new constitution, as it seeks a greater administrative efficiency of the State, preserves the hallmark characteristics of the Cuban political process, which were beginning to emerge in the 1960s, and which were institutionalized in the Constitution of 1976.  As we have seen, it is, in sum, a system that concentrates authority in the National Assembly, which is the legislative branch.  The National Assembly elects and oversees the executive and the judicial branches; it enacts laws; and only it can reform the Constitution.  The deputies of the National Assembly are nominated by the delegates of the 169 municipal assemblies, and subsequently elected by the people in referendum.  Said delegates of the 169 municipal assemblies are elected previously by the people in secret and direct voting in 12,515 voting districts, choosing from two or three candidates nominated by the people in neighborhood nomination assemblies, without the participation of electoral political parties.
 
     As we have seen in this series of posts on the new Cuban Constitution, the new Magna Carta of the nation has been developed through a thorough and careful process, illustrating the relations among the Party, the government (the National Assembly), and the people.  The Party initiated reflection and analysis on a new constitution in 2013, and it submitted a proposal to the National Assembly in 2018.  Most of the members of the Assembly are Party members, but in evaluating the proposal of the Party, they are functioning as the elected deputies of the people.  Upon receiving the Party’s proposal, the Assembly formed a Constitutional Commission, consisting of some of its members.  The Constitutional Commission submitted a draft to the Assembly, which debated and modified it, and approved it for a popular consultation.  The consultation consisted of 133,680 meetings held during a period of three months in neighborhoods and places of work and study.  Approximately 75% of the adult population (16 years of age or older) attended the meetings, and 25% of those present expressed an opinion or made a proposal, and each opinion or proposal was noted by a representative of the Constitutional Commission.  The Commission undertook a thorough analysis of the opinions and proposals, on the basis of which it modified the draft, and presented the modified draft to the National Assembly.  The National Assembly debated and modified it, demonstrating seriousness and political maturity in their debate.  The Assembly approved the draft with its final modifications for popular referendum, to be held on February 24, 2019.  Here we see the basic dynamics of the Cuban political process: The Party guides, educates, and exhorts; the people, through there own capacity to speak and their own mass organizations, and through their elected deputies to the National Assembly, decide. 
 
     The people, their elected deputies, and the Party are most satisfied with the process that is nearing culmination.  No one doubts that the people will vote overwhelmingly in support of the Constitution on February 24.  When they do so, they will vote for sovereignty, affirming the right of the nation to decide for itself the characteristics of its political-economic system.  They will vote for democracy, confirming the structures of popular democracy that they have been developing since the early 1960s, which ensure that political power is in the hands of delegates and deputies of the people, and not in the hands of politicians with debts to those who finance their political careers.  They will vote for continuity, proclaiming that the passing from the scene of the generation of the revolution does not mean rupture, but a continuation by a new generation of the same struggle that was launched in 1868, when a landholder freed his slaves and formed an army of national liberation, and that reached a more advanced stage with the revolutionary triumph of 1959.

      We have been reflecting in seven posts since January 9 on the new Cuban constitution, which will be submitted for popular referendum on February 24 (“Constitutional Democracy in Cuba” 1/9/2019; “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019; “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019; “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019; “The Cuban National Assembly debates” 1/24/2018; “The new Cuban Constitution: Continuity” 1/28/2019; “A more inclusive Cuban Revolution” 2/1/2019).  We turn now to economic issues that are reflected in the changes being made in the new constitution.
 
      Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, combined with a strengthening of the economic sanctions against Cuba by the United States, the Cuban economy suffered a collapse in the early 1990s, and there was a significant decline in the standard of living.  The government adopted intelligent adjustment strategies, designed to preserve and protect the social and economic gains since 1959.  During the next fifteen years, there was a slow but steady recovery, and universal, free health care and education were maintained, as were subsidies for food and utilities.  However, the people endured great sacrifices, and there was a continually growing feeling of dissatisfaction among the people with respect to the material standing of living, which did not involve a desire to abandon the socialist road.  In response to the growing popular inquietude, the Party began to analyze possibilities for strengthening the productive capacity of the nation, which culminated in a new social and economic model, approved by the National Assembly, following an extensive popular consultation, in 2012.  In essence, the new model expands space for self-employment, small-scale private property, cooperatives, and foreign investment, while maintaining state ownership as the principal form of property; it preserves the role of the state as manager and regulator of the economy. 
 
