February 18, 2019
 
     The Revolutionary Government of Cuba has denounced the pressure and actions of the government of the United States in preparation for a military venture disguised as “humanitarian intervention” in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  It called upon the international community to mobilize in order to prevent the U.S. plan from being implemented.
 
     The Declaration of the Revolutionary Government, emitted on February 13, 2019, notes that from February 6 to February 10, military transport planes, originating from U.S. military installations utilized by the Special Operations Forces and the U.S. Marines for covert operations, have been flying toward military bases in Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and other islands of the Caribbean.
 
     The Declaration observes that the mass media, including those of the United States, have revealed that extremist elements in the U.S. government have designed and have directly organized and managed the attempted coup d’état in Venezuela, which has included an illegal self-proclamation of a president.  It further observes that the Venezuelan people are resisting, as is made evident by the loyalty of the armed forces and the massive demonstrations in support of President Maduro.  The United States, however, is intensifying its international political and media campaign and is hardening economic measures.  The unilateral coercive economic measures include the blocking of millions of dollars belonging to Venezuela in banks in third countries and the robbery of income from the sale of petroleum.  Said measures are provoking harsh deprivations and serious humanitarian damage, which the United States is using as a humanitarian pretext to initiate a military aggression against Venezuela.  The humanitarian aid that it intends to introduce in Venezuelan territory is a thousand times less than the economic damage caused by the coercive measures unilaterally imposed from Washington, the Declaration asserts.  The cynical and hypocritical intention is to establish an “international corridor” under “international protection” as a base on Venezuelan territory for its military operations, justified with a pretext of “protecting civilians.”
 
     The Declaration recalls that similar conduct and pretexts were adopted by the United States as a prelude to the wars that it undertook in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya, resulting in an immense loss of human life and enormous suffering.  And it maintains that the sad and painful history of U.S. military interventions cannot be forgotten, including more than once in Mexico, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba, and Honduras; and most recently, in Grenada and Panama. 
 
      The Declaration maintains that the U.S. government undertakes these actions because the Chavist and Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela constitutes the greatest threat to the exercise of its imperialist domination over Latin America and the Caribbean and to its intention of dispossessing the Venezuelan people of the largest petroleum reserve on earth as well as other strategic natural resources.
 
     The Declaration supports the Montevideo Mechanism; initiated by Mexico, Uruguay, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and Bolivia; which seeks to preserve peace in Venezuela on the basis of the principles of non-intervention in the affairs of states and of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.  The Declaration applauds the fact that the government of Nicolas Maduro and the international community have welcomed the initiative, and it expresses concern with the categorical rejection by the government of the United States of this as well as other initiatives of dialogue proposed by various countries.
 
     The Declaration reiterates the firm and unwavering solidarity of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba with the Constitutional President Nicolás Maduro and with the Chavist and Bolivarian Revolution.  It declares that Venezuela is determined to defend the sovereignty and dignity of Latin America and the Caribbean and the peoples of the South.  It warns that history will judge severely a new imperialist military intervention in the region.
 
      For the full text of the Declaration, in English and Spanish, see: “Declaration of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba on Venezuela,” April 13, 2019.

     In eight recent posts, we have been reflecting on the new Cuban Constitution.  We have seen that, on the basis of an extensive popular consultation with a high level of participation by the people, the National Assembly has submitted to the people a proposed constitution that reaffirms the socialist character of the Revolution, the State, and the society; and that preserves the basic structures of popular democracy, which are distinct from representative democracy and are characteristic of nations constructing socialism.  At the same time, the proposed constitution is more inclusive than the Constitution of 1976 with respect to religious beliefs, sexual orientation, and gender identity.  And it also differs from the 1976 Constitution in that it provides a constitutional foundation for a pragmatic socialism that that has space for private capital and foreign investment, under planning and regulation by the State.  The popular referendum on the proposed constitution will occur on February 24, 2019.  See “Constitutional Democracy in Cuba” 1/9/2019; “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019; “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019; “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019; “The Cuban National Assembly debates” 1/24/2018; “The new Cuban Constitution: Continuity” 1/28/2019; “A more inclusive Cuban Revolution” 2/1/2019; “A more pragmatic Cuban Revolution” 2/7/2019.
 
     In accordance with its orientation to provide a constitutional foundation for economic measures and policies that are designed to increase productivity, the new constitution also seeks to found a greater administrative efficiency of the State.  To this end, the new constitution makes changes in the structure of the State, without in any way changing or modifying the logic of popular power.  As we have seen, in the Cuban structures of popular political power, the people elect directly and indirectly the deputies of the National Assembly; said National Assembly is the highest authority in the State and the nation, inasmuch as it elects the highest members of the executive and judicial branches, and it possesses the authority to legislate, to interpret the Constitution, and to make constitutional reforms (see “The new Cuban Constitution: Continuity” 1/28/2019).  The intention of the changes in the structure of the State is not to change its base in popular power, but to increase its effectiveness in responding to the daily and concrete needs of the people.
 
      Whereas the 1976 Constitution established a Council of State and Ministers elected by the National Assembly, the new Constitution divides functions, creating a Council of State (which represents the National Assembly) and a Council of Ministers (which is the executive branch).  The members of the Council of State are elected by the National Assembly from among its members.  The Council of State is the legislative branch; it represents the National Assembly between sessions of the Assembly, inasmuch as the Assembly has three or four sessions a year, since the majority of its deputies continue to work in their respective professions or occupations or continue with their studies.  The decrees of the Council of State are subject to the ratification of the National Assembly at its next session.  The President of the National Assembly presides over both the National Assembly and the Council of State.  The President, Vice-President, and Secretary of the National Assembly have the same charges in the Council of State. 
 
      The Council of Ministers is the Executive Branch.  It is directed and formed by the President of the Republic, who is the Chief of State.  The President of the Republic is elected by the National Assembly for a term of five years, with a maximum of two consecutive periods.  The President of the Republic presents the members of the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, to the National Assembly for approval.  The Prime Minister is designated by the National Assembly, upon the recommendation of the President of the Republic, for a period of five years. 
 
     The President of the Republic represents the State, directs foreign policy, presides over the Council of Ministers, presides over the Council of National Defense, and declares states of emergency.  The Prime Minister reports to President and manages the Council of Ministers.  The Council of Ministers organizes and directs the execution of the political, economic, cultural, scientific, social, and defense activities agreed to by the National Assembly; approves and submits international treaties to the Council of State; directs and controls foreign commerce and foreign investment; and develops legislative proposals for submission to the National Assembly or the Council of State.  The Council of Ministers renders account of its activities to the National Assembly. 
 
      Thus, the new constitution seeks to improve governmental effectiveness by creating two offices in the executive branch.  First, the President of the Republic, who is the chief of state.  Secondly, a Prime Minister, who is responsible for managing the various ministries of the government.  The President is the higher authority of the two, in that the President designates the Prime Minister and presides of the Council of Ministers, which the Prime Minister manages.  Both the President and the Prime Minister are elected by the National Assembly; and both report and must answer to the National Assembly, which, to remind, is elected by the people in a system of direct and indirect elections, and which is the highest authority in the nation.
 
     Changes were also made in the structures of local government, seeking to improve governmental responsiveness at the local level.  The new Constitution replaces the fourteen provincial assemblies of the nation with provincial governments.  The provincial governments are directed by governors, who are elected by the municipal assemblies in their respective provinces.  The provincial governors convoke and preside over meetings of the Provincial Council, which are composed of the Provincial Governor, Provincial Vice-Governor, and the presidents of the municipal assemblies of popular power in the province.  (To remind, the delegates of the 169 municipal assemblies of the nation are elected by the people in a direct and secret vote, in which voters choose from among two or three candidates that emerge from neighborhood nomination assemblies).
 
     As in the Constitution of 1976, the new constitution defines the Municipal Assembly of Popular Power as the highest local organ.  In the new Constitution, delegates of the 169 municipal assemblies of the nation are elected for terms of five years, changing the 1976 Constitution, which established terms of two and one-half years for delegates of the municipal assemblies. 
 
     As is evident, the new constitution, as it seeks a greater administrative efficiency of the State, preserves the hallmark characteristics of the Cuban political process, which were beginning to emerge in the 1960s, and which were institutionalized in the Constitution of 1976.  As we have seen, it is, in sum, a system that concentrates authority in the National Assembly, which is the legislative branch.  The National Assembly elects and oversees the executive and the judicial branches; it enacts laws; and only it can reform the Constitution.  The deputies of the National Assembly are nominated by the delegates of the 169 municipal assemblies, and subsequently elected by the people in referendum.  Said delegates of the 169 municipal assemblies are elected previously by the people in secret and direct voting in 12,515 voting districts, choosing from two or three candidates nominated by the people in neighborhood nomination assemblies, without the participation of electoral political parties.
 
     As we have seen in this series of posts on the new Cuban Constitution, the new Magna Carta of the nation has been developed through a thorough and careful process, illustrating the relations among the Party, the government (the National Assembly), and the people.  The Party initiated reflection and analysis on a new constitution in 2013, and it submitted a proposal to the National Assembly in 2018.  Most of the members of the Assembly are Party members, but in evaluating the proposal of the Party, they are functioning as the elected deputies of the people.  Upon receiving the Party’s proposal, the Assembly formed a Constitutional Commission, consisting of some of its members.  The Constitutional Commission submitted a draft to the Assembly, which debated and modified it, and approved it for a popular consultation.  The consultation consisted of 133,680 meetings held during a period of three months in neighborhoods and places of work and study.  Approximately 75% of the adult population (16 years of age or older) attended the meetings, and 25% of those present expressed an opinion or made a proposal, and each opinion or proposal was noted by a representative of the Constitutional Commission.  The Commission undertook a thorough analysis of the opinions and proposals, on the basis of which it modified the draft, and presented the modified draft to the National Assembly.  The National Assembly debated and modified it, demonstrating seriousness and political maturity in their debate.  The Assembly approved the draft with its final modifications for popular referendum, to be held on February 24, 2019.  Here we see the basic dynamics of the Cuban political process: The Party guides, educates, and exhorts; the people, through there own capacity to speak and their own mass organizations, and through their elected deputies to the National Assembly, decide. 
 
