Posted April 3, 2014

​      Wallerstein’s various essays reflecting on knowledge provide a review of the basic developments in epistemology (1999, 2004, 2006).  Before the modern era, theologians asserted that they could know both the true and the good on the basis of revelation.  They were challenged by the philosophers, who claimed to know the true and the good on a foundation of reason.  Then came the separation of philosophy and science.  Modern science claimed that it could know the truth, but not the good, on the basis of empirical observation, and the search for the good became interpretation or even mere speculation, relative to the person or social location.  In the twentieth century, the truth of science also became challenged, as philosophers of science began to understand that even science emerged in social context and was influenced by cultural assumptions.  Doubt was cast on the human capacity to understand not only the good but also the true.  Knowledge became uncertain.  Post-modernism emerged, including tendencies toward a radical relativism that reduced all truth claims to personal expression.  Wallerstein considers this breakdown of the twentieth century epistemological consensus of the world-system to be a dimension of the terminal structural crisis of the system, and he maintains that the formulation of an alternative epistemological consensus will be integral to the transformation of the world-system.

      I have proposed “cross-horizon encounter” as a methodological guideline for the alternative epistemology that we need to formulate.  I maintain that through cross-horizon encounter, we can arrive at a universal understanding, although not an eternal or certain understanding, of the true and the good (see “Universal philosophical historical social science” 4/2/2014).

     I have drawn from the Catholic philosopher Bernard Lonergan in the formulation of the concept of cross-horizon encounter.  That an essential component of the solution to our current dilemmas would come from a scholar formed in the institutions of the Catholic Church is unexpected.  However, it does make sense, if we give the question some thought.  The Catholic Church is one of the few institutions that pre-date the origin of the modern world-system, and it is by far the largest of them.  Prior to the emergence of the modern world-system, the Church was an important power in Europe.  But various dynamics greatly reduced its power.  Among them was secularization, that is, the separation of science from philosophy and theology, which established science as the domain for the determination of facts, on the basis of empirical observation, and reduced moral and spiritual questions to the realm of mere speculation.  The Church had to accept this situation as a part of its general strategy of adapting to political realities and political powers (Wallerstein 2005).  But the Church never completely made its peace with the modern situation.  As a result, during the twentieth century European Catholic theologians developed a school of thought known as neo-Thomism, which sought an adaptation of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas to the twentieth century.  Among the neo-Thomists was the Canadian Bernard Lonergan, who as we have seen, focuses on epistemological questions, including the question of certainty.  By formulating a single method of knowing in both the realms of the true and the good, and by clarifying the conditions in which there is a high probability that understandings are correct, Lonergan established a renewed epistemological foundation for the philosophical and theological claims of the Church, a foundation that would have some creditability to the modern person.

     As Catholic theologians and philosophers sought to find their place in the modern world, the people suffering from the denial of social and economic rights did not find the need to wrestle with theological or philosophical questions.  They simply continued with their religious beliefs and practices, always evolving, but continually characterized by a simple piety that affirms the presence of God, the saints, and/or the spirits in their lives, sustaining them through difficulties.  The poor have endured, in part, through personal piety.

      But significant numbers of the people also participated in Third World national liberation movements, which like Catholic theologians, did not make peace with the premises of the modern world-system.  The struggles of the peoples of the Third World provide the foundation for the development of an alternative just and democratic world-system, including alternative values and epistemological premises.  Like the neo-Thomist theologians and philosophers, the intellectuals and charismatic leaders of the Third World movements have been formulating a critique of the fundamental assumptions of the modern world-system.  Although Third World and Catholic critiques have been formulated from different vantage points, they nonetheless complement one another.

       The complementarity of Catholic and Third World epistemologies has its counterpart in the political arena, inasmuch as Catholic liberation theology has come to the support of the political and social struggles of the neocolonized.  Perhaps a global Third World-Christian alliance is emerging, as the Church increasingly is critical of the barbaric neoliberal economic war against the poor and the savage militarism of the neocolonial powers.  Perhaps this alliance is symbolized by the embraces of John Paul II and Fidel and by the later embraces of Pope Benedict and Raúl, as well as by the declarations by Hugo Chávez that Jesus was the world’s first socialist.  Perhaps as well such a global alliance against savage capitalism involves not only Christians but all religions persons, as is indicated by the growing relations between the Latin American progressive and leftist governments and the Islamic Revolution.  There is a fundamental contradiction between capitalism at its worst and the values proclaimed by all religious traditions.  And in the terminal crisis of the capitalist world-economy, capitalism at its worst has become manifest.

       This takes us in a direction different from what is suggested by Wallerstein, who believes that complexity theory and cultural studies provide the basis for the reunification of historical social science.  As we have seen (“The terminal crisis of the world-system” 3/28/2014), complexity theory enables us to understand that physical and social realities are characterized by order, patterns, and equilibrium for a period of time, but inevitably their contradictions lead to bifurcation and a transition to a new equilibrium and a new order.  Cultural studies refers to the post-1960s movement in the humanities that rebelled against the established canons of aesthetic achievements; cultural studies has maintained that cultural works are produced and interpreted differently according to social location, thus making it necessary to deconstruct cultural works.  Wallerstein maintains that cultural studies in the humanities and complexity theory in the natural sciences recognize that knowledge is socially constructed; and that in embracing one of the claims of the social sciences, the two tendencies are moving toward the social sciences.  For Wallerstein, this provides a possible basis for the reunification of knowledge (Wallerstein 2004:54-55; 1999:213-17).

     In my view, there are important insights in complexity theory and cultural studies, which must be incorporated into universal philosophical historical social science.  However, I do not believe that these theoretical tendencies have an adequate social base for the resolution of our epistemological dilemmas. 

     Complexity theory and cultural studies have emerged from the preoccupations of scientists, social scientists, persons of literature, humanists, academics, and intellectuals of the core.  Their concerns are far removed from the preoccupations of the great majority of people on the planet, in core and peripheral zones, for whom: the real can be observed and understood; what is written and said can be understood by those who take the time to read and listen; and moral truths are self-evident.  From the point of view of the peoples of the Third World, we can know the true and the good, if we pay attention to it, and are not led astray by the pursuit of particular interests and by the defense of privilege.  I will discuss the epistemological assumptions of Third World movements in a subsequent post.

