Posted September 5, 2014

      In his address to the court on October 16, 1953 (see “Fidel: ‘History will absolve me’” 9/4/2014), Fidel Castro maintained that if the assault had succeeded, the revolutionaries would have had the support of the people.  He described the people in the following terms.

He described the sectors that comprise the people: 600,000 unemployed; 500,000 agricultural workers who work only four months of the year and who live in miserable shacks; 400,000 industrial workers without adequate salary, pension, or housing; 100,000 tenant farmers, working on land that is not theirs; 30,000 teachers and professors who are poorly paid; 20,000 small businessmen who are weighed down by debt and plagued by graft imposed by corrupt public officials; and ten thousand young professionals in health, education, engineering, law, and journalism, who find that their recently attained degrees do not enable them to find work (2014:30-31).

     Fidel maintained that if the Moncada garrison had been successfully taken, five revolutionary laws would have been immediately broadcast by radio.  (1)  The re-establishment of the Constitution of 1940, with the executive, legislative, and judicial functions assumed by the revolutionary government, in order that the government would be able to implement the popular will and true justice, until these governmental structures, presently distorted by dictatorship and corruption, can be restored legitimately.  (2) The ceding of land to tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and squatters who occupy parcels of land of five caballerías or less, with compensation for the former owners.  (3)  The granting of the right of workers and employees in commercial, industrial, and commercial enterprises to 30% of the profits.  (4)  The granting of the right of tenant farmers to 55% of the yield of sugar production, and a guarantee to small tenant farmers of their participation in the sugar commerce.  (5) The confiscation of property that was fraudulently obtained as a result of government corruption, with the establishment of special tribunals with full powers to investigate and to solicit the extradition of persons from foreign governments (2014:32-33; 2007:28-29).

     Fidel further explained that these five revolutionary laws would have been proclaimed immediately, and they would have been followed by other laws, in which the specific measures would be based on previous study.  These further laws would include such areas as agrarian reform, the integral reform of education, the nationalization of (US-owned) electric and telephone companies, the return to the people of the excessive money that these companies have collected through high rates, and the payment to the government of taxes that have been evaded (2014:33; 2007:29-30).

     Fidel explained the structural roots of the social problems of Cuba.  Cuba is an agricultural country, an exporter of raw materials and an importer of manufactured goods; it has limited industrial capacity.  More than half of the productive land is foreign-owned.  Eighty-five percent of small farmers pay rent, and many peasant families do not have land to use for the production of food for their families.  These economic conditions generate inadequate housing, low levels of education, and high levels of employment (2014:34-36).

      The solution to these problems, Fidel maintained, cannot be based in strategies that protect the interests of the economic and financial elite.  A revolutionary government would ignore such interests and would act decisively in defense of the needs of the people.  It would mobilize capital to develop industry; distribute land to peasants; stimulate the development of agricultural cooperatives; establish limits to the amount of land that can be owned by an agricultural enterprise, expropriating the excess acreage; reduce rents; expand and reform the educational system (2014:34-41).

     In formulating a program for the next stage of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro did not mention US imperialism, nor did he cite Marxist thinkers or mention Lenin or the Russian Revolution.  Jesus Arobelya writes of “History will absolve me:”

     Given the ideological distortions that are integral to the subjective conditions of the neocolonial situation, to speak of socialism or to speak in Marxist terminology would have generated confusion, and it thus would have been less effective in communicating the motivation and the goals of the revolutionary leadership, and it would have generated division within the popular movement.  Thus, Fidel focused on the unjust conditions that are experienced by the people in their everyday lives and on the concrete steps to be taken to resolve these problems.  Only later, more than two years after the triumph of the revolution, having implemented concrete steps in defense of the people, did Fidel proclaim that the Cuban Revolution was a socialist revolution.  So Fidel used an intelligent strategy for educating the people concerning the meaning of revolution and of socialism, focusing first on practice and later on theory.

     Fidel’s capacity to develop an effective strategy of popular education, moving from practice to theory, was a consequence of his unusual capacity to think both theoretically and concretely, which will be the subject of our next post.

     An English translation of “History will absolve me” can be found in Fidel Castro Reader (Deutschmann and Shnookal 2007).


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Castro, Fidel.  2007.  “La historia me absolverá” in Fidel Castro: Selección de documentos, entrevistas y artículos (1952-56).  La Habana: Editora Política. 

__________.  2014.  History Will Absolve Me: Speech at the Court of Appeals of Santiago de Cuba, October 16, 1953.  La Habana: Editora Política.

Deutschmann, David and Deborah Shnookal, Eds.  2007.  Fidel Castro Reader.  Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel, Moncada

Posted September 8, 2014

     We have seen that on October 16, 1953, during the trial for the assault on the Moncada garrison, Fidel Castro made a statement, later distributed clandestinely as “History will absolve me,” that formulated concrete steps that would have been taken by a revolutionary government that had seized power.  And we have seen that this formulation reflected a concept of a revolutionary process that included the political and cultural formation of the people, beginning with practice and moving to theory (see “The Moncada program for the people” 9/5/2014).

      The key to Fidel’s exceptional capacity to imagine a revolutionary political-theoretical process lies in his form of thinking: he understands issues in historical and theoretical terms, and thus he possesses a solid grasping of the structural roots of problems and the steps necessary for solution.  But he does not explain to the people in historical and theoretical terminology, except briefly and succinctly.  He primarily explains in concrete language that connects to the world-view of the people.  He possesses not only understanding of the historical development of social dynamics, but he also has what the philosopher Bernard Lonergan had called the intelligence of “common sense.”

      Fidel’s common sense intelligence is rooted in his appreciation that the perspective of the people is based on their experience of problems: “subsistence, rent, the education of the children and their future” (2014:22).  The solutions proposed in “History will absolve me” respond to these concrete problems: the ceding of land to tenant farmers, the sharing of profits by workers in industry and mining, and increasing the small farmer’s share of the sugar yield.  When the proposal goes beyond addressing concrete popular needs, its steps are tapping in on resentments that are felt and expressed by the people: nationalization of foreign companies that charge exorbitant rates, and just punishment for corrupt government officials.  And the proposal that the revolutionary government assume executive, legislative, and judicial functions, in order to act decisively to implement the popular will, is fully consistent with the frustrations of the people, who have experienced that governments, except in revolutionary circumstances (such as the Grau-Guiteras government of 1933), do not respond to popular will but to the interests of the powerful.  The Moncada program was a proposal that was full of common sense intelligence, and as such, it was connected to the sentiments and the understanding of the people.

     But the Moncada program was not only connected to popular sentiment.  It was based in an understanding of the objective conditions of the neocolonial republic and a philosophical concept of social justice.  It was rooted, accordingly, in an understanding of the structural roots of the problems of the nation and the kinds of concrete measures that would be necessary in order to transform the neocolonial reality into an alternative more just and democratic reality. Fidel understood what the most advanced intellectuals of the time understood: the historical development on a global scale of capitalism, colonialism, and imperialism; and the emergence of revolutions that must necessarily be socialist, if they are to transform unjust structures. This advanced understanding is revealed in his explanation of the structural roots of the problems of Cuba (2014:34-36; see “Fidel: History will absolve me” 9/5/2014).  But his explanation was succinct. He understood that one does not begin with a lecture in philosophical historical social science.  That would come later in the reconstruction of the society and the cultural formation of the people, a process of transformation that was proposed in “History will absolve me” simply as a proposal for the “integral reform of education.” 