     The people, their elected deputies, and the Party are most satisfied with the process that is nearing culmination.  No one doubts that the people will vote overwhelmingly in support of the Constitution on February 24.  When they do so, they will vote for sovereignty, affirming the right of the nation to decide for itself the characteristics of its political-economic system.  They will vote for democracy, confirming the structures of popular democracy that they have been developing since the early 1960s, which ensure that political power is in the hands of delegates and deputies of the people, and not in the hands of politicians with debts to those who finance their political careers.  They will vote for continuity, proclaiming that the passing from the scene of the generation of the revolution does not mean rupture, but a continuation by a new generation of the same struggle that was launched in 1868, when a landholder freed his slaves and formed an army of national liberation, and that reached a more advanced stage with the revolutionary triumph of 1959.

      We have been reflecting in seven posts since January 9 on the new Cuban constitution, which will be submitted for popular referendum on February 24 (“Constitutional Democracy in Cuba” 1/9/2019; “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019; “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019; “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019; “The Cuban National Assembly debates” 1/24/2018; “The new Cuban Constitution: Continuity” 1/28/2019; “A more inclusive Cuban Revolution” 2/1/2019).  We turn now to economic issues that are reflected in the changes being made in the new constitution.
 
      Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, combined with a strengthening of the economic sanctions against Cuba by the United States, the Cuban economy suffered a collapse in the early 1990s, and there was a significant decline in the standard of living.  The government adopted intelligent adjustment strategies, designed to preserve and protect the social and economic gains since 1959.  During the next fifteen years, there was a slow but steady recovery, and universal, free health care and education were maintained, as were subsidies for food and utilities.  However, the people endured great sacrifices, and there was a continually growing feeling of dissatisfaction among the people with respect to the material standing of living, which did not involve a desire to abandon the socialist road.  In response to the growing popular inquietude, the Party began to analyze possibilities for strengthening the productive capacity of the nation, which culminated in a new social and economic model, approved by the National Assembly, following an extensive popular consultation, in 2012.  In essence, the new model expands space for self-employment, small-scale private property, cooperatives, and foreign investment, while maintaining state ownership as the principal form of property; it preserves the role of the state as manager and regulator of the economy. 
 
     The new model did not emerge from a sector within Cuban society that would benefit economically from the changes, nor was it developed to satisfy the interests of international capital.  The new model was developed by the revolutionary leadership in response to the dissatisfaction that had emerged among the people, a dissatisfaction that implied an erosion of popular support for the Revolution in comparison to the era of the 1960s through the 1980s.  Even though the popular dissatisfaction did not express itself in the form of counterrevolutionary thought and behavior, it was a matter of concern, especially with respect to its long-term implications. 
 
     The new social and economic model of 2012, therefore, was developed autonomously by the leadership of a sovereign socialist nation, forged by its vanguard party with the participation and full support of the elected deputies of the people.  Its goal is to increase capacity for the production and distribution of goods and services, in order that the needs and desires of the people will be more fully satisfied, so that they will be kept on board in the socialist project in the long term.  It intends to facilitate the construction of a more “prosperous” socialism.
 
     The National Assembly, in accordance with its constitutional authority, interpreted the new economic measures as constitutional.  Nevertheless, there was a belief within the Party that the new economic measures had created the need for a constitutional re-foundation.  As a result, it is not surprising that the section on “economic fundamentals” of the new constitution includes important changes from the 1976 Constitution.  Said changes, however, do constitute rupture; rather, they reflect a continuous evolution, based on continuing theoretical reflection by the vanguard on revolutionary practice, on national social dynamics, and on the evolving political-economy of the world-system. 
 
     Both the 1976 and new constitutions dictate that the Cuban economy is a socialist economy that is directed and regulated by the State in accordance with its plan for social and economic development (Articles 14 and 16 in the 1976 Constitution; Articles 18 and 19 in the new Constitution).  However, there is a difference between the two constitutions with respect to the various forms of property.  The 1976 Constitution establishes state ownership of agricultural land, sugar processing plants, factories, mines, banks, and natural resources; and it recognizes other forms of property as exceptions to state property.  These exceptions include the agricultural property of small farmers and cooperatives, joint ventures of state and private capital, self-employment in transportation, and the property of mass, social, and political organizations (Article 15).  In contrast, the new Constitution recognizes various forms of property, including socialist property of the people, in which the state acts a representative of the people; cooperatives; joint ventures; the property of mass, political, and social organizations; and private property (Article 22).  These are not exceptions to state property, as in 1976; rather, they are forms of property that exist alongside state property.  Moreover, in the new formulation, cooperatives are legitimated beyond agriculture.  In addition, private property is explicitly recognized as a form of property in the socialist economy, although the state regulates to ensure that concentration of private property is limited, in accordance with socialist values of equity and social justice (Article 30).  Furthermore, foreign investment has its role: “The State promotes and guarantees foreign investment as an important element for the economic development of the country, over the base of the protection and reasonable use of natural and human resources as well as respect for national sovereignty and national independence” (Article 28).
 
      Such recognition of various forms of property, including private and foreign property, is in accordance with what I have elsewhere called “pragmatic socialism” (see “Pragmatic socialism: The necessary road” 5/14/2018 in the category Revolution), which is the form of socialism being developed in theory and in practice in China, Vietnam, and Cuba.  In this concept of pragmatic socialism, state ownership is the principal form of property, but other forms of property have a role, formulated by the state development plan and regulated by the state.  Moreover, the state plays a primary role in formulating a development plan and in directing and regulating the various forms of property.  The central role of the state as principal property holder, planner, and regulator is clear in the new Cuban constitution.  It affirms that Cuba has a “socialist economy based on the property of all the people over the fundamental means of production, as the principal form of property, and based on the planned direction of the economy, which regulates and controls the market in accordance with the interests of the society” (Article 18).  “The State directs, regulates, and controls economic activity, reconciling national, territorial, collective, and individuals interests in benefit of the society” (Article 19).  “The State socialist company is the principle subject of the national economy.  It has at its disposal autonomy in administration and management, and it plays the principal role in the production of goods and services” (Article 27). 
 
      Pragmatic socialism is the necessary road.  In the present conditions in the nations constructing socialism, and in the present international conditions, the total elimination of private property and foreign capitalist investment is not possible.  The nations constructing socialism have to develop productive capacity in order to satisfy the needs of the people, and in their present productive, commercial, and financial situation, they cannot do so without private property and foreign investment, assigning them a role in the national economic development plan.  In addition to such objective factors, there are subjective conditions: the aspirations of the people are influenced by the consumer societies of the core nations and the dissemination of their “values,” which really are anti-values.  The political reality is that concessions must be made to the aspirations of the people, in order to keep them with the socialist project. 
 
     Accordingly, there are both objective and subjective conditions that establish and limit possibilities, and socialist revolutions in power must intelligently respond and adjust.  It is possible that, in the future, property will be almost entirely state property and workers’ cooperatives, or entirely workers’ cooperatives; we cannot yet know, experience will teach us.  But under present conditions, the elimination of private property and foreign investment is not possible.
 
      In their efforts to construct socialism and a more just, democratic, and sustainable world-system, the nations moving toward socialism must confront the aggressions of the imperialist powers, which continue to seek to preserve their structural advantages in the neocolonial world-system.  At the present time, for example, the declining hegemonic core power is threatening a trade war with China; is strengthening the long-standing economic, commercial, and financial blockade of Cuba; and is imposing economic sanctions, intervening politically, and threatening military action against Venezuela.  These actions, of course, are new manifestations of the longstanding imperialist policies that were central to the transition from colonialism to neocolonialism, in which the sovereignty of nations is pretended but not real.  In this situation of continuing imperialist aggression, all of the nations that seek an autonomous road, different from that assigned to them by the neocolonial world-system, must economically and diplomatically cooperate with one another, as they are doing.
 
     In the struggle between the established unsustainable neocolonial world-system and the more just, democratic, and sustainable world-system in development, the role of ideas is central.  Unfortunately, many intellectuals and activists of the Left in the nations of the North have a limited understanding, as a result of the weakness of socialist movements in their lands.  Influenced by utopian conceptions of what socialist governments ought to do, they believe that the pragmatic socialist nations have lost the socialist road.  They cannot see that the nations constructing socialism they are leading the way in the forging of a socialist world-system.

     Juan Guaidó is President of the Venezuelan National Assembly, which has been suspended for being in contempt of court, by virtue of its refusal to comply with a court order emitted by the Venezuelan Supreme Court.  Guaidó is the point guard in the U.S. effort to remove from office the constitutionally and democratically elected president, Nicolás Maduro.  Guaidó has been declared interim president of Venezuela by the suspended National Assembly, a declaration not recognized by the executive and judicial branches, the military, and the Constitutional Assembly.  The Constitutional Assembly was created through democratic elections, following the Court’s ruling that the National Assembly was in contempt of court.
 
      An editorial by Guaidó was published in The New York Times on January 30.  Its strategy is to distort reality through the omission of relevant and important facts, relying on the unfamiliarity of the U.S. public with the history and current situation in Venezuela, and depending on the political and ideological support of the USA, which also repeatedly uses the same disinformation strategy, thus preparing the ideological terrain for Guaidó’s editorial.  In a previous post (“The legitimacy of Maduro and Venezuela” 1/15/2019), I try to describe the historical and political context of the current situation in Venezuela, which includes fundamental facts that Guaidó leaves aside.
 
     Guaidó blames the government of Nicolás Maduro for food and medical shortages.  U.S. readers ought to be aware that the opposition and the Bolivarian Revolution blame each other for the economic difficulties of the last five years.  Opposition leaders are tied to the dominant economic sectors, and their privileged position includes control of the import-export trade, on which the Venezuelan economy is dependent.  In 2014, import-export traders launched what the Chavists call an economic war against Venezuela.  The traders stopped importing goods, and they hoarded goods, provoking shortages in necessities.  Such a political strategy is in violation of international law, and it is unpatriotic.  There are persons, no doubt, in the USA who believe that the policies of the Maduro government have caused the economic difficulties; they ought to be aware of the damage done to the economy by the Venezuelan traders, who adopted a strategy consistent with U.S. intentions of promoting chaos and destabilization.
 
