Posted August 5, 2014

     In various posts on Cuba from  June 12 to  July 17, we have seen: that the conquest and peripheralization of Cuba led to the development of underdevelopment and to the establishment of an economy dependent on the exportation of sugar, tobacco and coffee, based principally on superexploited labor; that the war of independence of 1868-78, led by the Eastern landholding class, was unable to attain its principal goals of independence and the abolition of slavery; that José Martí emerged as a charismatic leader who established a clearer ideological foundation for the revolution, forging a dual focus of anti-imperialist national liberation and the social liberation of the people of all races and classes, and unifying the people for the launching a second war of independence in 1895; that the vision of Martí was eclipsed by the US intervention of 1898, which established the foundation for a neocolonial republic and the conversion of the Cuban bourgeoisie into a figurehead bourgeoisie under US tutelage; that the popular revolution became revitalized in the 1920s, further developing the vision of Martí in the context of the neocolonial republic, including the first steps, taken by Julio Antonio Mella, toward the synthesis of Martí with Marxism-Leninism; and that the Machado government responded to the renewed movement with harsh repression, transforming Cuban “democracy” into tyranny.  Having devoted several recent posts to developments with respect to the relations of China and Russia with the Latin American process of political change and regional integration, we now return to the story of the historical development Cuban Revolution.

     Beginning in 1930, new popular political actors emerged who were influenced by Marxism and were tied to the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), which had been established by Julio Antonio Mella and Carlos Baliño López in 1925.  They brought the PCC to a position of prominence in the popular revolution during the period 1930-32.  The most outstanding of the new leaders was Rubén Martínez Villena, who became the de facto leader of the Cuban Communist Party and the National Worker Confederation of Cuba (CNOC) after the exile and assassination of Mella and the assassination of Alfredo López (see “Julio A. Mella and the student movement” 7/8/2014 and “The Cuban Workers’ Movement of the 1920” 7/7/2014).  Martínez Villena was a poet whose verses of 1923 had described the “moral blindness,” the “inertia of the soul,” and a “profound sensation of the impossible” that characterized the neocolonial republic, but they also evoked the sun that illuminates the revolutionary imperative that would cast aside the fatalistic sense of the impossible, driven by a “yearning for the salvation of the beloved land” (Arboleya 2008:96; Vitier 2006:125-28).

     PCC, CNOC and other organizations tied to both called for a general strike for March 20, 1930.  Under the slogan “Down with Machado,” the demands announced by PCC/CNOC included: the revocation of a government measure that declared CNOC illegal; the release of workers who had been detained for promoting the general strike; respect for the right of workers to organize and to strike; freedom of press and of association; the limit of the working day to eight hours; and measures in support of the unemployed, including an assistance payment, suspension of evictions and rent and debt payments, and aid for transportation, meals and lodging  (Instituto de Cuba 1998:288; Vitier 2006:137).

     In spite of the always present fear of reprisal, two hundred thousand workers and employees responded to the call, and the economic activities of Havana and various other cities were completely paralyzed for twenty-four hours.  The success of the strike demonstrated the prestige that Martínez Villena and the PCC had attained among the popular classes, overcoming obstacles created by the extreme repression of the government (see “‘Democracy’ becomes tyranny” 7/17/2014).  Further demonstrating that it was a strong political force, the PCC led mass demonstrations in Havana and in other cities in commemoration of the First of May (Instituto de Cuba 1998:289).

      In addition to addressing concrete demands of workers, the platform of the PCC embraced without ambiguity the demands of peasants and agricultural workers for land and for the cessation of evictions.  This enabled it to have success in the rural areas in the organization of leagues and committees of peasants and agricultural workers (Instituto de Cuba 1998:296).

     The general strategy of the PCC was to form organizations of workers and peasants in urban and rural areas and to organize strikes and demonstrations in order to develop a popular, democratic and anti-imperialist revolution that would evolve to a socialist revolution led by the working class.  Its goal was to establish a socialist government, controlled by popular councils composed of workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors (Instituto de Cuba 1998:287). 

     In addition to the PCC and CNOC, other organizations emerged during 1930-32.  In the fall of 1930, the University Student Directorate (DEU) was formed, and it organized student demonstrations.  On September 30, it issued a reformist manifesto, “To the People of Cuba,” which condemned the crimes of the Machado tyranny against workers, students, and political opponents; denounced the assassination of Julio Antonio Mella; criticized the corruption of the regime; expressed disapproval of the growth of the public debt; called for the restoration of constitutional democracy; embraced the principles of university reform; and called for a struggle against the Machado tyranny.  Its insurrectional practices included strikes, student demonstrations, underground propaganda, sabotage, and execution of government dignitaries and henchmen (Instituto de Cuba 1998:289-90; Vitier 2006:137-38; Arboleya 2008:98).    

     In spite of its use of the tactics of armed struggle, the goals of DEU were reformist rather than revolutionary.  As a result, in the beginning of 1931, leftist students split from DEU to form the Student Left Wing (AIE).  AIE called the students to an anti-imperialist revolution of national and social liberation, a revolution directed by the proletariat in alliance with the peasants and the radical petit bourgeoisie (Instituto de Cuba 1998:290; Vitier 2006:137; Arboleya 2008:98).       

     Women’s organizations also actively participated in the popular uprising against the Machado tyranny.  The Feminist National Alliance established the right of women to vote as its principal slogan.  In May 1930, it was reorganized as the Labor Union of Women, led by Ofelia Dominguez and Bertha Darder.  A few months later, Oppositionist Women was formed, which included prominent leaders of the women’s movement, including Pilar Jorge de Tella, although it primarily had a reformist orientation.  On January 8, 1931, the police violently broke up a demonstration of women in front of the Presidential Palace.  After that date, the repressive brutality of the Machado regime made no gender distinction, and many women were included among the detained and, in some cases, the assassinated (Instituto de Cuba 1998:290-291). 

     Many intellectuals, professors, and professionals also were opposed to the Machado tyranny, the great symbol of which was Enrique José Varona.   Most professors, for example, adhered to the positions of DEU, although this organization, as has been noted, was reformist.  Similarly, most professional organizations adopted positions of reformist opposition to the Machado government (Instituto de Cuba 1998:291).

     Thus, there emerged by 1931 a national consciousness against the Machado tyranny, including both revolutionary and reformist tendencies.  During the course of the year, strikes and demonstrations were daily occurrences (Instituto de Cuba 1998:291).

     There also was a reformist opposition composed of leaders of traditional political parties that sought to bring down the government of Machado by means of armed struggle.  This group, which called itself the “Revolutionary Junta of New York,” included Mario García Menocal, the third president of the neocolonial republic.  In spite of its use of the word “revolutionary” in its name, and in spite of its use of the means of armed struggle, its goals were reformist.  It sought through the armed struggle to induce the United States to withdraw its support of the Machado tyranny and to overthrow the Machado government, with the intention of establishing a “democratic” government that would not be detrimental to US interests and that would close the road to popular revolution.  In August 1931, the Revolutionary Junta organized an armed expedition that disembarked on the north coast of the western province of Pinar del Río, and it coordinated uprisings in the central and eastern provinces.  But the expedition soon surrendered to government troops without offering resistance, and the other uprisings were quickly put down (Instituto de Cuba 1998:292-93; Arboleya 2008:98).