      In my life experiences in the United States, I have observed a schism between the academic world and the world of activists.  Most academics, as a result of the segmentation and the bureaucratization of knowledge (see “Reunified historical social science” 4/1/2014), do not have an advanced understanding of the historical and structural roots of the problems of the world-system.  But some do have an advanced understanding, as a result of their encounter with the social movements that have emerged from below (see “What is cross-horizon encounter?” 7/26/2013).  However, even those academics and intellectuals with advanced understanding think in historical and theoretical terms that are alien to the language of the people, who think in concrete terms.  Activists, aware of the disconnection of academic knowledge from their concerns, tend to disdain intellectual work.  They do not develop a deep understanding of the historical and structural roots of problems, and thus their solutions tend to be superficial and partial.  Activists are connected to the people, but they do not have an adequate understanding of the structural roots of the concrete problems that the people confront.  

     Fidel, however, combines the best characteristics of both academics and social activists.  He combines theoretical and historical understanding with a connection to the people, and thus he has been able to express proposals in concrete terms, in the context of a revolutionary process that is continually unfolding and that includes the theoretical and practical education of the people.  Fidel’s exceptional qualities reflect unique personal characteristics, but they also were formed in a social context shaped by Latin American popular movements.  In Latin America, higher education has been less fragmented than in the United States, and the popular movements have been more connected to the academic world and intellectual work.  Moreover, Cuban social and political thought and the Cuban revolutionary movement have been the most advanced in Latin America.  Indeed, a central thesis in the insightful book by the Cuban poet and essayist Citrio Vitrier is that Fidel inherited, appropriated, and drove to a more advanced stage a social ethic that had been developing in Cuba since the beginning of the nineteenth century.  The advanced character of the Cuban popular movement is a result of various factors, including the twin pillars of domination of colonialism and slavery; the social and cultural mixing of the African and European populations; and the emergence of a relatively developed petit bourgeoisie and working class as a result of the role of Havana as a major international port and the emergence of tobacco manufacturing (see “Cuba and the United States” 6/13/2014; “The peripheralization of Cuba” 6/16/2014). 

     Thus, as of result of personal characteristics and social dynamics that shaped his development, the author of “History will absolve me” is a person of exceptional intellectual qualities, who combines historical and theoretical understanding of social dynamics with a concrete common sense understanding.  But he also is a person of exceptional moral qualities, who analyzes social dynamics from a vantage point rooted in the conditions of the exploited and the oppressed, and who has been committed without compromise to justice for the oppressed.  Like his intellectual perspective, these moral qualities also were formed by Latin American and Cuban popular movements, and in addition, they were a consequence of family influences and of the impact of his education in private Catholic primary and secondary schools, as we will discuss in subsequent posts.

     We will see in future posts that the Moncada program, in essence, was implemented after the triumph of the revolution.  The people would defend and participate in the revolutionary project, many calling themselves Fidelistas.  And the Cuban national bourgeoisie and US imperialism would never forgive the audacity. 

     An English translation of “History will absolve me” can be found in Fidel Castro Reader (Deutschmann and Shnookal 2007).

References

Castro, Fidel.  2007.  “La historia me absolverá” in Fidel Castro: Selección de documentos, entrevistas y artículos (1952-56).  La Habana: Editora Política. 

__________.  2014.  History Will Absolve Me: Speech at the Court of Appeals of Santiago de Cuba, October 16, 1953.  La Habana: Editora Política.

Deutschmann, David and Deborah Shnookal, Eds.  2007.  Fidel Castro Reader.  Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press.

Vitier, Cintio.  2006.  Ese Sol del Mundo Moral.  La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela.

Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel, Moncada

Posted September 9, 2014

    We have seen in previous posts that there is a tradition in Marxism-Leninism of interpreting the popular revolution as a proletarian revolution or as led by a proletarian vanguard (see posts on The Vanguard).  In “History will absolve me,” there is no notion of a proletarian revolution or a proletarian vanguard.  Instead, we find a concept of a people prepared to support a revolution, a people coming from various social classes (see “The Moncada program for the people” 9/5/2014).   . 

      As he explained in an extensive interview in 1985 with the Brazilian Dominican priest Frei Betto, Fidel already had a Marxist-Leninist formation at the time of “History will absolve me.” During his third year at the University of Havana, he had begun to study the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, using books obtained at the library of the Communist Party.  In his study of Marxist literature, The Communist Manifesto had the most impact on him, because of its simplicity and clarity, and particularly important was its understanding that human societies are characterized by class division.  Fidel’s life experiences, in which he had “seen up close the contrasts between wealth and poverty, between a family that possessed extensive land and those that have absolutely nothing,” (Castro 1985:161), confirmed the truth of Marx’s insight into class division.  And the insight, for Fidel, had explanatory power, for it made clear that social phenomena are not consequences of the evil or immorality of men, but of factors established by class interests (Castro 1985:157-70). 

     In this description of his reading of The Communist Manifesto, we can see that Fidel was making immediately a Cuban interpretation of Marx.  In confirming the validity of Marx’s insight for the reality of Cuba, Fidel was focusing not on the exploitation of the industrial workers, which was the social context in which Marx formulated the concept, but on the unequal distribution of land, rooted in the colonial and neocolonial situation of Cuba.  Thus, Fidel was beginning to appropriate from Marx in a form that reflected the neocolonial conditions of Cuba. 

      Fidel was not studying the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin as an academic exercise.  He was seeking to understand how to further develop the Cuban Revolution and the revolutionary theory and practice that was the heritage of Céspedes, Martí, Mella, and Guiteras. As a result of this intellectual work and political practice, Fidel had formulated, even before the Batista coup, a revolutionary strategy for bringing about a profound social revolution in Cuba.  Having observed the isolation of the Communist Party, in spite of its considerable influence among urban workers, and the dissemination of anti-socialist and anti-communist ideas, he concluded that it would be necessary for the revolution to develop in stages.  The first stage would involve a mass rebellion by the majority of people, focusing on concrete demands that would respond to the sources of popular discontent; and a subsequent stage would be characterized by the formation of the political consciousness of the people, during which the socialist character of the revolution would be understood (Castro 1985:164-65).

      Thus, Fidel had become a Marxist-Leninist by 1950, the year of his graduation from the university.  But his understanding of Marxism-Leninism was shaped by Cuban revolutionary practice, and it adapted the key insights of Marx and Lenin to Cuban reality. Accordingly, he did not speak of a proletarian revolution, but a popular revolution formed by various classes and social sectors, including the unemployed, agricultural workers, industrial workers, tenant farmers, teachers and professors, small businessmen, and young professionals.  He did not refer to a proletarian vanguard, but instead implied that the popular revolution would be led by members of the various popular classes who possess the courage to act in defense of the revolutionary ideals defined by José Martí.  And he conceived and envisioned a socialist revolution in stages.  Based on an appreciation of the insights of Marx as well as observation of Cuban reality in a context of political practice, Fidel’s formulation represented a synthesis of Marxism-Leninism with the Cuban revolutionary struggle for national liberation. 