    In as similar vein, Guaidó speaks of violence against protestors, and he maintains that the government has unleashed a brutal crackdown on protestors.  He observers that “240 Venezuelans have been murdered at marches, and there are 600 political prisoners.”  Again, the government describes these events in a fundamentally different way.  It maintains that the opposition has organized violent gangs that have attacked Chavists and government property; that the great majority of the persons who died were killed by the violent gangs organized or stimulated by the opposition; and that the political prisoners have been charged and found guilty of engaging in or inciting violence.
 
     Guaidó claims that Maduro’s re-election on May 20, 2018 was illegitimate.  He offers no evidence in support of this claim, other than to say that the illegitimacy of said elections “has since been acknowledged by a large part of the international community.”  The veracity of this observation depends on what is meant by “large part.”  He further claims that “over 50 countries have recognized either me as interim president or the National Assembly as the legitimate authority in Venezuela.” On the other hand, Cuban newspapers report that more than 120 nations in the world have recognized the legitimacy of the Maduro government.  Moreover, recent efforts by the U.S. government to obtain support for a declaration or action against Venezuela were rejected by the UN Security Council and the General Assembly.  Even the Organization of American States, infamous for its historic role in soliciting the support of Latin American governments in the U.S. policy of domination over them (see “Pan-Americanism and OAS” 10/2/2013 in the category US Imperialism) and an instrument in the current U.S. strategy toward Venezuela, would not go along with U.S. plans.  It appears that the majority of nations are taking the minimal position that the United States should not interfere in the affairs of Venezuela, in accordance with the principles of respect for the sovereignty of all nations and of non-interference in the affairs of nations, which are universally recognized principles, proclaimed by the United Nations and other international organizations.  Standing in opposition to these principles, Guaidó is permitting himself to be an instrument of the U.S. coup attempt.
 
     Although it is inconvenient for U.S. policy that the people of the United States know it, the fact is that Maduro won the May 20, 2018 elections with 67% of the vote, in elections that international observers as well as the opposition candidates declared to be fair.  The turnout was lower than has been customary in the last twenty years of Chavist rule, partly as a result of calls by some sectors of the opposition to not vote, and partly as a result of a decline in support for the opposition.  However, in spite of the low turnout by recent Venezuelan standards, Maduro’s vote as a percentage of registered voters was higher than that of victorious candidates in recent presidential elections in Argentina, the United States, and Brazil, administrations that deny the legitimacy of the Maduro government. 
 
      Guaidó writes, “My ascension as interim president is based on Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution, according to which, if at the outset of a new term there is no elected head of state, power is vested in the president of the National Assembly until free and transparent elections take place.”  The difficulty with this justification is that it is based on the false claim that Maduro was not constitutionally re-elected on May 20, 2018.  And a further difficulty is that the National Assembly itself has been suspended, because of its failure to respect the judicial authority established by the same Constitution that Guiadó cites.
 
      Guaidó maintains that “under Chávez the country was drifting toward totalitarianism.”  He provides no evidence in support of this claim.  Fundamental facts indicate the opposite: the Chavist revolution has organized 20 elections in the past 20 years, certified by international observers, winning 18 of them; the Chavist revolution developed a new constitution on a foundation of democratic elections for a constitutional assembly, expanding the rights of the people; and the Bolivarian Revolution has organized popular councils for popular participation. 
 
     The unsubstantiated accusation of totalitarianism has credibility if constantly repeated (as it is by the media and by the powerful), and if the audience has a limited understanding of Venezuelan reality.  Unfortunately, public discourse in the United States reflects a limited understanding of the Third World story of colonial and neocolonial domination and popular anti-imperialist social movements.  Guaidó makes no reference to the Venezuelan manifestations of this Latin American historic reality and current situation, and it is the most fundamental of his omissions.
 
      In recounting his own personal story, Guaidó describes how he joined the student movement in opposition to the Chavist referendum on constitutional reforms in 2007.  Readers of The New York Times may or may not be aware that the Latin American student movement has a heroic tradition of standing in opposition to military dictatorships and U.S. imperialism.  In Cuba, for example, historically important leaders like Julio Antonio Mella and Fidel Castro took their first steps as leaders in the student movement.  However, Latin American students are not always on the side of social justice; sometimes they are defenders of privilege.  In many countries in Latin America, university students are primarily middle class, and the Latin American middle class has high levels of activism in both bands, in both the revolution and the counterrevolution.  The student movement in opposition to the 2007 constitutional reform referendum was a movement of middle class students, casting itself in opposition to the deepening of a popular revolution that intended to expand opportunities for persons of all classes; a revolution that is seeking transformation of a historical reality in which opportunities were to a considerable extent restricted to the privileged classes.
 
           Guaidó proposes shoring up the National Assembly and consolidating the support of the international program.  But this is hardly a program or a platform, and this has been a continuous shortcoming of the opposition.  The opposition is against the Bolivarian Revolution, and it makes vague charges of totalitarianism.  But what are its specific objections to the Chavists?  Was it that the Chavists took effective control of the previously nationalized oil industry?  Was it that they used government revenues obtained through control of the oil industry to reduce foreign debt and to finance missions in education, health, and housing?  Was it that they united with Latin American and Caribbean governments, seeking to develop an effective regional response to U.S. imperialism?
 
      And what specific measures does the opposition propose?  One suspects that it wants to restore the neoliberal agenda, in which the government permits the market to rule, playing rhetorical political games with its duty to formulate and implement a plan for social and economic development.  And one suspects that the opposition wants to restore Venezuelan subordination to U.S. capital, thus creating opportunities for Venezuelans in privileged positions.  But such a program cannot be proclaimed, because it would be rejected by the majority as contrary to the needs of the people and the interests of the nation.  So the opposition therefore must engage in a disinformation and destabilization campaign, seeking to create chaos and disorder, as a prelude to U.S. military intervention in some form, which would seek to put into power a regime more accommodating to its interests.
 
      It is hard to know how this situation will play out.  The U.S. government has frozen Venezuelan assets in U.S. banks, and Guaidó indicates that he will seek control of Venezuelan assets abroad.  He could use these funds to appoint ambassadors, which some countries will recognize; to form para-military organizations; and to disseminate misinformation in the world and in Venezuela.  He can count on U.S. support, and Trump is threatening a possible military intervention.  A “civil war,” of the kind principally financed and supported from the exterior, may be beginning.  If this happens, almost everyone will lose, but not the opportunists.
 
     Events of this kind will continue, unless and until the people of the United States acquire the necessary understanding of world history and international affairs; and develop the political maturity and the political power required to establish that the government of the United States, in the conduct of its foreign policy, respect the sovereignty of the nations of the world, even those nations with important natural resources, and even those nations with the audacity to seek an autonomous road, different from that assigned to them by the imperialist and neocolonial powers.

​     Triumphant revolutions evolve following their taking of political power, on the basis of their practical experience in seeking to achieve revolutionary goals and taking into account a constantly evolving society as well as a changing international situation.  In the case of Cuba, the Revolution since 1959 has evolved to be a more inclusive and more pragmatic Revolution, and more committed to administrative and productive efficiency.  Said evolution is reflected in the new Constitution that the National Assembly of Popular Power approved on December 22, 2019, which will be submitted to popular referendum on February 24, 2019.   See various posts on the development of the new Cuban Constitution (“Constitutional Democracy in Cuba” 1/9/2019; “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019; “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019; “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019; “The Cuban National Assembly debates” 1/24/2018; “The new Cuban Constitution: Continuity” 1/28/2019).
 
     The Cuban Revolution has evolved to be a more inclusive revolution, including all the people, regardless of sexual orientation, gender identity, or religious belief.  Whereas the Constitution of 1976 affirmed the equality of all, regardless race, color, sex or national origin (Article 41), the new constitution expands the equal protection clause to include no discrimination for reason of sexual orientation, gender identity, religious belief, or disability.  The equal protection clause of the Constitution now reads: 

​The amplification of the equal protection clause is in accordance with international tendencies, and it reflects changes in Cuban society, as it has evolved since 1976.
 
      In recent years, the revolutionary leadership move toward embracing the international tendency toward affirmation of the rights of gays and transgender persons.  However, it did not want to do so in a way that provoked a reaction from religious persons, whom it also wanted to include.  So its orientation has been to educate rather than to impose.  It has sought consensus, with the intention of avoiding a conflictive divide among the people on the question of religion and homosexuality.  The Revolution does not see the question as central to the essence of revolution; that is, a person could be gay or not, or religious or not, and could still be revolutionary (or not).  Therefore, the Revolution has sought to ensure consensus and mutual respect among the people on questions related homosexuality and religion. 
 
     The Revolution’s orientation toward consensus can be seen in the reaction of the Constitutional Commission to the polemical debate that emerged during the popular consultation with respect to the definition of marriage.  The issue here was whether marriage should be defined as a union between a man and a woman, as formulated in Article 35 of the 1976 Constitution, or as a union between two persons, as expressed in the draft of the new constitution distributed for popular consultation (see “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019 and “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019).  The Commission responded to the polemical debate by modifying the language of the proposed new constitution.  The modified proposal removes the 1976 definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman, but at the same time, it does not define the subjects that enter a marital union, thus deferring the debate to a later moment.  In its transitional dispositions, the new Constitution directs the National Assembly to develop a family code on the basis of a popular consultation, which should be submitted to popular referendum.  In addition, the new Constitution recognize the diversity of marriage and family forms in Cuban society.  Its chapter on the theme is entitled “Families,” in contrast to the 1976 title, “The Family” (Articles 81-82 in the new constitution; Articles 34-35 in the 1976 Constitution). 
 
      Thus, the new Cuban constitution, in the form modified by the Commission, has a progressive character with respect to LGBT rights, taking into account various related articles.  In Article 42, it affirms the rights of all, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity.  Articles 81-82 remove the traditional definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman, and they affirm the diversity of marriage and family forms.  The new Constitution mandates a popular consultation on the family, which will provide extended opportunity for the people to debate the theme of gay marriage, in which defenders of gay rights will seek to educate the people with respect to scientific evidence and international tendencies. 
 