     I believe that the resolution of our epistemological difficulties will emerge from the premises of the social movements that are formed by the peoples of the planet.  And as the movements are unfolding, we are given a message from Catholic philosophy and theology: listen to what the poor are saying, and take seriously their understanding.  So here we have the key to imagining a possible path in the bifurcation of the world-system:  Through cross-horizon encounter with Third World movements, we intellectuals of the North can participate in the development of a universal philosophical historical social science that educates and informs the people and at the same time is connected to popular epistemological assumptions. 


References

Lonergan, Bernard.  1958.  Insight.  New York:  Philosophical Library.

__________.  1973.  Method in Theology, 2nd edition.  New York:  Herder and Herder.

McKelvey, Charles.  1991.  “The Cognitional Theory of Bernard Lonergan” in McKelvey, Beyond Ethnocentrism:  A Reconstruction of Marx’s Concept of Science, Pp. 127-52.  New York:  Greenwood Press. 

Wallerstein, Immanuel.  1999.  The End of the World as We Know It:  Social Science for the Twenty-First Century. 

__________.  2004.  The Uncertainties of Knowledge.  Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 

__________.  2005.  “The Catholic Church and the World,” Commentary No. 159 (corrected version), April 15, 2005.  [Available on Fernand Braudel Center Website].

__________.  2006.  European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power.  New York: The New Press.


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Wallerstein, world-systems analysis, historical social science, Lonergan, cross-horizon encounter, Thomism, Catholic theology

Posted April 4, 2014

     The existing structures of knowledge emerged during the nineteenth century as an integral dimension of a world-system characterized by colonial domination of vast regions of the planet by seven European powers.  In the 1960s, anti-colonial and anti-neocolonial movements in the Third World reached an advanced stage, and they impacted political consciousness in the core, exposing the contradictions between the democratic pretensions of the global powers and the fundamental colonial and neocolonial structures that sustained them.  A dimension of the world-wide revolution was its critique of the functional relation between the structures of knowledge and the global structures of domination.  Because of the impact of the global revolution, the social roots of knowledge became widely recognized, and the epistemological consensus that had been evolving and consolidating since 1789 collapsed, a phenomenon that is one symptom of the terminal crisis of the world-system.  Although some adjustments have been made, such as the creation of departments of African-American studies and women’s studies, the pre-1968 structures of knowledge remain intact.  And although various scholars are working in disparate new directions, an alternative epistemological consensus has not emerged. 

     The emergence of an alternative epistemological consensus must be an integral part of a transformation of the world-system from a neocolonial world-system to a just and democratic world-system.  This social transformation has begun in peripheral and semi-peripheral zones of the world-system, and it thus represents a possibility for the future.  But a revolutionary social process has not yet emerged in the core, where the major centers of higher education are located.  A transformation of the structures of knowledge will require that a popular revolutionary process emerge in the core.

      How can we imagine a popular revolution in the core?  In accordance with the methodological guideline of cross-horizon encounter (see “Universal philosophical historical social science” 4/2/2014), we must encounter popular revolutions in other lands in order to learn from these experiences.  Of course, we cannot apply strategies developed in one context to another, at least not without creative adaptation.  But we are able to understand general revolutionary structures by observing the various revolutionary processes that have occurred in the world, focusing especially on those popular revolutions that have been able take power, to deliver on many of the promises to the people, and to maintain themselves in power for a reasonable period of time.

     Drawing upon observation of popular revolutions in general, what are revolutionary structures that we can imagine as having possibilities for the core? First, there must occur the education of the people, the formation of a vanguard from among the people who have an understanding of the structures of domination of the neocolonial world-system and of the historic and contemporary movements of the Third World that seek the development of a just and democratic world-system.  We need to form local groups that meet regularly to study, to dialogue, and to act locally; and to elect delegates who will participate in the emerging alternative political structure at the regional, state, and national levels.  From this vanguard that combines study and action, charismatic leaders must emerge, leaders who can lead the people in the transformation of the fundamental structures of the world-system, in solidarity with similar efforts in other nations throughout the world.

      In the formation of a vanguard, intellectuals have a necessary role, as a consequence of the educational function of the vanguard.  Many of these intellectuals, but by no means all, will be academics.  But they must be academics who are aware of the limitations of the assumptions and boundaries of the academic disciplines; and who are prepared to sacrifice their careers, that is, to advance less in prestige and bureaucratic authority within the structures of higher education.  They must liberate themselves from the disciplinary assumptions and bureaucratic structures of academia in order to discover relevant questions through cross-horizon encounter with the social movements formed by the dominated.  They must dedicate themselves to popular education and to the raising of political consciousness among the people, working in structures of popular education being developed by the unfolding alternative revolutionary political structure.

      The ultimate goal of the alternative revolutionary political structure must be the taking of power.  We must move beyond protesting the policies formulated by those in power, beyond “speaking truth to power.”  The goal must be to take power, with the intention of governing in a form: that defends the social and economic rights of the people in the nation and the world; that conducts foreign policy on a basis of respect for the sovereignty of all nations; and that develops policies that promote ecologically sustainable forms of production.

       As the vanguard forms, and the revolutionary process unfolds, the revolution will be able to attend to one of its tasks, which is the reorganization of the division of knowledge within the universities.  The revolution can call upon social scientists, historians, and philosophers to reorganize knowledge.  As a rising political force, the revolution will have the possibility of overcoming the resistance of petty conservatives in academia, who presently defend the turf of their various disciplines.  As the general social transition occurs, the reorganization of the university becomes possible.  An alternative university can be created as part of a more just and democratic world-system, a university that seeks to develop knowledge that serves the needs of the people and not the interests of the powerful.

      Keeping a vision like this in mind, intellectuals and academics of the North today need to personally liberate themselves from the assumptions and bureaucratic structures of higher education and to search for ways to encounter the movements of the Third World, seeking to develop alternative forms of understanding that grasp colonial and neocolonial structures of domination,  and searching for strategies of popular education and political action in the North that are connected to and work in solidarity with the Third World national liberation movements that seek a more just and democratic world.  