     In addition, ABC, a fascist organization, was formed by a group of intellectuals and lawyers in August or September of 1931.  It was opposed to the Machado government and to the popular movement. Its leaders were admirers of Mussolini, and its program was influenced by Italian fascism.  It was organized in secret cells, and its methods included assassinations of government leaders, sabotage, and propaganda, activities that led to a certain degree of support among the popular classes, particularly the middle class (Instituto de Cuba 1998:293; Arboleya 2008:98).

     Thus, the panorama in Cuba in the period 1930-32 was characterized by a “democratically” elected but brutally repressive government, a popular opposition that was mostly revolutionary but that included reformist elements, a bourgeois reformist opposition that launch an aborted armed struggle, and the emergence of fascism.  The neocolonial republic was in full crisis, and the inherent contradictions of neocolonialism were fully exposed.

      In the context of this panorama, the most outstanding popular leader of the 1930s, Antonio Guiteras, would emerge, as we will discuss in the next post.
 

References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 

Vitier, Cintio.  2006.  Ese Sol del Mundo Moral.  La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Machado, PCC, CNOC, DEU, AIE, ABC

Posted August 6, 2014

     Among those who participated in the armed insurrection led by the Revolutionary Junta of New York was Antonio Guiteras Holmes, who had been the leader of a Student Revolutionary Directorate formed in 1927.  As part of the actions of the Revolutionary Junta in August 1931 (see “The Cuban popular revolution of 1930-32” 8/4/2014), Guiteras and his followers engaged government troops in a brief combat in a plantation in the eastern province of Oriente.  The rebels suffered three casualties, and they were captured and imprisoned.  During his four months in prison, Guiteras worked with Felipe Fuentes in winning followers among the prisoners.  Fuentes was a communist leader from Oriente who was the founder of the Student Left Wing (Instituto de Historia de Cuba 1998:292). 

     Following the failure of the insurrection led by the Revolutionary Junta of New York, Guiteras severed ties with the Junta and formed an independent organization, the Revolutionary Union, in order to develop his own revolutionary project.  Guiteras was influenced by a number of revolutionary movements and ideas, including: Cuban revolutionary theory and practice, in which Martí and Mella were the most influential leaders/intellectuals (see “José Martí” 6/26/2014; “Julio A. Mella and the student movement” 7/8/2014); the Russian Revolution; the Mexican Revolution; the struggle of Augusto César Sandino in Nicaragua; the Irish independence movement; the ideas of Antonio Blanqui on the role of the revolutionary vanguard; the ideas of the French socialist Jean Jacques Jaurés; and the analyses of Marx and Lenin.  The Revolutionary Union was organized in the last four months of 1931, and it united a number of existing small insurrectional groups in the eastern and central provinces.  Its members included professionals, intellectuals, artisans, service employees, workers, farmers, veterans of the independence war, and students.  It advocated a popular, democratic, agrarian, and anti-imperialist revolution of national liberation that would create conditions for the gradual construction of a socialist society in Cuba (Instituto de Historia de Cuba 1998:293-94; Arboleya 2008:99). 

     The strategy of the Revolutionary Union was urban and rural armed struggle, utilizing such tactics as sabotage, execution of government representatives and police officers, the taking of military barracks, and guerrilla actions in the countryside.  Guiteras conceived a plan for the taking of the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba, with the intention of arming the people and creating a guerrilla struggle in the eastern mountains, but the plan was frustrated by the maneuvers of the army.  On April 29, 1933, the Revolutionary Union took the barracks of San Luis, but Guiteras and his followers were forced to withdraw in the face of an army counterattack, although they were able to avoid capture.  In the second half of 1933, small guerrilla units, composed principally of peasants, emerged in the eastern and central provinces of the country, under the direction of Guiteras and the Revolutionary Union, and they continued to operate until the fall of Machado on August 12, 1933 (Instituto de Historia de Cuba 1998:294, 297; Arboleya 2008:99).

     The Revolutionary Union was a significant development.  Like the PCC, it had revolutionary goals, for it sought to develop a revolution of national and social liberation and to establish a socialist society ruled by popular sectors.  But unlike the PCC, it turned to armed struggle, as had the reformist Revolutionary Junta.  However, unlike the Revolutionary Junta, it was able to sustain armed struggle in rural areas for a period of months.

      In spite of the similarity of goals of the Communist Party of Cuba and the Revolutionary Union, the two were moving in different directions with respect to strategy, creating a division within the revolutionary sector of the popular movement.  Such divisions in revolutionary popular movements must be overcome, if the revolution is to triumph, but in this phase of the Cuban revolution, it was unable to do so.  We will return in a subsequent post to this issue.

      Although the Communist Party of Cuba did not support armed struggle during the Revolution of 1930-33, various organizations, both reformist and revolutionary, adopted the strategy.  The use of armed force had been central to the Cuban political process, practiced historically by both the forces of domination and the forces of liberation.  As a result, by the 1930s the use of armed force came to be defined as a legitimate strategy of popular struggle.  The complete lack of legitimacy of the Machado government, as a result of its repressive tactics and its representation of foreign interests, also was a factor in legitimating the strategy of armed struggle in the eyes of many of the popular leaders and many of the people.

      The necessity and the legitimacy of armed force in revolutionary processes is one of the lessons that we must learn as we seek to understand revolutionary processes of the past, present and future. But we must be careful to observe the particular subjective and objective conditions.  We must recognize that armed struggle is legitimate in many revolutionary contexts, but not all, for it depends on particular conditions.  The particular conditions for armed struggle were present in the Cuban neocolonial republic.  But they were not present, for example, in the United States in 1968, and they are not present in the United States today.  The errors of the Revolution of 1968 in the United States and the possibilities for revolution in the United States in the future are themes that we will discuss in future posts.

     Armed struggle has been integral to celebrated revolutions that have taken power, such as the Haitian, Mexican, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban, and Sandinista Revolutions.  However, we must keep clearly in mind that revolution is not synonymous with armed struggle. Revolution is the taking of power, and armed struggle is merely a strategy to this end, but other strategies can be more effective, depending on particular conditions.  In the cases of Chile, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, revolutions took power by using mechanisms of representative democracy, although their experiences have demonstrated the need for effective civilian control of the armed forces, once power is taken.  In general, revolutions show that the taking of power requires creative strategies, for those who have power have many resources at their disposal.  The taking of power cannot be reduced to an imitation of armed struggles that have successfully taken power in certain particular conditions. 

