In the first days following the triumph of the Cuban Revolution on January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro envisioned the economic and scientific development of the nation through the incorporation of the Cuban bourgeoisie in a national project of autonomous development, liberated from the neocolonial economic relation with the United States.  Inasmuch as the bourgeoisie had been forged in the context of the neocolonial Republic of 1902 to 1959, its adaptation to the new revolutionary reality of the nation would have required it to transform itself, bringing to an end its function as a figurehead bourgeoisie, dependent on and directed by U.S. economic and political interests.  In accordance with this vision, Fidel called the national bourgeoisie to patriotic participation in the revolutionary project, and he took decisive steps to include the national bourgeoisie in the revolutionary government and the revolutionary process.  See my article in Counterpunch, “The Cuban Revolution and the National Bourgeoisie.”
 
 
      The adaptation of the national bourgeoisie to the revolutionary reality of the nation was not likely to occur, given various economic, political, and ideological obstacles.  But there was wisdom in Fidel’s approach.  No one could know with certainty beforehand what the comportment of the national bourgeoisie would be.  The historic moment was dynamic, driven by the unprecedented force and overwhelming popular appeal of the Revolution.  Fidel waited for the revolutionary process itself to teach the revolutionary leaders and the revolutionary people what the comportment of the national bourgeoisie would be. 
 
      Beginning in July 1960, Fidel began to teach the people that the revolutionary process was demonstrating that the interests of the national bourgeoisie and foreign capital were one and the same in the revolutionary moment, as they had been in the neocolonial situation.  Therefore, although the Revolution would prefer that the big industrialists continue to own and manage their companies in accordance with the revolutionary reconstruction of the economy, the industrialists in reality were working against the revolution by sabotaging production, abandoning management of their companies, and participating in illegal and violent counterrevolutionary activities.  The comportment of the national bourgeoisie made necessary the nationalization of Cuban companies in industry, commerce, and banking.  The first nationalizations of Cuban companies occurred on October 13-14, 1960, with the hope that no more nationalizations would be necessary.  But with the national bourgeoisie continuing to abandon the country and expanding their participation in illegal counterrevolutionary activities, subsequent nationalizations occurred through July 1962, in effect liquidating the national bourgeoisie as a class.  (See “Cuban property ‘confiscations,’ 1959-1962” 07/11/2019 in the category Cuban History; see also my article in Counterpunch, “The Cuban Revolution and the National Bourgeoisie”).
 
      Observing that the Cuban Revolution, through the Agrarian Reform Law of 1959 and the nationalization of U.S. properties of 1960, had struck at the center of U.S. neocolonial interests in Cuba, the national bourgeoisie during the period 1959 to 1962 increasingly placed its hopes in the interests of the USA to bring the Revolution to an end.  Unable to transform itself from a figurehead bourgeoisie to an autonomous national bourgeoisie allied with a popular revolutionary project, the national bourgeoisie abandoned the nation and worked in cooperation with U.S. interests to bring about regime change in Cuba.  However, the revolution’s overwhelming popular appeal within Cuba made its reversal politically impossible.  Having misread the political situation and having left the country at the decisive historic moment, the Cuban national bourgeoisie subsequently had no option but to adapt to a permanent self-imposed exile in the USA.
       
     The Cuban émigré community that took shape in Miami during the period 1959 to 1962 was constituted almost entirely by the national bourgeoisie and the most privileged members of Cuban society, including many professionals and technicians.  The first counterrevolutionary organizations operating from Miami were formed in 1960, and they were composed of members of the national bourgeoisie, persons affiliated with the Batista regime, representatives of the traditional political parties, and Catholics influenced by the anti-Communist ideology.  There thus emerged a political and social integration of the different economic and social sectors that had an economic or political interest in the overthrow of the Cuban Revolution.
 
    In 1962, a special unit of the CIA created approximately 55 legitimate companies in Florida that supported covert counterrevolutionary activities in Cuba.  In 1962 and 1963, the U.S. government no longer directly supported internal clandestine groups in Cuba, which had been nearly totally dismantled by Cuban civilian-military security.  Rather, the U.S. strategy was to use the Cuban émigré community as the base of the Cuban counterrevolution.  During the period, the CIA directly and indirectly financed and supplied counterrevolutionary groups in Miami that were engaging in counterrevolutionary activities in Cuba, including sabotage of the Cuban energy, transportation, and production infrastructure.  Such injection of resources by the CIA was the base for the economic development of the Cuban-American community in Miami and the re-composition of the Cuban figurehead bourgeoisie and other privileged sectors into a Cuban-American bourgeoisie. 
 
     The evident failure of the counterrevolution to bring down the Cuban government led the United States to decrease its support for the Cuban counterrevolution.  In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the suspension of operations of sabotage against Cuba.  In the 1970s, with the deterioration of the prestige and influence of the counterrevolutionary groups based in Miami, U.S. government support of counterrevolutionary activity declined significantly, and the number of counterrevolutionary groups decreased.  From 1973 to 1975, President Richard Nixon softened policy toward Cuba, seeking global détente with the Communist world, although the normalization of relations was blocked by the USA, supposedly over objections to Cuban support of Angola and for the independence of Puerto Rico. 
 
      Nevertheless, the Cuban-American organizations of the Left of the 1970s did not have sufficient cohesion or capacity to reframe U.S. policy to Cuba on a foundation of alternative premises, nor did it have the necessary resources to influence U.S. policy.  The counterrevolutionary rhetoric remained the official line of U.S. policy and of the sectors that controlled the political life of the Cuban-American community. 
 
      The conservative restauration of 1980 in the USA revitalized the fortunes of the Cuban counterrevolution based in Miami.  The emergence of the Right in the United States was due to various factors.  The student anti-war and black power movements, while correctly pointing to the colonialist and imperialist foundation of the nation’s ascent, adopted tactics that alienated a majority of the people.  The emergence of the movements of national and social liberation in the Third World, symbolized by the black power movement in the USA and the triumph of anti-imperialist revolutions in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Iran, generated popular insecurities by casting doubt on the capacity of the U.S. government to maintain control of the neocolonial world order.  Popular apprehensions were further fed by the sustained economic problems of inflation and recession.  The Left in the United States lacked the maturity to explain the causes of these developments to the people, and to reformulate the American narrative on a foundation of historical and scientific knowledge and universal human values.  In contrast, the Right was able to revitalize the American narrative, but with a discourse that omitted significant historical facts.
 
     The “New Right” reformulation, later known as neo-conservativism, was new in the sense that it rejected the focus on small-scale capitalism as well as the international isolationism of the conservativism of the past; rather, it accepted the logic of monopoly capitalism that had emerged in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and it envisioned the reestablishment of the supreme power of the United States that had existed in the post-World War II era.  At the same time, it promoted values that had reigned in an earlier era, advocating a restoration of religious values and the family.  It extolled individual liberty, rejecting the growing size of the governmental bureaucracy.  It promoted “the law of supply and demand,” attacking the state for hindering production by intervening in the economy for what it considered dubious social ends.  It rejected the initial proposals then emerging for the protection of the environment. 
 
     With respect to Latin America, the New Right called for the re-imposition of U.S. power and interests over the region.  It rejected the efforts of the Carter administration to improve relations with Cuba, and it called for support of the Cuban counterrevolution.  Cuba was presented as a vassal of the Soviet Union, as an organizer of subversion in Latin America and the Caribbean, and as a violator of human rights. 
 
     The ideology of the New Right coincided with the Cuban-American counterrevolution’s rejection of the strongly interventionist role of the Cuban Revolutionary Government in the economy, and it coincided as well with counterrevolution’s religion-based anti-communism.  Once in power, the New Right adopted a policy of using the Cuban-American community to disseminate an essentially false portrayal of Cuba that was distorted by the particular interests of the Cuban-American bourgeoisie.  At the same time, the Cuban-American bourgeoisie, owners of businesses that provided goods and services to the Cuban émigré community, were useful to the neoconservatives of the national power structure, because of its capacity to mobilize necessary resources for political ends in an area of concentrated population in a key Electoral College state. 
 
     Accordingly, the counterrevolutionary function of the Cuban immigration was revitalized, and the Cuban-American Right was incorporated into the neoconservative movement, catapulting it into a position of national influence.  Integrated into the U.S. structures of power, the Cuban-American national bourgeoisie has been able to influence U.S. policy toward Cuba, shaping it in accordance with its particular interests and its presuppositions, setting aside analysis on a basis of U.S. interests as a whole, thus legitimating a policy of maximum hostility toward Cuba.  This political revitalization was the culmination of the re-composition of the Cuban national bourgeoisie as a Cuban-American bourgeoisie in the United States.
 
     The Cuban-American National Foundation has played a key role in this process of connecting the Cuban-American counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie to the neoconservatives of the national political power structure.  In the early 1980s, some 100 Cuban-American business persons were integrated into the Foundation, many of whom had been tied to the Cuban national bourgeoisie and were active participants in the counterrevolutionary organizations, including many with ties to the CIA.  The Foundation has made financial contributions to the political campaigns of U.S. congresspersons and senators, and it has been able to influence donations to campaigns by individuals associated with the activities of the Foundation.  The local means of communication submit to its pressure, either through common interest or fear.  In fact, Americas Watch has singled out the Foundation for its participation in the intimidation of dissident political voices in the Cuban-American community in Miami, and for its repeated verbal assaults against newspapers, radio stations, and individuals.  In addition to its repressive methods, a decisive factor in the success of the Foundation as the undisputed source of legitimation of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba has been the absence of a true opposition to the suppositions of U.S. policy toward Cuba.
 