     The new model did not emerge from a sector within Cuban society that would benefit economically from the changes, nor was it developed to satisfy the interests of international capital.  The new model was developed by the revolutionary leadership in response to the dissatisfaction that had emerged among the people, a dissatisfaction that implied an erosion of popular support for the Revolution in comparison to the era of the 1960s through the 1980s.  Even though the popular dissatisfaction did not express itself in the form of counterrevolutionary thought and behavior, it was a matter of concern, especially with respect to its long-term implications. 
 
     The new social and economic model of 2012, therefore, was developed autonomously by the leadership of a sovereign socialist nation, forged by its vanguard party with the participation and full support of the elected deputies of the people.  Its goal is to increase capacity for the production and distribution of goods and services, in order that the needs and desires of the people will be more fully satisfied, so that they will be kept on board in the socialist project in the long term.  It intends to facilitate the construction of a more “prosperous” socialism.
 
     The National Assembly, in accordance with its constitutional authority, interpreted the new economic measures as constitutional.  Nevertheless, there was a belief within the Party that the new economic measures had created the need for a constitutional re-foundation.  As a result, it is not surprising that the section on “economic fundamentals” of the new constitution includes important changes from the 1976 Constitution.  Said changes, however, do constitute rupture; rather, they reflect a continuous evolution, based on continuing theoretical reflection by the vanguard on revolutionary practice, on national social dynamics, and on the evolving political-economy of the world-system. 
 
     Both the 1976 and new constitutions dictate that the Cuban economy is a socialist economy that is directed and regulated by the State in accordance with its plan for social and economic development (Articles 14 and 16 in the 1976 Constitution; Articles 18 and 19 in the new Constitution).  However, there is a difference between the two constitutions with respect to the various forms of property.  The 1976 Constitution establishes state ownership of agricultural land, sugar processing plants, factories, mines, banks, and natural resources; and it recognizes other forms of property as exceptions to state property.  These exceptions include the agricultural property of small farmers and cooperatives, joint ventures of state and private capital, self-employment in transportation, and the property of mass, social, and political organizations (Article 15).  In contrast, the new Constitution recognizes various forms of property, including socialist property of the people, in which the state acts a representative of the people; cooperatives; joint ventures; the property of mass, political, and social organizations; and private property (Article 22).  These are not exceptions to state property, as in 1976; rather, they are forms of property that exist alongside state property.  Moreover, in the new formulation, cooperatives are legitimated beyond agriculture.  In addition, private property is explicitly recognized as a form of property in the socialist economy, although the state regulates to ensure that concentration of private property is limited, in accordance with socialist values of equity and social justice (Article 30).  Furthermore, foreign investment has its role: “The State promotes and guarantees foreign investment as an important element for the economic development of the country, over the base of the protection and reasonable use of natural and human resources as well as respect for national sovereignty and national independence” (Article 28).
 
      Such recognition of various forms of property, including private and foreign property, is in accordance with what I have elsewhere called “pragmatic socialism” (see “Pragmatic socialism: The necessary road” 5/14/2018 in the category Revolution), which is the form of socialism being developed in theory and in practice in China, Vietnam, and Cuba.  In this concept of pragmatic socialism, state ownership is the principal form of property, but other forms of property have a role, formulated by the state development plan and regulated by the state.  Moreover, the state plays a primary role in formulating a development plan and in directing and regulating the various forms of property.  The central role of the state as principal property holder, planner, and regulator is clear in the new Cuban constitution.  It affirms that Cuba has a “socialist economy based on the property of all the people over the fundamental means of production, as the principal form of property, and based on the planned direction of the economy, which regulates and controls the market in accordance with the interests of the society” (Article 18).  “The State directs, regulates, and controls economic activity, reconciling national, territorial, collective, and individuals interests in benefit of the society” (Article 19).  “The State socialist company is the principle subject of the national economy.  It has at its disposal autonomy in administration and management, and it plays the principal role in the production of goods and services” (Article 27). 
 