      The emergence in 1933 of armed struggle directed by the Revolutionary Union deepened the crisis of the Machado regime, which already had been in crisis as a result of the organization of popular opposition by the Communist Party of Cuba, the emergence of reformist and revolutionary opposition among students and women, and the emergence of a bourgeois reformist opposition that had launched an aborted armed struggle (see “The Cuban popular revolution of 1930-32” 8/4/2014).  The United States, concerned that its interests would be compromised by the coming to power of the popular revolution, began to search for a way to end the Machado regime but to preserve a neocolonial republic in accordance with its interests, as we will see in the next post.


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 

Vitier, Cintio.  2006.  Ese Sol del Mundo Moral.  La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Guiteras

Posted August 7, 2014

     The inability of Cuba and the world producers of sugar to control production in order to stabilize prices (see “Machado and the promise of reform” 7/16/2014); the higher tariffs imposed by the United States on Cuban sugar; the increasing use by the United States of sugar produced in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines; and the global economic crisis of the Great Depression had a strong impact on Cuban production and export of sugar and had disastrous consequences for the economic and social situation of the country.  The Cuban exportation of crude sugar to the United States declined from 3,752,410 tons in 1929 to 1,340,000 tons in 1933, so that it was only slightly more than one-third in 1933 what it had been in 1929; and the Cuban share of the US sugar market fell from 51.9% in 1929 to 25.4% in 1933.  The Cuban national income from sugar nearly was cut in half from 1929 to 1933, from 571 million pesos to 294 million.  The purchasing power per capita was reduced more than half, from 151 pesos in 1929 to 71 in 1933, adjusted for inflation (Instituto de Cuba 1998:282-86).

     The deteriorating economic situation fueled the emerging popular revolution (see “The Cuban workers’ movement of the 1920s” 7/7/2014; “Julio A. Mella and the student movement” 7/8/2014; “The Cuban women’s movement of the 1920s” 7/11/2014; “The Cuban popular revolution of 1930-32” 8/4/2014; “Guiteras and the Revolutionary Union” 8/5/2014).  The neocolonial republic was in full economic, political, and social crisis.

      Franklin Delano Roosevelt ascended to the presidency of the United States in January 1933, at the depths of the Great Depression.  He launched a significant change in direction with respect to US domestic policies, in that he turned to strong state action in order to reduce unemployment and social inequality.  With respect to Latin America, however, he continued the imperialist policies of his predecessors (see “Imperialism and the FDR New Deal” 9/20/2013).  He sought to reactivate and increase the sale of US manufactured products in Latin America and the purchase of Latin American raw materials by the United States.  His strategy for this revitalization of the core-peripheral commercial relation, weakened by the Great Depression, was to negotiate trade agreements with Latin American governments.  However, because of the emergence of anti-imperialist movements in Latin America, he sought to avoid direct US military intervention and to present US policy with a more democratic face, proclaiming that the United States desired to be a “Good Neighbor” (Instituto de Cuba 1998:297-98). 

      Roosevelt named his personal friend Benjamin Sumner Welles as US ambassador to Cuba.  Welles’ task was to bring about the end of the political conflict and the restoration of constitutional authority by means of personal mediation and without US military intervention (see “‘Democracy’ becomes tyranny” 7/17/2014).  Welles arrived in Cuba in May 1933, and tyrannical President Gerardo Machado was obligated to accept the mediation of the US ambassador, because of pressure from US companies in Cuba as well as the Cuban national bourgeoisie. Welles proposed the restoration of constitutional guarantees and freedom for political prisoners; the holding of elections in 1934, with Machado staying in office until May 20, 1935, when he would be replaced by the newly-elected president; the cessation of anti-government activities by the fascist (ABC) and reformist opposition; amnesty for members of the Machado government for crimes committed by the regime; and a clampdown on the revolutionary opposition (Instituto de Cuba 1998:298).

     The reformist opposition and ABC accepted Welles’ proposals and suspended all activities in opposition to the regime.  However, the revolutionary opposition, consisting of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), the National Worker Confederation of Cuba (CNOC), and the Revolutionary Union, firmly rejected the proposals.  After some hesitation, the reformist University Student Directorate (DEU) also rejected Welles’ proposals (Instituto de Cuba 1998:298-99).

      Ignoring the mediation of Welles, the people continued the offensive.  In August 1933, a strike by workers in bus companies in Havana rapidly became a general strike, provoked by arbitrary measures taken against the strikers by the city government.  The general strike was organized by PCC and CNOC, which put forth social and economic demands as well as a demand for the removal of Machado from power.  Machado proposed acceptance of the social and economic demands but not his departure.  The leadership of PCC and CNOC recommended acceptance of Machado’s proposal, but the workers, meeting in general assemblies, decided to continue the general strike until the dictator be overthrown.  The leaders of PCC and CNOC conceded to the workers’ desires, and the general strike continued (Instituto de Cuba 1998:299). 

      Concerned by the possible triumph of the popular revolution, and fearful that the national situation could provoke a US military intervention, which could lead to the dissolution of the Cuban armed forces, high-ranking army officers rebelled on August 12, compelling Machado to resign.  That same day, Machado and a good part of his clique departed for the Bahamas.  The plans of the US ambassador for an orderly transition to a post-Machado government and the re-establishment of order to the neocolonial republic were ruined by the force of the people (Instituto de Cuba 1998:299-300).

     The people had forced the tyrant to flee.  But this did not mean that the people would be in control.  The maneuvering of the Cuban political class and the US ambassador would continue, as we will see in the next post.


References

Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Machado, FDR, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Good Neighbor

Posted August 8, 2014

     With the flight of Machado on August 12, 1933 (see “FDR and US mediation in Cuba” 8/7/2014), US ambassador Benjamin Sumner Wells sought to establish a government that would be capable of frustrating the popular revolution.  He pressured the Congress to designate as president Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, a bland politician who possessed the merit of being the son of the first President of the Republic of Cuba in Arms, established in 1869 during the first Cuban war of independence (see “The Cuban war of independence of 1868” 6/17/2014).  In accordance with the desires of the US ambassador, Céspedes was designated president on August 13.  The Céspedes government was supported by the national estate bourgeoisie as well as the reformist opposition to Machado.  In addition, the fascist ABC, with paramilitary structures of direct action, was an important social base of support.  However, inasmuch as the Cespédes government had been established by the US ambassador, it was lacking in moral authority in the eyes of the people.  The Céspedes government tried to take advantage of popular hostility to Machado by setting aside the changes that the Machado regime had made in the Constitution, placing the Constitution of 1901 in full vigor. But the workers continued with the wave of strikes, directed by committees elected by the masses, putting forth economic, social and political demands.  At the same time, using distinct strategies, the Communist Party of Cuba, the Revolutionary Union, and the University Student Directorate sought to bring down the Céspedes government.  The Céspedes government lasted only three weeks, and it was characterized by vacillations.  It was a moment of anarchy, including executions of Machado government officials by the enraged people (Instituto de Cuba 1998:300-2).