     We intellectuals of the North today confront a situation in which our people are confused, and they are divided between reactionary conservatism and moderate liberalism.  Furthermore, public discourse that shapes popular consciousness is superficial and ethnocentric.  It thus does not seem possible that the people would support a revolutionary process. Confronting a similar situation of ideological confusion in Cuba at the end of the nineteenth century, José Martí asserted that the task of the revolutionary is to make possible the impossible.  He formed the Cuban Revolutionary Party, which took the first decisive steps toward the liberation of the people from structures of domination.  We should take a lesson from Martí and concentrate our energies on creative strategies for transforming popular consciousness.

     The peoples of the North have the right to understand the world and the options that are available for future human development.  By organizing fields of study in a form that systematizes the blocking of relevant questions from consciousness, the structures of knowledge in higher education deny this right.  We intellectuals of the North must creatively search for ways to overcome this obstacle.

     Above all we must believe in the possibility of social transformation.  We will never be full citizens until we believe that we can be subjects in history: reading, thinking, creative and politically active subjects who are forging our destiny.

     The most powerful weapon of social control is the generation of ideas that convince the people that they must accept things as they are.  When I was a child growing up in suburban Philadelphia, I often heard the expression, “You can’t fight City Hall.”  We should invent an alternative saying, “You can fight City Hall, and you can win.  But it will be a long fight that will require discipline, determination, and courage.”  How do I know that this is possible?  I have seen it in other lands.


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Wallerstein, world-systems analysis, historical social science, Lonergan, cross-horizon encounter

Posted April 14, 2014

​      World-systems analysis developed by Immanuel Wallerstein provides a foundation for understanding the modern world.  It enables us to understand the role of European colonial domination in creating the world-system and its inequality between developed and underdeveloped regions.  And it enables us to understand the role of neocolonialism and imperialism in maintaining the economic relations established during the colonial era.  In addition, Wallerstein has described European justification of its domination with ideas that it presented as universal, but in fact represent a “European universalism.”

       I have maintained in previous posts that cross-horizon encounter, where we encounter the social movements of the dominated, is the key to overcoming the assumptions and distortions of European ethnocentrism, and that such personal encounter involves meeting people and taking serious their interpretation of reality (see “Universal philosophical historical social science” 4/2/2014; “What is personal encounter?” 7/25/2013; “What is cross-horizon encounter?” 7/26/2013; “Overcoming the colonial denial” 7/29/2013; “Wallerstein and world-systems analysis” 3/25/2014). 

     Wallerstein’s experience in developing world-systems analysis illustrates the process of cross-horizon encounter.  In Africa, Wallerstein encountered African nationalism during its movement that culminated in the political independence of most African nations.  He took seriously the passionate claims of African nationalists that their social condition was that of the “colonial situation.”  He recognized that the fundamental truth of this claim could not be denied, and that the responsibility of the scholar was to seek to understand the forces that gave rise to its development.  He realized that conventional sociology, with its use of “society” as a unit of analysis, was inadequate for this task.  He read the Martinican intellectual Frantz Fanon, the Guinean revolutionary Amilcar Cabral, and Black Panther co-founder Huey Newton.  Fanon, Cabral, and Newton, and African nationalism in general, expressed in one form or another that conventional Marxism was not applicable to the colonial situation, and this may have led Wallerstein to conclude that conventional Marxism, like conventional sociology and political science, was not able to address the questions he was asking.  Wallerstein found key insights in the works of European scholars who were not in the mainstream of European scholarship.  From the French historian Fernand Braudel, he took the pivotal concepts of the world-economy, which expanded his space-scope beyond the “society” of conventional sociology; and the “long term,” which provided him with a time-scope that was longer than the contemporary and shorter than eternity.  The Polish economic historian Marian Malowist enabled him to deepen his understanding of the concept of periphery and to understand that Eastern Europe had become a peripheral region of an emerging capitalist world-economy in the sixteenth century.  Karl Polanyi’s differentiation of three types of economic behavior enabled him to formulate a distinction between two types of world-systems: world-empires and world economies.  Thus, he came to understand that the modern world-system was one of many world-systems in human history, and that the African “colonial situation” was established by the incorporation of Africa into the periphery of an expanding European capitalist world-economy after 1750 (Wallerstein 1986a; 1986b; 1986c; 2004a; 2004b).

   There is similarity between Wallerstein and Marx.  Marx encountered the working class, and he combined this personal encounter with a study of political economy and his previous study of German philosophy to formulate the new theory of historical materialism. Wallerstein arrived at new insights by virtue of encounter with African nationalism, and he combined this with a study of Braudel to formulate world-systems analysis.  Both illustrate the importance of cross-horizon encounter, that is, encounter with the social movements formed by a dominated class.

      In formulating historical materialism, Marx placed socialist thought on a scientific foundation.  He formulated a transition to socialism based on empirical observation of the possibilities contained in existing economic and political conditions.  Socialism no longer was a utopian and idealist vision for humanity, but a projection of a real possibility through the practical resolution of contradictions in the existing political-economic system.  But historical materialism was not only an advance for socialist theory and practice.  It also was an advance for science, for it brought the science of political-economy beyond its bourgeois perspective, and it brought the study of philosophy beyond its idealism.  But the university did not take advantage of Marx’s achievement.  The disciplines of history and the social sciences were organized separately from one another and on a basis of scientistic (but not scientific) epistemological assumptions, thus ensuring that social scientists, historians, and philosophers would not have understanding of the insights of Marx.  Such exclusion of Marx was functional for the world-system, inasmuch as historical materialism was a formulation from below with implications for the political, economic, and cultural transformation of the world-system.  However, the achievements of Marx were not left in abeyance.  They were appropriated by Lenin and subsequently by revolutionary Third World charismatic leaders and intellectuals, who reformulated and transformed his insights in accordance with particular national conditions in relation to the colonial situation.  Thus, there occurred an evolution of Marxism-Leninism outside the universities in the form of the formulation of insights by revolutionary charismatic leaders and intellectuals of the Third World.  This in effect meant the evolution of scientific knowledge apart from and independent of the universities.