      Pragmatic socialism is the necessary road.  In the present conditions in the nations constructing socialism, and in the present international conditions, the total elimination of private property and foreign capitalist investment is not possible.  The nations constructing socialism have to develop productive capacity in order to satisfy the needs of the people, and in their present productive, commercial, and financial situation, they cannot do so without private property and foreign investment, assigning them a role in the national economic development plan.  In addition to such objective factors, there are subjective conditions: the aspirations of the people are influenced by the consumer societies of the core nations and the dissemination of their “values,” which really are anti-values.  The political reality is that concessions must be made to the aspirations of the people, in order to keep them with the socialist project. 
 
     Accordingly, there are both objective and subjective conditions that establish and limit possibilities, and socialist revolutions in power must intelligently respond and adjust.  It is possible that, in the future, property will be almost entirely state property and workers’ cooperatives, or entirely workers’ cooperatives; we cannot yet know, experience will teach us.  But under present conditions, the elimination of private property and foreign investment is not possible.
 
      In their efforts to construct socialism and a more just, democratic, and sustainable world-system, the nations moving toward socialism must confront the aggressions of the imperialist powers, which continue to seek to preserve their structural advantages in the neocolonial world-system.  At the present time, for example, the declining hegemonic core power is threatening a trade war with China; is strengthening the long-standing economic, commercial, and financial blockade of Cuba; and is imposing economic sanctions, intervening politically, and threatening military action against Venezuela.  These actions, of course, are new manifestations of the longstanding imperialist policies that were central to the transition from colonialism to neocolonialism, in which the sovereignty of nations is pretended but not real.  In this situation of continuing imperialist aggression, all of the nations that seek an autonomous road, different from that assigned to them by the neocolonial world-system, must economically and diplomatically cooperate with one another, as they are doing.
 
     In the struggle between the established unsustainable neocolonial world-system and the more just, democratic, and sustainable world-system in development, the role of ideas is central.  Unfortunately, many intellectuals and activists of the Left in the nations of the North have a limited understanding, as a result of the weakness of socialist movements in their lands.  Influenced by utopian conceptions of what socialist governments ought to do, they believe that the pragmatic socialist nations have lost the socialist road.  They cannot see that the nations constructing socialism they are leading the way in the forging of a socialist world-system.

     Juan Guaidó is President of the Venezuelan National Assembly, which has been suspended for being in contempt of court, by virtue of its refusal to comply with a court order emitted by the Venezuelan Supreme Court.  Guaidó is the point guard in the U.S. effort to remove from office the constitutionally and democratically elected president, Nicolás Maduro.  Guaidó has been declared interim president of Venezuela by the suspended National Assembly, a declaration not recognized by the executive and judicial branches, the military, and the Constitutional Assembly.  The Constitutional Assembly was created through democratic elections, following the Court’s ruling that the National Assembly was in contempt of court.
 
      An editorial by Guaidó was published in The New York Times on January 30.  Its strategy is to distort reality through the omission of relevant and important facts, relying on the unfamiliarity of the U.S. public with the history and current situation in Venezuela, and depending on the political and ideological support of the USA, which also repeatedly uses the same disinformation strategy, thus preparing the ideological terrain for Guaidó’s editorial.  In a previous post (“The legitimacy of Maduro and Venezuela” 1/15/2019), I try to describe the historical and political context of the current situation in Venezuela, which includes fundamental facts that Guaidó leaves aside.
 
     Guaidó blames the government of Nicolás Maduro for food and medical shortages.  U.S. readers ought to be aware that the opposition and the Bolivarian Revolution blame each other for the economic difficulties of the last five years.  Opposition leaders are tied to the dominant economic sectors, and their privileged position includes control of the import-export trade, on which the Venezuelan economy is dependent.  In 2014, import-export traders launched what the Chavists call an economic war against Venezuela.  The traders stopped importing goods, and they hoarded goods, provoking shortages in necessities.  Such a political strategy is in violation of international law, and it is unpatriotic.  There are persons, no doubt, in the USA who believe that the policies of the Maduro government have caused the economic difficulties; they ought to be aware of the damage done to the economy by the Venezuelan traders, who adopted a strategy consistent with U.S. intentions of promoting chaos and destabilization.
 