     Although the Cuban-American counterrevolution, based in Miami, has been successful in attaining influence in Washington, it has scant influence in Cuba, where it completely discredited itself in the early 1960s by virtue by its blatant subservience to a foreign imperial power.  The Cuban counterrevolution seeks a return to representative democracy, a political system much more subjectable to elite manipulation than are structures of popular democracy; and a return to rule by the market, curtailing the authority of the state to control and regulate the economy.  Such proposals represent the interests of the U.S. power elite and the Cuban-American bourgeoisie.  In Cuba, however, such a program lacks a domestic class base; it represents the specific interests of no particular sector of Cuban society, as a result of the massive emigration of the national bourgeoisie in the early 1960s.  At the same time, the Cuban Revolution has been able to develop viable alternatives to these proposals.  Following the departure of the bourgeoisie from national life, the Revolution attained the integration of the remaining social classes, including a professional class formed by the remnant that remained in Cuba in the early 1960s and the considerable number of professionals that have been educated and formed by the Revolution itself.  Such is the political reality within Cuba, a situation that could be called a revolutionary reality.
 
     The Helms-Burton Law of 1996 permits civil demands in U.S. courts by proprietors who were not U.S. citizens at the time of the expropriation, such as Cuban big industrialists whose property was nationalized and who emigrated to the USA and subsequently became U.S. citizens.  This unusual and questionable feature of the Law reflects the influence of the Cuban-American bourgeoisie on the U.S. government.  In contrast, reflecting the Cuban political reality, the National Assembly of Popular Power emitted from 1996 to 1999 a number of laws that constitute a Cuban legal counteroffensive to the Helms-Burton Law.  Law No. 80 of 1996, Reaffirmation of the Dignity and the Sovereignty of Cuba, declares the Helms-Burton Law illicit, and it considers null any demand based on it.  In addition, the Law reaffirms the disposition of the Cuban government to negotiate with the U.S. government compensation for proprietors who were U.S. citizens at the time of the nationalization, apparently not recognizing the U.S. government as a legitimate representative of the interests of the Cuban national bourgeoisie reconstituted as a Cuban-American bourgeoisie. 
 
      A 1999 Cuban law declares the economic, commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the USA against Cuba since 1962 to constitute the crime of genocide, as defined by the 1948 UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  The Law also declares as criminal any support of or collaboration with the blockade, the Helms-Burton Law, and the economic war against Cuba, within the national territory or from outside Cuba, including the territory of the United States.  Therefore, any negotiation of compensation for expropriated properties with the Cuban-American bourgeoisie is complicated by the criminal conduct of some of its most prominent members, with respect to association with the Batista regime, illegal counterrevolutionary activities in 1959 and 1960, and support for the criminal genocidal blockade in recent years.
 
     For decades, Cubans whose property was confiscated and their descendants have disseminated a discourse that conveniently ignores their own activities and that exploits the limited understanding of the people of the United States, portraying a “communist tyranny” that has little to do with Cuban reality.  The people of the United States ought to have sufficient political maturity to recognize the discourse of the Cuban-American bourgeoisie as a distortion of reality in pursuit of particular interests.
 
       The Trump administration’s move toward the implementation of Title III is consistent with its policy toward Latin America as a whole.  It seeks to reestablish U.S. neocolonial domination, which has lost terrain to the popular revolutions of the last two decades.  The USA, however, has experienced relative decline, and it no longer has the economic capacity nor the necessary prestige to reestablish the relatively stable political domination and economic penetration that it possessed in the 1950s.   Inasmuch as it is politically incapable of accepting and adjusting to its decline, the United States is likely to continue to use its hegemonic military power and its remaining economic capacity to unleash great damage on Latin America and the world.  The Left in the United States, however, should make a comprehensive, scientifically informed, and principled analysis of this situation, proposing an alternative direction for the nation.

Source
 
Arboleya, Jesús.  1997.  La Contrarrevolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

      During the last five years or so, the Latin American Right has been able to retake power or partial power in key Latin American nations, creating difficulties for the Leftist governments that have reshaped Latin American political reality during the last twenty years.  I have maintained that these developments do not mean that a cycle of Left dominance is now coming to an end (see “The probable endurance of the ‘Pink Tide’”05/29/2019; and “The end of the Leftist cycle in Latin America?” 04/05/2019 in the category Latin American Right).  I have taken this position, above all, because the Latin American Right has absolutely nothing to offer the peoples of Latin America.  They have recaptured power through deception and corruption, and once in power, they have no program to offer other than a return to neoliberalism, which the peoples have previously rejected.  Once the Right again in power demonstrates that it has no viable program to offer, the probability is high that the people will turn against it and return to the option of the progressive governments, consolidating the direction that the leftist governments have taken during the last twenty years.
 
     Argentina is a case in point.  In the context of a situation of economic crisis and political turmoil, including demonstrations so massive that they resulted in a series of short-lived governments, Nestor Kircher was named president in 2003, and he took measures in defense of the people that resulted in economic and political stability.  His two terms of office were followed with two administrations of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner.  The four Kirchner governments of 2003-2015 were characterized by: reduction of external debt; challenges to the regulations of the international finance agencies, including a refusal to pay the debts of the “vulture funds,” state debts that had been purchased at only a small fraction of their original value; the development of programs in education, health, and science; nationalization of key industries; and cooperation with the leftist governments of the region in the forging of a process of Latin American unity and integration, seeking to transform the structures of neocolonial domination (see “The Right takes power in Argentina” 01/04/2016 in the category Latin American Right).
 
        The election of Mauricio Macri as president of Argentina in 2015 was seen by some as an indication that the leftist cycle was coming to an end.  Macri defeated Daniel Scioli, the candidate of the party of Cristina, by 2.64 percentage points.  Macri had campaigned on a promise of change and improvement, without specifics.  He was able to benefit from a level of popular satisfaction with the Kirhcner governments, resulting from idealist popular conceptions with respect to the changes that are possible. And he benefitted from the fact that Cristina herself was not on the ballot, as a result of term limits.  At the present time in Latin America, popular consciousness has not attained full political maturity, with the result that, on the one hand, idealist concepts and unrealistic expectations are still prevalent; and on the other hand, there is political identification with charismatic leaders rather than with political parties that have collective leadership.   
 
      Although he did not campaign on a neoliberal agenda, once in office Macri took the neoliberal road, which the people have sufficient political maturity to reject. One of his first steps was to end Argentina’s conflict with international finance capital by agreeing to its demands with respect to vulture funds, thus putting the state in a position of overextended debt.  He then proceeded to cut social programs and amend social and economic policies of the Kirchner governments, returning to the “structural adjustment program” of the neoliberal area.  And he reoriented foreign policy and foreign commerce, limiting Argentinian participation in the process of unity and integration in the region.  With Macri’s neoliberal agenda increasingly manifest, his government declined in popular approval, and in addition, neoliberal policies were leading to serious problems in the national economy, further undermining popular support. 
 
     The decline in support of the government of Macri was evident in the first round of the presidential elections on August 11.  Alberto Fernández, with Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as candidate for Vice President, attained 47.66% of the vote; Macri was fifteen points behind, with 32.09%.  Roberto Lavagna was third with 8.23%; and three other candidates received between two and three percent each.  The second round of the elections will be in October.
 
      If the “Front of All” political formation of Fernández and Fernández wins in October, the return to a progressive agenda is not necessarily guaranteed, because Left-Center alliances have complexities.  However, the electoral results of August 11 illustrate the incapacity of the Right in political power to maintain popular support, and they provide evidence that points to the unsustainability of the political-economic project of the Right in the context of the current Latin American political reality.

July 11, 2019
 
     The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 codified the economic measures that had been directed against Cuba since the Kennedy administration.  The measures seek to suffocate the Cuban Revolution and to effect political change in Cuba.   The Law allows the termination of these coercive economic measures when Cuba becomes democratic, granting the U.S. government the right to determine whether or not democracy exists in Cuba. 
 
     The Helms-Burton Act is widely interpreted as a violation of the UN Charter on two grounds.  First, the UN Charter prohibits coercive economic measures against nations in order to attain political ends.  Secondly, the Charter affirms the principle of the sovereignty of nations, and it does not allow for one nation to be the ultimate authority on the legitimacy of the political system of another.
 
     Title III of the Helms-Burton Act permits any U.S. citizen or entity, whose property was expropriated by the government of Cuba, to file suit in U.S. courts against companies engaging in commercial activities related to the expropriated property.  The Act has an extraterritorial character, in that it allows the filing of suits against foreign companies.  In reaction, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Mexico, Canada, and Cuba have adopted resolutions and laws that are designed to counter Helms-Burton.
 
     The Act gives the President the authority to suspend the implementation of Title III for up to six months, if would be in the national interest.  All presidents from Clinton to Obama have suspended the implementation of Title III on a continuous basis, concerned with backlash from trading partners and allies that do business in Cuba.  The Trump administration, however, recently has changed the implementation policy of more than two decades.  The full implementation of Title III has been in effect since May 2, 2019. 
 