     Fidel’s formulation was an important theoretical advance in the evolution of Marxism-Leninism.  But Fidel did not present it as such.  He did not offer a theoretical analysis of the development of the concept of a proletarian vanguard, describing the social context in which the concept emerged and explaining why a reformulation is necessary. Rather than making a theoretical defense of his reformulation from proletarian to popular revolution, he simply presented the new formulation.  And this creative formulation made sense to the people, for it described what they already knew in experience, and it included concrete solutions.

     An English translation of “History will absolve me” can be found in Fidel Castro Reader (Deutschmann and Shnookal 2007).

References

Castro, Fidel. 1985.  Fidel y La Religión: Conversaciones con Frei Betto.  La Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado. [English translation: Fidel and Religion: Conversations with Frei Betto on Marxism and Liberation Theology.  Melbourne: Ocean Press].

__________.  2007.  “La historia me absolverá” in Fidel Castro: Selección de documentos, entrevistas y artículos (1952-56).  La Habana: Editora Política. 

__________.  2014.  History Will Absolve Me: Speech at the Court of Appeals of Santiago de Cuba, October 16, 1953.  La Habana: Editora Política.

Deutschmann, David and Deborah Shnookal, Eds.  2007.  Fidel Castro Reader.  Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel, Moncada

Posted September 10, 2014

     Fidel Castro’s father, Angel Castro, was a poor peasant from Galacia, Spain, who migrated to Cuba at the beginning of the twentieth century.  He began as a worker for the United Fruit Company, and later he became a contractor who organized groups of workers.  The earnings enabled him to acquire property, and he became a landholder who owned significant extensions of land.  His plantation in the eastern province of Oriente was dedicated primarily to the cultivation of sugar and secondarily to cattle and to the exploitation of wood.  A variety of fruits and vegetables also were produced.  Near the family house, there was a dairy, butchery, bakery, and store, all owned by Angel; there also was a public school, post office, and telegraph.  By the 1930s, there were about 1000 people living on the plantation (Castro 1985:89-100, 2006:52-53).

     Although he was the son of a landholder, Fidel was not socialized into bourgeois culture.  His father had peasant roots, and his mother, Lina Ruz González, had been born into a poor Cuban peasant family.  Neither parent had formal education; both had taught themselves how to read.  The couple lived on the plantation, and they had no social contact with members of the bourgeois class (Castro 1985:138, 153-54; 2006:65-67).

     Fidel’s first social world as a child was formed by the poor workers of his father’s plantation.  They were mostly Haitian immigrants, and they lived in huts of palm leaves with dirt floors.  The children of these families were Fidel’s first playmates, and they continued to be his friends and companions of Christmas and summer vacations throughout his childhood and adolescence (Castro 1985:97-104, 114, 153-54, 161; 2006:66-67, 105).  

     Although the workers were poor, the plantation of Angel Castro was an oasis among the US plantations in the region, which were characterized by absentee ownership and total neglect of worker’s needs during the so-called “dead time.”  Angel always was generous with respect to any request for assistance, and he employed more persons than the plantation required, in response to requests for employment.  Later in life, Fidel believed that the conduct of his father with respect to his workers was an important ethical example in his formation (Castro 1985:160-61). 

     At the age of four, Fidel began attending the primary school on his father’s plantation, a small school with fifteen or twenty children.  The schoolteacher advised his parents that Fidel had an advanced aptitude, and she recommended that he be sent to school in the city of Santiago de Cuba.  At first Fidel was sent to live in the house of a tutor.  Subsequently, he was enrolled in the Colegio de LaSalle, of the Salesian Brothers, from the first through the fourth grades; and in the Jesuit Colegio de Dolores in Santiago de Cuba for the last two years of primary school and the first two years of high school.  In his third year of high school, he transferred to the prestigious Jesuit institution, the Colegio de Belén, in Havana, from which he graduated in 1945 at the age of 18.  These schools were private Catholic boarding schools for boys, whose students for the most part were the sons of the bourgeoisie (Castro 1985:108-42; 2006:66). 

      Fidel believes that he learned from his family at an early age an ethical sensitivity and certain ethical values, an awareness that there is difference between right and wrong and between what is just and unjust, and that that one has the duty to do what is right and just.  This ethical sensitivity, he maintains, was reinforced by his education in Catholic schools, particularly the education of the Jesuits.  The Jesuits preached and practiced the virtues of good character, honesty, sacrifice, and discipline.  A developed ethical sensitivity, he maintains, is the foundation for political consciousness and for a commitment to social justice.  The religious martyr and the revolutionary hero, he asserts, are made from the same mold (Castro 1985:154-57; 1998:56; 2006:92).

      At the Colegio de Belén, Fidel’s main interests were the Explorer Scouts, including hikes of several days to the mountains, and sports.  He often did not pay attention to teachers in class, and his attendance was erratic.  But he was driven by a sense of pride and honor to earn good grades.  So he learned on his own from books, studying intensely in the days before exams.  Thus, he “developed a certain capacity to decipher the mysteries of physics, geometry, mathematics, botany, and chemistry simply with texts” (Castro 1985:143-46; 1998:54-55; 2006:93-94, 117).  This approach to learning would serve him later in life.

      Fortunate to have attended the finest schools for the bourgeoisie, and fortunate to not be burdened by the prejudices of bourgeois culture, Fidel Castro possessed a solid ethical and intellectual foundation when he entered the University of Havana, where he would become a revolutionary, as we will discuss in the next post.


References

Castro, Fidel. 1985.  Fidel y La Religión: Conversaciones con Frei Betto.  La Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado. [English translation: Fidel and Religion: Conversations with Frei Betto on Marxism and Liberation Theology.  Melbourne: Ocean Press].

__________.  1998.  “Días de Universidad” in Fidel en la memoria del joven que es.  Edited by Deborah Shnookal and Pedro Albarez Tabío.  Melbourne: Ocean Press.

__________.  2006.  Cien Horas con Fidel: Conversaciones con Ignacio Ramonet.  La Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado.  [English translation: Ramonet, Ignacio.  2009.  Fidel Castro: My Life: A Spoken Autobiography.  Scribner. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel

Posted September 11, 2014

     Fidel Castro arrived at the University of Havana in 1945 with a basic concept of justice that had been formed in his family and in Catholic primary and secondary schools (see “Fidel’s social roots” 9/10/2014).  And he arrived as a “profound and devoted admirer of the heroic struggles of our people for independence in the nineteenth century,” and as an admirer and follower of Martí, as a result of “the enormous attraction of Martí’s thought for all of us.”  This formation in the heritage of Martí and of national liberation was deepened by the fact that he had read “practically all the books that were published” on the two Cuban wars of independence of 1868-78 and 1895-98 (Castro 1985:158-59; 1998:69; 2006:116, 122).

      But he arrived with little political consciousness.  He would later describe himself as a “political illiterate” at that time.  He had possessed a basic concept of justice; he had seen extreme inequality; and he had knowledge of and identification with the historic Cuban struggle for independence.  But he had limited understanding of political economy and class divisions and conflicts, and he had not been involved in any way in political activities.  His thinking and his life would be transformed during his five years at the University of Havana (Castro 1998:51; 2006:115-17).