     At the same time, the Constitutional Commission has arrived to this progressive proclamation and agenda in a manner that is respectful of the people who are opposed to a legal recognition of gay marriage.  The Commission sought to formulate a constitutional foundation that would have consensual support.  It withdrew its formulation of marriage as a “union between two persons;” and it included in the new Constitution a requirement for a final popular referendum on a new family code, not wanting to impose legalization of gay marriage on the people, if the popular consultation does not persuade them. 
 
     In this approach to a polemical issue, the Cuban Revolution reflects a historic principle: the people must be respected.  If, as a result of pervasive confusions and distortions, the people have an unscientific or an unreasonable idea, they must be educated and persuaded; the political will of an “enlightened” minority can never be imposed. 
 
     Although the Constitution of 1976 affirmed freedom of religious beliefs and practices, it nonetheless maintained that the state bases its activities and educates the people on a “materialist, scientific conception of the universe” (Article 54).  However, during the 1970s and 1980s, there was evolving a more inclusive orientation of the revolutionary leadership, recognizing that the Revolution’s conflict with the Catholic Church in 1960s was not religious but political, and it did not result from an antireligious attitude by the Revolution (Castro 1985).  Reflecting this evolution, the Constitutional Reform of 1992 declares that the Cuban State is not an atheist State but a lay State, and it declares the separation between Church and State (Díaz 2011:71).  In the new Constitution set for referendum on February 24, 2019, the article guaranteeing religious freedom (Article 57) clearly and fully affirms the rights of religious believers. 
 
     The equal protection clause of the new Constitution (Article 42, cited above) includes disabled persons, whereas the Constitution of 1976 did not.  However, the rights and special needs of the disabled has been respected in practice in Cuban society since 1959, with schools and hospitals being provided for those in need.  The inclusion of disabled persons in the equal protection clause is not a reflection of change in Cuban society; rather, it is a reflection of the greater international tendency in this direction as well as of a desire to give a constitutional foundation to the practice.
 
      In addition to be being more inclusive with respect to the LBFT community and religious persons, the Cuban Revolution has also evolved to be more inclusive with respect to self-employed persons and small capitalists, defining them as part of the revolutionary people that are constructing socialism.  This evolution has occurred as a result of the need for the Cuban Revolution to be more pragmatic with respect to its socialist economy.  This will be the theme of our next post.

References
 
Castro, Fidel.  1985.  Fidel y La Religión: Conversaciones con Frei Betto.  La Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado. [English translation: Fidel and Religion: Conversations with Frei Betto on Marxism and Liberation Theology.  Melbourne: Ocean Press].
 
Díaz Sotolongo, Roberto.  2011.  La Constitución.  La Habana: Ediciones ONBC.

​     In accordance with the project of a constitution approved the National Assembly of Popular Power on July 22, 2018, and on the basis of an analysis initiated in 2013 by the Communist Party of Cuba, the National Assembly on December 22, 2018 approved a new Constitution, subject to ratification by the people in referendum on February 24, 2019.  For discussion of the constitutional process in Cuba, see previous posts on the theme (“Constitutional Democracy in Cuba” 1/9/2019; “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019; “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019; “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019; “The Cuban National Assembly debates” 1/24/2018).  In this post, I focus on the elements of continuity, that is, the ways in which the new Constitution continues with principles and structures that have been hallmarks of Cuban society since the revolutionary triumph of 1959.
 
      The Preamble of the new Constitution declares that Cuban citizens, in adopting a new Constitution, are inspired by the heroism, patriotism, and sacrifice of those that struggled against slavery, colonialism, and imperialism for a free, independent, sovereign, democratic, and just nation.  It declares that Cuban citizens are determined to carry forward the Revolution that triumphed in 1959, guided by the ideals and the examples of Martí and Fidel as well as the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.
 
     The Constitution affirms the socialist character of the Revolution and the nation.  It proclaims that Cuba is a socialist, democratic, and sovereign state.  It proclaims that its socialism and its revolutionary social and political system are irrevocable (Articles 1, 4, 229).
 
      As in the Constitution of 1976, the proposed new constitution names the Communist Party of Cuba as the Martían, Fidelist, Marxist, and Leninist vanguard party that organizes, educates, and leads the people toward the construction of socialism (Article 5). 
 
       The new constitution conserves the structures of Popular Power that were established by the Constitution of 1976.  The new constitution names the National Assembly of Popular Power as “the supreme organ of the power of the State;” it is “the only organ in the Republic with constitutional and legislative power” (Articles 102-3).   The National Assembly makes laws and interprets the Constitution, elects the highest offices in the executive and judicial branches of the government, and approves the state budget (Articles 107-9).
 
       The National Assembly of Popular Power is elected by the people.  “The National Assembly of Popular Power is composed of deputies elected by the voters in a free, equal, direct, and secret vote, in accordance with procedures established by law” (Articles 104).  Inasmuch as the National Assembly is the highest authority in the state, and the National Assembly is elected by the people, the State is the expression of the sovereign will of the people. “In the Republic of Cuba, sovereignty resides untransferably in the people” (Article 3).
 
     The new Constitution affirms the right of Cuba to sovereignty in international relations: “The economic, diplomatic, and political relations with any other State can never be negotiated under aggression, threat, or coercion.”  It affirms Cuba’s foreign policy principles of sovereignty, anti-imperialism, and self-determination.  It recognizes the need for the unity of the Third World in opposition to colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism.  It reaffirms its commitment to integration and solidarity among the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean.  It condemns interference in the internal affairs of states.  It describes wars of aggression and conquest as international crimes.  It recognizes “the legitimacy of struggles of national liberation and of armed resistance to aggression.”  It rejects the existence, proliferation, or use of nuclear arms and arms of mass destruction as well as the employment of new arms, including cyber arms.  It repudiates terrorism in all of its manifestation, especially terrorism carried out by states (Article 16).  A similar anti-imperialist approach to Cuban foreign policy was formulated in Article 12 of the 1976 Constitution, with minor differences reflecting a changed international situation.
 
      Like the 1976 Constitution, the new constitution protects civil rights.  It affirms due process rights, including the presumption of innocence, the right to a lawyer, and the right to a fair trial (Articles 94-95); and no arbitrary search and seizure (Article 49).  It guarantees freedom of thought and expression (Article 54), freedom of assembly (Article 56), and freedom of religion (Article 57).  It affirms freedom of the press, in the context of a system with state ownership of the fundamental means of communication (Articles 54-55).  It asserts the right to leave and enter national territory (Article 52).  These rights were guaranteed in Articles 52 through 58 in the 1976 Constitution.
 
     Like the Constitution of 1976, the new constitution affirms social and economic rights.  All persons have the right to dignified work, to equal salary for work of equal value, to workers’ safety and workers’ compensation, and to a limit to the working day.  All citizens have the right to adequate housing; free, quality health services; free and accessible public education from the pre-school to university post-graduate level; to physical education, sport, and recreation; to art and culture; to potable water; to a healthy and adequate diet; and to social security.  Persons of low income and the unemployed have the right social assistance (Articles 64-79; Articles 44-51 in the 1976 Constitution).
 
     The Cuban Revolution has a commitment to science, in two senses.  First, there is recognition of the need for scientific and technological development in order to promote economic development.  Accordingly, the Revolution always has funded a form of scientific research that is integral to production for the enhancement of human needs, particularly as they pertain to the Third World.  Secondly, the political education of the people is rooted in knowledge in all its fields, including philosophy, history, social science, and natural science.  Indeed, well-educated petit bourgeois intellectuals played a central role in the formulation of the revolutionary project, since its origins in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Accordingly, the new Constitution affirms that the state supports the development of science and culture.

  However, the commitment to scientifically based economic development is seen as a dimension of what today is called sustainable development, that is, a form of development that does not undermine production in the long term by exhausting natural resources and overreaching environmental limits.  Therefore, the new constitution, like the Constitution of 1976, declares the duty of the state to protection the environment and confront climate change (Article 16).  “All persons have the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment.  The state protects the environment and the natural resources of the country.  It recognizes its close connection with sustainable economic and social development in order to make human life more reasonable and to assure the survival and wellbeing and security of present and future generations” (Article 86; see Article 27 in the 1976 Constitution).

   Like the Constitution of 1976, the new constitution affirms the principle of gender equality.

    The same affirmation is found in Articles 35 and 43 of the 1976 Constitution, although it did not include affirmation of sexual and reproductive rights and protection from gender violence.  However, these rights were being developed in practice under the 1976 Constitution, as a result of the political presence and educational role of the Federation of Cuban Women, a mass organization in which 85% of Cuban women with 16 or more years of age are inscribed.
 
     In his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 26, 2018, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel declared that the arrival to political power of a new generation of Cubans is characterized by continuity, not rupture.  He maintained that the leadership today continues with the development of the revolutionary project forged with intelligence and courage by the generation of the Revolution (see “Cuba is still Cuba: Continuity, not rupture” 10/4/2018).  The constitutional process unfolding in Cuba today confirms the Cuban President’s proclamation.
 
    However, all revolutions and societies evolve, and thus some changes will occur.  In my next post, I will focus on the changes that have been evolving in Cuban society and in the Cuban Revolution, and that are legitimated in the new Constitution, signaling an even more inclusive and more pragmatic revolution.

     This the fifth in a series of posts on the development of a new constitution in Cuba (see “Constitutional Democracy in Cuba” 1/9/2019; “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019; “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019; “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019).
 
       The debate on the new constitution by the deputies of the Cuban National Assembly of Popular Power was had three parts.  First, on December 20, the assembly divided into three work commissions.  None of the commissions had authority to make changes in the text; it was a question of discussion and clarification.  Secondly, a report by the Constitutional Commission to a plenary session of the National Assembly, held on December 21.  Thirdly, debate in plenary session of the proposed constitution, held on December 22.
 
      (1)  The three December 20 commissions were held simultaneously.  They were broadcast on national television that evening in a special six-hour program as edited versions of each of the three sessions.  Some of the highlights of the sessions follows.
 