      The Helms-Burton Act refers to Cuban “confiscations,” thus obscuring important legal and moral distinctions.  In the first place, there is the distinction between confiscation and nationalization.  Confiscation refers the seizing of assets by the state, without compensation, because the owner had obtained the property illegally or had been found guilty of some other criminal behavior.  On the other hand, nationalization refers to appropriation with compensation, undertaken for reasons of social utility or public benefit.    In addition, there is the distinction between foreign properties and properties held by nationals, which have entirely different political, moral, and legal contexts.
 
      On the basis of these distinctions, we can discern three types of property appropriations in Cuba from 1959 to 1962.  (1)  The first appropriations of property in 1959 were confiscations in response to criminal behavior.  From 1902 to 1959, corruption was rampant in Cuba, as government officials used their positions to enrich themselves.  Presidential candidates who promised reform were elected, but the administrations of the “reformist” presidents were notorious for their rampant corruption.  With the Batista coup d’état of March 10, 1952, political repression was added to the historic pattern of corruption.  Leaders of workers, students, and political organizations were arrested and tortured; and in the rural areas, peasants were subjected to brutal and repressive treatment by the army.  The Batista dictatorship enlisted the support of political parties and politicians in serving in the legislative and executive branches, who thus gave legitimacy to corruption, repression, and brutality.
     
     Following the triumph of the Revolution on January 1, 1959, the Revolutionary Government responded to the popular outcry for justice by developing Revolutionary Tribunals and confiscating properties.  With respect to the latter, the Revolutionary Government on February 28, 1959 approved a law proposed by the Minister of the newly created Ministry for the Recuperation of Embezzled Public Funds.  The Law authorized the confiscation of the property of certain persons, all of whom were Cuban nationals:  Batista and his collaborators; officers of the armed forces who had participated directly in the coup d’état of March 10, 1952; ministers of the Batista government during the period 1952-1958; members of the spurious congress of 1954-58; and candidates in the sham elections of 1958.  The revolutionary leadership believed that the corruption prior to the Batista dictatorship with justice could be addressed, but doing so would cast an impractically wide net, and the focus on the corruption and brutality of the Batista regime would be sufficient to satisfy the popular demand.  In accordance with the Law, the Ministry for the Recuperation of Embezzled Public Funds carried out confiscations, and it turned the properties over to appropriate state institutions, such as the National Institute of Agrarian Reform. 
 
     Article 24 of Law 851 of July 6, 1960 superseded and expanded the February 28 law by including counterrevolutionary crimes and activities, which were activities that today would be described as terrorism, inasmuch as they included violence against civilians and sabotage, for the most part carried out with the support of the U.S. government.  Law 851 authorized confiscation with respect to real estate owned by: Batista and his collaborators; persons who had committed crimes against the national economy or the public treasury, or who had used a public office to enrich themselves illicitly; and persons who had committed counterrevolutionary crimes (as defined by law), had abandoned the country in order to escape punitive action by the Revolutionary Tribunals, or had abandoned the country in order to carry out conspiracies against the Revolutionary Government. 
 
     The confiscated properties have been used as public buildings, such as primary schools, day care centers, medical clinics, multiple housing units, and embassies.  Members of the Council of Ministers did not personally benefit from the confiscations.
 
     (2) The second type of appropriation was the nationalizations of foreign properties in Cuba.  Nationalization of foreign property was a necessary precondition for Cuban attainment of true sovereignty.  Cuba at that time faced a situation in which most agricultural land was in foreign hands, and there was high concentration of land ownership.  Addressing this structural problem in the Cuban economy, the Revolutionary Government on May 17, 1959 emitted an Agrarian Reform Law that nationalized large-scale agricultural lands, making no distinction between foreign and national ownership, and providing for compensation in the form of “Agrarian Reform Bonds” that were to mature in twenty years. 
 
     In addition, banks, electricity and telephone companies, gasoline refineries, mining companies, and importing companies were under foreign ownership.  In response, the Revolutionary Government on July 6, 1960 emitted Law 851, authorizing nationalization of U.S. properties.  The Law established compensation through government bonds, and it required the Cuban government to contribute to a compensation fund through bank deposits equal to 25% of the value of the U.S. purchase of Cuban sugar in excess of the sugar quota.  On the basis of Law 851, the Revolutionary Government emitted three resolutions on August 6, September 17, and October 24, 1960, nationalizing all 197 U.S. companies in Cuba.  These decisive steps struck at the heart of the Cuban neocolonial condition.  They intended not the severing of relations with the United States but transformation of the Cuba-USA political-economic relation from exploitation and domination to cooperation and mutual respect.
 
     The U.S. government, however, refused to cooperate with the Cuban quest for sovereignty.  Rather than financing compensation through an increase in the U.S.-Cuba sugar trade, the U.S. government reduced sugar purchases to a level below the sugar quota.  At the same time, the U.S. government refused to negotiate with the Cuban government a mutually satisfactory agreement with respect to compensation for U.S. proprietors who were adversely affected by the Cuban nationalizations.  The U.S. government stood out in this regard, inasmuch as the governments of France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Spain negotiated agreements with the government of Cuba with respect to demands of their citizens resulting from the Cuban nationalizations.  The USA was not interested in negotiating reasonable compensation; its political agenda was regime change, which it sought to attain through what Cuba has described as terrorist activities and economic aggression. 
 
     In 1974, the General Assembly of the United Nations affirmed the right of states to nationalize properties, declaring that nationalization is an indispensable precondition for national sovereignty over natural resources.  It further declared that no state should be subjected to coercion in response to its exercising this right of nationalization.  The “Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order” affirmed the:

     Steve Ellner, in an interview by Alan Freeman published on Canadian Dimension on April 16, 2019, maintains that the so-called Pink Tide phenomenon is not likely to be a thing of the past without lasting effect, in spite of recent setbacks for the Left in Latin America.  Ellner is a retired professor who taught for many years in Venezuela and the United States, and he is the author or editor of twelve books on Venezuela and Latin America.  He recently edited Latin America’s Pink Tide: Breakthroughs and Shortcomings (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019).  His view coincides with mine and with the arguments that I presented in my April 5, 2019 post, “The end of the Leftist cycle in Latin America?”, found in the blog category Latin American Right.
                                                              
    Ellner rejects the pendulum metaphor that some analysts use.  He maintains that, in comparison to previous progressive waves in Latin America, the recent socialist and progressive governments were or have been in power for a much longer period of time, and there have been many more of them.  And unlike progressive governments in Latin America in the past, they formed regional associations dedicated to promoting unity (see the category Latin American Unity).
 
      Ellner briefly mentions the fact that the Right governments of Brazil and Argentina have extremely low ratings.  I develop this a bit further in the above-mentioned April 5 post.  I maintained that, in the current political and ideological situation, any other result is unlikely.  The Latin American Right intends a return to neoliberal economic policies and to subordination to the interests of international capital.  Such a project has been rejected by the peoples, and they have sufficient political maturity to continue to reject it as a project that undermines the social and economic needs of the people and the sovereignty of the nation.  The Right’s return to power in three Latin American nations was based on deception and corruption, and not on a promise of returning to the delegitimated policies of the past.  Now that these governments have turned to enactment of these policies, they have lost a significant level of support among the people.  In order to sustain themselves in power, they would have to create a new project that moves beyond both neoliberalism and the progressive/socialist alternative to it, and that could attain a popular consensus.  I have not yet seen such a formulation, which perhaps would require a creative combination of ideological manipulation and science fiction.  Lacking a political program that could attain legitimacy, the restored governments of the Right have little probability of sustaining themselves.  In contrast, the progressive and socialist forces of the Left made important political and ideological gains beginning in the late 1990s, on the foundation of the historic Latin American anti-imperialist movements and a scientific understanding of the contradictions of the neocolonial world-system.
 
      Ellner also mentions the relations of the Pink Tide governments with China and Russia, which especially has significance in the context of the declining U.S. economic presence and political prestige in Latin America.  In a similar vein, but developing the idea further, I have argued that the deepening economic and political relation of the progressive and socialist governments of Latin America with China and Russia is pointing to the necessary road for humanity, an alternative to the inherently exploitative structures of the capitalist world-economy and the neocolonial world-system.  China is seeking to ascend in the context of a world-system which has overextended its geographical and ecological limits and in which the prospects for the assent of nations are limited and necessarily involve confrontation with the core powers.  Accordingly, China seeks ascent, not via the modern European road of colonial domination and superexploitation, but on the basis of an alternative road of cooperation and mutually beneficial trade.  Meanwhile, a revitalized Russia is seeking to reestablish its presence as a global power through key alliances that stand against U.S. and to some extent Western European interests.  In the process, these actors are developing relations on a basis of alternative principles that, they declare, should guide international relations, principles that are fully consistent with the UN Charter and various UN resolutions.  Therefore, the so-called Pink Tide governments are part of a global process that seeks to develop an alternative world order at a historic moment in which the established world-system is demonstrating its incapacity to resolve its contradictions and problems.  See “The fall & rise of South-South cooperation” 07/24/2914, “China-CELAC cooperation” 07/25/2014, and “China treats Latin America with respect” 07/28/2014 in the category South-South Cooperation.
 