     In the Cuban army and navy, there had emerged a caste division between the officers, who proceeded from the upper and middle classes; and the non-commissioned officers, soldiers, and sailors, who were from the lower classes.  The officers lived in a privileged manner, and they were abusive toward non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, whose salaries were low.  In addition, non-commissioned officers were disheartened by the role that the army had played during the Machado regime, lowering its prestige among workers and peasants.  As a result, revolutionary and reformist ideas permeated the ranks of enlisted men, and there were significant contacts between them and Guiteras, the Revolutionary Union, and the University Student Directorate (Instituto de Cuba 1998:302-3).

     On September 4, 1933, the sergeants, corporals and enlisted men seized control of the military base of Columbia.  Along with leaders of the University Student Directorate and some university professors, they formed the Revolutionary Group of Cuba, which declared itself to be the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Cuba.  It announced a program that reflected the reformist proposals of the University Student Directorate: the convoking of a Constitutional Assembly; affirmation of the principles of representative democracy; the establishment of special tribunals for the trial and punishment of officials of the Machado government; protection of the life and property of citizens and foreigners; and recognition of the good faith and patriotism of the members of the Céspedes government.  The Revolutionary Group received the support of the units of the army, navy and police throughout the country, so that chiefs and officers were replaced by sergeants, corporals, and soldiers across the nation (Instituto de Cuba 1998:303-4).

     Among the members of the Revolutionary Group was Sergeant Fulgencio Batista.  He suggested that the key leaders of the rebellion in Columbia, located in Havana, travel to the cities of Matanzas and Pinar del Río, in order to control the uncertain situation in the barracks of these cities.  This enabled Batista to personally conduct negotiations in the early morning of September 5, with respect to the first public proclamation by the recently created Revolutionary Group.  The “Proclamation to the People of Cuba” was signed by sixteen civilians, two ex-military men, and only one military man in active service, Batista, who signed the document with the self-designated title of “Revolutionary Chief Sergeant of all the Armed Forces of the Republic.”  Later that same day, Batista issued a public statement in the name of the armed forces, signed by him, and he met with the US ambassador.  In this way, Batista came to be identified in public opinion as the leader of the sergeant’s revolt.  When the other leaders returned to the capital, they decided to accept the facts that had transpired, including the new prominent role of Batista, rather than undermine the sergeant’s revolt through an internal struggle for power (Instituto de Cuba 1998:303-4).

      On September 5, the Revolutionary Group established a collective presidency of five persons, implementing a proposal to this effect that had been put forward a month earlier by the University Student Directorate.  The “Pentateuch,” as it was called by the people, could not function, because ideological divisions among the five prevented the emergence of consensus.  So the Pentateuch was dissolved on September 10, and Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín was named President. Thus began the “government of 100 days,” which was the only government of the neocolonial republic to be established without US approval, and which during its brief existence enacted progressive reforms, as we will discuss in the next post (Instituto de Cuba 1998:  304-5). 

     During its five days of life, the Pentateuch promoted Batista to the rank of coronel (Instituto de Cuba 1998:304-5).  The era of Batista had begun. 


References

Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Batista

Posted August 11, 2014

     The government of Ramón Grau San Martín lasted from September 10, 1933 to January 15, 1934.  Although short-lived and characterized by internal contradictions, the government of “100 days” was an important moment in the neocolonial republic, because it was independent of the United States, and it enacted a series of progressive reforms that had potential implications for the breaking of the neocolonial relation.

     There were three factions in the Grau government, in contradiction and conflict with one another.  The rightist faction was led by Fulgencio Batista (see “The rise of Batista” 8/8/2014), who refused to enter the cabinet but controlled the armed forces.  Batista supported the interests of US imperialism and the Cuban oligarchy, and during the Grau government, he was in constant communication with the US ambassador (Instituto de Cuba 1998:306-7). 

     The nationalist-reformist faction was led by Grau and leaders of the University Student Directorate.  It advocated the convoking of a Constitutional Assembly; the capitalist economic development of the country; laws for the protection of the rights of workers and the people; the eradication of racial and gender discrimination; the expansion of educational opportunity and of access to culture; the distribution of land to peasants and agricultural workers, but in a form that was consistent with the interests of the Cuban estate bourgeoisie; and the protection of Cuban political sovereignty, without undermining the alliance between the United States and Cuba; and it had an anti-communist ideology (Instituto de Cuba 1998:307).  Like Machado in 1924, the nationalist-reformist faction sought to reform the neocolonial system by making concessions to popular demands and at the same time protecting the interests of the US corporations and banks and the Cuban national bourgeoisie.  As we have seen, a reformist program is not sustainable in the long run (“Machado and the promise of reform” 7/16/2014).

     The revolutionary faction of the Grau government was led by Antonio Guiteras, who held the important cabinet post Secretary of Government and War.  As we have seen, Guiteras had led the armed struggle in the eastern and central provinces against the Machado regime (see “Guiteras and the Revolutionary Union” 8/6/2014). Guiteras sought to establish a government “where the interests of workers and peasants are above the profit desires of national and foreign capitalists” (quoted in Instituto de Cuba 1998:308).  He advocated the economic independence of Cuba with respect to the United States, the gradual nationalization of public services, the immediate distribution of land to peasants and agricultural workers, and social and employment equality for women (Instituto de Cuba 1998:307-9).

      The Grau government enacted a number of legislative reforms, proposed by Guiteras and made possible through tactical alliance between the revolutionary and reformist factions.  Measures were taken with the intention of removing the participants in the Machado government from the political scene: the dissolution of the political parties; the designation of governors and mayors in the provinces; and the establishment of tribunals to sanction those who had been responsible for crimes committed by the Machado regime.  With respect to economic policy, the orientation of the Grau government was toward greater intervention in the economy.  The economic measures included the regulation of the sugar industry, with regulations favorable to small producers; suspension of the payment of the debt contracted by the Machado government with the Chase National Bank; and the reduction of electricity rates.  With respect to labor, the government recognized the rights of workers to form unions and to strike; it established a minimum wage; and it limited the working day to eight hours.  In foreign affairs, the government adopted an anti-imperialist posture, calling for the abrogation of the Platt Amendment (see “The ‘democratic’ constitution of 1901” 6/30/2014) and rejecting US interference in the affairs of Latin American nations (Instituto de Cuba 1998:309-10; Vitier 2006:141-43).

     At the same time, troops under the command of Batista engaged in a ferocious repression of striking workers and the Communist Party of Cuba.  This policy was made possible through a tactical alliance between the right and reformist factions, and it was the source of significant conflict between the rightist and revolutionary factions within the government (Instituto de Cuba 1998:311-13, 316).