     In 1945, the University of Havana was an educational institution for the rich and the middle class, a social place where there was mixing of the relatively privileged sector of the popular classes and the bourgeoisie, in an environment that included some professors of the Left.  In the 1920s and the 1930s, in the epoch of Mella and Martínez Villena, anti-imperialism was the dominant tendency among student leaders.  However, student consciousness had become confused as a result of the emergence of the anti-communist reformism of Grau, and many students had been influenced by this tendency, leading to a decline of anti-imperialism.  With the election of Grau as president of Cuba in 1944, the university administration and the student leadership was controlled by the government of Grau. By 1945, there had emerged a reaction to Grau reformism among students.  This tendency would ultimately be expressed in the establishment in 1946 of the Orthodox Party of the Cuban People, which beginning in 1948 would be led by Eduardo Chibás.  Fidel, as a consequence of his personal tendency toward rebelliousness and his ethical sense of justice, immediately identified with the emerging anti-Grau tendency at the university, which protested the corruption of the Grau government; and he became actively involved immediately with the political activities of this tendency among university students (Castro (1985:162; 1998:60-61; 2006:114, 116; “Julio A. Mella and the student movement” 7/8/2014; “The Cuban popular revolution of 1930-33; Rubén Martínez Villena” 8/5/2014; “The failure of ‘democracy,’ 1940-52” 8/25/2014; “Grau and reformism” 8/26/2014).

     Fidel’s studies during his first two years at the university led him to become what he would later call a “utopian communist.”  Especially important was a course taken during his first year, taught by a professor of political economy, Delio Portela.  The course, which included 900 pages of mimeographed material, discussed the laws of capitalism and the various economic theories.  His study led Fidel to question the capitalist system, and he arrived at the conclusion that the capitalist system was absurd.  However, his interpretation was utopian, in that it was not based in a scientific analysis of human history.  It was simply recognition that capitalism is bad, that it does not work, and that it generates poverty, injustice, and inequality (Castro 1998:51; 2006:117, 122).

     Other courses that influenced Fidel’s development included the “History of Political Ideas,” taught by Raúl Roa García, and “Worker Legislation,” taught by Aureliano Sánchez Arango.  Roa had been a prominent member of the student revolutionary movement in the 1920s.  After the triumph of the revolution, he would become the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.  As a result of his passionate and eloquent defenses of the Cuban Revolution before international organizations, he came to be called the “Chancellor of Dignity” (Castro 1998:69; 2006:122, 642).

     During his third year at the university, Fidel began to avidly read the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.  Drawing upon his good relations with party leaders in the university, he had access to books of the library of the Communist Party.  The Communist Manifesto was one of the first that he read, and it had the most impact.  It made clear to him the role of class divisions and class interests in human history, thus enabling him to understand why politicians in Cuba behave so badly: they make promises to the people, in order to obtain the political support of the majority; but they are financially supported by the bourgeoisie, and thus they respond to its interests.  This period of self-directed reading was the culmination of an intellectual and moral development that had included, as we have noted, an ethical formation in Christian values, socialization and reading with respect to the Cuban heritage of struggle for national liberation, and a study of bourgeois political economy that had led him to utopian communism.  As a result of this period of new reading, Fidel would become a Marxist-Leninist by the time he graduated from the university in 1950.  But since it was a form of Marxism-Leninism that was synthesized with the Cuban tradition of national liberation, he “would not have been able to convince a communist militant that [his] theories were correct” (Castro 1985:157-59, 161, 167-68; 1998:69-70; 2006:123).

     By 1951, Fidel had developed a complete revolutionary conception and a plan for putting it into practice, taking into account the conditions of the country, which included the confusion of the people resulting from the dissemination of anti-communist ideology.

The first stage involved focusing on the discontent of the masses with respect to concrete problems (unemployment, poverty, and the lack of hospitals and housing) by proposing concrete solutions.  The masses attributed these problems to government corruption and to the perversity of the politicians, but from a scientific Marxist-Leninist perspective, one could see that these problems are rooted in the capitalist system, and that their solution requires a transformation to socialism.  However, the political education of the masses pertained to the second stage (Castro 1985:162, 164-65, 169; 1998:70-71).

     The Batista coup d’état of March 10, 1952 changed the political context, but it did not change the conditions that made necessary and possible the revolution as conceived by Fidel.  The plan was put into action with the assault on the Moncada garrison of July 26, 1953, and the revolutionary program was announced in “History will absolve me” (see “The Moncada program for the people” 9/5/2014; “Reflections on “History will absolve me” 9/8/2014).

    Like Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro was first a nationalist (see various posts on Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh).  When he arrived at a moment of encounter with Marxism-Leninism, his formation in and commitment to national liberation enabled him to see its insights.  He thus proceeded to formulate and put into practice a revolutionary project based on a synthesis of national liberation and Marxism-Leninism.  As Fidel would express in 1985:   “I believe that my contribution to the Cuban Revolution consists in having realized a synthesis of the ideas of Martí and of Marxism-Leninism, and having consequently applied it in our struggle” (1985:163-64).


References

Castro, Fidel. 1985.  Fidel y La Religión: Conversaciones con Frei Betto.  La Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado. [English translation: Fidel and Religion: Conversations with Frei Betto on Marxism and Liberation Theology.  Melbourne: Ocean Press].

__________.  1998.  “Días de Universidad” in Fidel en la memoria del joven que es.  Edited by Deborah Shnookal and Pedro Albarez Tabío.  Melbourne: Ocean Press.

__________.  2006.  Cien Horas con Fidel: Conversaciones con Ignacio Ramonet.  La Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado.  [English translation: Ramonet, Ignacio.  2009.  Fidel Castro: My Life: A Spoken Autobiography.  Scribner. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel, University of Havana

Posted September 15, 2014

     On December 2, 1956, Fidel Castro and 81 armed guerrillas, having trained in Mexico and having traveled by sea for seven days, disembarked from the yacht Granma in a remote area of eastern Cuba, with the intention of establishing an armed struggle in the mountains known as the Sierra Maestra.  It was a total disaster.  The Granma arrived two days behind schedule, thus undermining the strategy of a simultaneous uprising in Santiago de Cuba, intended to distract Batista’s army.  As the rebels disembarked, they encountered swampland so difficult that they had to abandon most of their weapons.  Three days later, they were surprised and routed by Batista’s army, dispersing in small groups and in different directions. When twelve of them were able to regroup under the protection of a local peasant, Fidel was jubilant.  “We will win the war,” he declared. “Let us begin the struggle!”  As described Universo Sanchez, one of the twelve, it was “faith that moves mountains” (Vitier 2006:195-97).

     The faith of Fidel is not, observes Cintio Virtier, “a religious faith in supernatural powers, but a revolutionary faith in the potentialities of the human being.”  It is an “uncontainable force” that “sees in history what is not yet visible” (2006:197).