     Ellner notes that leftist criticisms of the Pink Tide governments focus on their failure to transform their nations’ peripheral role, which makes them dependent on the exportation of primary commodities, such as oil in the case of Venezuela.  Ellner maintains that such critiques evaluate political decisions in the abstract, removing them from a political context shaped by the opposition of the business elite and the need to secure the support of the popular sectors.  And, focusing on the thus far limited transformation of global economic structures, the critics underestimate the significance of the gains of the progressive and socialist governments: social programs for the benefit of the people, a foreign policy that defends the sovereignty of the nation, and state control of strategic sectors of the economy.  Ellner maintains that these are important steps, building a foundation for the long term.
 
     In am in agreement with Ellner’s observations concerning leftist criticisms of the failure of the Pink Tide governments to transform the peripheral role of raw materials exportation.  Revolutionary Third World leaders do not need leftist scholars to offer lessons on the importance of transforming global economic structures.  Since the 1950s, Third World leaders have declared the importance of diversifying their economies, and they have understood South-South cooperation as a necessary strategy for attaining this goal.  But the diversification of production, important substitution, and South-South cooperation have confronted numerous obstacles, including the hostility of the global powers, insufficient capital to develop industry, and a transportation infrastructure that had been developed for core-peripheral trade.  The transformation of the global economy is a relatively slow and long-term process, which the progressive and socialist governments of Latin America have been developing step-by-step, seeking cooperation with one another and with China and Russia as well as other nations of the global South.  Meanwhile, it makes good political sense to channel significant resources toward attention to social needs, inasmuch as it has immediate and important results, and it demonstrates the commitment of the leadership.
 
     In the title to this blog post, I have “Pink Tide” in quotes, because I am not in agreement with this designation for socialist and progressive governments in Latin America, even though Ellner uses it.  It seems to me that the phrase connotes that the governments that have proclaimed “socialism for the twenty-first century” are not really “red,” in that they are not developing socialism in a form that had been previously understood, on the basis of the European experience of socialism, or on the basis of an abstract definition of socialism.  I maintain that socialism and Marxism-Leninism have continually evolving concepts and theories, developing on as basis of political and social practice.  Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador under Correa have been developing socialism with characteristics that are appropriate for their conditions, to the extent that it is politically and economically possible (see various posts in the category Marxism-Leninism).  Inasmuch as the phenomenon has included progressive governments (Brazil under Lula and Dilma Rousseff, Argentina under the Kirchners, Uruguay, and El Salvador) that are allied with the socialist governments in the forging of a new political reality in Latin America, I prefer to refer to them as socialist and progressive governments.
 
      In our efforts to form an integral philosophical-historical-social science (see “Universal philosophical historical social science” 4/2/2014 in the category Knowledge), we understand knowledge as including the identification of future probabilities, on the basis of understanding of historical and current systemic tendencies.  For this reason, in the title of this blog post, I refer to the “probable” endurance of the socialist and progressive governments of Latin America.

​     The member countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the peoples of Our America-Treaty of Commerce of the Peoples (ALBA-TCP for its initials in Spanish), meeting in Havana on May 21 for the organization’s Eighteenth Political Council, have issued a declaration that rejects recent U.S. efforts to reestablish hegemony over Latin America and the Caribbean, and that affirms support for Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

  The preamble to the Declaration affirms that the member countries are:

​     The Declaration expresses support for the government of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, as it confronts the hostile and interventionist policies of the United States.

​     Similarly, the Declaration expresses its support for the sovereignty of Nicaragua and the negotiations undertaken by the government with opposition parties.  “We ratify our support for the process of dialogue and negotiation of the Government of Reconciliation and National Unity of Nicaragua in its decision to continue defending its sovereignty, peace, and the notable advances that it has attained in the social and economic sphere as well as with respect to security and national unity.”

         The Declaration also rejects the longstanding U.S. economic war against Cuba.

​     The Declaration rejects U.S. efforts to reestablish its hegemony over Latin America and the Caribbean.  “We repudiate the Monroe Doctrine, an old reflection of the hegemonic and imperialist ambitions of the United States with respect to the lands and peoples of America, today resurrected.”  And it condemns the U.S. use of the Organization of American States to attain its imperialist goas.  “We reject the interventionist conduct of the government of the United States, which once again is utilizing OAS and its Secretary General in its interventionist policy in opposition to the sovereignty, the self-determination, and the constitutional order of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Republic of Nicaragua, and the Republic of Cuba.”
 
     Since the 1960s, Third World governments have denounced the imperialist and interventionist policies of the United States and the Western European powers, doing so in the name of the principles that the global powers have themselves proclaimed.  Such denunciation of imperialism on the basis of international principles and international law is evident in the declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement, which has arrived to include 120 member governments (see posts in the category Third World).  In accordance with this global political tendency, the ALBA-TCP Declaration demands adherence to international principles and international law.  “We demand strict observance of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the prohibition of the use of force or the threat of the use of force, and respect for self-determination, for sovereignty, for the integrity of territories, and for non-interference in the domestic affairs of states.”
 
     The socialist and progressive governments of Latin America and the Caribbean have a tendency to condemn U.S. policy as “unilateral” and “coercive.”  With this designation, they are opposing not only the unjust and unscientific character of the measures, but also the fact that they are imposed by a single power, in defense of its particular interests, ignoring the consequences for other nations.  From their perspective, policies with international consequences should be formulated and implemented on a basis of multilateralism.  The participation of various nations in the joint formulation of policies helps to ensure that they are not arbitrary or ill-informed, and that they emerge from agreement rather than being imposed by a more powerful nation that is single-mindedly pursuing its interests.  Accordingly, the Declaration states, “We insist that the application of unilateral coercive measures, rejected by numerous resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is contrary to the purposes and principles consecrated in the UN Charter and International Law.”  Universal coercive measures “restrict the enjoyment of human rights of the populations of the states against which they are applied.”
 
      The Declaration calls for the strengthening of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which has been weakened in the last couple of years as a result of the fall of progressive governments in Brazil and Argentina and the socialist government of Rafael Correa in Ecuador, although it likely will be aided by the recent election of a progressive government in Mexico.  “We reaffirm the necessity of strengthening the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) as a mechanism for regional political coordination based on the strict observance and defense of the principles of International Law.”
 
     At the opening of the Political Council, Cuban foreign minister Bruno Rodríguez called upon social movement organizations to influence their governments in opposition to another imperialist military adventure in the region; and in opposition to the unilateral coercive measures imposed by Washington on Venezuela, which have had serious consequences and have done humanitarian damage to the people of Venezuela.  Rodríguez further asserted that the power of articulation of our peoples and the role of the truth should not be underestimated.  He declared that “ALBA-TCP is and will be a nucleus of resistance that always will back the peoples of the region,” finding inspiration in the teachings and thought of Fidel and Chávez.
 
     During his intervention in the Political Council, Venezuelan foreign minister Jorge Arreaza observed that when the U.S. government invokes the anachronistic Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed in the second decade of the nineteenth century, it gives cause for alarm to the peoples and governments.  He asserted that, for the dominant elite, a process of liberation in the continent is unacceptable.  Diego Pary, foreign minister of the Plurinational Republic of Bolivia, affirmed that the people of Venezuela have consciousness and commitment to principles, and they therefore recognize and defend the constitutional government of President Nicolas Maduro; all of the peoples of the region, he declared, will know how to respond to the complex situation that the region confronts, characterized by threats to multilateralism and international law.
 
     Carlos Castaneda, foreign minister of El Salvador, stated that the unity of the progressive forces of the region will be an important element in confronting threats and aggressions against the development of the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean.  Paul Osquit, representing Nicaragua, observed that Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, in spite of having different political processes, are united in historic defense of the sovereignty and self-determination of the peoples, and in defense of their right to construct their political projects in accordance with their own decisions.  
 
     At the conclusion of the meeting, David Choquehanca, Executive Secretary of ALBA-TCP, observed that ALBA-TCP has to lift up its own identity on the basis of a decolonizing thought that permits a culture of life and of peace to prevail.  He asserted that one must assert and defend the noble road of integration, a road that seeks justice and truth and that values the “we” more than the “I.”  A road that struggles against neoliberalism, war, and the sacking of natural resources; and that defends the sovereignty of the nations against domination.
 
     ALBA was founded on December 14, 2004 by Cuba and Venezuela as the Bolivarian Alternative for the peoples of Our America.  Bolivia was incorporated into ALBA in 2009, at which time the name of the organization was changed to the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Commercial Treaty for the Peoples (ALBA-TCP).  ALBA-TCP now has eleven members.  In addition to Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia, they are Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Granada, Haiti, Nicaragua, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Surinam.  El Salvador also attended the Political Council as an invited country.
 
     ALBA seeks real integration, based in complementarity and solidarity above merely commercial interests.  In addition to coordinating political responses in defense of the principles of international law, ALBA has developed cooperative programs in health and education.  Millions of persons have received free medical services, with priority given to persons of limited resources, some of whom had never before received medical attention.  A cooperative literacy program has resulted in three members nations being declared free of illiteracy, namely, Venezuela (2005), Bolivia (2008), and Nicaragua (2009).  The Latin American School of Medicine, with branches in Cuba and Venezuela, has educated youth from many countries of Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, producing community doctors who not only have scientific and technical preparation but also humanitarian and ethical formation.  ALBA-TCP is working on a proposed Space of Interdependence, Sovereignty, and Economic Solidarity, through the resources of the Trade Agreement of the People, the Sucre (a regional currency for commercial exchanges between members of ALBA), and the Bank of ALBA.
 