    In as similar vein, Guaidó speaks of violence against protestors, and he maintains that the government has unleashed a brutal crackdown on protestors.  He observers that “240 Venezuelans have been murdered at marches, and there are 600 political prisoners.”  Again, the government describes these events in a fundamentally different way.  It maintains that the opposition has organized violent gangs that have attacked Chavists and government property; that the great majority of the persons who died were killed by the violent gangs organized or stimulated by the opposition; and that the political prisoners have been charged and found guilty of engaging in or inciting violence.
 
     Guaidó claims that Maduro’s re-election on May 20, 2018 was illegitimate.  He offers no evidence in support of this claim, other than to say that the illegitimacy of said elections “has since been acknowledged by a large part of the international community.”  The veracity of this observation depends on what is meant by “large part.”  He further claims that “over 50 countries have recognized either me as interim president or the National Assembly as the legitimate authority in Venezuela.” On the other hand, Cuban newspapers report that more than 120 nations in the world have recognized the legitimacy of the Maduro government.  Moreover, recent efforts by the U.S. government to obtain support for a declaration or action against Venezuela were rejected by the UN Security Council and the General Assembly.  Even the Organization of American States, infamous for its historic role in soliciting the support of Latin American governments in the U.S. policy of domination over them (see “Pan-Americanism and OAS” 10/2/2013 in the category US Imperialism) and an instrument in the current U.S. strategy toward Venezuela, would not go along with U.S. plans.  It appears that the majority of nations are taking the minimal position that the United States should not interfere in the affairs of Venezuela, in accordance with the principles of respect for the sovereignty of all nations and of non-interference in the affairs of nations, which are universally recognized principles, proclaimed by the United Nations and other international organizations.  Standing in opposition to these principles, Guaidó is permitting himself to be an instrument of the U.S. coup attempt.
 
     Although it is inconvenient for U.S. policy that the people of the United States know it, the fact is that Maduro won the May 20, 2018 elections with 67% of the vote, in elections that international observers as well as the opposition candidates declared to be fair.  The turnout was lower than has been customary in the last twenty years of Chavist rule, partly as a result of calls by some sectors of the opposition to not vote, and partly as a result of a decline in support for the opposition.  However, in spite of the low turnout by recent Venezuelan standards, Maduro’s vote as a percentage of registered voters was higher than that of victorious candidates in recent presidential elections in Argentina, the United States, and Brazil, administrations that deny the legitimacy of the Maduro government. 
 
      Guaidó writes, “My ascension as interim president is based on Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution, according to which, if at the outset of a new term there is no elected head of state, power is vested in the president of the National Assembly until free and transparent elections take place.”  The difficulty with this justification is that it is based on the false claim that Maduro was not constitutionally re-elected on May 20, 2018.  And a further difficulty is that the National Assembly itself has been suspended, because of its failure to respect the judicial authority established by the same Constitution that Guiadó cites.
 
      Guaidó maintains that “under Chávez the country was drifting toward totalitarianism.”  He provides no evidence in support of this claim.  Fundamental facts indicate the opposite: the Chavist revolution has organized 20 elections in the past 20 years, certified by international observers, winning 18 of them; the Chavist revolution developed a new constitution on a foundation of democratic elections for a constitutional assembly, expanding the rights of the people; and the Bolivarian Revolution has organized popular councils for popular participation. 
 
     The unsubstantiated accusation of totalitarianism has credibility if constantly repeated (as it is by the media and by the powerful), and if the audience has a limited understanding of Venezuelan reality.  Unfortunately, public discourse in the United States reflects a limited understanding of the Third World story of colonial and neocolonial domination and popular anti-imperialist social movements.  Guaidó makes no reference to the Venezuelan manifestations of this Latin American historic reality and current situation, and it is the most fundamental of his omissions.
 
      In recounting his own personal story, Guaidó describes how he joined the student movement in opposition to the Chavist referendum on constitutional reforms in 2007.  Readers of The New York Times may or may not be aware that the Latin American student movement has a heroic tradition of standing in opposition to military dictatorships and U.S. imperialism.  In Cuba, for example, historically important leaders like Julio Antonio Mella and Fidel Castro took their first steps as leaders in the student movement.  However, Latin American students are not always on the side of social justice; sometimes they are defenders of privilege.  In many countries in Latin America, university students are primarily middle class, and the Latin American middle class has high levels of activism in both bands, in both the revolution and the counterrevolution.  The student movement in opposition to the 2007 constitutional reform referendum was a movement of middle class students, casting itself in opposition to the deepening of a popular revolution that intended to expand opportunities for persons of all classes; a revolution that is seeking transformation of a historical reality in which opportunities were to a considerable extent restricted to the privileged classes.
 