      Wallerstein pertains to the world of the universities, and his initial formation led him to internalize some of its misguided assumptions (Wallerstein 2004:87-88).  But his personal encounter with African nationalism in the 1960s (combined with his study of Braudel) enabled him to break through this limitation and to formulate world-systems analysis.  His achievement represents, on the one hand, an important advance for the science of the universities, for it creates a foundation for universal philosophical historical social science (see “Reunified historical social science” 4/1/2014; and “Universal philosophical historical social science” 4/2/2014).  At the same time, Wallerstein’s achievement represents an advance for the evolution of Marxism-Leninism connected to revolutionary Third World movements, for it enables movement leaders and intellectuals to understand liberation struggles in a broader historical and global context.  In effect, world-systems analysis contributes to the continuing development of Marxism-Leninism in the Third World movements.

       But Wallerstein’s achievement has its limitations.  Wallerstein encountered the Third World evolution of Marxism-Leninism in one of its important manifestations, namely, African nationalism.  But it was not based on a sustained encounter with other significant manifestations of the evolution of Marxism-Leninism in the Third World: the Chinese Revolution, the Vietnamese Revolution, the Cuban Revolution, and the popular revolutions in Latin America today.  The formulation of universal philosophical historical social science that can further advance scientific knowledge and contribute to the making of a more just and democratic world-system will require sustained encounter with the evolution of Marxism-Leninism in the Third World revolution in all of its manifestations. 

      This limitation in the development of world-systems analysis up to now is, in my view, the reason that Wallerstein sees the emergence of an alternative socialist civilizational project as a theoretical possibility but not as a real emerging possibility.  This real possibility is expressing itself in the Third World today, where movements and governments are demanding a more just and democratic world-system.  This movement from below has been provoked by the terminal structural crisis of the world-system.  Led by Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Cuba, it has taken concrete steps toward the creation of an alternative more just and democratic world-system.  This will be the subject of my next post.


References

Wallerstein, Immanuel.  1986a. “Africa in a capitalist world” in Wallerstein, Africa and the Modern World.  Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Pp. 47-76. [Originally published in 1973].

__________.  1986b. “The Lessons of the PAIGC” in Wallerstein, Africa and the Modern World.  Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Pp. 37-45. [Originally published in 1971].

__________.  1986c. “The Three Stages of African Involvement in the World Economy” in Wallerstein, Africa and the Modern World.  Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Pp.101-37. [Originally published in 1978].

__________.  2004a. “The Itinerary of World-Systems Analysis, or How to Resist Becoming a Theory” in The Uncertainties of Knowledge, Pp. 83-108.  Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  [Originally published in J. Berger and M. Zelditch, Jr., Eds.  New Directions in Contemporary Sociological Theory (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), Pp. 358-76.]

__________.  2004b. “Time and Duration” in The Uncertainties of Knowledge, Pp. 83-108.  Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  [Originally published in Thesis Eleven 54 (Sage Publications, 1998).


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Wallerstein, world-systems analysis, knowledge, epistemology, philosophy of social science

Posted April 16, 2014

​     In the emergence of the Third World revolution during the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the Third World movements of national liberation have repeatedly formulated the fundamental characteristics of the good society.  One aspect of their political action has been to pressure the United Nations and other international organizations to adopt resolutions that affirm fundamental principles that ought to govern human conduct, both within and among nations. Because of the success of this political action, many international documents and declarations proclaim basic moral principles.  These declarations are so extensive, and the principles that they express have been so frequently repeated by leaders of all regions of the world, that I like to call them “universal human values.”

      What are the “universal human values” that have been affirmed repeatedly by humanity?  They include the principles: that all persons ought to possess social and economic rights, including free education and health care and adequate nutrition, housing, clothing, and transportation; that the state ought to act definitively and decisively, to the extent that national resources permit, to protect the social and economic rights of its citizens; that special attention should be given to the needs of vulnerable populations and to sectors that historically have been victimized by discrimination, such as children, women, the elderly, indigenous populations, ethnic minorities, and migrants; that all persons have the right to meaningful political participation; that all persons have the right to cultural formation and to the development of political consciousness; that women have the right to full and equal participation in the society; that all peoples and nations have the right to self-determination; that all nations have the right to sovereignty and to autonomous national development; that all peoples have the right to the preservation of their cultures and their languages; that production should be directed toward the satisfaction of human needs, and it should not be driven by the market or by profits; that ecological forms of production should be rapidly developed; and that states should act definitively and decisively to protect the environment.  The proclamation of these principles has often been accompanied by denunciations of the global powers for their repeated violation of them.  Thus the peoples of the earth have denounced colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, interventions in the political affairs of nations, and the imposition of the neoliberal project.

        Whereas the European-centered world-system formulated what Wallerstein (2006) calls a European universalism, the Third World national liberation movements during the past seventy years have formulated a universal universalism.  The Third World formulation has drawn upon the popular movements of all regions of the world: the bourgeois democratic revolution, which affirmed the rights and the equality of all men; the socialist movements that sought to defend social and economic rights; the communist movements that developed workers’ and peasants’ councils and the principle of popular democracy; the Third World movements of national liberation, which proclaimed that not only individuals but also nations and peoples have rights, such as those of true sovereignty, self-determination, and cultural preservation; the women’s movement, which affirmed that democratic rights pertain fully and equally to women; and the ecology movement, which proclaimed the necessity of a harmonious relation with nature.  In appropriating Western moral values, the Third World movement transformed their meaning, expressing them in a complementary form with one another and in a context that was defined by colonial and neocolonial domination. 

      Many of the universal human values, but not all, have been affirmed by governments and political leaders of the North.  But often governments and political leaders of the North behave cynically.  They often see universal human values as something that should be proclaimed but not implemented.  They often view such proclamations as useful for pacifying the rebellious South or for satisfying demands of certain popular sectors in the North, but they avoid putting them into practice.  But in the Third World, the affirmation of universal human values in the formal declarations of international agencies is taken seriously.  It is seen as an important step in the construction of a more just and democratic world-system.  Third World governments and movements repeatedly call upon governments of the North and international organizations to respect the principles to which they have given formal approval.


References

Wallerstein, Immanuel.  2006.  European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power.  New York: The New Press.