     Virtier maintains that such faith proceeds from and is fed by three sources: “a moral conviction that defends the cause of justice; profound confidence in the human being; and the highest examples in human history.”  And such faith is integrally tied to a dynamic view of human history and human being: “for the revolutionary, it is not a matter of history been but of history being, where the highest examples continue acting; not of a stagnant and fixed human being but of the human being becoming, in evolution.”  And this becoming is above all “oriented toward duty” (2006:198; italics in original).

      The unshakable faith of Fidel, “contagious, irradiating and attracting with the moral magnetism of heroism, . . . became a live experience in the terrain of the struggle itself.”  Whereas the skepticism of the theoreticians could see only the objective conditions and the correlation of forces, revolutionary faith sees the possibility of changing the objective conditions and the correlation of forces, following the highest examples in human history.  And this faith would be fed by the evolving social dynamics in which it was acting: the rebel army in the mountains and the clandestine struggle in the cities were creating new objective conditions (Vitier 2006:197-98).

      Vitier believes that the revolutionary faith of Fidel saved the revolution from falling once again into the abyss of the impossible, in which its fulfillment seemed impossible.  Fidel was driven by a faith that was “nurtured by analysis” and that therefore could discern the reality hidden by the perception of the impossibility of things, and it could discern that what appeared to be impossible was, in reality, possible and attainable (2006:198).

     After the imposition of the neoliberal project on the world, the collapse of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe, and the advent of the “special period” in Cuba, Fidel would frequently proclaim: “No one has the right to be indifferent to the suffering of others;” and “No one has the right to lose faith in the future of humanity.”  These declarations go against bourgeois democratic concepts of freedom of thought and freedom of expression.  Fidel believes that people do not have the right to think and say anything they want.  The freedoms of thought and expression, for Fidel, are intertwined with duty: a duty to be concerned with the well-being of others, and a duty to have faith in the possibility of constructing a better world.  To live any other way is not really to live; it is a debasement of our humanity.  For Fidel, conformity to duty is the essence of human life and human fulfillment, not the possession of property, material things, and consumer goods.  In his view, the kind of human being that capitalism seeks to create is a degradation of the human being; socialism, in contrast, seeks to create a new kind of person, who lives in solidarity with others, a kind of person that up to now has been exemplified by a minority and has existed in the majority in the form of human potentiality. 

     We have seen in previous posts that revolutionary processes are characterized by the emergence of charismatic leaders (see various posts on charismatic leaders).  These charismatic leaders possess gifts that are recognized by the people.  In the case of Fidel, we have seen that these gifts include an extraordinary intellectual capacity and exceptional moral commitment, which enabled him to formulate, on a basis of intellectual work and political practice, a dynamic perspective that possesses both general theoretical understanding and concrete common sense understanding and that discerns the movement of the revolution through stages (see “The Moncada program for the people” 9/5/2014; “Reflections on “History will absolve me” 9/8/2014).  We can now add the gift of an unshakable revolutionary faith that, based on observation of the unfolding correlation of forces, sees the possibilities for the creation of new objective conditions, on a foundation of courageous action, in the tradition of the highest examples in human history.  The “highest examples in human history” are the charismatic leaders of the past, who are still present, for their teachings, their example, and their spirit of struggle are an integral part of our reality.  In this sense, Fidel will be with us always. 


References

Vitier, Cintio.  2006.  Ese Sol del Mundo Moral.  La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel, University of Havana

Posted September 17, 2014

     During the Cuban revolutionary war of 1957 and 1958, there were organizational, tactical and ideological divisions.  The revolution was able to triumph and sustain itself by virtue of its capacity to overcome these divisions.

      When the 26th of July Movement (M-26/7) was established on June 12, 1955, a national leadership consisting of a small group of trustworthy and capable leaders was formed, under the direction of Fidel Castro.  When Fidel went to Mexico to organize the armed struggle, and later, when Fidel was directing the armed struggle in the Sierra Maestra, the national direction of M-26/7, located in Havana, was responsible for organizing all its activities throughout the country. Two types of activities emerged: a clandestine struggle in the cities, characterized by sabotage and the formation of secret cells among workers and the radicalized sector of the petit bourgeoisie; and the guerrilla struggle in the Sierra Maestra, which as it evolved would increasingly have peasant participation.  Many of the urban leaders of M-26/7 saw the guerrilla struggle in the mountains as of secondary importance.  Using the Revolution of 1930 as their guide, they believed that a combination of mass action and sabotage in the cities would bring down Batista.  But the leaders and soldiers of the rebel army believed that they would acquire the military capacity to defeat Batista’s army and force the surrender or flight of the dictator.  At the same time, there was an ideological division within M-26/7: some were Marxist-Leninists who favored an alliance with the communist party, whereas others were anti-communist, an ideological division that existed both in the urban front and among the guerrillas (Castro 1985:229-31; Arboleya 2008:123-25).

     Although the 26th of July Movement was by far the organization with the most popular support, as a result of its heroic action on July 26, 1953, it was not the only revolutionary organization.  The second most important was the Popular Socialist Party (PSP, the communist party), which was strong particularly among urban workers, and it possessed a significant capacity to organize urban workers.  In general, the PSP membership had far more experience and political consciousness than the members of the M-26/7.  Many of the PSP had a distrustful attitude toward M-26/7, due to its diversity of ideological viewpoints, including an element of anti-communism, and its relative political immaturity. Another important revolutionary organization was the Revolutionary Directorate, a student organization led by José Antonio Eceheverría.  The Revolutionary Directorate experienced the same tactical and ideological divisions that were found in the M-26/7 (Arboleya 2008:125; Castro 1985:235-38) 

     Events during 1958 would demonstrate the greater viability of the guerrilla struggle as against the urban front, and they would solidify the dominance of the 26th of July Movement within the revolution and would strengthen the authority of Fidel within the M-26/7.  The leaders of the urban front of M-26/7 called for a general strike and actions of sabotage for April 9, with the intention of provoking the fall of Batista. But as a result of the lack of cooperation between the communist party and the urban M-26/7, the general strike failed.  The PSP, with its network among urban workers, had the capacity to mobilize workers, but the PSP was not participating in the mass action.  Although the M-26/7 had enormous prestige among the people, it lacked organizational structures to mobilize the people.  The leaders of the urban M-26/7 had mistakenly believed that a general call would bring the people to strike and acts of sabotage, in spite of its lack of organizational strength, because of its high prestige (Arboleya 2008:126).  

     The failure of the general strike had two consequences.  First, priority was given to the guerrilla struggle.  At a meeting of the national leadership of M-26/7 on May 3-4, it was decided to transfer headquarters to the Sierra and to place the organization under the direct control of Fidel.  Henceforth, all resources and arms were to be sent to the guerrilla forces.  Secondly, Batista was emboldened, and on May 24, he launched an offensive against the rebel army, seeking to totally annihilate it.  Ten thousand soldiers were sent against the guerrilla forces, which at the time consisted of no more than 300. There were 30 battles in 76 days during the offensive, and the rebels were forced to retreat to an area of twenty kilometers from the highest point of the Sierra Maestra.  But the rebel retreat to some extent was strategic.  As the Batista army advanced, it was more vulnerable to guerrilla attacks and more isolated from its bases of support.  By the end of the offensive, the Army had suffered one thousand casualties, and the guerrillas had taken 400 prisoners, turning them over to the Red Cross with great publicity.   They captured arms from Batista’s forces, and they increased their numbers threefold.  The Batista army was exhausted and demoralized.  On August 18, Fidel announced on Radio Rebelde that the offensive had failed and that the guerrillas would soon begin a counteroffensive.  The rebel army expanded from its base, and battles began to acquire characteristics of conventional war.  Che Guevara and Camilio Cienfuegos commanded columns that marched to the West, supplementing the front to the east that Raul Castro had established prior to the army offensive.  Fidel moved M-26/7 headquarters from the mountains to the plains.  The tide had turned; the guerrillas were occupying towns at a dizzying pace, and Batista’s army was in disarray (Arboleya 2008:126-28; Buch and Suarez 2009:17-18, 25-26; Castro 1985:232).