           Guaidó proposes shoring up the National Assembly and consolidating the support of the international program.  But this is hardly a program or a platform, and this has been a continuous shortcoming of the opposition.  The opposition is against the Bolivarian Revolution, and it makes vague charges of totalitarianism.  But what are its specific objections to the Chavists?  Was it that the Chavists took effective control of the previously nationalized oil industry?  Was it that they used government revenues obtained through control of the oil industry to reduce foreign debt and to finance missions in education, health, and housing?  Was it that they united with Latin American and Caribbean governments, seeking to develop an effective regional response to U.S. imperialism?
 
      And what specific measures does the opposition propose?  One suspects that it wants to restore the neoliberal agenda, in which the government permits the market to rule, playing rhetorical political games with its duty to formulate and implement a plan for social and economic development.  And one suspects that the opposition wants to restore Venezuelan subordination to U.S. capital, thus creating opportunities for Venezuelans in privileged positions.  But such a program cannot be proclaimed, because it would be rejected by the majority as contrary to the needs of the people and the interests of the nation.  So the opposition therefore must engage in a disinformation and destabilization campaign, seeking to create chaos and disorder, as a prelude to U.S. military intervention in some form, which would seek to put into power a regime more accommodating to its interests.
 
      It is hard to know how this situation will play out.  The U.S. government has frozen Venezuelan assets in U.S. banks, and Guaidó indicates that he will seek control of Venezuelan assets abroad.  He could use these funds to appoint ambassadors, which some countries will recognize; to form para-military organizations; and to disseminate misinformation in the world and in Venezuela.  He can count on U.S. support, and Trump is threatening a possible military intervention.  A “civil war,” of the kind principally financed and supported from the exterior, may be beginning.  If this happens, almost everyone will lose, but not the opportunists.
 
     Events of this kind will continue, unless and until the people of the United States acquire the necessary understanding of world history and international affairs; and develop the political maturity and the political power required to establish that the government of the United States, in the conduct of its foreign policy, respect the sovereignty of the nations of the world, even those nations with important natural resources, and even those nations with the audacity to seek an autonomous road, different from that assigned to them by the imperialist and neocolonial powers.

​     Triumphant revolutions evolve following their taking of political power, on the basis of their practical experience in seeking to achieve revolutionary goals and taking into account a constantly evolving society as well as a changing international situation.  In the case of Cuba, the Revolution since 1959 has evolved to be a more inclusive and more pragmatic Revolution, and more committed to administrative and productive efficiency.  Said evolution is reflected in the new Constitution that the National Assembly of Popular Power approved on December 22, 2019, which will be submitted to popular referendum on February 24, 2019.   See various posts on the development of the new Cuban Constitution (“Constitutional Democracy in Cuba” 1/9/2019; “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019; “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019; “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019; “The Cuban National Assembly debates” 1/24/2018; “The new Cuban Constitution: Continuity” 1/28/2019).
 
     The Cuban Revolution has evolved to be a more inclusive revolution, including all the people, regardless of sexual orientation, gender identity, or religious belief.  Whereas the Constitution of 1976 affirmed the equality of all, regardless race, color, sex or national origin (Article 41), the new constitution expands the equal protection clause to include no discrimination for reason of sexual orientation, gender identity, religious belief, or disability.  The equal protection clause of the Constitution now reads: 

​The amplification of the equal protection clause is in accordance with international tendencies, and it reflects changes in Cuban society, as it has evolved since 1976.
 
      In recent years, the revolutionary leadership move toward embracing the international tendency toward affirmation of the rights of gays and transgender persons.  However, it did not want to do so in a way that provoked a reaction from religious persons, whom it also wanted to include.  So its orientation has been to educate rather than to impose.  It has sought consensus, with the intention of avoiding a conflictive divide among the people on the question of religion and homosexuality.  The Revolution does not see the question as central to the essence of revolution; that is, a person could be gay or not, or religious or not, and could still be revolutionary (or not).  Therefore, the Revolution has sought to ensure consensus and mutual respect among the people on questions related homosexuality and religion. 
 