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Wallerstein, universalism, universal human values

Posted April 17, 2014
  
​     In various posts, I have discussed the significance of the Catholic philosopher Bernard Lonergan in enabling us to understand a method through which we can arrive at an understanding, if we desire to understand.  I have called this method cross-horizon encounter, which involves personal encounter with the movements of the dominated, where personal encounter consists of meeting persons and taking seriously their understandings.  Cross-horizon encounter enables us to discover relevant questions that previously were beyond our horizon and our consciousness.  Such discovery empowers us to liberate ourselves from ethnocentric cultural assumptions and beliefs.  The knowledge that we collectively develop through cross-horizon encounter is not eternal truth, because new developments in reality or in theory can lead to new understandings; but it is the most advanced understanding of which humans are capable in a given historical period.   Neither is this knowledge characterized by certainty, because there always exists some probability that not all relevant questions have been asked.  But when persons seeking to understand find that the answers to relevant questions are reinforcing the insight, they are in a position to know that the insight has a high probability of being correct.  And they are therefore in a position to make the judgment that the insight is correct and to take the decision to act, to commit themselves to political and social action on the basis of the judgment that the insight is correct (see “What is personal encounter?” 7/25/2013; “What is cross-horizon encounter?” 7/26/2013; “Overcoming the colonial denial” 7/29/2013; “Universal philosophical historical social science” 4/2/2014; “We can know the true and the good” 4/3/2014).

      For Lonergan, the human capacity to make judgments that go beyond ethnocentrism and that possess a degree of certainty, and to take decisions to act on the basis of these judgments, pertain to the realms of both fact and value.  That is, they pertain not only to judgments concerning what is, but also to judgments concerning what ought to be done.  They involve not only descriptions of what in fact has happened in human history, but also evaluations concerning the characteristics of the good society.  As I have previously expressed, we can know both the true and the good.

      We have seen that during the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Third World movements have proclaimed universal human values (see “Universal human values” 4/16/2014).  These universal moral values could be considered self-evident truths.  Thomas Jefferson considered that there are self-evident moral truths. He arrived at this understanding on the basis of the experience of the British settlers in North America, on whom taxes and duties were imposed by the British Parliament in order to pay debts accumulated during the Seven Years War (see “The US popular movement of 1775-77” 11/1/2013).  This seemed to the Americans as an injustice, and it seemed to them that as citizens they possessed certain rights.  Jefferson’s formulation of the notion that “all men are created equal” and possess “certain inalienable rights” advanced human understanding of the good and the right.

      Similarly, the colonized peoples of the Third World have emerged to proclaim certain rights, formulated in the context of their systemic denial.  Experiencing colonial domination and consequent underdevelopment, they moved to demand universal respect for social and economic rights and for the right of all peoples to self-determination.  Confronting the neocolonial world-system as politically independent nations, they moved to demand universal respect for the rights of all nations to sovereignty and true independence.  They moved to condemn the processes that denied these rights: colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, and neoliberalism.  They are formulating what appear to them to be self-evident moral truths that can provide a foundation for a world-system that is more just and democratic.

       Thus, we can understand universal moral values, or self-evident moral truths, as an important component of human knowledge.  They have been developing as an integral dimension of a dialectical relation between theory and practice that has been advancing human knowledge.  In various posts reflecting on the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, I have discussed some of the key moments in this unfolding dialectical process:  Marx, encountering the proletarian revolution, formulated a critique of the science of political economy and placed socialism on a scientific foundation; Lenin, on the basis of the Russian Revolution, advanced further the understanding of social dynamics; the universities, however, marginalized the insights of Marxism-Leninism; but Marxism-Leninism continued to evolve in popular revolutions, such as the Chinese Revolution, the Vietnamese Revolution, the Cuban Revolution, and revolutionary African nationalism, thus establishing the development of knowledge of social dynamics outside the institutions of higher education; in the context of awareness of the uncertainties of knowledge and the multicultural character of the social world, Lonergan formulated a cognitional theory that explains the process through which humans can understand the true and the good; on the basis of encounter with African nationalism, Wallerstein formulated world-systems analysis, partially reconnecting the knowledge of the universities with the knowledge of social dynamics emerging in the revolutionary movements; and since 1995, Third World revolutionary movements have renewed, a process particularly advanced in Latin America.  These are the key moments in the development of an emerging universal philosophical historical social science.

     The emerging universal philosophical historical social science seeks not only to understand what has happened and what is happening; it also seeks to understand the characteristics of the good society and the essential components of right conduct.  It seeks to understand not only the true, the good and the right, but also the process of understanding itself, providing methodological guidelines for the human quest for understanding.  And it appreciates the wisdom of charismatic leaders who have been lifted up by peoples whose tremendous thirst for social justice has established a democratic option for humanity.

     The formulation of universal philosophical historical social science is an unfinished collective work, a work still in process.  It seeks to not only advance human knowledge of social dynamics but also to contribute to the creation of a more just and democratic world-system. 


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Wallerstein, Lonergan, epistemology

Posted January 7, 2014​

      During the period of October 1843 to August 1844, Marx experienced a profound intellectual transformation.  The cognitional theory of the twentieth century Canadian Catholic philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan enables us to understand what occurred.  Lonergan maintains that culturally-rooted assumptions constitute horizons that block relevant questions from consciousness, thus leading to ethnocentric understandings.  For Lonergan, this problem can be overcome through personal encounter with persons of different horizons, enabling a person to arrive at an understanding that goes beyond the limited, partial, and ethnocentric understanding that is rooted in his or her culture (see “What is personal encounter?” 7/25/2013; “What is cross-horizon encounter?” 7/26/2013).

     Marx experienced this phenomenon of personal encounter with persons of different horizons from October 1843 to August 1844, when Marx relocated to Paris and began listening to and taking seriously the understanding of the artisans, industrial workers, intellectuals (including journalists, writers, university professors, and medical doctors) connected to the workers’ movement.  Marx’s personal encounter with the working class movement occurred as he was studying intensely the British science of political economy, which was fundamentally different from the German philosophy that had formed Marx’s perspective prior to October 1843.  Unlike German philosophy, which focused on the history of ideas, British political economy was an analysis of the modern system of capitalism, and it was based on empirical observation (McKelvey 1991; see “Marx and the working class” 1/6/2014). 