     The spectacular march toward victory by the guerrilla forces during the second half of 1958 brought to an end all tactical debates within the revolutionary movement.  Clearly, the guerrilla army, expanding in numbers and moving west and east, was the force that was bringing down the dictatorship.  As often occurs in revolutionary movements, differences within the movement are resolved in practice as the revolution evolves.

     Batista fled Cuba just past midnight on January 1, 1959, and the revolutionary army occupied Santiago de Cuba and Havana, with an enthusiastic and celebratory popular reception.  The complete ascendency of the 26th of July Movement within the revolution was established.  Fidel has estimated that the M-26/7 had the support of 85% or 90% of the people, with 10% or 15% supporting other parties and organizations, including both other revolutionary parties as well as counterrevolutionary parties.  In these political conditions, it would have been possible to establish the M-26/7 as the party to lead the revolution.  But Fidel considered it important to establish the organizational unity of the revolution, to establish a single organization that would function as a party leading the revolution, including the various factions within the revolution.  He spoke with leaders of all of the organizations and parties, including those of the old and discredited political parties of the “democratic” period of 1940-52.  He was able to bring on board the Popular Socialist Party (the communist party) and the Student Directory, which were the two principal revolutionary organizations other than the M-26/7.  He considered the participation of the communist party to be important, because of the greater experience and the greater political consciousness of its members.  The three organizations thus dissolved themselves and formed a single organization, Integrated Revolutionary Organizations, which after some difficulties in its evolution, later would become the reconstituted Communist Party of Cuba (Castro 1985:233-39). 

      In addition, Fidel also sought to overcome a prejudice within the triumphant revolution in favor of the guerrillas, diminishing the contribution of those who had participated in the urban clandestine struggle.  He taught that there were different roads of struggle against the dictatorship; not all were in the guerrilla struggle, but those in the urban clandestine struggle also took great risks.  This teaching was a dimension of his effort to overcome divisions within the revolution and to forge unity, to include all who are committed to the basic principles of the revolution, to prevent the emergence of resentments and disappointments as the revolution unfolds (Castro 1985:234).

      In forging an organizational unity that included the communist party, the revolution took the ideological decision to reject anti-communism and to overrule the exclusion of the communist party from the revolution.  This caused some who had an anti-communist orientation to break with the revolution and to join the counterrevolution.  However, to exclude communists would have caused division among the most active of the popular sectors, given the significant influence of the communist party among urban workers and the important role that it had played in the Cuban revolution since the 1920s. 

      The forging of organizational unity among the principal organizations that had struggled against Batista was an important step in unifying the revolution and preparing it to do battle with powerful national and international forces whose interests could not permit the taking of power by a popular organization that gives first priority to the needs of the people and that places the sovereignty of the nation above international corporate interests.  Fidel’s awareness of this need for unity, and his capacity to persuade the principal actors to strive for unity, is another one of his charismatic gifts, another indication of his exceptional capacities for understanding and leadership.


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Buch Rodríguez, Luis M. and Reinald Suárez Suárez.  2009.  Gobierno Revolucionario Cubano: Primeros pasos.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Castro, Fidel. 1985.  Fidel y La Religión: Conversaciones con Frei Betto.  La Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado. [English translation: Fidel and Religion: Conversations with Frei Betto on Marxism and Liberation Theology.  Melbourne: Ocean Press].


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel, 26th of July Movement, Communist Party of Cuba

Posted September 18, 2014

     Fidel Castro is a man of firmly held principles: the right of nations to be truly independent and sovereign; the rights of all persons to education, health care, nutrition, and housing; and the right of all nations to defend themselves against aggression, interventionism, and terrorism.  And he is a person of convictions: the resolution of the social problems generated by the capitalist world-economy and the neo-colonial world system cannot be resolved without a structural transformation to a socialist world-system.  But he has never been dogmatic.  His absorption of Marxism-Leninism was characterized by a creative interpretation and adaptation of its insights to Cuban reality and to the Cuban struggle for national liberation, and thus he forged in theory and practice a form of Marxism-Leninism that was a synthesis with the ideas that emerged from the Cuban struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism (see “Fidel adapts Marxism-Leninism to Cuba” 9/9/2014; “Fidel becomes revolutionary at the university” 9/11/2014).  Thus, in his formation as a Marxist-Leninist, Fidel placed himself in opposition to the established dogmas of Marxism-Leninism.  His way of thinking was diametrically opposed to dogmatism, that is, to fixed doctrines, concepts and plans of action that are applied universally, regardless of particular national conditions.

      Dogmatism leads to sectarianism, which involves the refusal of popular organizations with common goals to cooperate, because of differences in tactics or concepts.  When revolutionaries adhere to fixed doctrines, they have a tendency to believe that those who do not accept these doctrines are outside the revolutionary process and are allies, consciously or unwittingly, of the counterrevolution.  Thus, there emerges the lack of cooperation and division within the revolutionary movement, rendering it unable to take power or to implement a deep political, economic, social and cultural transformation.  We have seen, for example, that in the early 1930s, sectarianism among popular organizations in Cuba created division within the popular revolution and facilitated Batista’s rise and consolidation of power (“The lesson of sectarianism” 8/15/2014). 

     In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Fidel worked to overcome sectarianism in the Cuban popular revolution, and his success in this effort made possible the survival and sustainability of the Cuban Revolution.  He sought to forge unity on the basis of a common commitment to an anti-imperialist project that would transform neocolonial structures (Arboleya 125).  He sought to include all who had participated in the struggle against Batista, regardless of organizational affiliation or whether they had been in the guerrilla struggle or the urban front.  In spite of a political situation overwhelmingly in favor of the organization that he founded, the 26th of July Movement, he dissolved this organization and established a new unifying revolutionary organization that would include the communist party and the Student Directory, which eventually led to the establishment of a reconstituted Communist Party that would be the only party to lead the revolution (“Unifying the Cuban revolutionary process” 9/16/2014). 

     Thus, Fidel sought to create unity on a foundation of commitment to common principles and acceptance of a diversity of views with respect to the implementation of these principles, a diversity concerning concepts, strategies, and tactics.  These differences would be debated within the context of an organizational unity of a single political party, which would permit the maintenance of political unity of the face of the opposition of the counterrevolutionary forces.