    A deputy of the National Assembly addressed the article that declares the duty to work of all persons with the conditions for working (that is, not too old or too young, or not incapacitated in some way).  Observing that persons who do not work receive all the same social benefits as those who do, the delegate expressed concern that there is not a mechanism to enforce this duty.  Another delegate expressed that some people who do not work live better that those who do, and that this was a major concern of the people in the popular consultation.  Members of the Commission responded, saying that the State cannot obligate people to work, or pass a law to the effect.  This would create numerous legal problems, including with respect to international agreements.  The best way is to do it indirectly, by establishing greater rewards for working.
 
       Deputy Eusebeo Leal, Historian of the municipality of Old Havana and a public figure in Cuba, expressed the view that the Preamble ought to include mention of the first Constitution of Guáimaro, which was the constitution of the Republic in Arms from 1868 to 1878.  The amendment was supported by the members of the Commission present, and it was included in the draft approved by the National Assembly on December 22.
 
      A delegate asked, with reference to the article referring to the sovereignty of the State and its jurisdiction, why is cyberspace sovereignty not included?  A Commission member responded that, since cyberspace is international, it is not possible to speak of sovereignty with respect to cyberspace, in the same sense as nations having the right to exercise sovereign control of their territory and natural resources.
 
      A delegate expressed support for the article guaranteeing religious freedom, especially its declaration that the Cuban State is a lay state, meaning that the state does not interfere in religion, and religion does not interfere in political affairs.  He noted that the separation of the state and religious institutions is a modern principle dating from the French Revolution.  The Constitution of 1976 did not proclaim the state atheistic.  Rather, it established is non-confessional state, not favoring any religion.  It established in effect a lay state.  Now, this is explicit.
 
       Deputy Fernando González Llort, one of five Cuban heroes who endured years of imprisonment in the United States as a political prisoner, addressed the article affirming that the state guarantees the just distribution of wealth.  In recognition of the fact that the state must work toward this goal in accordance with the capacities of the nation, he proposed changing the language to “an increasing more just” distribution of wealth. 
 
     One of the members of the Commission explained the modifications in the definition of marriage following the popular consultation (see “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019; and “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019).  The member noted that the modified language avoids mention of the subjects that enter a marriage, that is, whether marriage be defined as a union between a man and a woman or between two persons.  Rather, the question is turned over to the National Assembly, which ought to formulate a family code following a popular consultation, with the new code being subject to approval by the people in referendum.  A delegate who presented himself as a representative of the LGBT community accepts the modification, but he is not agreement referendum; the National Assembly ought to decide, as it does with other laws, and which it has the constitutional authority to do.  Another delegate declared that she considered the modified language, in abandoning “union between two persons,” to be a reversal for the cause of the rights of all, regardless of sexual orientation.  Members of the Constitutional Committee defended the modified language and approach.  Although not declaring that marriage is a union between two persons, the new Constitution affirms diversity in marriage.  In conjunction with another article that affirms the rights of all regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity, the new constitution represents an important advance.  No other country in the world has brought the issue to the level of constitutional change.  The articles on the family in the modified constitutional project point to the need for a change of popular attitudes, and the popular consultation led to much popular education on the theme.  The Commission appears to be taking the position that it supports constitutional and legal sanctioning of gay marriage, but it does not want to impose it on the people; the Commission is in effect assigning to the defenders of gay rights the duty of educating the people, so that a majority would confirm support for the change.
 
      A delegate referred to the fact that some in the popular consultation had asked, why not have direct election of the president?  A member of the Commission responded that the Cuban system has a highly democratic political process in which the people have control, much more democratic than multi-party systems.  Many systems with parliamentary multi-party democracies do not have direct elections of president.  The Cuban political experience demonstrates that its system is highly democratic and participatory process, with power in the hands of the people.  The people participate in the nominations and elect the national assembly in elections of the second degree, in which power is concentrated.  We have to defend our model, he asserted, which is different from other countries. 
 
     (2)  The report by the Constitutional Commission to a plenary session of the National Assembly was held on December 21.  For a summary of this session, see “Cuban Constitutional Commission Reports” 1/21/2019. 
 
      (3)  The debate in plenary session of the National Assembly was held on December 22.  Prior to the beginning of the plenary session, fifty-eight delegates had solicited the opportunity to speak, but some, when their name was called, indicated that subsequent conversations had satisfied their questions or concerns, and they would not be making a declaration or raising a question.  Some indicated the same satisfaction with the addressing of their concerns, but still took the floor, giving a brief expression of support for the process.  Among them were declarations that the popular consultation has been a success for the Revolution and the people, and that the new Constitution is yet another victory of the people.
     
     A deputy proposed amplifying the references to the activists in the revolutionary movements of the colonial and neocolonial epochs.  Members of the Commission spoke against the proposal for stylistic reasons, saying that the Preamble has to be succinct.  The delegate indicated that she understood, and she withdrew the proposal. 
 
      A delegate who identified himself as religious expressed his contentment that the Constitution declares, for the first time, that Cuba has a lay state.  Another delegate later spoke extensively and enthusiastically of the article referring to religious beliefs and the general orientation toward inclusion of religious persons in the revolutionary process; the deputies of the Assembly warmly applauded his intervention.
 
     A delegate proposed that the article referring to the right to sell property include the requirement that the seller inform the state.  A Commission member spoke against the proposal, saying that the right of the State to be informed is protected in other articles and in the law.  The matter was put to a vote of the assembly, and only one delegate voted in in favor of the proposal.
 
      A deputy proposed a change in the language concerning the socialist property of the people.  It was approved by a strong majority of the deputies of the National Assembly.
 
     Fernando González Llort presented his proposal concerning an “increasingly more just” distribution of wealth.  The proposal was approved unanimously by the Assembly.
 
     Delegate Jorge Gomez proposed a change in the article on creative artists.  It was accepted by the members of the Commission, and approved unanimously by the Assembly.
 
     A delegate expressed the view that egalitarians, an extremism that emerged in Cuba in the 1960s, is not revolutionary, because absolute equality is not possible.  He proposed a change in the article declaring that all persons are equal before the law.  In addition to declaring that all persons have the same rights, “without any discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, ethnic origin, skin color, religious belief, disability, national origin, or any other distinction detrimental to human dignity,” he proposed including “persons with less material resources or social condition.”  A member of the Commission expressed agreement with the principle, but argued that including it would complicate the article.  Such protection already is included in various articles of the Constitution.  The delegate decided not to submit to matter to the vote of the Assembly, because of agreement concerning the principle.
 
     A delegate spoke concerning the articles on freedom of the press and freedom of speech, noting that the theme very much manipulated internationally.  He maintained that the goal of socialism is an autonomous press with commitment only to the people, and therefore, it rejects private ownership of media.  He noted that the text asserts that the fundamental media of communication are the socialist property of the people, but it ought to say that the media cannot have any form of property other than the socialist property of the people.  A member of the
Commission responded that the language in the text follows the historical constitutions of 1940 and 1976, and it is consistent with the formulation of Martí and Fidel that the press is obligated to seek the truth.  The Revolution recognizes freedom of the press and the rights of a person to express free though and expression, he maintained.  It would be a step backward for the constitution to confine the media to socialist property of the people; it is a right for the people to express themselves, with limits and regulated.  Socialism does not take this right away, although it does not interpret the right in a liberal bourgeois sense, which seeks to legitimate that the major media of communication are in private hands.
     
     Three representatives of the LGBT community expresses satisfaction with the modifications made by the Commission with respect to families and the definition of marriage.  They called for all to vote for the Constitution, for it endorses the rights of all.  Among the three was Mariela Castro Espín, the most visible defender of LGBT rights and director the Center for Sexual Education and Teaching; as well as the daughter of Raul Castro, General Secretary of the Party, and the late Wilma Espín, founder of the Federation of Cuban Women.  She maintained that the reformulation is an advance in the cause of inclusion and anti-discrimination, contrary to what is disseminated in the international media of information, which has taken out of context the decision of the Commission to not define the subject that enter a marriage union.  The reformulation, she notes, is different from the 1976 Constitution, in that it does not refer to gender in the marriage union, and thus it does not preclude gay marriage.  Moreover, the new Constitution recognizes diverse forms of families, which can include the formation of couples, regardless of sexual orientation.  She announced that after the passage of the new Constitution, we will concentrate on the development of a new family code; we will make reference to scientific developments on the theme, as well as international tendencies, in our efforts to educate the people.  We will combat the international campaign of disinformation concerning the theme.  We congratulate the Commission for its work in developing a democratic constitutional process, and we call upon the people to adopt the constitution on February 24.  She concluded her intervention by paying tribute to her mother and father, who encouraged her in the defense of this cause, but counseled her to do so within the Revolution.
 
     Deputy Susely Morfa, General Secretary of the Union of the Young Communists, expressed support for a new article that focuses on youth.  He declared that “our youth affirm the spirit of the Constitution.”
 
     A deputy applauded inclusion of the protection of flora and fauna.  He notes that this was one of the expressions of the people in the popular consultation.
 
     A deputy supported legal guarantees that are affirmed in the modifications.  She proposed a change concerning when the right to legal counsel begins, indicating that the Constitution should make clear that the right is protected from the beginning of the process.  A member of the Commission maintained that this matter should be attended the laws of the penal code, rather than the Constitution, because when the process begins is complicated by various factors.  The deputy accepted the explanation and withdrew the proposal.
 
     A proposal was put forth by a deputy who is President of the Supreme Court.  It was approved unanimously.
 
     On December 23, 2018, the National Assembly of Popular Power of Cuba, elected directly and indirectly by the people and in accordance with the authority granted to it by the 1976 Constitution, approved the new constitution for submission to the people in referendum.  There were 583 votes in favor, none against, and nineteen absences. 
 