      This simultaneous process of encounter with the working class struggle and with British political economy was the experiential bases for an intellectual transformation that provided the foundation for Marx’s intellectual and moral project: an analysis of human history and of modern capitalism on the basis of a synthesis of German philosophy and British political economy, written from the vantage point of the proletariat.  The basic outlines of the project are evident in the writings that were published after his death as the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, written from April to August.  He would spend the rest of his life further developing its formulation, but its basic outlines were in place by August 1844.  Whereas his writing prior to October 1843 reflected a radical philosophy typical of German intellectuals, his double encounter with the science of political-economy and the working class movement led to what Lonergan calls an intellectual and moral conversion, such that by 1844 he was formulating the basic concepts of the new scientific perspective of historical materialism (McKelvey 1991).

     Lonergan’s cognitional theory enables us to understand that Marx formulated an analysis of the political-economy of modern capitalism that was not merely different from that of Adam Smith but was more precisely a further development of the analyses of Smith and Ricardo and a more advanced formulation, in that Marx’s formulation was a more integral and comprehensive analysis based on relevant questions that emerged from horizons defined by three intellectual and moral traditions: German philosophy, English political economy, and the emerging Western European proletarian movement.  Lonergan’s cognitional theory also enables us to understand how Marx, although a petit bourgeois intellectual, was able to write from a proletarian point of view, for it provides us with the explanation that Marx through encounter with the working class movement had discovered relevant questions that were beyond the horizon of the petty bourgeois cultural context, enabling him to move beyond its limitations.

       Marx’s achievement was to overcome the parameters of nationality and class within the context of nineteenth century Europe.  In our time, the movements that challenge the capitalist world-economy emerge primarily not from the exploited European working class but from the neocolonized and superexploited peoples of the Third World.  Just as Marx delegitimated the notion of a general interest, a concept that obscured class interests at stake in theoretical interpretations, our task today is to overcome the colonial denial, which obscures the role of colonialism and neocolonialism in the origin, development, and reproduction of the modern world-system (see “Overcoming the colonial denial” 7/29/2013).  And just as Marx’s achievement was rooted in encounter with the newly emerging working class movements of his time, our understanding today must be based on encounter with the movements from below in our time, that is, with the anti-neocolonial movements of the Third World.  What is required is a reconstruction of the classical Marxist formulation on the basis of a vantage point rooted in the colonial situation.  And such a reconstruction is underway and has today reached an advanced stage, inasmuch as Marxism-Leninism has been reformulated through adaptation to the colonial situation by charismatic leaders such as Ho Chi Minh and Fidel, and inasmuch as a further reformulation is occurring today in the context of the Chavist revolution in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.


References

McKelvey, Charles.  1991.  Beyond Ethnocentrism:  A Reconstruction of Marx’s Concept of Science.  New York:  Greenwood Press. 


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marx, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, cross-horizon encounter

Posted January 9, 2014

     Synthesizing German philosophy and British political economy from the perspective of the exploited, Marx formulated an intellectually powerful and spiritually moving vision that discerned meaning and purpose in human history.  It focused primarily on the development of systems of production and technology and the structures of domination that emerged from them.  Marx viewed technological development as tending to increase the level of domination but also as establishing new possibilities for human progress.  Accordingly, he believed that the unfolding economic and social forces of his time were creating unprecedented forms of human exploitation and alienation, but they also were establishing the conditions that would make possible a new era of human freedom.

    Marx identified five stages in human history.  He saw technological development as integral to the transition from one stage to the next: the invention of agriculture led to the transition from tribal (hunting and gathering) society to ancient society; the invasion by “barbarians” led to the emergence of feudal society; the invention of the factory established the foundation for capitalist society; and the development of automated industry would establish the conditions for the transition to socialism.  On giving centrality the development of the material forces, Marx formulated an understanding more advanced than the idealism of German philosophy and at the same time more comprehensive than the limited historical consciousness of British political economy (Bottomore 1964; Marx 1963, 1967, 1970, 1973; Marx and Engels 1948, 1965).

     But the possibilities for advances in social scientific understanding established by Marx’s work were not realized in the subsequent development of knowledge in the world of the university.  Academic structures were shaped in accordance with bourgeois interests, leading to the fragmentation of philosophy, history, and the social sciences and facilitating the marginalization of Marx’s work (see “History from below” 12/4/2013).  Thus it would be the charismatic leaders lifted up by popular movements who would further develop the important insights that Marx had formulated.  Therefore, we must turn to the writings of charismatic leaders of popular movements to find further formulation of a comprehensive historical social science, the foundations of which were established by Marx.  I will endeavor in future posts to formulate the key insights of the major charismatic leaders, whose insights constitute the evolution of Marxism as a science.

        In reflecting on Marx’s work, we must keep in mind the context and the specific purpose of Marx’s intellectual project.  Marx was writing during the nineteenth century, and his goal was to overcome the limitations of the idealism of German philosophy and the ahistorical empiricism of British political economy in order to formulate an analysis of human history from the vantage point of the emerging Western European proletarian movement.  In this blog, I am writing of course in a different historical time, and I am seeking to write from the vantage point of the movements of the neocolonized of the Third World.  As a result, my writing has a tendency to give more emphasis than did Marx to the role of conquest in human development, seeing technological development as occurring on a foundation of conquest (see “Dialectic of domination and development” 10-30-2013; “The French Revolution in Global Context” 11/26/2013).  But this is merely a difference in emphasis reflecting different historical, social and intellectual contexts. 

     Certainly Marx understood the central role of conquest in human history, as is clear from the final part of Volume One of Capital, in which he maintains that force is the secret of the primitive accumulation of capital (Marx 1967:713-74).  “In actual history,” he writes, “it is notorious that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly force, play the great part. . . .  The methods of primitive accumulation are anything but idyllic” (1967:714).  It is a question of forcibly separating the producer from the means of production, as for example, when peasants at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth were forcibly driven from the land, thus producing the surplus labor that formed the English proletariat (1967:714-718).  Furthermore, he understood that forceful appropriation in vast regions of the planet was the foundation for the primitive accumulation of industrial capital: “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the running of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signaled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.  These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation....  These methods depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial system. . . .  Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one.  It is itself an economic power” (1967:751).