     Taken on balance, however, the government of “100 days” was an independent and progressive government.  Citio Vitier writes that the government “emitted an impressive series of truly revolutionary laws and decrees.”  He describes it as “an audacious anti-imperialist offensive, the first realized in Cuba from power.”  With reference to Guiteras, he writes, “As incredible as it seems, Cuba was governing itself in the person of that pale, serious, direct and unyielding youth of twenty-six years of age” (Vitier 2006:141-42; italics in original). Because of its progressive character, the Grau government was under constant attack by the Cuban estate bourgeoisie, the associations of Cuban and foreign capitalists, the societies with roots in Spanish colonialism, the ex-officials of the armed forces, the reformist opposition to Machado, the fascist ABC, and the reactionary press (Instituto de Cuba 1998:314).

     The US administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not recognize the Grau government.  On the day of the September 4 coup, Batista began to meet with Benjamin Sumner Welles.  The US ambassador was impressed immediately, and he soon came to view Batista as the best hope for an order consistent with US interests.  By the end of October, Wells and Batista had arrived at a plan to replace Grau with Coronel Carlos Mendieta as president, with Batista as head of the armed forces.  Guiteras tried to use Batista’s collusion with a foreign power as grounds for his removal as head of the armed forces, but Grau rejected Guiteras’ proposal for the dismissal of Batista.  At the same time, there was resistance to the Batista-Wells plan by the Cuban elite, as a result of the fact that Batista was a mulatto of humble origins.  And the Batista-Wells plan was complicated by the indecision of Mendieta.  But as the Grau government came to be increasingly influenced by the revolutionary faction, Wells and his successor, Jefferson Caffery, continued to lobby for the replacement of Grau. Under pressure from Batista, Grau submitted his resignation on January 15, 1934.  Mendieta was installed as president on January 18, and the Mendieta government was recognized by the United States on January 23.  Thus emerged a government that was “delivered by Caffery, directed by Batista, and represented by Mendieta” (Instituto de Cuba 1998:304, 313, 316-18).    

     With the coup d’état of January 15, 1934, Guiteras went underground, with the intention of organizing an armed revolutionary struggle against the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government (Instituto de Cuba 1998: 318).  Antonio Guiteras was assassinated by Batista’s soldiers on May 8, as he was seeking to clandestinely leave the country.  Killed with him was the Venezuelan Carlos Aponte, who had been a coronel in the army of Sandino in Nicaragua (Vitier 2006:143). 

     Ramón Grau San Martín went into exile in Mexico on January 20, 1934.  Upon his arrival, he was acclaimed by a great multitude, which believed that he was the principal force behind the progressive laws that Guiteras had championed (Instituto de Cuba 1998:319).  Grau would later return to Cuba, and he would be elected president in 1944, promising reforms.  Whereas Machado had promised reform and had delivered repression, Grau would promise reform and would deliver corruption.
 

References

Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 

Vitier, Cintio.  2006.  Ese Sol del Mundo Moral.  La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Guiteras, Grau, Batista

Posted August 12, 2014

     With the coup d’état that overthrew the Grau government and established the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government, Antonio Guiteras went underground.  Guiteras had been the most prominent member of the Grau government, and the leader of its revolutionary faction (see “Guiteras & the ‘government of 100 days’” 8/11/2014).

     In the beginning of 1934, Guiteras established the organization TNT, which connected revolutionaries from Havana, the eastern province of Oriente, and other provinces.  It planned to battle the government by means of sabotage and assassination of government officials (Instituto de Cuba 1998:326-27).

     In March of 1934, TNT dissolved itself, and its leaders established Joven Cuba (meaning Young Cuba).  The preamble to its program states that Cuba continues to be a colonial state.  The Cuban economic structure, according to the preamble, is subordinated to foreign capital, designed by and for foreign interests, and does not serve the collective needs of the people.  The preamble maintains that the nation can attain stability only through a socialist state, which is constructed in various stages.  It affirms anti-imperialism and defense of the sovereignty of the nation as basic principles.  Its program advocates: agrarian reform; nationalization of public utilities companies and of natural resources; nationalization of teaching; attention to the health, cultural, and housing problems of workers and peasants; diversification of foreign commerce; and elimination of racial and gender discrimination.  Joven Cuba proposed the formation of a revolutionary struggle, composed of all classes and sectors that were victimized by neocolonialism, which would seek to take power and to establish a revolutionary dictatorship that would utilize the power of the state to implement a popular, agrarian, anti-imperialist revolution of national liberation, which would serve as a preamble to the necessary socialist revolution.  It advocated the taking of power by means of armed insurrection, including rural and urban guerrilla war, propaganda, sabotage, mobilization of the masses, revolts by soldiers and sailors, partial strikes, and revolutionary general strikes (Instituto de Cuba 1998:327).    

     Joven Cuba spread rapidly, and cells were established throughout the island.  Its activities included propaganda, sabotage, assassinations, and preparations for the breakout of a revolutionary war.  It planned for an insurrection in stages, beginning with rural guerrilla forces supported by urban sabotage, and culminating in uprisings in the armed forces and a general revolutionary strike (Instituto de Cuba 1998:327).    

      Joven Cuba acquired a plantation in Mexico to use as a training center for guerrilla forces, under the command of Guiteras, which would disembark in Oriente and launch a rural guerrilla war, supported by urban units.  But on May 8, 1935, as the expeditionaries prepared to depart for Mexico from the coastal city of Matanzas, they were surprised by the army of Batista, which had been informed by two sailors who were presumed revolutionaries.  Guiteras and Carlos Aponte, a Venezuelan who had been a coronel in the army of Sandino in Nicaragua, were killed.  The rest of the expeditionaries were imprisoned (Instituto de Cuba 1998:332).

     The concept and strategy of Antonio Guiteras would be retaken by Fidel Castro, who attempted to launch a guerrilla war on July 26, 1953, and began again in December 1956, leading an expedition that had trained in Mexico.  Although surprised by Batista’s army shortly after disembarking, a remnant was able to regroup and launch a rural guerrilla revolutionary war, with support of cells in the cities, which was able to advance to the taking of cities, culminating in the triumph of the Cuban Revolution on January 1, 1959.  The triumphant revolution in power established a government of national liberation as a first step in a transition to socialism.

 
References

Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Guiteras, Joven Cuba

Posted August 13, 2014

     Among the opponents of the progressive government of 100 days was the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC for its initials in Spanish).  This has been analyzed by Lionel Soto, who was part of the leadership of the Popular Socialist Party (the name of the Communist Party at the time) from 1947 to 1960.  After the triumph of the revolution, Soto became a member of the Central Committee of the reconstituted Communist Party of Cuba, and he occupied many important positions in the government.

     Soto maintains that the opposition of the Communist Party of Cuba to the Grau government of 1933 was an error.  In his analysis, the error was rooted in the application of a political line, according to which the working class was to take power through the formation of soviets or popular councils of workers, peasants and soldiers, which would replace the political structures of representative democracy.  To accomplish this transition to popular power, alliances should be formed among the various popular sectors, under the direction of the Communist Party, which was to function as a revolutionary vanguard (Soto 1995:447-48).  