      During breaks in the session, a constitutional specialist, who is president of an organization of Cuban civil society, offered extended commentaries for the television audience.  He noted that a constitution ought to reflect the society.  The Cuban Constitution of 1976, he maintained, reflected Cuban society of that time, and the proposed constitution reflects Cuban society today.  He also noted that few countries in the world have had a popular consultation with respect to a constitution.  In the great majority of countries, a Constitutional Assembly debates and decides, followed in some cases by a popular referendum., but there is not a popular consultation, in which the people are converted into a constitutional assembly (see “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019).
 
     In my next post, I will discuss the content of the proposed Constitution that will be voted by the people in referendum on February 24.  I will note the similarities and differences between this new constitution and that of 1976.

      We have seen in three previous posts that Cuba is developing a new Constitution.  The Constitutional Commission, taking into account the opinions and proposals of the people expressed during the popular consultation of August 13 to November 15, 2018, made substantial modifications of the proposed text.  The Commission presented the modified document to the National Assembly for further debate and modification.  A popular referendum on the proposed constitution will be held on February 24, 2019.  (See “Constitutional Democracy in Cuba” 1/9/2019; “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019; “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019).
 
      On December 21, 2018, at a Plenary Session of the National Assembly, Homero Acosta, speaking on behalf of the Constitutional Commission, made an excellent four-hour presentation of the revisions in the document made by the Commission, based on the popular consultation.  Beyond his duties as a Commission member, Acosta is Secretary of the Council of State, which is the executive branch of the Cuban government, elected by the National Assembly.
 
      Acosta described the principal changes in the text.  Concerning the Preamble, the phrases “clandestine struggle” and “proletarian internationalism” were added, even though very few proposed it, because they were good suggestions.  The word “communism” was included to eliminate confusion over its not being included, which only had to do with the fact that communism pertains to a future stage. 
 
     The few proposals rejecting the socialist character of the revolution and the constitutional definition of the role of the Party were rejected by the Commission, because of the few number of people proposing it, and because of the ample popular support for these principles.  In addition, the Commission rejected the proposal of 4,802 citizens to change name of the country to “Socialist Republic of Cuba,” for historic reasons and because of tradition.
 
     There were some changes made with respect to the section on Economic Fundamentals, specifically the article that defines the various forms of property in the context of a socialist economy.  The description of private property was amplified, such that its complementary role in the socialist economy is affirmed.    There were more than 400 proposals for the elimination of private property, and a few proposals to eliminate the market.  Acosta maintained that these proposals “do not know our reality.”  Some compañeros are prejudiced against self-employment, but workers that are not part of the state sector are part of our revolutionary process, Acosta argued.  “This is a reality that we have to accept; this is the reality of socialism in our circumstances.”  Foreign investment, also, is necessary for our development, Acosta affirmed.  The Constitutional Reform of 1992 recognized this.  Even the Constitution of 1976, when there was no foreign investment, suggested possibilities of cooperation of this kind.  We have to abandon prejudice against foreign investment and recognize its place, as well as that of self-employment, in the socialist economy, he maintained.  The article now makes more explicit that the state regulates and controls the manner in which all the forms of property contribute to economic and social development.  And the new constitution continues with the affirmation of the 1992 reform, that the socialist property of all the people, in which the state acts in representation of the people as proprietor, is the principal form of property. 
 
      An article was added with respect to science: “The state promotes the advance of science, technology, and innovation as necessary elements for economic and social development.”
 
      One article affirms that “the State creates conditions for guaranteeing the equality of its citizens.”  Acosta maintained that this is different from absolute equality.  The State works to create more equality, but it also has to create more wealth, and this sometimes involves adopting measures that promote more inequality.  The adoption of internal use of foreign currency in 1993 is an example, but it had to be done.  We do not presently have the conditions for total equality, and we cannot do things that are beyond our capacity, Acosta argued.  However, responding to the concerns of some for growing inequality, the Commission amended the article to include, “the State makes effective this right [to equality] through the implementation of public policies and laws that promote social inclusion and the safeguarding of the rights of persons whose condition requires it.”
 
     The Commission amplified the article on the right to employment, identifying the role of the state to help the unemployed to find employment.  It amplified the article on health, designating the responsibility of the state to ensure that the system of public health is accessible to the population and to develop programs of prevention and education.  It amended the article on education, rescinding the proposal in the draft to exclude post-graduate education from the right of citizens to free, quality education at all levels.
 
      In response to the polemical debate on the proposal to define marriage as “union between two persons” (see “The Cuban people speak” 1/18/2019), Acosta explained that a new chapter on “Families” has been included.  He stressed the designation of families in the plural affirms that there are many types of families, including traditional families, single parent families, and multigenerational families, as well as couples. Among Cuban couples, 52% are married; and 47% are consensual unions.  And there are homosexual couples.  This is the reality, and the Commission believes that the Constitution has to legitimate what exists. 
 
     However, Acosta continued, the Commission believes it must accept and be respectful toward the various opinions, on both sides of the debate.  We want to arrive at a position that respects both sides; this Constitution must reflect equilibrium and consensus.  Therefore, the new formulation does not mention the subjects that enter into marriage.  It sets aside the debate for another moment, by requiring that the National Assembly develop a new Family Code within two years, and that development of the Code include a popular consultation and a referendum.
 
     Acosta declared that with this resolution of the issue by the Commission, there are no winners and losers.  We all win (a declaration greeted by applause). We continue to affirm the rights of all, and we will not abandon the struggle.  But we have to recognize what is possible today, in a form that respects the positions of all.
 
     Acosta took issue with persons who maintained that presidents are elected directly in other countries.  This is not true, he stated.  Many systems of parliamentary elections have second level elections for head of state.  Including the United States (referring to the Electoral College).  He maintained that the Cuban system is more democratic, because of the direct vote of the people in the formation of municipal assemblies, and the direct vote of the people affirming the second-level elections for the National Assembly.  “We have to defend our form of election.  We respect the systems of other countries.  Ours too should be respected.” 
 
      With respect to the limit of two consecutive terms on important offices of the government and the setting of age limits, Acosta maintained that these proposals came from the Party, and they did not originate in the Constitutional Commission itself.  He cited comments by Raúl on various occasions, who argued that the situation is different from the earlier years, when the Revolution confronted many challenges.  Acosta also cited Fidel on this matter.  The Commission wishes to maintain these proposed restrictions, in accordance with the views of the Party, its historic leader, and its present leader.
 
       A modification was introduced in one of the articles with respect to proposed changes in the structures of government.  The new office of provincial governor is to be elected by the delegates of the municipal assemblies of popular power in the province, rather than being designated by the National Assembly. 
 
      Homero Acosta concluded his four-hour presentation with the affirmation, “Never before in the world has an entire people participated in the development of a Constitution.”
 
     I will discuss the debate on the new Constitution in the National Assembly in my next post.

​     As I described in two previous posts, Cuba is in the midst of a process of developing a new constitution.  A Constitutional Commission named by the National Assembly developed a draft of a proposed new constitution, which the National Assembly subsequently approved.  Next, there was a people’s constitutional assembly, held from August 13 to November 15, 2018, which consisted of 113,680 meetings in neighborhoods and places of work, in which roughly 85% of the adult population attended at least one.  There were 1,706,872 expressions of opinions by the people, including 783,174 proposals, that is, proposed modifications, additions, or eliminations of the text.  Based on these opinions and proposals, the Commission made substantial modifications and then presented it to the National Assembly, which debated, further modified, and approved the document.  A popular referendum that will establish the proposed constitution as the “law of laws” will be held on February 24, 2019.  (See “Constitutional Democracy in Cuba” 1/9/2019 and “People’s Constitutional Assembly in Cuba” 1/11/2019). 
 
      In this post, I address the question, what did the people say in their 1,706,872 interventions in 133,680 meetings?  Overwhelmingly, the people expressed approval of the socialist revolutionary road that has been in march since January 1, 1959.  The very high level of participation in the constitutional process itself is an affirmation.  Moreover, 62% of the interventions included some favorable expression with respect to the unfolding constitutional process.  At the same time, there were a scant thirty expressions of rejection of the socialist character of the revolution; and there were only 262 proposals (0.03% of the proposals) that rejected the constitutional definition of the role of the Communist Party of Cuba as the guiding force of the nation.  Going in the opposite direction, there were 4,802 proposals to change the name of the country to the “Socialist Republic of Cuba.”
 
     Some proposals could be construed as criticism of the Cuban political system, without necessarily implying a rejection of the socialist direction.  For example, the right of the accused to legal counsel was addressed in 2.33% of the proposals, which concerned for the most part a definition of the moment in which this due process right should begin.  These expressions may reflect dissatisfaction with the existing procedures as they operate in practice.  There is some sentiment among the people that those accused of crimes, in some cases, does not have a lawyer with sufficient time prior to the beginning of a criminal trial. 
 
     Similarly, there were 11,080 proposals (1.4% of the proposals and 0.6% of the interventions) in favor of direct election of the president.  In Cuban political discourse, direct election includes the approval or rejection of individual candidates on a list.  So some of these proposals could be expressing a desire that the people in a referendum approve the election of a president by the National Assembly.  On the other hand, some of the proposals referred to elections with competing candidates in other countries, so they might have had some version of this in mind.  Such a proposal is inconsistent with the structures of the Cuban electoral system, characterized by a combination of direct and indirect elections.  It was put forward by a small percentage, and the raising of the issue did not stimulate discussion and debate at the meetings of the people.
 
     There were more than 400 proposals for the elimination of private property, rejecting the greater space for private property granted by the new Constitution, in comparison to the Constitution of 1976.  This could be interpreted as an ultra-Left criticism of the direction taken by the Party and the government in the New Social and Economic Model of 2012.  However, inasmuch as such proposals constituted less than 1% of the proposals, this constitutes an implicit support for the new direction formally established in 2012.
     
     By far, the theme most addressed by the interventions was that of marriage.  The proposed new Constitution changed the language defining marriage from a union “between a man and a woman” to a union “between two persons.”  Some 24.56% of the proposals addressed the issue, more than twice that of any other issue.  Overwhelmingly, the proposals were in favor of reverting to the 1976 language of “a man and a woman,” or arguing that a constitution ought not enter into the issue.  The theme was addressed in 66% of the meetings.  Interestingly, in the section expressing the equal rights of all without discrimination, the insertion of sexual orientation and gender identity did not provoke controversy.  The people seemed to be saying that, yes, all people have rights, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity, but gay marriage ought not be legitimated or legalized. 
 