     ALBA-TCP is an important dimension of the efforts of the last two decades to put into practice the historic Latin American vision of La Patria Grande and the classic Third World vision of South-South Cooperation.  See posts on these themes in the category Latin American Unity and the category Third World.  For the full text of the May 21 Declaration, go to Declaration of the XVIII Political Council of ALBA-TCP, May 21, 2019.

​Sources
 
Concepción Pérez, Elson.  2019.  “El ALBA, tan esperanzadora como necesaria,” Granma (May 22), P. 5.
 
Menéndez Quintero, Marina.  2019.  “ALBA-TCP reitera necesidad de defender la paz,” Juventud Rebelde (May 22), Pp. 4-5.
 
Mojena Milian, Bertha.  2019.  “América Latina y el Caribe en la hora del recuento y de la marcha unida contra las amenazas imperiales,” Granma (May 22), P. 4.
 
__________.  2019.  “El ALBA-TCP renueve el compromiso con la cooperación, la integración, y la defense de la unidad frente a la injerencia,” Granma (May 22), P. 1.

     In previous posts, I have maintained that the forging of a popular revolution in the USA is an objective possibility, a necessity, and, therefore, a moral obligation.  Utilizing existing constitutional rights and electoral procedures, a popular revolution in the USA would seek to take political power, that is, to take control of the political and legislative branches of the federal government, with the intention of implementing fundamental changes in defense of the rights and needs of the people as well as the sovereign dignity of the nation.  The revolution’s central strategy for taking political power would be the formation of an alternative political party that redefines what a political party is and does, in that its primary task would be the patient and long-term education and the organization of the people, projecting important electoral victories in a period of twenty years or more.  (See, for example, “The possible and necessary popular coalition” 10/10/2016 in the category Third World and “An integral and comprehensive narrative” 03/13/2017 in the category Trump).
 
     An important issue that the alternative political party would need to address with insight and political intelligence is that of the military.  The alternative political party would have to envision and formulate the transformation of the militarization of economy and society, which has been unfolding since the late 1940s, when the Truman Administration created the Cold War ideology in order to justify a permanent war economy and what Truman’s successor, Dwight Eisenhower, called the military-industrial complex.
 
      A recent article by Willian J. Astore, a retired lieutenant colonel (United States Air Force), maintains that for decades the Pentagon has been conning politicians and the people in order to maximize public support for military spending.  Astore mentions several distortions of reality in the history of this con game: the “missile gap” of the 1950s and the 1960s; the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that authorized military action in Vietnam; the “consistent exaggeration of Soviet weapons capabilities in the 1970s . . . to justify a new generation of ultra-expensive weaponry;”  the casting of the Soviet Union as an “Evil Empire” in order to justify increased military expenses in the 1980s; the identification of “rogue states” in the 1990s, thereby avoiding the expected “peace dividend” following the collapse of the Soviet Union; the invasion of Iraq, justified by arms of mass destruction that never were found; and an endless war on terrorism that ignores the actual sources of terrorism.
 
      Although Astore writes of this phenomenon as a Pentagon con, many of the mentioned distortions were sold to the people by prominent politicians, and not by the military chiefs.  In the case of Trump, Astore reminds us that, during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump spoke “against the folly and cost of America’s wars in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. He said he wanted better relations with Russia. He talked about reinvesting in the United States rather than engaging in new wars. He even attacked costly weapons systems.”  If it is true, as Astore asserts, that Trump is a con man, and that the Pentagon attains support for military spending through the con, then it could be said that the Trump administration’s military defense budget of $716 billion demonstrates that you can indeed con a con man.  But it is our own human weaknesses that enable a con to work; in this case, the weakness might be a lust for power, and the capacity to see an exploitable issue and useful partners in order to maintain, extend, and increase personal power. 
 
       The nation needs military chiefs that place the good of the nation above the expansion of the military branch, and political leaders who are morally and intellectually capable of resisting the seductions of power and the distorted claims of all who represent particular moneyed and powerful sectors.  The task of the alternative political party is to forge a change in the political culture, so it would be possible for principled political and military leaders to rise to prominence, principled leaders who seek not personal power but the authorization of the people to exercise power in their name.  In forging this cultural change, the alternative political party needs to unmask, in the name of patriotism, the conduct of militarist politicians and the Pentagon, who for decades have exaggerated threats to national security in order to justify military expenditures.  It must reformulate the meaning of patriotism, leading the people to the understanding that it is not unpatriotic to oppose imperialist wars; but it is unpatriotic, and profoundly damaging to the nation, to exaggerate threats to national security in order to channel national resources to the military, especially when the exaggeration is driven by the desire to rout economic benefits to companies and individuals who produce and market arms. 
 
      But let us not be naïve concerning the importance of the military.  In the alternative political party, there can be no place for idealism and naivete with respect to questions of peace and war.  The foreign policy proposed by the alternative party must recognize the ancient and modern tendency of empires and nation-states to conquer new territories and to impose its interest on the conquered peoples.  It must recognize that the modern world-system has been forged on a foundation of conquest and colonial domination of the world, and it has been shaped by a system of competing imperialisms, in which global powers compete with one another for control of territories and markets.  In the context of such a world, the government of the USA must be committed to its national security and any threat to its territory and its markets by means of force and violence.  In condemning exaggerations of national security, the alternative political party must propose a genuine concept of national security, and define the necessary role of the military in the defense of national security.
 
     In seeking an alternative to the militarization of economy and society, the alternative party cannot dream of peace in the abstract; it must pursue its vision of demilitarization in the context of existing international relations.  Accordingly, it should support the alternative approach to international diplomacy that currently is emerging in world affairs, one that gives priority to the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.  The peaceful resolution of conflict is the mission of the United Nations and other international organizations; and several governments, including China, Cuba, and Venezuela, have been developing foreign policies in this direction.  Such tendencies are pointing to an alternative world order in which states work cooperatively toward international, multilateral, and bilateral agreements, committing themselves to the reduction of arms, especially nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction; to the peaceful resolution of conflicts; to respect for the sovereignty of all nations; and to refraining from aggression against other nations.  The alternative political party should propose that the nation play a leadership role in this emerging alternative form of international relations, with the understanding that all agreements must necessarily include provisions for the verification of compliance.
 
      Inasmuch as the arms industry is the USA’s strongest and most important industry, the nation has an objective economic interest in war and in the maintenance of global conflicts.  This objective economic condition, forged by both major political parties since the late 1940s, ensures significant political opposition to a peaceful reorientation of U.S. foreign policy.  The alternative political party must manage this situation with political intelligence, and therefore, it must base its proposals for economic and social transformation on recognition of the current dependency of the nation’s economy on military expenditures.  It must propose a gradual transformation of the militarized economy toward an economy dedicated to sustainable forms of production, recognizing that changes that are implemented faster than objective conditions permit would create chaos.  Annual cuts in the nation’s military expenditure must be part of a comprehensive plan that includes new investments in production and education, so that sustainable economic growth is facilitated.  In the transition from a permanent war economy to a peace-based economy, creative strategies could be employed, such as sending the U.S. Army to Central America to work in cooperative projects of infrastructural construction.
 
      The alternative political party needs among its leadership and its advisors persons with knowledge of military affairs and with military experience.  It should be actively recruiting such persons as it develops, so that it can speak with credibility on the military issue in the eyes of the people.  The article by Astore, a retired Air Force officer, is evidence that there are high military officers who would be committed to the development of an armed forces structure that has become liberated from the vicious cycle of imperialist policies feeding the arms industry, and its perverse feedback, the economic interests of the arms industry generating imperialist policies.  With the change in political culture that the alternative political party would seek to generate, there would come to the fore military officers who have endeavored to dedicate their lives to an armed forces that serves the genuine national security of the nation, who could now do so with the full support of a government of, by, and for the people.
 
    Astore’s proposals for “curbing our military mania” are important and worthy of consideration and discussion.  He proposes that the “nation fight wars only as a last resort and when genuinely threatened;” and therefore, “the U.S. should end every conflict it’s currently engaged in, bringing most of its troops home and downsizing its imperial deployments globally.”  He further proposes downsizing nuclear forces; and he advocates responding to the threat of international terrorism through law enforcement and intelligence services.  He believes that with an alternative orientation that is committed to the genuine defense of national security and is not economically and politically driven to exaggeration, it would be possible to significantly reduce the military budget; he cites defense analyst Nicolas Davies in declaring that the Pentagon budget could be reduced by 50%.
 
     Astore’s proposals involve to a considerable extent an ideological shift.  He maintains that the people should understand that current U.S. military actions do not deter aggressive or threatening nations, nor do they defend democracy; in many cases U.S. military interventions are for the purposes of exploitation and dominance.  He further observes that the people should not believe that national strength is measured by military strength.  Above all, he maintains that the people should not be so ready to believe lies generated by the Pentagon and their militaristic political allies in order to justify military actions and imperialist policies.
 