     The Revolution’s orientation toward consensus can be seen in the reaction of the Constitutional Commission to the polemical debate that emerged during the popular consultation with respect to the definition of marriage.  The issue here was whether marriage should be defined as a union between a man and a woman, as formulated in Article 35 of the 1976 Constitution, or as a union between two persons, as expressed in the draft of the new constitution distributed for popular consultation (see “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019 and “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019).  The Commission responded to the polemical debate by modifying the language of the proposed new constitution.  The modified proposal removes the 1976 definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman, but at the same time, it does not define the subjects that enter a marital union, thus deferring the debate to a later moment.  In its transitional dispositions, the new Constitution directs the National Assembly to develop a family code on the basis of a popular consultation, which should be submitted to popular referendum.  In addition, the new Constitution recognize the diversity of marriage and family forms in Cuban society.  Its chapter on the theme is entitled “Families,” in contrast to the 1976 title, “The Family” (Articles 81-82 in the new constitution; Articles 34-35 in the 1976 Constitution). 
 
      Thus, the new Cuban constitution, in the form modified by the Commission, has a progressive character with respect to LGBT rights, taking into account various related articles.  In Article 42, it affirms the rights of all, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity.  Articles 81-82 remove the traditional definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman, and they affirm the diversity of marriage and family forms.  The new Constitution mandates a popular consultation on the family, which will provide extended opportunity for the people to debate the theme of gay marriage, in which defenders of gay rights will seek to educate the people with respect to scientific evidence and international tendencies. 
 
     At the same time, the Constitutional Commission has arrived to this progressive proclamation and agenda in a manner that is respectful of the people who are opposed to a legal recognition of gay marriage.  The Commission sought to formulate a constitutional foundation that would have consensual support.  It withdrew its formulation of marriage as a “union between two persons;” and it included in the new Constitution a requirement for a final popular referendum on a new family code, not wanting to impose legalization of gay marriage on the people, if the popular consultation does not persuade them. 
 
     In this approach to a polemical issue, the Cuban Revolution reflects a historic principle: the people must be respected.  If, as a result of pervasive confusions and distortions, the people have an unscientific or an unreasonable idea, they must be educated and persuaded; the political will of an “enlightened” minority can never be imposed. 
 
     Although the Constitution of 1976 affirmed freedom of religious beliefs and practices, it nonetheless maintained that the state bases its activities and educates the people on a “materialist, scientific conception of the universe” (Article 54).  However, during the 1970s and 1980s, there was evolving a more inclusive orientation of the revolutionary leadership, recognizing that the Revolution’s conflict with the Catholic Church in 1960s was not religious but political, and it did not result from an antireligious attitude by the Revolution (Castro 1985).  Reflecting this evolution, the Constitutional Reform of 1992 declares that the Cuban State is not an atheist State but a lay State, and it declares the separation between Church and State (Díaz 2011:71).  In the new Constitution set for referendum on February 24, 2019, the article guaranteeing religious freedom (Article 57) clearly and fully affirms the rights of religious believers. 
 
     The equal protection clause of the new Constitution (Article 42, cited above) includes disabled persons, whereas the Constitution of 1976 did not.  However, the rights and special needs of the disabled has been respected in practice in Cuban society since 1959, with schools and hospitals being provided for those in need.  The inclusion of disabled persons in the equal protection clause is not a reflection of change in Cuban society; rather, it is a reflection of the greater international tendency in this direction as well as of a desire to give a constitutional foundation to the practice.
 
      In addition to be being more inclusive with respect to the LBFT community and religious persons, the Cuban Revolution has also evolved to be more inclusive with respect to self-employed persons and small capitalists, defining them as part of the revolutionary people that are constructing socialism.  This evolution has occurred as a result of the need for the Cuban Revolution to be more pragmatic with respect to its socialist economy.  This will be the theme of our next post.

References
 
Castro, Fidel.  1985.  Fidel y La Religión: Conversaciones con Frei Betto.  La Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado. [English translation: Fidel and Religion: Conversations with Frei Betto on Marxism and Liberation Theology.  Melbourne: Ocean Press].
 
Díaz Sotolongo, Roberto.  2011.  La Constitución.  La Habana: Ediciones ONBC.