      The second theme most addressed in the popular consultation was the placing of a limit of two five-year terms on the office of the President of the Republic.  Some 11.24% of the proposals addressed this theme, and they overwhelmingly expressed that no term limits should be placed on the office of the president.  In a related vein, 2.33% of the proposals addressed the establishment of a maximum of sixty years of age for a person to be elected president for a first term.  Overwhelmingly, the proposals eliminated the placing of an age limit on the office, or making the age limit higher.
 
      Some 6.56% of the interventions addressed the article asserting that all able persons have the duty to work.  The interventions reflected the sentiment in the society that too many persons are not working, yet they are receiving full rights and social benefits, and they may be living better materially than most, because of illicit activities or family remittances from abroad.  The interventions overwhelmingly expressed the view that work should be obligatory.
 
     A popular consultation is an open and public process.  Therefore, anyone criticizing the fundamental direction of the nation is doing so publicly, which could inhibit people from expressing their true feelings.  Not that there is any danger of legal action against them.  It is just that, in any social context, when persons express ideas that are against the prevailing consensus, they risk the loss of prestige among their neighbors and co-workers.  However, such rejection by fellow citizens would not deter anyone who is committed to his or her ideals.  Therefore, unless and until there emerges an anti-socialist or counterrevolutionary commitment among the people, in which the advocates of fundamental change are prepared to risk all in defense of their ideas, as the creators of the socialist road in Cuba themselves did, the counterrevolution cannot be taken seriously as a political presence in Cuban society.
 
     The popular consultation of August 13 to November 15 demonstrated the willingness and desire of the Cuban people to participate and to express themselves in the context of a national consensus in support of its socialist project; and to debate issues as framed by the Party, carrying out its historically assigned role as the vanguard of the Cuban nation.  For the foreseeable future, Cuba is on a revolutionary socialist road, with the support and commitment of the people.  I believe that the Cuban people, with the leadership and guidance of the Party, will continue permanently on that road, unless catastrophic events, caused by international developments, intervene.

     On January 10, 2019, Nicolás Maduro Moros took the oath of office for his second term as president.  Maduro won the elections of May 20, 2018 with more than 67% of the vote.  Nevertheless, the United States and several governments in Latin America deny the legitimacy of his government.  The “Group of Lima,” foreign ministers of seven Latin American nations, responding to the directions of Washington, emitted on January 9 a resolution soliciting that Maduro not assume the presidency for a second term.  On the other hand, presidents and delegations from several Latin American governments were present at the swearing-in ceremony, as 94 countries from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East sent delegations.  More than 120 countries as well as the United Nations have ratified the legitimacy of the government. 
 
     The conflict over Venezuela has deep historic roots.  The modern world-system is built on a foundation of colonial domination.  Seven European nations conquered the empires, nations, and peoples of vast regions of the planet from the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries, converting the conquered into suppliers of cheap raw materials on a base of forced labor, thus enabling the economic development of the conquering nations and their immediate neighbors.  During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the colonized formed anti-colonial movements, obligating the colonial powers to concede political independence.  However, colonial economic structures were preserved following independence, and various imperialist forms of penetration and intervention were developed.  As a result, the former colonies did not have true independence, which gave rise to popular anti-imperialist movements throughout the former colonies.  These movements condemned not only the imperialist powers, but also the national politicians, political parties, and governments that accommodated imperialist interests for personal gain.
 
       In this global scenario defined by neocolonial structures and imperialist policies, any nation that has been able to mobilize its political and economic resources toward an autonomous road has been branded an outlaw nation by the global powers.  The governments, corporations, and civil organizations of the powerful have sought to destroy the governments and political leaders that possess the audacity and the capacity to lead their peoples and nations toward a destiny different from that assigned to them by the global powers.  They have used all methods, including aggressive and barbarous military attacks, support for brutal dictatorships, economic sanctions, and the dissemination of half-truths and lies.  Examples of nations seeking autonomous economic and political development that have been branded and punished are legendary.  They include the People’s Republic of China, Vietnam, (North) Korea, Nasser’s Egypt, Cuba, Tanzania in the time of Nyerere, Chile in the age of Allende, the first stage of the Sandinista Revolution in power in Nicaragua, the government of al-Qaddafi in Libya, and the Islamic Republic of Iran.  In Latin America today, the targeted nations are Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia.
 
      Economic interests shape political thought and behavior in the colonies and neocolonies, as occurs everywhere.  Accordingly, two tendencies emerge, namely, accommodation and revolution.  Those who accommodate to imperialist interests are tied to sectors that economically benefit from the colonial/neocolonial economic relation.  Such sectors include the landed estates and mines that export raw materials as well as import/export commerce with the metropolis.  Some accommodationists are well grounded in the ideological orientation of the North by virtue of education and employment.  In the great majority of cases, in the transition from colonialism to neocolonialism, the accommodationists are installed in political power by the withdrawing colonial power. 
 
     However, the majority of the people in the neocolonies, including peasants, workers, and professionals, do not have an interest in accommodation to neocolonial domination.  They have an interest in the economic and social development of the nation, on a base of diversity of production and commerce, including scientific and technological development.  They have an interest in the structural transformation of neocolonial economic structures, such that autonomous and nationally directed economic development can occur.  They have an interest in the true sovereignty of the nation.  They have an interest in the taking of political power from the accommodationists, such that the state can act to promote the economic development of the nation and to defend the social and economic rights of the people.
 
       Domination and exploitation nearly always are based on force, but they are never carried out by brute force alone.  The global conflict between colonialist North and neocolonized South includes a battle of ideas, as the imperialist powers justify their interventions with ideological distortions that they present to their own peoples and that they disseminate throughout the world.  They speak of communism, terrorism, human rights, and humanitarian intervention.  With these ideological maneuvers, the imperialist nations and imperialist policymakers present themselves as defenders of democracy and civilization as they inflict great damage on the peoples of the world as well as on their own young men and women who are sent to carry out morally questionable missions in hostile areas.
     
       Such are the fundamental dynamics of the world.  A world-system founded on colonialism, constituting a neocolonial world-system that ensures the flow of raw materials, lowed-waged manufactured goods, and capital from the neocolonies to the metropolitan centers.  Indirect political control by the core powers, with the support of accommodationist actors.  Anti-imperialist social movements throughout the neocolonies, with the taking of political power by the movements in some cases, branded as outlaw nations and attacked.  The dissemination of ideological distortions, designed to discredit the recalcitrant nations and their leaders and to justify economic and military actions against them.  If our frame of reference is not shaped by colonial consciousness, that is, by consciousness of these fundamental historical and global dynamics of the last five centuries, we are not going to be able to understand very much about the world today, and we will be more easily taken in by the ideological distortions.
 
       Colonial consciousness helps us to understand the conflict concerning Venezuela today.  The Venezuelan twentieth century popular anti-imperialist movement above all was oriented to attaining national control of the oil industry.  The movement was not able to attain control, in spite of the nationalization of the industry in 1976, because Venezuelan managers accommodated to the economic interests of international oil capital.  Following the implementation of neoliberal policies, which began in 1989 in the case of Venezuela, foreign penetration of the economy intensified, and foreign political influence increased.  In 1992, Hugo Chávez led a group of military officers in a failed coup d’état, proclaiming the need for a constitutional assembly.  Released from prison in 1994, Chávez formed the Bolivarian Fifth Republic Movement.  He was democratically elected president in 1998, on the basis of a campaign calling for an alternative constitutional foundation and charging that the national elite was “kneeling undignified before the imperial power.”  When Chávez assumed the presidency in 1999, he convoked a Constitutional Assembly, the delegates of which were elected by the people in free, direct, and universal elections.  The Constitutional Assembly approved a new Constitution that established the Fifth Republic.  Chávez was elected president for two consecutive terms under the mandates of the Constitution, winning in free elections by strong majorities, before dying of cancer in 2013 prior to the completion of his second term. (See various posts in the category Venezuela). 
 
       The presidency of Hugo Chávez had three basic dimensions.  First, the taking of effective control of the oil industry, by appointing managers of the state petroleum company who were committed to Venezuelan national development and not the interests of international capital.  In addition, Chávez visited leaders of OPEC countries, forging new agreements with respect to limits on oil production, thus generating higher prices and more government income.  Secondly, the redistribution of income, through the channeling new oil revenues toward programs that responded to the needs of persons of modest income, including programs that reduced illiteracy and expanded educational opportunity and health care.  Thirdly, a foreign policy that sought Latin American unity and integration, seeking to develop alternative structures to those of the neocolonial world-system.  Accordingly, Chávez and Fidel founded in 2004 the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), an association of Latin American and Caribbean states dedicated to integration, unity, and mutually beneficial commerce and cooperation.  ALBA was the foundation for other regional anti-imperialist initiatives, such as the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR, founded in 2008) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC, founded in 2010), in which Venezuela was one of the leading actors (see various posts in the category Latin American unity) .
 
     As a popular revolutionary project that seeks to attain the true sovereignty of the nation and to develop its own endogenous project of national development, the Chavist Bolivarian Revolution is a threat to the neocolonial world-system.  The U.S. government has sought to undermine the Chávez government through the support of those sectors in Venezuela that have economic interests opposed to the goals of the revolutionary project, sectors that benefit from the neocolonial world order.  These sectors initially included: the technocratic elite that managed the petroleum industry prior to 1998; the business elite, owners of import-export companies; leaders of the union of petroleum workers, who were in a privileged position relative to the majority of workers; the landed estate bourgeoisie, historic beneficiaries of the core-peripheral relation; and the traditional political parties, junior partners in the imposition of neocolonial structures and in the implementation of neoliberal policies.  The opposition sectors control the private media of communication, and they can count on international financial support and the active engagement of the US embassy.   
 