       Such an ideological reorientation with respect to the role of the military in the nation is precisely one of the tasks of an alternative political party.  As I have argued in previous posts, an alternative political party must formulate an alternative narrative of the nation, which redefines the meaning of patriotism, which unmasks the imperialist character of U.S. foreign policy, and which seeks to strengthen the nation by developing sustainable forms of production and by seeking mutually beneficial forms of commerce with other nations.  Astore helps us to understand that such an alternative national narrative would include a genuine concept of national security, leaving behind exaggerations created to justify the militarization of the economy and society.  A politically effective alternative narrative would lead the people to understand that excessive military expenditures undermine the economy of the nation in the long run; and that, when such excessive military expenditures are justified by lies, deceptions, and distortions, they undermine the capacity of the people to understand global affairs as well as the moral fabric of our nation.  An alternative political party must lead the people toward a sounder political, economic, ideological, and moral foundation, thereby fulfilling the historic hope of the nation to constitute a republic that would be an example to the world of human dignity.

Reference
 
Astore, William J.  2019.  “How the Pentagon Took Ownership of Donald Trump: Six Ways to Curb America’s Military Machine.”  Tom Dispatch (April 30).

      Today, May 17, 2019, marks the sixtieth anniversary of the Agrarian Reform Law, signed by the Cuban Revolutionary Government on May 17, 1959, a little more than four months after the Rebel Army triumphantly entered the city of Havana.  The signing ceremony was held in the wooden shack that had served as the general headquarters of the Rebel Army in the mountains of Sierra Maestra during the revolutionary war, in recognition of the important role of peasants in the revolutionary triumph.  The date for the signing ceremony was chosen in recognition of the “Day of the Peasant,” declared by Guantanamo peasants in commemoration of the May 17, 1940 assassination of Niceto Perez, a peasant who had been successfully cultivating, without title or authorization, land that he had informally occupied.   During the past week, in commemoration of the Day of the Peasant and the sixtieth anniversary of the Agrarian Reform Law, various acts have been held throughout the island, with significant media attention and journalistic commentary.
 
      In essence, the Agrarian Reform Law nationalized 40 billon square meters of land pertaining to large agricultural estates, without distinction between domestic and foreign ownership, offering compensation in the form of bonds that would mature in twenty years.  It was a bold and decisive step, made necessary by the fact that a majority of agricultural land was foreign owned, and 85% of peasants worked on land they did not own.  Of the expropriated land, 45.8% was distributed to 100,000 peasants, who, in addition to being granted titles of property, received favorable terms of credit as well as access to a state-regulated network for the commercialization of their products and the purchase of agricultural supplies, such as seeds and fertilizers.  In the late 1960s, the revolution propelled the cooperative movement, which, on a voluntary basis, unified the lands and resources of the peasants, and which gave rise to small village communities, with schools, medical institutions, markets, and offices.
 
      The remaining 54.2% of the expropriated land was converted into state-managed agricultural enterprises, which should not be interpreted as a top-down form of management.  In the first place, the revolutionary government was taking steps in accordance with popular will and in defense of the interests of the people; and in the mid-1970s, it developed popular structures to ensure that the political process is controlled by the people (see “Popular Democracy in Cuba”).  Secondly, alongside managers appointed by the appropriate ministry, the revolution impelled the organization of the workers, who elect their own leaders to work with the state-appointed managers in the development of the companies.  In general, the state management approach was taken with respect to the large U.S. owned sugar plantations, where distribution of land to individual peasants as a transitional step toward cooperatives would have been complicated.  In the early 1990s, in the context of the economic difficulties of the “Special Period,” the state-managed agricultural enterprises were converted into cooperatives, with contractual relations with the state.
 
      The Agrarian Reform Law sought to break Cuban neocolonial dependency on the USA and to break with its peripheral role of exporting sugar and coffee on a base of foreign ownership and superexploited labor.  It hoped to generate the diversification of agricultural production, the elevation of the level of consumption and the standard of living of the people, and the industrial and scientific development of the nation.  Standing against the interests of the Cuban national estate bourgeoisie and U.S. corporations with landed property in Cuba, the Agrarian Reform Law revealed the essentially anti-neocolonial character of the Cuban Revolution.  It provoked a firestorm of opposition from those interests, national and international, that benefited from the neocolonial world order.
 
     The Revolution, however, sought to minimize conflict with the USA.  The revolutionary leadership did not envision the rupture of USA-Cuba trade; rather, it intended a transformation of exploitative core-peripheral exchange into mutually beneficial commerce.  On July 6, 1960, the Cuban revolutionary government emitted Law 851, which authorized the expropriation of companies and not merely land, including the expropriation of companies in non-agricultural sectors.  Superseding the terms of compensation provided by the Agrarian Reform, Law 851 authorized the creation of a compensation fund that would be fed by deposits equal to 25% of the value of U.S. purchases of Cuban sugar in excess of the sugar quota.  It proposed, therefore, a mutually beneficial resolution to the issue of compensation, linking payment for nationalized properties to the U.S.-Cuban sugar trade. By means of a higher U.S. sugar purchase and Cuban use of the additional income to finance compensation and invest in industrial development, Law 851 pointed to the transformation of core-peripheral exploitation into North-South cooperation.  Although the United States immediately reduced U.S. purchases to a level below the sugar quota, thirty days later, in the announcement of the first nationalizations, Fidel appears to be hopeful that the U.S. government will accept the proposal of compensation through U.S. purchase above the sugar quota, thus maintaining a strong economic relation, but basing it in cooperation rather than exploitation.  Perhaps Fidel had hoped that a constructive relation between the two peoples and nations would be a practical learning experience for humanity, pointing to the necessary road toward a transformation of neocolonial structures, such that a more sustainable world-system based on cooperation, mutually beneficial trade, and respect for the sovereignty of nations could be constructed step-by-step.  However, the USA has been incapable of accepting Cuban sovereignty; it has continued to insist on a relation defined by Cuban subordination to U.S. interests, and it persistently has tried to effect regime change to this end.
 
     Although the Agrarian Reform Law confronted the established neocolonial world order, it did not affect directly the interests of the Cuban national industrial bourgeoisie.   Moreover, lawyers with ties to the national bourgeoisie were included in the revolutionary government in January 1959, making possible a political alliance between the Revolution and a national bourgeoisie committed to the industrial and scientific development of the nation.  However, the Cuban national bourgeoisie had been formed during the neocolonial republic as a puppet bourgeoisie, totally subordinated to the interests of U.S. capital.  In the months following the triumph of the Revolution, the national bourgeoisie demonstrated its incapacity to reconstruct itself as an independent national bourgeoisie, in alliance with the social and political forces that the triumphant revolution had unleashed.  Taking its cue from the U.S. corporations with which it was organically tied, the majority of members of the Cuban national industrial bourgeoisie, after the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law, increasingly abandoned their companies and emigrated to the United States, participating in the U.S. project of regime change in Cuba, with the expectation that they would return to Cuba and reclaim their properties under a government supportive of U.S. interests.  As this political project failed, the Cuban national industrial bourgeoisie integrated with other counterrevolutionary sectors in the Cuban émigré community, eventually reconstituting itself as a Cuban-American bourgeoisie.
 
     Therefore, even though the Agrarian Reform Law did not affect directly the interests of the Cuban national industrial bourgeoisie, the law was a decisive step that provoked the breaking of the national industrial bourgeoisie with the Cuban Revolution.  The rupture reached culmination in the period of October, 1960 to July, 1962, when the Revolution nationalized Cuban-owned private companies, reasoning that members of the Cuban industrial and commercial bourgeoisie were abandoning the management of their establishments, participating in criminal counterrevolutionary activities, channeling capital out of the country, emigrating to the United States, and/or sabotaging production; and that such comportment made the nationalization of the companies, with compensation, a matter of public utility and social interest.
 
       Cuba, meanwhile, persists in its quest for sovereignty, in the face of the hostility of its powerful neighbor to the North, but with the growing support of the governments and peoples of the world.  It sustains itself by celebrating its modest gains.  In commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Agrarian Reform Law, Ana Margarita González, a journalist of Trabajadores (Workers, the weekly newspaper of the Union of Cuban Workers), traveled to the village of Güira de Melena, where she talked with associates of the Niceto Pérez cooperative for agricultural and animal production.  (All of the works of the revolution are named after martyrs of the revolution, and this cooperative is named for the above-mentioned peasant whose assassination prompted the declaration of the Day of the Peasant).  The associates report that the cooperative, established nearly forty years ago, has always been profitable, and this year it has attained a record crop of grains, vegetables, and fruits.  Celedonio Barroso, a sharecropper before the triumph of the revolution and an associate of the cooperative, declared that “the Agrarian Reform was the liberation of the Cuban peasant.”  It could be said with justice that the Agrarian Reform Law is the foundation of the national and social liberation of the nation; and it constitutes a Cuban declaration of sovereignty, standing in defiance of the structures of the neocolonial world-system.
 
      To read more on Agrarian Reform in Cuba, see “The Agrarian Reform Law of 1959” 09/23/2014 and “The defining moment of the Cuban Revolution”  09/24/2014 in the category Cuban History.