      The Cuban revolutionary project has been criticized for developing a single political party and not following the multiple party model of representative democracy.  Structures of representative democracy, however, were developed in a social and historical context defined by the need of the revolutionary bourgeoisie to enlist the support of the popular classes, but also to constrain the full expression of popular interests (see various posts on the American Revolution and the French Revolution).  As a result, structures of representative democracy often function to protect elite interests rather than the interests of the people.  In a neocolonial context, representative democracy is even more dysfunctional with respect to popular interests.  For in a neocolonial context, the denial of popular rights and needs is more profound, the capacity of the government to make concessions to popular demands is less, and the popular movement must contend with both the international and national bourgeoisie.   In the neocolonial context, when a popular revolution triumphs, it needs a political structure that promotes unity, in order to defend the revolution for national liberation and social and economic transformation against the various strategies and maneuvers of powerful national and international actors.  Such a need is not provided by a system characterized by multiple political parties, for it promotes competition for power rather than the seeking of consensus.  For this reason, the African nationalist movement and the movement for African socialism in the 1960s developed a concept of one-party democracy, as we will see in future posts.

       Following the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, a political process developed in the context of Cuban conditions was required.  Given the historic problem of division and sectarianism, which had undermined the Cuban revolution in three historic moments (1873-78, 1898-1902, 1933-35), Fidel sought to develop a political structure that would permit internal debate and discussion but would facilitate unified action on the basis of consensus.  In developing this approach, he took into account, on the one hand, the historic problem of division within the revolution; and on the other hand, the fact that the revolution must proceed in an environment characterized by the opposition of powerful actors that have an economic interest in preventing the structural transformation that the revolution intends.  The single revolutionary party does not intend to stifle debate, but to permit debate and respect diversity in a form that does not undermine necessary revolutionary unity.

     At the international level as well, Fidel has possessed a pluralist conception of revolutionary unity that is opposed to dogmatism and sectarianism.  Speaking in 1987, Fidel maintained that there had been a tendency in the international communist movement to “seek an impossible unity, an absolute homogeneity of thought” that “ignored the diversity of situations existing in the world,” and that does not take into account the particular conditions of each nation.  This tendency had emerged as a result of the prestige and authority of the Soviet Union in the international communist movement.  Fidel discerned, however, that there was beginning to emerge within the international communist movement “a greater understanding of the diversity of situations and of the need for pluralism within socialism.”  He saw this emerging principle of pluralism as a remedy for the problem of sectarianism.  In the case of the Third World nations, he observed, many theoretical concepts had emerged that reflected Third World situations (Castro 1988:125-28).  In this respect, Fidel was anticipating what would become a principle in the Third World revolutions after 1995 and a principle of socialism for the twenty-first century: respect for the diversity of situations in the various nations, recognition of the pluralism of socialism, and avoidance of a sectarianism that excludes and divides.

     In the same vein, speaking at a time in which Muammar Qaddafi and the Ayatollah Khomeini had been labeled as devils by the transnational mainstream media, Fidel described both as revolutionaries, even though they were not Marxist-Leninists and had philosophical and political concepts different from those of Fidel.  Qaddafi, he noted, had played an important role in liberating Libya from colonialism and from the military bases of NATO.  His government had established national control over petroleum, had developed important programs in economic and social development, and had made an effort to provide food for the people.  Fidel noted that he had read Qaddafi’s Green Book, which expressed advanced social ideas; although he did not agree entirely, Fidel expressed respect for Qaddafi’s point of view.  The aggression and hostility of the United States toward Qaddafi, Fidel noted, is simply a consequence of his anti-imperialist policy and his defense of the sovereignty of Libya.  Similarly, Khomeini had played a central role in overthrowing the Shah of Iran, who had been a tyrant and an ally of imperialism (Castro 1988:118-21).

     In his comments with respect to Qaddafi and Khomeini, Fidel was anticipating attitudes in Latin America today, where socialist and Leftist governments are developing relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.  In spite of religious and cultural differences, the need for mutually beneficial economic and commercial relations, cultural interchange, and unity in opposition to US and European imperialism is recognized.
 

References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Castro, Fidel. 1988.  Un Encuentro con Fidel: Entrevista realizada por Gianni Miná.  La Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado.  [English translation: Mina, Gianni.  1991.  An Encounter With Fidel.  Translated by Mary Todd.  Melbourne: Ocean Press]. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel, Communist Party of Cuba

Posted September 19, 2014

     During 1958, the last year of the revolutionary war, the 26th of July Movement took steps toward the formation of a provisional government.  The orientation of Fidel was to establish a government that would calm the Cuban bourgeoisie and would not provoke an immediate hostile reaction from the dominant economic class, in order to give the revolution time to prepare itself to take the steps required for a profound economic and social transformation, which necessarily would provoke the hostile reaction of the national and international bourgeoisie (Buch and Suarez 2009:74, 194).

      The 26th of July Movement named Manuel Urrutia Lleó as president of the provisional government.  He had not been part of the revolutionary movement.  However, he was appreciated by the movement for his vote as a judge in 1957, in which he affirmed, in opposition to the other judges in a trial against captured guerrillas and insurrectionists, the constitutional right of Cubans to resist oppression, thus giving legitimacy to the armed struggle against the dictatorship. Urrutia was ratified as the presidential candidate of the July 26 Movement at a meeting in the Sierra Maestra on May 3 (Buch and Suarez 2009:6-8, 18, 191).

     On July 20, the July 26 Movement formed the Revolutionary Civic Front.  The Front proclaimed a Declaration of Unity on Radio Rebelde, calling for the united participation of Cubans of all classes, races, religions, and ideologies in overthrowing the Batista dictatorship by means of armed struggle.  The Declaration was subscribed by a number of organizations and parties, including the traditional parties of the period 1940-52 and student organizations, but not including the communist party.  On August 11, at a meeting in Miami, the Revolutionary Civic Front, upon the recommendation of the 26th of July Movement, approved Urrutia as provisional president, although he was not supported by the March 13 Revolutionary Directory (a student organization), on the grounds of his lack of participation in the revolutionary struggle.  In preparation for his assumption of duties, Urrutia arrived in the Sierra Maestra on December 7.   On January 2, 1959 in Santiago de Cuba, one day following the flight of Batista, the Provisional Revolutionary Government was established, and Uruttia took the oath of office as president.  On January 3, the government established headquarters at the library of the University of Oriente in Santiago de Cuba, and several ministers of the government were sworn.  On January 5, the government relocated to the Presidential Palace in Havana (Buch and Suarez 2009:23-25, 28-29, 35, 42-45, 50-52, 192).

     A Council of Ministers was formed by Urrutia in consultation with Fidel and other leaders of the 26th of July Movement.  Most were lawyers who had ties with the national bourgeoisie.  Some, including the president and prime minister, had no connection with the anti-Batista movement, although most did participate in some way.  Only four of its eighteen members were leaders of the July 26 Movement (Buch and Suarez 2009:30-31, 53-54, 63, 74, 193-96).  