      In accordance with the “extreme Left” and “sectarian” political line, during the Cuban popular revolution of 1930-33 in opposition to the governments of Machado and Céspedes, the Communist Party of Cuba considered any popular organization that did not place itself under its direction to be part of the “bourgeois opposition” to the government. Thus, the PCC interpreted the movement against the government as consisting of two sectors: the popular councils and parties directed by the PCC; and everyone else, dismissed as pertaining to the “bourgeois opposition.”  Soto writes that “the PCC conceived the popular triumph as a struggle between two well-defined poles: ‘soviet’ power, and the power of the landowning bourgeois oligarchy.  There did not exist the possibility of a transitional power formed by a radical or radicalizable petit bourgeoisie” (Soto 1995:448). In Soto’s view, this conception devalued alliances with popular organizations that were democratically less advanced than the popular councils led by the PCC, alliances that could have opened the road to a more advanced development within these popular organizations. José A. Tabares (1998:301) concurs, noting that, in dividing the popular sectors into those that followed PCC and those that did not, the PCC undermined the possibility of putting into practice an effective policy of alliances among popular organizations (Tabares 1998:301).  According to Soto, this political line had the effect of isolating the proletarian struggle, because in Cuba, the revolutionary peasant movement was weak, and the number of socialists from the petty bourgeoisie was small (Soto 1995:448).

      In accordance with the sectarian political line, the Communist Party of Cuba considered the government of 1933 to be a landholding bourgeois government, and it attacked all sectors of the government, without making any distinction among the factions led by Batista, Grau, and Guiteras (Soto 1995:737).  As we have seen (“Guiteras & the ‘government of 100 days’” 8/11/2014), there were significant differences and conflicts among the right, reformist, and revolutionary factions of the government, led by Batista, Grau, and Guiteras respectively.

      PCC opposition to the revolutionary government of 1933 was in part fueled by the repressiveness of the government with respect to the PCC, which occurred in spite of the efforts of the revolutionary faction of Guiteras to prevent it.  PCC opposition, therefore, was understandable to a certain extent.  Nevertheless, it was an error, for it undermined the possibility of an alliance between the Revolutionary Union of Guiteras and the Communist Party of Cuba, a possibility that could have derailed Batista’s consolidation of power.  As Soto concludes, “the PC struggled sincerely and hard for the agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution and the socialist revolution. . . .  But it was wrong, and its erroneous concept impeded working for its unity with the Guiterist forces in order to give battle—which would have been truly historic—to the Batistist right” (Soto:1995:737).

     Our task is to learn from historic errors, and not to discredit or dismiss our heroes.  And they were indeed heroes, taking into account their sacrifices for a most just world.  They confronted difficult decisions over complex issues, decisions that had to be made in the heat of battle. Certainly, the Revolutionary Union and the Communist Party of Cuba should have become allies.  But the differences between them were deep.  The PCC was seeking power through the formation of popular councils, having success particularly among workers; the Revolutionary Union sought to take power, first, by a guerilla struggles from the country to the city, fought mostly by peasants, and later, by participating in a government that included representatives of bourgeois interests.  And the Revolutionary Union had adopted a policy of execution of government officials, a controversial practice that was not supported by the PCC (Tabares 1998: 287, 294-97, 301, 310-12, and 325-28; Arboleya 2008:99).

     The issue would revisit the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s.  In the tradition of Guiteras, Fidel Castro led a guerrilla struggle with a strategy of taking power from the country to the city, and with the intention of establishing a government of national liberation as a first step toward socialism.  This was not the approach of the Popular Socialist Party. But the exceptional theoretical and practical insight of Fidel enabled his 26 of July Movement to become the leading force of the revolution, which facilitated tactics of cooperation.  Following the triumph of the revolution in 1959, a new Communist Party was formed through the integration of the three principal organizations that had combated the Batista dictatorship: the 26 of July Movement, the Popular Socialist Party, and the 13 of March Revolutionary Directory (a student organization, named for an assault on the Presidential Palace on March 13, 1957).  As a result of the charismatic authority of Fidel, the revolutionary factions would become unified, a necessary precondition for their success and sustainability.  We will be discussing these developments in future posts.  Further information on the reconstituted Communist Party can be found at “The Cuban revolutionary project and its development in historical and global context.” 


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Soto, Lionel.  1995.  La Revolución Precursora de 1933: Un momento trascendental en la continuidad revolucionaria de José Martí.  La Habana: Editorial Si-Mar.

Tabares del Real, José A.  1998.  “Proceso revolucionario: ascenso y reflujo (1930-35)” in Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Guiteras, Revolution of 1933, Communist Party of Cuba

Posted August 15, 2014

     We have seen that the Communist Party of Cuba during the 1930s rejected a strategy of alliances with popular organizations that would not subordinate themselves to the direction of the party, and it was opposed to the government of 1933, even though this government included a revolutionary faction headed by Antonio Guiteras (see “Guiteras and the ‘government of 100 days’” 8/11/2014; and “The Communist Party of Cuba in the 1930s” 8/13/2014).  In accordance with this sectarian approach, the PCC published harsh criticisms of Joven Cuba, the revolutionary organization developed by Antonio Guiteras and his followers after the fall of the Grau government (Tábares 1998:327; see “Guiteras and Joven Cuba” 8/12/2014). 

     At the same time, Guiteras and Joven Cuba also committed the error of sectarianism.  They insisted that the unity of the popular organizations in opposition to the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government be formed on a base of compliance with the perspective and methods of Joven Cuba and be under the leadership of Guiteras (Tábares 1998:327). 

      Moreover, the problem of sectarianism was evident not only with respect to the principal popular organizations, the PCC and Joven Cuba.  A wide variety of small revolutionary groups emerged during 1934 and 1935, with different programs and tactics, giving rise to “constant antagonism and frequent confrontations among them” (Tábares 1998:328).

      José Tábaras maintains that the antagonism among the popular organizations was an important factor in enabling the government to consolidate its power.  He writes, “The contradictions and disunity among the different organizations that were opposed to the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government contributed much to its survival and consolidation” (Tábares 1998:328).  He concludes:

     In its most profound sense, the error was not appreciating the dialectics of theory and practice.  Revolutionary theory is formulated on the basis of practice, and it develops through reflection on experience in practice.  When there are divergent understandings within the revolutionary process, we must ask, which understanding is correct?  The answer emerges in experience.  As the revolutionary process advances, the insight and the oversight of different understandings will become clear.  In the meantime, until the answer emerges in practice, the two sides have to develop tactics of cooperation, which strengthen the force of the revolutionary process and enable it to advance.