​      The United States emerged to a position of hegemony in the neocolonial world-system during the period 1946 to 1968.  Its ascent to hegemony was fueled by several factors (see posts in the category US Ascent and the category US Imperialism).  However, since 1968, the USA has experienced a relative decline in its productive, commercial, and financial capacity as well as its prestige, as a consequence of: the Vietnam War; excessive military expenditures in relation to productive capacity; and insufficient investment in education, infrastructure, and sustainable forms of production.
 
     The post-1980 conservative restauration has sought to shore up the increasingly evident decline of the nation through the imposition of neoliberal economic policies, which reduce the role of the state and give priority to the market, with the intention of extracting more capital from labor in the core and from the peripheral and semi-peripheral regions of the world-economy.  Initially, the neoliberal project was successful as a short-term remedy for international capital (see posts in the category Neoliberalism). 
 
     However, beginning in the late 1990s, the neoliberal project provoked a reaction of resistance among the peoples of the world, which attained its most advanced expression in Latin American and the Caribbean.  Popular social movements led to progressive and socialist governments dedicated to taking control of national resources and protecting the social and economic needs of the people.  Regional associations were formed, seeking to put into practice the classic call of the Third World for South-South cooperation and mutually beneficial trade among nations.  Looking for necessary financial support, the progressive states and regional associations strengthened commercial and diplomatic relations with China and Russia.  A post-neoliberal era was beginning to emerge, and the United States, having never attended to the structural sources of its relative decline, was losing control of the neocolonies in its backyard (see posts in the categories Third World, Latin American Unity, and South-South Cooperation).
 
      Trump wants to restore the greatness of America, and in accordance with this vision, the Trump administration is undertaking a desperate attempt to restore its hegemony over Latin America and the Caribbean.  The attempt is misguided, because it is not based on an understanding of the sources of the nation’s relative decline, and because it underestimates the force of Latin American resistance to the neocolonial world-system.  Although not well understood in the USA, Latin American resistance is rooted in historical consciousness, social scientific knowledge, and universal human values; and therefore, it is capable of unifying diverse political forces and marshalling the necessary support of the people.
 
      In accordance with its desperate and ill-advised effort to reestablish its hegemony over Latin America and the Caribbean, the USA has launched what Cuban journalists call an unconventional war on Venezuela.  Eight dimensions of the unconventional war can be identified.
 
      (1)  Unconventional war makes extensive use of national leaders who have been formed in the ideological assumptions and beliefs of US hegemony, including the belief in a free market and a minimal role of the state in the economy, and the definition of freedom as synonymous with the structures of representative democracy that have been developed since the late eighteenth century in the USA.  Such national leaders formed in U.S. ideology play a central role in the political dynamics and in the destabilizing tactics in the targeted nation, and they give legitimacy to the regime change strategy in the USA.  To this end, NGOs since the 1980s have developed academic interchanges, scholarships for study, and leadership courses.  They place the recipients of these programs in positions of importance in the economies of the South, and to the extent possible, in the governments.
 
      Consequently, when Juan Guaidó, self-proclaimed “interim” president of Venezuela, presented a national plan for Venezuela at the Central University of Venezuela on January 31, he noted that the presentation was written by economic experts and national assembly deputies.  The presentation argued that the socialist government had destroyed the economy through arbitrary regulations and state controls that enabled corruption.  It proposed giving state power back to the people through the free market, the elimination of state controls on private property, the recapitalization of banks, the privatization of public companies and public services.  Barry Cannon interprets the documents emitted with the presentation as reflecting a philosophy of individualism of the U.S. variety. 

     (2)  Unconventional war includes the adoption of measures designed to suffocate the economy.  The measures include sustained and comprehensive economic sanctions, with the intention of creating shortages in necessary goods, with the made-in-USA-national-leaders and the international news media playing an important role in disseminating the idea that government policies and corruption are to blame for the subsequent shortages.  In the case of Venezuela, the strategy included, during the period 2014-2015, the hording of goods and the suspension of trade by Venezuelan importers with ties to the opposition.  Since August 2017, the USA has imposed a financial embargo, which reduced the capacity of the government to respond to the hyperinflation that resulted from the shortage of goods.  Since January 1919, the USA has imposed a trade embargo, which has cost Venezuela billions of dollars in foreign exchange earnings from oil exports, necessary for the purchase of food, medicines, and other necessities. 
 
      (3)  The unconventional war includes robbery of assets.  Venezuelan bank accounts in the USA, Venezuelan gold in the Bank of England, and the Venezuelan owned CITGO gasoline distributorship in the United States have been frozen.  Venezuelan frozen assets amount to approximately 30 billion dollars.  Funds from Venezuelan frozen assets have been channeled to Guaidó and his “government.”
 
     (4)  Unconventional war includes sabotage.  From March 7 to March 9, there was a series of attacks on the Venezuelan National Electric System.  An initial attack was ordered by the Southern Command of the U.S. military, and it involved hacking the main computer and control system, carried out from Houston and Chicago.  The cyber-attack affected electric services in 80% of the national territory, with consequences for banking services as well as the distribution of water and gasoline.  Recovery proceed rapidly during the next 48 hours, but it was disrupted by further attacks on the electric system carried out locally.  Nearly full recovery was attained on March 10, and the government declared victory over the sabotage.  By March 12, the system had returned to normal.
 
       The US government and Latin American governments of the Right allied with it blamed the government of Venezuela for the power outage.  Luis Almagro, Secretary General of the OAS, in fulfillment of the historic role of the OAS as a Latin America colonial office of the USA, declared that “the energetic crisis . . . is a result of corruption, incompetence, and lack of investment for many years by the usurper dictatorship.”
 
      The intention of the sabotage on the electric system was to provoke social fragmentation and chaos, and to generate a popular uprising.  But the popular reaction was not what had been hoped.  The people did not turn to violent protest or looting, and they turned to family and community structures to attend to their needs during the emergency.  Rather than taking to the streets in protest, most opposition supporters stayed at home during the three-day energy crisis, a tacit rejection of the sabotage strategy.
 
        (5)  Unconventional war includes recognizing an alternative government.  According to news reports, the decision to declare an alternative “government in transition” in Venezuela was made in a meeting at the OAS headquarters in Washington on December 14.  With assurances of support from Washington, Guaidó declared himself president on January 23, and some fifty nations of the world have recognized him.   Efforts have been made to appoint ambassadors and take possession of embassies.
 
     (6)  Unconventional war includes threats of military intervention.  In recent weeks, the threat of a U.S. military intervention in Venezuela has been constant, with frequent proclamations that all options are on the table. 
 
     (7)  Unconventional war includes the lie.  Inasmuch as the role of conquest and colonialism in promoting the economic development of the nations of the North has been excluded from public debate and the evolution of American national consciousness, U.S. foreign policy from the beginning has been conducted on the most fundamental of lies, the erasing of colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism from modern history.  In the context of the most fundamental lie of the colonial denial, there are other fundamental lies, such as erasing from human history the successes of the socialist governments of the world and the Asian tigers in promoting economic and social development through a strong state role in the economy; and erasing from human experience the achievements of popular democracy in promoting open expression and discourse, popular control of the political process, and political stability, standing as a successful alternative to representative democracy.  However, above and beyond these fundamental lies, there are specific lies that have been disseminated by the U.S. government in order to justify U.S. military invasions and interventions and support for coups d’état and military dictatorships in Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.  In this context, there is a long history of exaggerations of threats to national security by the Pentagon, in order to justify government expenditures in support of the military-industrial complex.
 
     In the case of U.S. justification of economic war and possible military intervention in Venezuela, the specific lies have included the erasure of the social gains of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela, led by Hugo Chávez.  Such gains include the reduction of poverty, illiteracy, and inequality, with the result that Venezuela, prior to the launching of the economic war, had a high rating on the UN Human Development Index.  And the lies include the false claim that Maduro was not legitimately elected in May 2018, leaving aside fundamental facts (see “The legitimacy of Maduro and Venezuela” 01/15/2019 in this category Venezuela).  In Venezuela, as in other interventions in the past, U.S. foreign policy is based on normalizing the lie, which constitutes the false foundation of an ideological attack.
 
     The ideological attack on Venezuela to some extent has included an anti-socialist discourse.  In a speech in Florida before Cuban-American counterrevolutionaries, Trump declared that socialism has created human misery where ever it has been implemented.  However, the anti-socialist discourse occurs in a rhetorical context different from that of the Cold War.  In the 1950s, viewing the Soviet Union as militarily expansionistic, and seeing communism as an international conspiracy, the people of the United States felt threatened by the spread of communism in the world.  But in the current historic moment, the people do not feel threatened by communism or socialism.  Therefore, the anti-socialist discourse is effective today not by touching fears but by drawing upon stereotypes with respect to socialism and Latin American politicians and military dictatorships.  The anti-socialist discourse is integral to a pro-democratic, human rights, anti-authoritarian discourse, presenting the United States as a defender of human rights against authoritarian regimes.  Mike Pompeo used this ideological strategy when he described U.S. policy as involving an effort to free the people of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela from the “yoke of authoritarianism.”  It is a question of repeatedly referring to targeted nations as “dictatorships,” ignoring the highly participatory democratic structures that they have developed.  It is an effective ideological strategy, because of the lack of knowledge of the people of the United States concerning the political processes of the targeted nations.  It is effective, not because it convokes fear, but because it draws upon popular stereotypes and exploits the limited political consciousness of the people. 
 