       Accordingly, I view the perspective that I am seeking to formulate, the perspective of the dialectic of domination and development, as a Marxist formulation that shares with Marx basic concepts and orientations.  It searches for meaning, direction, and purpose in human history.  It recognizes the fundamental role of conquest and class domination in human technological, economic, and cultural development, and it sees the unfolding of these dynamics as establishing definitive possibilities for a new era of human freedom and liberation.  It views these possibilities as being seized in our time by the dominated neocolonized peoples, who act in their own defense, and in so doing, act in defense of all humanity.  What I am seeking to express is not classical Marxism, but it is Marxism.  It rejects the idealist philosophy and the fragmented empiricism that rules in higher education.  It seeks to formulate a form of Marxism adapted to and appropriate for the current phase in human development.

     Since 1850, those struggling for social justice in a variety of social contexts throughout the world have found in Marx’s writing a powerful analysis of their own conditions of exploitation, domination and struggle.  Many reformulated some of his basic concepts to adapt his analysis to their reality, thus establishing that his work would have global political implications: it would provide powerful analytical tools for those who sought to create an alternative political-economic system. 

      For those of us who are intellectuals of the developed countries of the North, Karl Marx is our exemplar.  It was he who first discovered the key to understanding the modern world: encounter the social movements formed by the dominated, combining this with study  of the most advanced forms of understanding that have been formulated by our species in its present stage of development.  He has shown us the road to the true and the right.


References

Bottomore, T.B., Ed.  1964.  Karl Marx: Early Writings.  New York: McGraw-Hill.

Marx, Karl.  1963.  The Poverty of Philosophy.  New York: International Publishers.

__________.  1967.  Capital, Vol. I.  New York: International Publishers.

__________.  1970.  A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.  New York: International Publishers.

__________.  1973.  Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy.  New York: Random House, Vintage Books.

Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels.  1948.  The Communist Manifesto.  New York: International Publishers. 

__________.  1965.  The German Ideology.  London:  Lawrence & Wishart. 


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marx, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, dialectic of domination and development

        In order to be objective and scientific, history must be understood from below, from the vantage point of the oppressed.  As I have expressed in earlier posts, understanding an issue requires asking relevant questions, which are discovered through encounter with persons of different horizons and cultures.  This process of cross-horizon encounter receives its most advanced expression in the form of encounter with the social movements that have been formed by the oppressed, the exploited, and the marginalized (see “What is Personal Encounter?” 7/25/2013; “What is cross-horizon encounter?” 7/26/2013; and “Overcoming the colonial denial” 7/29/2013 in the section on Knowledge).

       The possibilities for insight from below were first demonstrated by Marx, who arrived at his insights through encounter with the working-class movements of France and Western Europe during the 1840s.  He subsequently developed his understanding further through reflection on the Paris commune of 1871 and on the first signs of the Russian Revolution in 1870-71.  Thus, Marx’s understanding was intimately tied to working-class movements.  This connection enabled him to develop an understanding more advanced than that of German philosophy, which could not escape idealism; French socialism, which was utopian; and British political economy, whose development in insight was rooted in and limited by a parallel development in the emerging bourgeoisie, thus implicitly reflecting a bourgeois point of view (McKelvey 1991).

     Inasmuch as the democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth century triumphed as bourgeois revolutions, the forms of knowledge of Western Europe and the United States have been constrained by bourgeois interests, and they thus have nullified the implications of Marx’s more advanced analysis.  The mechanisms for doing so were (1) the fragmentation of the social sciences and history into distinct disciplines, and (2) the formulation of a false understanding of scientific objectivity (see “Overcoming the colonial denial” 7/29/2013; “What is cross-horizon encounter?” 7/26/2013).  Both strategies were effective in blocking relevant questions from being investigated.  Thus mainstream history and social science were being formulated de facto from above, not taking into account the relevant questions that emerge from below.

      The French Revolution was forged by actors of different classes, including artisans, peasants, merchants, financiers, factory owners, and workers (see “Class and the French Revolution” 11/27/2013).  They for the most part had a common interest in the abolition of feudalism, but their different interests led to different conceptions of the form of democracy that ought to emerge.  Thus, to understand the French Revolution, we have to maintain consciousness of the class interests that are at stake as the process unfolds.  The vantage point from below enables us to do this, because the lower classes understand that the form of democracy being pushed by the bourgeoisie is not their own, and it reflects the particular interests of the bourgeoisie.

     The important study of the French Revolution by the French historian Albert Soboul (1975) is sometimes obscure on this point.  He is aware of the class differences of the actors, but he often refers to them as the “middle class,” combining in this vague term actors as different as shopkeepers and artisans, on the one hand, and large merchants and factory owners, on the other.  The Argentinian historian Valeria Ianni (2011), on the other hand, maintains consistency in describing the actors as pertaining to distinct classes and thus as having a vision that reflects class interests.  Ianni’s analysis enables us to have a more advanced understanding of the French Revolution and of its gains and limitations.

     On the other hand, Ianni’s analysis reflects to a certain degree what we might call classical Marxism, which described the emergence of new classes and new forms of class exploitation.  But the capitalist world-economy and the modern world-system forged not only new classes and new forms of class exploitation.  They also developed new forms of domination by some nations over others, pushing the historic process of empire formation to a more advanced stage.  Indeed we have seen that European colonial domination of vast regions of America, Africa, and Asia established the foundation for the modern world-system and the capitalist world-economy (see various posts in the section on the World-System).

      Thus our analysis today cannot be confined to analyzing the world-system from a vantage point rooted in the European proletarian movements, which was the vantage point of classical Marxism.  We today must seek to understand the double axis of class domination and global imperial domination, and it must be based on relevant questions that emerge from movements formed both by exploited classes and by colonized peoples.  In effect, what is needed is a synthesis of Marxism-Leninism, rooted in European proletarian and peasant movements, and the Third World national liberation perspective, rooted in the anti-colonial and anti-neocolonial movements of the Third World.  Such a synthetic understanding has been formulated by those Third World national liberation movements that have most fully appropriated the insights of Marxism-Leninism, with the Vietnamese Revolution and the Cuban Revolution being the most advanced manifestations.

      From this synthetic Marxist-Leninist-Third World vantage point, four observations can be made concerning the French Revolution.  (1) The Revolution was a process of fundamental change that was pushed forward by classes that had been formed by the historic human tendencies toward conquest and centralization, tendencies that took a significant step forward with the Spanish and Portuguese conquest of America.  (2) The Revolution culminated in the triumph of bourgeois interests at the expense of the interests of the poplar classes, but the popular sectors would later invoke its values to attain some degree of protection of social and economic rights.  (3) The Revolution formulated values of universal validity, such that the colonized and neocolonized peoples of the world would come to embrace them, ultimately deepening their meaning to include the rights of nations and peoples to sovereignty and self-determination.  (4) The French Revolution is being brought to fruition today through the global movement for a just and democratic world, which seeks human liberation from all forms of domination.