     In the 1930-35 stage of the of Cuban Revolution, there were two competing theories: the taking of power through the creation of popular councils, which would replace the structures of representative democracy; and the taking of power through a guerrilla war emerging in the country and advancing to the city.  The Cuban Communist Party practiced the former concept; and the Revolutionary Union and Joven Cuba implemented the latter.  These organizations were by far the most influential popular organizations of the period.  The proponents of both conceptions had many beliefs and commitments in common: opposition to the existing government, on the basis of its representation of imperialist and national bourgeois interests; the taking of power by a vanguard organization in the name of the people; and the formation of a government of national liberation as a first step toward socialism.  But they disagreed concerning the strategy through which power is to be taken.  It was not a trivial disagreement, for different understandings of the road to power can imply different forms of exercising power, once the revolution triumphs.  Which was correct?  Should the people take power through the formation of popular councils, or through armed struggle?  The answer emerges in practice: one of the two approaches will have more success, and this greater success in achieving goals demonstrates its greater insight in the context of particular conditions.  

      An example of the answer emerging in practice is provided by the case of Cuba in the 1950s.  Although the Cuban revolutionary process was aborted in 1935 by the consolidation of the power of Batista, the revolution continued.  Division within the revolutionary process remained, principally in the form of conflict between a strategy of alliance with reformist sectors, including bourgeois parties, and the strategy of armed struggle.   But on July 26, 1953, an attack on Moncada Barracks by Fidel Castro and his followers announced a renewed armed struggle and a revitalization of the concept of the taking of power from the country to the city.  This heroic action was effective in galvanizing the people, freeing them from a pervasive sense of powerlessness, and renewing the hope of the people in a more just and democratic nation.  Thus, the insight of the strategy of armed struggle, in relation to the particular conditions of Cuba in the 1950s, could not be denied.  The evident superiority of this approach made possible the unification of the popular revolutionary forces on a basis of support for the guerrilla struggle emerging in the mountains of Sierra Maestra in 1957 and 1958 and spreading to the cities in late 1958, culminating in the triumph of the Cuban Revolution on January 1, 1959.  

     In retrospect, we can see that the strategy of armed struggle was appropriate for the conditions of the Cuban neocolonial republic of the 1950s.  To be sure, the Communist Party strategy of 1930-35, involving the formation of popular councils, had much to recommend it, inasmuch as it involved the people actively in self-government, thus promoting practical education in the meaning of democracy, and it had been the successful strategy of the October Revolution.  And the Communist Party strategy, beginning in October 1935, of forming alliances with various sectors, including bourgeois parties, made possible certain concrete gains.  But the particular conditions of Cuba in the 1950s made the armed struggle a viable strategy for the taking of power: the repressiveness of the second Batista dictatorship, creating serious obstacles to the more open and visible forms of political opposition; the long history of armed conflict in the political affairs of Cuba, giving legitimacy to the tactic of armed struggle; and the willingness of the rural people to support the guerrilla struggle in practical ways. 

     With the restoration of the project of the Right on a global scale, a process that began in 1979, the post-World War II era of revolution came to an end.  The imposition of the neoliberal project and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist bloc would soon follow.  After this setback for the revolutionary forces, there emerged a period a profound critical evaluation of the errors of the revolution.  Among the conclusions was recognition of the error of sectarianism, defined as the malady in which popular organizations with common goals refuse to cooperate, because of differences in tactics or concepts.  Since the reemergence of popular movements, beginning in 1995, principally on the basis of popular world-wide rejection of the neoliberal project, the various emerging revolutionary organizations have been conscious of the need to avoid sectarianism.  They have been oriented to cooperation with one another, seeking to include in collective action the various organizations that are committed to the creation of a more just and democratic world.

     The revolution today that seeks to establish socialism for the XXI century has learned the historic lesson of the absolute practical necessity of overcoming sectarianism.  It has learned the need for unity, not a unity imposed from above, but a horizontal cooperation that respects differences and that becomes in practice a unity with pluralism and diversity.  A unity and diversity that has a base in universal human values (see “Universal human values” 4/16/2014) and in the knowledge of errors of the past, errors made by persons of good intentions who continue to be our heroes, even as we seek to overcome their limitations.  And a unity with diversity that has faith that, when there are sincere differences among us, rooted in different understandings, our experience together in common struggle will teach us the way.

 
References

Tabares del Real, José A.  1998.  “Proceso revolucionario: ascenso y reflujo (1930-35)” in Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Guiteras, Cuban Communist Party, sectarianism

Posted August 18, 2014

     We have seen that divisions and sectarianism among the various revolutionary organizations enabled the establishment in January 1934 of a government delivered by US Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, controlled by the sergeant-named-coronel Fulgencio Batista, and represented by President Carlos Mendieta (see “Guiteras and the ‘government of 100 days’” 8/11/2014; “The Communist Party of Cuba in the 1930s” 8/13/2014).  And we have seen that continuing divisions among the revolutionary forces was an important factor in enabling the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government to survive (“The lesson of sectarianism” 8/15/2014).

     Prior to the overthrow of Machado, “the chiefs of the armed forces were subordinate, in law and in fact, to civil authority, and they did not participate in the taking of political decisions” (Chang 1998:320).  The role of the armed forces of the neo-colonial republic prior to 1934 was limited to carrying out repressive measures authorized by the president and other civil authorities, in exchange for which the chiefs were granted participation in the looting of the public treasury.  But the coup d’etat of September 4, 1933, which led to the Grau “government of 100 days,” and the coup of January 15, 1934, which established the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government, greatly strengthened the role of the military in political affairs, inasmuch as the military had played a central role in both events.  Accordingly, after the fall of Machado, “Batista and his army emerged as the true arbiters of the situation.  The traditional political parties, fragmented and involved in endless fights that promoted their ambitions, only would occupy the space in governmental management that the formal maintenance of republican institutions required.  Real power would be in the hands of the military chiefs, with Batista at the head” (Chang 1998:346).  

      Through a series of laws and decrees between February and April of 1936, a number of institutions were created, all under the direction of the chief of the army and dedicated to such tasks as the creation and operation of rural schools and the providing of social services and services of public health.  By virtue of a law of August 28, 1936, these various institutions were united in the Corporative Council of Education, Health, and Welfare, which pertained to the military.  These measures increased the power of Batista and the military, by giving them control over areas that ought to be under the civilian authority of the government.  The Corporative Council, for example, and not the office under the direction of the Secretary of Education, appointed teachers to the rural schools.  Similarly, the Corporative Council appointed health specialists, social workers, and administrators necessary for the various programs of social and health services (Instituto 1998:348-50).

     In addition to increasing his power, the Corporative Council also enabled Batista to improve his image, which had been severely damaged by his “well-earned fame as an oppressor of the people” (Chang 1998:349), earned during the Grau government.  The programs of the Corporative Council involved the military with the rural peasantry, converting officers and soldiers into agents of social change that were improving the conditions of life (Chang 1998:349).  However, Federico Chang Pon considers the program to be demagoguery, in that it sought to attain social support for the personal ambitions of Batista (see also Arboleya 2008:109).    In his view, the paternalistic character of the program, its idealistic solutions, and its lack of technical support reveal its essentially demographic character (Chang 1998: 350).