     Fidel declined to enter the government, and thus did not directly participate in the decision-making process during the month of January.  However,   he was by far the most powerful person in Cuba. He was overwhelmingly and enthusiastically supported by the people, as a result of his having led the heroic struggle that had toppled the dictatorship.  This enormous prestige was reinforced by his exceptional gifts of leadership.  At the same time, he was named by the provisional government as Chief of the Armed Forces, the principal branch of which was the army formed by the guerrilla struggle that had displaced the army of Batista, incorporating some Batista battalions.  During the days following the triumph of the revolution, Fidel met with the people, spontaneously visiting them in places of work, seeking to deepen his understanding of their concerns and hopes.  He functioned at this time as an “overseer,” criticizing the government when he perceived errors or shortcomings (Buch and Suarez 2009:31, 47, 67).

     During its first month, the Provisional Revolutionary Government adopted some measures of importance.  On January 7, in reaction to the participation of the courts in the brutality of the Batista dictatorship, it suspended the authority of the judicial branch, with anticipation of its reconstitution.  On January 23, it established the Ministry of Social Welfare, with the intention of addressing serious social problems, such as child mendicancy; and it suspended mayors that had been appointed by Batista, replacing them with three-person executive commissions for each municipal government (Buch and Suarez 2009:57, 64, 65).

      However, the process was slow and inefficient, and many important measures remained pending.  Uruttia was a judge by profession, and he had little administrative capacity.  Under his leadership, council meetings were characterized by endless discussion.  Much time was consumed by debates between Uruttia and Prime Minister José Miró Cardona, who perhaps was oriented to creating a crisis, so that he would be named to replace Uruttia as president.  By early February, the people were becoming impatient (Buch and Suarez 2009:73, 197). 

     Some of the members of the Council of Ministers believed that its dysfunctional character was creating a crisis for the revolution.  They believed that it would be necessary for Fidel to take a leadership role within the government, for only he possessed the authority of prestige that could make the government effective.  They were aware of his reticence to enter the government, but they also knew of his sense of obligation to duty.  They thus approached Fidel, asking him to assume the position of Prime Minister, arguing that the situation required him to assume this role.  Not wanting to enter into a complex situation that would be out of control, he indicated that he would be willing to assume the position, if it would be established that the Prime Minister is to have direct control of general policy, without undermining the legal authority of the president (Buch and Suarez 2009:74-75).

       Acceding to Fidel’s condition required an amendment to the Fundamental Law, which had been passed in February 7 and had not yet been printed for distribution to the people.  The Fundamental Las was based on the Constitution of 1940, with some modifications for the facilitation of the revolutionary process.  On February 13, the Council of Ministers unanimously approved a change in the language of the Fundamental Law with respect to the position of Prime Minister.  Rather than “representing” general policy, the Prime Minister will “direct” general policy.  This set the stage for Fidel’s entrance into the government as chief of state, and he immediately began to chair the sessions of the Council of Ministers.  Uruttia continued as president, whose signature was required on all measures, but his role was considerably reduced.  At the same time, Fidel was freed from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, a position that was assumed by Raúl Castro (Buch and Suarez 2009:72, 75-76, 79). 

      Following Fidel’s entrance into the government as Prime Minister, a number of decisive steps were taken, as we will discuss in the next post.


References

Buch Rodríguez, Luis M. and Reinald Suárez Suárez.  2009.  Gobierno Revolucionario Cubano: Primeros pasos.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel, 26th of July Movement, Provisional Revolutionary Government

Posted September 22, 2014

     On February 16, the day that he assumed the position of Prime Minister (see “The Provisional Revolutionary Government of 1959” 9/19/2014), Fidel proposed to the Council of Ministers a reduction in the salary of the ministers by 50% and the elimination of a surplus payment that the ministers received for “Representation Expenses.” The proposal was approved that same day. 

     The Council of Ministers also approved on February 16 various measures that were designed to protect employment: a ban on the dismissal public employees; suspension of the dismissal of employees in the private sector, when this had been done to reduce costs; and restoration of employees that had been dismissed for this reason. These measures with respect to employment were designed to respond to the inquietudes of the people.  In previous changes of government, there had been massive and arbitrary dismissal of public employees, in order to facilitate nepotism and the fulfillment of commitments made during electoral campaigns.  And the British-owned Shell petroleum company in Cuba had provoked popular anxiety by announcing layoffs.  This cost-cutting measure was made necessary by a boycott of British companies, which had been called by the 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra, in response to the sale by the British government of airplanes and tanks to the Batista government.  The conflict was resolved when the government annulled the boycott and Shell agreed to an increase in workers’ salaries.  But it contributed to popular apprehension.  In his encounter with the people during the month of January, Fidel had found that unemployment was among the highest concerns, and there was fear that the changing political situation could provoke the elimination of jobs (Buch and Suarez 2009:67-69, 83-84, 91). 

     On February 17, the Council of Ministers approved a law that made legal all acts that had been prosecuted as criminal acts during the period of March 10, 1952 to December 31, 1959, when such acts were directly or indirectly part of the movement against the Batista dictatorship (Buch and Suarez 2009:85). 

     On February 20, in response to efforts to create disorder by instigating peasants to occupy land, the Council approved a law stipulating that all persons who occupy land without waiting for the enactment of an agrarian reform law would forfeit their right to receive land under said law (Buch and Suarez 2009:86). 

     The Council on Ministers also approved on February 20 funding for the completion of construction of ten hospitals that had been left partially constructed as a result of corruption during the Batista government (Buch and Suarez 2009:87).

     On February 28, Faustino Pérez, Minister of the newly created Ministry for the Recuperation of Embezzled Public Funds, proposed a law that confiscated the property of Batista and persons associated with the Batista regime.  The Council approved the law on the same day, and it affected the property of Batista and his collaborators; officials of the armed forces that had participated directly in the coup of March 10, 1952; ministers of the Batista government during the period 1952 to 1958; members of the spurious Congress of 1954-58; and candidates in the sham elections of November 1958 (Buch and Suarez 2009:51, 88). 

     On March 3, the Council took action against the Cuban Telephone Company, a US-owned company that had been operating in Cuba since 1909.  It approved a law authorizing government intervention in the affairs of the company, and it annulled an increase in telephone service rates that had been implemented on March 13, 1957 (Buch and Suarez 2009:89).

    On March 19, the Council approved a law that reduced housing rents.  A scale was established, with the lowest rents reduced to 50% and the highest rents reduced to 70% of their previous level (Buch and Suarez 2009:90).

     In 1890, the Spanish Crown had declared the beaches available for public use.  However, for decades this decree was rendered inoperable, as governments granted concessions along the coast to persons and societies of recreation of the bourgeoisie.  On April 21, the Council abolished such concessions, returning the beaches to the people (Buch and Suarez 2009:92).

     Thus, we see that in February, March and April of 1959, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, with Fidel as Prime Minister, took decisive steps in defense of the interests of the people and in accordance with popular desires: the reduction of salaries for ministers at the highest levels of government; protection of public employees and of employees in the private sector; reduction of housing rents and rates for telephone services; the confiscation of the property of Batista and members of the Batista dictatorship; and the cancellation of concessions to bourgeois recreation societies, and the opening of the beaches to the people.  The most significant step, however, lay ahead. The Agrarian Reform Law would strike at the heart of the neocolonial relation, and it would mark a definitive break with the bourgeoisie, as we will see in subsequent posts.


References

Buch Rodríguez, Luis M. and Reinald Suárez Suárez.  2009.  Gobierno Revolucionario Cubano: Primeros pasos.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.


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