      During the period of the Chávez presidency from 1998 to 2013, the opposition generated much conflict, but the Chavist forces prevailed.  However, with the death of Chávez in 2013, the opposition escalated its tactics, seeking to destabilize the government of Nicolás Maduro.  In February 2014, fascist gangs were organized to attack citizens and property, and the international media falsely presented the violent groups as peaceful student protestors.  There were calls for US intervention.  But Maduro weathered the storm by responding with political intelligence.  He convoked peaceful demonstrations by supporters of the Bolivarian revolution; he announced the organization of popular vigilance in centers of work and study and in neighborhoods; and he called for dialogue with the moderate opposition, seeking to isolate the extreme right. 
 
     But more challenges lay ahead.  Beginning in the summer of 2014, oil prices began a sustained and sharp fall, which significantly affected the Venezuelan economy, inasmuch as petroleum accounts for ninety percent of national income from foreign trade.  In addition, China adopted a model of slower economic growth, which reduced the prices of metals and soybean exported by Venezuela to her trading partners in Latin America.  Moreover, the value of the U.S. dollar increased, resulted in higher costs for imported goods in Venezuela.  These dynamics made evident the limits of the strategy of using oil revenue to redistribute income.  Further progress must be made in practice with respect to the Revolution’s goal of increasing and diversifying national production.
 
      An economic war, which had been waged by the opposition against the governments of both Chávez and Maduro, intensified and had greater effect in the context of the economic difficulties of 2014-2015.  Inasmuch as Venezuela imports more goods that it consumes, the country is dependent on the importing companies.  When these companies, with foreign financial support, reduce the availability of food, medicine and consumer goods by hording goods in warehouses and reducing imports, the result is critical shortages, price speculation, and price increases.  The withholding of food and medicine as a political weapon violates international law, and in the case of Venezuela, it has been conducted by importers and big merchants against the people of their own nation.
 
      The difficulties from the economic war, in conjunction with a constant anti-government campaign by the corporate owned media, gave rise to a lack of satisfaction with the government by the people.  As a result of the growing popular dissatisfaction, a coalition of opposition parties won the parliamentary elections of December 6, 2015, attaining nearly a two-thirds majority.
 
      The opposition parliamentary victory of 2015 makes evident the need for the improvement and further development of popular assemblies, where the people are able to discuss their concrete problems with their co-workers and neighborhoods.  In such a setting, informed revolutionaries are able to explain the sources of the shortages and price increases, making clear the culpability of the opposition, and not the revolutionary government.  The Bolivarian revolution has had a commitment to develop popular assemblies, but it needs to develop them further.
 
     However, the limitations of the opposition parliamentary victory also should be understood.  The Chavists continued to control other governmental powers, namely, the executive and judicial branches as well as the military forces.  In addition, the Constitution of 1999 was a creation of the Bolivarian revolution, and it supports revolutionary goals.  Moreover, the opposition has no viable program to offer.  In reality, the opposition favors a neoliberal dismantling of the structures established by the Bolivarian Revolution, but it did not campaign on such a program, and if now announced, such a platform would not have popular support. 
 
     Therefore, the opposition in early 2016 found itself in control of one of four governmental branches, with an unannounced agenda that, if clearly proclaimed, would not have popular support.  Moreover, the opposition was divided between a moderate and extreme opposition.  The moderates were prepared to work within the structures of the Constitution to promote their political objectives, even though this would likely imply merely partial and limited political power.  In contrast, the extreme opposition, recognizing the obstacles to obtaining sufficient popular support for a neoliberal restauration through constitutional means, sought to foster political destabilization and to create an international image of chaos, which would provide a pretext for a foreign military intervention that would create the opportunity for the taking of full political control by Venezuelan actors committed to neoliberalism.
 
     In the opposition-controlled parliament, the extremists gained the political upper hand over the moderates.  The extremists immediately demonstrated their contempt for the other constitutional powers.  They projected that the constitutionally elected president would be removed from power within three months.  They called for popular demonstrations against the government, and they organized violent gangs that burned public buildings, looted commercial establishments, and attacked supports of the Bolivarian Revolution.  Rather than formulating a proposal for an alternative direction for the nation, their focus was on the fomenting of political instability.  The international media supported their agenda, falsely portraying the violence as repression by the government of peaceful demonstrators. 
 
      In 2016, the opposition-controlled parliament came into conflict with the Venezuelan Supreme Court over the seating of three parliamentary deputies.  Much was at stake here, because the three additional seats would have given the opposition a two-thirds majority, enabling it to adopt measures without presidential approval.  However, the Supreme Court ruled that the three deputies should not be seated, as a result of irregularities in the voting in their districts.  The Parliament defied the Court, and administered the oath of office to the three deputies, thus ignoring the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court.  In response, the Court ruled the National Assembly to be in contempt of court.
 
     The Constitution mandates that, if the National Assembly is found in contempt of court, a Constitutional Assembly should assume the functions of the National Assembly, until the National Assembly obeys the decision of the Court.  Accordingly, taking into account the continuing violence of the opposition and the ongoing stalemate between the National Assembly and the Supreme Court, in June 2017 Maduro convoked a Constitutional Assembly.  Some 545 delegates to the Constitutional Assembly were elected in a universal, secret, and direct election held on June 30, 2017.  The majority of the elected delegates were Chavists, a result that was influenced by the fact that a good part of the opposition was oriented to disruption rather than to the nomination of candidates, and by popular disgust with the conduct of the opposition since its parliamentary victory of December 2015.
 
      Reflecting growing popular rejection of the opposition for its irresponsible conduct, Chavist candidates won the regional elections of October 2017.  The Chavist party, United Socialist Party of Venezuela, won 18 state governorships; whereas two opposition parties, Democratic Action and Justice First, won five.  Chavist candidates received 54% of the total votes cast.  Voter participation was 61%, the highest in the nation’s history for regional elections.
 
      In response to the violence and the attempts at promoting political instability, Maduro was continually calling for dialogue with respect to any issues of substance.  Accordingly, an encounter between the government and the opposition was held in the Dominican Republic, in which it was agreed that the presidential elections scheduled for the end of 2018 would be moved up to May of that year.  The Constitutional National Assembly emitted a decree to the effect, and elections conducted by National Electoral Council were held on May 20, 2018.
 
     Maduro won the May 2018 presidential elections with 5,823,728 votes (67.7%).  Henri Falcón of Progressive Advance was second with 21.1%.  Two other candidates had lower percentages.  The elections were recognized as free and fair by the opposition candidates and by international observers.  The voter participation was lower than in previous elections in the Chavist era, for two reasons.  First, the switch of voters from the opposition to the “ni-ni” category (neither for nor against the Chavists), as a result of the irresponsible conduct of the parliamentary majority.  Secondly, some opposition leaders, recognizing that they could not win and more oriented to destabilization, called for a boycott of the elections.  Nevertheless, Maduro’s absolute vote was roughly the same as in previous elections that the Chavists won, but now the vote represented a higher percentage of the votes cast.  Moreover, Maduro’s vote as a percentage of eligible voters was higher than that of the winning candidates in recent presidential elections in other nations, including Brazil, Argentina, and the United States.
 
      In fact, the Venezuelan electoral system in the Chavist era is recognized as one of the best in the world, with transparency and high voter participation.  It has been so characterized by former President Jimmy Carter.  In last 20 years, 25 elections have been held; and Chavists have won 23 of them. 
 
      But the United States stands against Venezuela.  In 2015, the Obama administration declared that Venezuela is a threat to the national security of the United States.  In August 2017, the Trump administration ordered economic and financial sanctions against Venezuela, with the intention of deepening the economic problems caused by the fall in oil prices, stimulating an economic collapse.  The United States has endeavored to use the Organization of American States, its historic diplomatic arm for controlling Latin America, in its attack on Venezuela.  The OAS attack is directed by Luis Almagro, Secretary General of the OAS, with the coordination of the Southern Command of the U.S. military.  Amargo convoked a session of OAS on March 28, 2017, but he was unable to obtain the approval of OAS members for the expulsion of Venezuela from OAS (as was done with respect to Cuba in 1961) or any other action against Venezuela.  On January 11, 2019, a U.S.-supported resolution not recognizing the legitimacy of the Maduro government and urging countries to take punitive measures against Venezuela was presented at an extraordinary session of the Permanent Council of OAS; however, it did not obtain the necessary votes from the member nations. 
 
       U.S. policy toward Venezuela has nothing to do with democratic elections or constitutional procedures.  From the U.S. point of view, the problem with Venezuela is that it is an oil rich country that does not submit to its mandates.  And even worse, it is a country that has played a leading role in forging a unified movement toward autonomous economic development and genuine political independence among nations located in what used to be the U.S. “backyard.”   The USA is supporting an economic and media war against Venezuela with the intention of promoting political instability and an international image of chaos, in order to justify a military intervention, dressed up as humanitarian aid. 
 
     U.S. policy in Venezuela is consistent with its general policy with respect to Latin America, which involves efforts to destabilize governments in the vanguard of change, operating through opposition political sectors that have an economic stake in the neocolonial world order.  Today, the attack is directed against of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua.  It was directed against Ecuador and the citizen revolution led by Rafael Correa, before that revolution was hijacked by a Trojan Horse.  Meanwhile, in accordance with the same imperialist objectives, the economic, commercial, and financial blockade of Cuba continues.
 
       As the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela struggles to move forward in the face of the interferences and the threat of military intervention by the imperial power, it must in the long term strengthen itself through the diversification of the economy; the strengthening of popular assemblies and alternative structures of popular power; and the further development in practice of South-South commerce.  Nicolás Maduro, the constitutionally elected and legitimate President of Venezuela, is working hard on these objectives.
 
     Perhaps the United States will ultimately decide not to take the option of military intervention, taking into account the risks, including armed resistance in the occupied nation, opposition by numerous governments and international organizations, and widespread popular rejection in the world and in the United States itself.  However, taking into account the declining capacity of the United States to apply economic forms of inducement and coercion, as well as the growing political resistance of the neocolonized to U.S. demands, the peoples and nations of the world must be prepared for the increasingly likely possibility that the United States will return to its earlier forms of imperialism.  That is, we must prepare ourselves for the sad phenomenon of the declining hegemonic power increasingly turning to military interventions and propping-up military dictatorships in defense of its economic interests.