     The usurpation of power by the military led to constant tension between Batista and President Mendieta.  The conflict came to a head in a dispute concerning the management of the state budget.  On December 14, 1936, Batista met with the chiefs of the armed forces, and it was decided to make an accusation against the president before the House of Representatives, accusing him of threatening members of the Congress in order to coerce them to support the legislation that he supported.  On December 24, the Senate, presided by the Supreme Court, declared the president guilty of violating the free functioning of the legislative power, and he was removed from office, replaced by Vice-President Federico Laredo Brú.  The removal of the president demonstrated and reinforced the power and ambitions of Batista (Chang 1998:352-55).

      In August 1937, Batista launched the Plan for Social-Economic Reconstruction, a program dedicated to improving the conditions of life in the countryside.  The program was launched by Batista personally, and it was accompanied by an ample propaganda campaign that proclaimed its benefits to the people.  However, the proposed program did not touch the large landholdings, which was the principal structural source of rural poverty.  And although the proposed program would have provided some support to small and middle peasants dedicated to sugar production, it provide no support for landless peasants or for peasants who were not tied to sugar production.  In fact, analyses of the proposal maintain that, if it had been implemented, it would have led to loss of land and pauperization for 60% of peasant small landholders (Chang 1998:357-560).

     Chang considers the Plan for Social-Economic Reconstruction to have been another example of Batista’s demagoguery.  He maintains that the astute Batista understood that he could not obtain the support of the workers and students through such deception, as a result of his previous repression against these sectors.  So he was attempting to establish a social base of support in the rural population, which had less developed political consciousness and had been less directly repressed by the armed forces under his command (Chang 1998:359; see also Arboleya 2008:109).

      But the demagogic maneuver did not work.  The plan never attained necessary popular support.  Leaders of the popular movement provided penetrating analyses of the plan, exposing its deceptions and contradictions.  At the same time, the international situation was changing, which was establishing conditions for a different road for Batista, namely, cooperation with the progressive and revolutionary popular forces of the nation.  So in May 1938, Batista announced a postponement of the plan, which was actually the first step in its abandonment.  Batista was moving toward an alternative strategy of a democratic opening, as we will see in a subsequent post.    


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Chang Pon, Federico.  1998.  “Reajustes para la estabilización del sistema neocolonial” in Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Batista

Posted August 19, 2014

     The US economic recovery plan of the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, conceived at the depths of the Great Depression, included the signing of commercial agreements with Latin America governments, with the intention of increasing access to foreign markets for the industrial and agricultural products of the United States (see “FDR and US mediation in Cuba” 8/7/2014).  The Reciprocal Agreement between Cuba and the United States of 1934 reduced the tariffs on thirty-five articles exported from Cuba to the United States and 400 articles proceeding from the United States to Cuba (Instituto de Cuba 1998:336-39).

     The agreement deepened Cuba’s peripheral role as an exporter of sugar.  It increased the Cuban percentage of US imports of sugar, facilitating a recovery for Cuban sugar producers. However, the recovery was merely partial, because the Cuban share was still only half of what it had been in the period 1925-29, before US sugar producers began to lobby the US government to reduce the Cuban share, in response to the effects of the Great Depression.  The Cuban recovery, moreover, had limited advantages for Cuba, for it was on the base of the historic peripheral role of sugar exportation; sugar comprised four-fifths of Cuban exports (Instituto de Cuba 1998:339-41; see “The peripheralization of Cuba” 6/16/2014). 

    In addition, the 1934 reciprocal trade agreement deepened dependency on the United States.  By the end of the 1930s, Cuban trade with the United States reached three-fourths of Cuban foreign commerce (Instituto de Cuba 1998:341).

    Furthermore, the 1934 trade agreement, by reducing tariffs for US manufactured goods, failed to defend the development of Cuban national industry.  Federico Chang notes that, in this respect, Cuba was different from other Latin American countries of the period, which had a “solidly defined policy of import-substitution,” seeking to develop national industry.  He notes that the Cuban oligarchy delivered “without reserve” the Cuban internal market, thus demonstrating its “complete subordination to the United States”.  Its “most abject servility” was revealed in its declarations that “praised the negotiations with the US government as ‘beneficial for the country’” (Chang 1998:338-39, 342).

      Similarly, Francisco López Segrera (1972:274) maintains that the 1934 commercial agreement frustrated possibilities for industrial development, reinforcing the position of Cuba as a consumer of manufactured products and producer of sugar.  The agreement represented the mutual interests of US imperialism and the Cuban sugar oligarchy.  The agreement deepened the core-peripheral relation between the United States and Cuba, in spite of the formal political independence of the island, thus exemplifying the process of neocolonialism.   

      Since the times of José Martí, the Cuban revolutionary movement sought to break the core-peripheral relation and the neocolonial structures that sustained it.  But in the era of Batista, the revolutionary movement was unable to overcome its divisions, in spite of its considerable advances in theory and practice during the 1920s and 1930s.  At the same time, Batista astutely combined repression of the revolutionary movement with concessions to the masses, adopting rhetoric that “integrated the revolutionary and nationalist protest into a counterrevolutionary and anti-nationalist neo-populism, disguised as democracy and worker concessions” (López Segrera 1972:274).  Thus, neocolonialism in Cuba was moving toward its full expression: superexploitation of labor; access to sugar at low prices; access to needed markets for surplus manufactured goods; maintenance of the system through repression of the revolutionary movements that seek to transform it; and the pretense of democracy. 

     The characteristics of neocolonial Cuba during the era of Batista are integral to the world-system today: super-exploitation of labor; cheap raw materials; markets for the surplus manufactured goods of the core; the pretense to democracy; and revolutionary movements in the neocolonies, seeking to break the neocolonial relation.  Our task today is to expose the fictions of neocolonialism: a “free market” and free-trade agreements create not economic liberty but structures of economic and financial domination; representative government, rather than empowering the people, creates structures that facilitate the manipulation of the people.  The unmasking of the fictions of the neocolonial world-system is a necessary precondition for the taking of power by the people, itself a necessary precondition for the survival of humanity.  The taking of power by the people is well underway in Latin America, a process that began in 1995.  We in the North have the duty to join in this emerging world revolution by humanity in defense of itself.


References

Chang Pon, Federico.  1998.  “Reajustes para la estabilización del sistema neocolonial” in Instituto de Historia de Cuba. 1998.  La neocolonia.  La Habana: Editora Política. 

López Segrera, Francisco.  1972.  Cuba: Capitalismo Dependiente y Subdesarrollo (1510-1959).  La Habana: Casa de las Américas.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Batista