Reference

McKelvey, Charles.  1991.  Beyond Ethnocentrism:  A Reconstruction of Marx’s Concept of Science.  New York:  Greenwood Press. 


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, French Revolution      

Posted July 25, 2013

     The twentieth century Catholic Canadian philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan analyzes the various forms of human knowledge (natural sciences, social sciences, philosophy, theology, and common sense) in order to address the issue of the possibility of attaining objective knowledge.  
  
      Lonergan maintains that there is in all of us a “pure desire to know.”  The desire to know can be cast aside by other desires: rest, sleep, food, comfort, wealth, power.  But we all have moments in which these other desires are stilled, and our attention is focused on the desire to understand.  Some of us are called to a life of intellectual work, in which we develop a daily pattern of permitting the desire to know to come to the fore.  
      
      But as we seek to understand, can we manage to formulate concepts that in some form are independent of the social roots and social positions in which we necessarily, as human beings, are immersed?  If so, how can we do it?  
 
     For Lonergan, as we seek to understand, we proceed within a particular social context.  We all occupy different positions by virtue of the different societies and sub-societies to which we belong.  In each social position, we learn through social interaction a coherent set of values, facts, and assumptions concerning the world.  Lonergan seeks to stress that this worldview is rooted in a particular social place, and he thus invokes an analogy and calls it our “horizon.”  
 
      By enabling us to make sense of the world, horizon aids understanding.  The natural and social world in which humans live is complex, and we would be overwhelmed and bewildered were it not for a socially-based and commonly-accepted set of assumptions, facts, and values that enable us to meaningfully organize selected elements of the complex world in which we live.

      At the same time, horizon limits our understanding, in that it provides us with a view of the world that is shaped by the particular social positions that we occupy.  Horizon thus constitutes the fundamental basis for ethnocentrism.  As Lonergan wrote:
"As our field of vision, so too the scope of our knowledge, and the range of our interests are bounded.  As fields of vision vary with one’s standpoint, so too the scope of one’s knowledge and the range of one’s interests vary with the period in which one lives, one’s social background and milieu, one’s education and personal development.  So there has arisen a metaphorical or perhaps analogous meaning of the word, horizon.  In this sense what lies beyond one’s horizon is simply outside the range of one’s knowledge and interests: one neither knows nor cares" (1973:236).

      Lonergan, however, maintains that we can overcome the limitations imposed on understanding by horizon through personal encounter with persons who possess social positions and horizons different from our own.  Personal encounter involves “meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing one’s living to be challenged at its roots by their words and their deeds” (1973:247).  
 
       Thus, personal encounter is the key to transcending the limitations of culturally-rooted assumptions and moving toward an understanding that is universal.  In subsequent posts, we will explore the implications of Lonergan’s insight into human understanding for our understanding of the global crisis that humanity today confronts.

 
References
 
Lonergan, Bernard. 1958.  Insight.  New York: Philosophical
Library.
 
__________. 1973.  Method in Theology, 2nd edition.  New  York: Herder and Herder.

 
Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, Lonergan, cognitional theory, epistemology, philosophy

      The significance of personal encounter (see “What is personal encounter?” 7/25/2013) is related to the characteristics of understanding.  The philosopher Bernard Lonergan views understanding as a process in which, having established for the moment the desire to know as paramount over other desires, we move through different levels: experience (sensual data and facts); understanding (and formulation); judgment (factual and moral); action based on understanding; and a cyclical return to experience.  As we move through the level of understanding and formulation, we respond to questions that are relevant to the issue at hand.

      Personal encounter is critical precisely at this moment of raising and responding to relevant questions.  As we seek to understand, we may not be aware of questions that are relevant to the issue, because such questions are beyond the scope of our horizon.  But through encounter with persons of other horizons, we become aware of relevant questions of which we were previously unaware.  If we are driven by the desire to know, we will address these newly discovered questions, which cannot have any other consequence than transforming our understanding, taking us beyond what was possible in the context of our horizon.  Encounter thus enables us to discover relevant questions and to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding.

     An Englishman in colonial Kenya, for example, may not think to ask the question, what is the role of English conquest and colonial domination in promoting poverty in Kenya?  But a Kikuyu cannot possibly avoid considering the question, given that the English conquered the Kikuyu through force of arms and relocated them to “African reserves” in order to obtain land for coffee plantations.  An Englishman who encounters, in Lonergan’s sense of the term, the Kikuyu social movement will become aware of this relevant question.  If he is driven by the desire to know, rather than by a desire to protect English interests, his understanding will be transformed.  To the extent that he is driven by the desire to know, our Englishman can move toward understanding and scientific knowledge, moving beyond the ideologies that promote particular interests, if he engages in personal encounter with the Kikuyu.  

      Lonergan invokes the image of horizon to refer to the culturally bounded assumptions that shape human understandings, and he maintains that the limitations imposed on human understanding by horizon can be overcome through personal encounter with persons of different horizons (see “What is personal encounter?” 7/25/2013).  I have coined the term “cross-horizon encounter” to refer to this process.

     Cross-horizon encounter is integral to attaining an objective understanding, that is, a universal understanding that transcends cultural differences, and as such, can be affirmed as true by persons of different cultures.  Cross-horizon encounter enables us discover relevant questions, pushing us beyond an understanding rooted in our particular social positions.  Cross-horizon encounter enables us to develop understandings that take into account the experiences and understandings of persons of different social positions and horizons.  Anyone who desires to understand must be driven by the desire to know and must seek cross-horizon encounter.

     In future posts, we will continue to explore the implications of “cross-horizon encounter” for understanding the global crisis that humanity confronts and for understanding what collective action is required in order the safeguard the future of humanity.

Greetings from Havana, Cuba

July 26, 2013

Sixtieth anniversary of the attack on the Moncada Barracks, an event that announced the armed struggle against the Batista dictatorship.

Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, Lonergan, cognitional theory, epistemology, philosophy