     (8)  Unconventional war enlists the support of the mainstream, corporate-owned media for the dissemination of lies and ideological distortions.  In the case of Venezuela, a survey of U.S. journalistic opinion found no example of an article or video report that opposed the U.S. policy of regime change.  During the March 7-9 blackout, NGOs released false reports of widespread chaos, seeking to create a perception of a humanitarian crisis that required U.S. intervention, which the media disseminated.   Some media outlets have disseminated the absurd lie that the Russia and Cuba are propping up the Maduro government.
    
     The unconventional war on Venezuela has not had the results its instigators had hoped.  The anticipated popular uprisings and military desertions have not occurred.  The people have increasingly taken to the streets in defense of the government.  The fundamental flaw of the unconventional war is that it is premised on an underestimation of the moral and political force of popular revolution. 
 
      Venezuela is defending itself.  It has developed a civic-military union, in which a popular militia of 2 million combatants in 335 municipalities serves as a rearguard for the Armed Forces.   The government recently convoked a National Day of Dialogue and Rectification, involving 16,800 popular assemblies in 2,500 communities, with the proposals of the people recorded by members of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela.  The emphasis on the assemblies is on making corrections in the revolutionary road, changing what ought to be changed.  At the same time, the government is seeking to compensate for the losses in trade by expanding commercial relations with China, Russia, and other nations that have been seeking an alternative to the trading patterns defined by the U.S.-European dominated world-economy.  In addition, it is adopting measures for the progressive increase of petroleum production and for the diversification of production.
 
      As I have argued previously, the long-term tendencies of the world-system favor the endurance of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela and other alternative projects from below, requiring adjustments in U.S. foreign policy to this global political reality (“Venezuela and world-systemic tendencies” 03/08/2019 in this category Venezuela).

Sources

Sources
 
Arias Fernández, Francisco.  2019.  “Ineptocracia o el gabinete de demolición,” Granma (May 9).
 
Cannon, Barry.  2019.  “Juan Guaidó’s Policy Proposals: 'The Venezuela to Come' or the Venezuela That Has Already Been?”  NACLA (March 15).
 
Capote, Raúl Antonio.  2019.  “Recete para Trump: una dosis de jarabe vietnamita,” Granma (March 13).
 
Carrasco Martín, Juana.  2019.  “Sabotaje eléctrico alumbra conciencia de venezolanos,” Juventud Rebelde (March 9).
 
García Rodríguez, Julio César.  2019.  “La colaboración cubana: principios y verdades desde Venezuela,” Granma (March 20).
 
Escuela, Mauricio.  2019.  “Venezuela seguirá siendo irrevocablemente libre,” Granma (April 16).
 
Koerner, Lucas.  2019.  “The Global Left and the Danger of a Dirty War in Venezuela,” Mint Press News (February 25).
 
Milanés León, Enrique.  2019.  “El contragolpe del pueblo,” Granma (May 6).
 
__________.  2019.  “El presidente autoapagado,” Granma (March 15).
 
Misión Verdad.  2019.  “Solidarity, Survival and Sabotage: Reconstructing the History of the Blackouts Tormenting Venezuela,” The Grayzone (April 1).
 
Pilger, John.  2019.  “The War on Venezuela Is Built on Lies,” Counterpunch (February 24).
 
Ramírez, Edgardo Antonio.  2019.  “La Razia imperialista contra Venezuela,” Granma (February 27).
 
Shupak,  Gregory.  2019.  “US Media Erase Years of Chavismo’s Gains,” FAIR  (March 11).
 
Weisbrot, Mark.  2019.  “The Reality Behind Trumps Coalition for Regime Change in Venezuela,” The New Republic (March 14).

     The International Day of the Worker is a living memorial to the Chicago workers murdered on May 1, 1886.  In many countries of the world, there is an annual mass demonstration in which the demands of the workers’ movements in their particular countries are lifted up.  This year, in hundreds of cities of the world, workers protested the social insecurities provoked by neoliberal economic policies, unemployment, wage inequality, and increasingly concentrated wealth.  In Latin America, International Workers Day saw mass demonstrations of workers protesting the interference of the International Monetary Fund, the conditions of life of the people, the privatization of state companies, labor reforms that legalize superexploitation and low salaries, the annulment of the right to organize, and the growth of the external debt with the packages of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
 
     In Cuba, International Workers’ Day has a different tone, as a consequence of the political empowerment of the workers in the island nation.  In Cuba, the mass demonstration is a festive celebration of the socialist revolution and its achievements in defense of the workers and other popular sectors.  Protests are directed not to the government, but in support of the government in opposition to the imperialist policies of the global powers, especially Cuba’s powerful neighbor to the north.
 
     The political empowerment of Cuban workers was attained through a historic struggle that had its gains and setbacks.  In the 1920s and early 1930s, workers organizations were in the vanguard of the struggle against the Machado dictatorship, with the first Communist Party of Cuba as the leadings force, educating and organizing the workers.  But during the 1940s and 1950s, the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC for its initials in Spanish) had become an instrument for forcing the workers to submit to capital.  During the dictatorship of 1952 to 1959, a corrupt union oligarchy benefitted from obligatory membership dues, and it collaborated with Batista in the repression of workers.  However, in the early 1960s, with the support of the Revolutionary Government, CTC took definitive form as a revolutionary organization, casting aside the corrupt union oligarchy.  Along with other mass organizations of peasants, agricultural cooperativists, students, and women, CTC played a central role in the mass assemblies of the 1960s. 
 
     Since the Constitution of 1976, the political empowerment of workers is integral to Cuban structures of popular democracy.  CTC representatives, along with those of the other mass organizations, form candidacy commissions, which present to the delegates of the 169 municipal assemblies the names of candidates to the National Assembly of Popular Power.  (The municipal assemblies are elected by the people in 12,515 voting districts in secret elections in which voters choose from two or more candidates nominated by the people in a series of neighborhood nomination assemblies).  Elected by the municipal assemblies on the basis of the recommendations of the candidacy commissions formed by representatives of CTC and other mass organizations, the National Assembly of Popular Power is the highest authority in nation; it elects the highest members of the executive and judicial branches of the state, and it enacts legislation.  By constitutional requirement, representatives of CTC and other mass organizations are included in the legislative committees of the National Assembly. 
 
     CTC members are workers of all categories: industrial workers, agricultural workers, service workers, professionals, educators, doctors, nurses, and self-employed workers.  They generally are organized by place of work, united regardless of occupation, such that the medical staff and the janitorial staff of a hospital are in the same local union.  More than 90% of Cuban workers are members of the CTC. 
 
       This year, May Day occurs in the aftermath of the declaration of a new Constitution, which was developed on the basis of an extensive and vibrant popular consultation, and which was approved in referendum by 86% of the voters, with a voter participation of 90%.  The 2019 Constitution, like the 1976 Constitution, affirms: the socialist character of the nation; the National Assembly of Popular Power as the highest constitutional and legal authority; the role of the Communist Party of Cuba as the educating and guiding vanguard of the revolution; and a foreign policy that emphasizes the right of Cuba and all nations to be sovereign and the right of peoples to self-determination, and that calls the Third World to unity in opposition to imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism.  (See various posts from January 9 to February 26, 2019 on the new Cuban Constitution in this category Cuba Today). 
 
     At the same time, this year’s May Day occurs in the context of the strengthening of the U.S. economic, commercial, and financial blockade of Cuba, which intends to nullify Cuban popular democracy and impose structures of representative democracy, inasmuch as representative democracy is far more susceptible to manipulation by moneyed particular interests.  Accordingly, the 2019 May Day celebration of Cuban socialism and the Cuban Revolution was accompanied by frequent denunciations of the U.S. blockade and of the announced implementation of Title III of the 1996 Helms-Burton Law.  Said law, fully implemented for the first time of May 2, authorizes demands against companies of any nation that have any kind of commercial relation with companies that were nationalized or confiscated by the Cuban Revolutionary Government in 1959 and 1960.
 
      In the Plaza of the Revolution in Havana, a multi-generational wall of people, nearly a million people, marched by the José Martí Memorial, where they were saluted by Raúl Castro, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba; Miguel Díaz-Canel, President of the Councils of State and Ministers of Cuba; and Ulisés Guilarte, General Secretary of the Federation of Cuban Workers.  Numerous were the slogans on their placards: “Unity, Commitment, and Victory”; “Down with the Blockade”; “Down with the Helms-Burton Law;” “Title III? Disapproved”; “Hands off Venezuela”; “Free Lula Now”; and “We are continuity.”  I liked the placard carried by a ten-year old girl: “Mr. Trump: With what right to you stomp on my future?”   Images of Fidel, Raúl, Martí, and Che were in abundance.  Similar celebrations were held throughout the nation; more than 350,000 marched in Santiago de Cuba, and nearly a million Cubans in the thirteen provinces outside Havana marched in defense of their nation and their socialist revolution.
 
     The Cuban Revolution has experienced a revitalization in recent years, as a consequence of a politically intelligent adjustment in the revolutionary project by the Party, formulated in response to the inquietudes of the people with respect to the material standard of living.  The social and economic model of 2012 seeks to improve the productive capacity of the nation through the expansion of self-employment and small-scale capitalist enterprises, the expansion of cooperatives to non-agricultural sectors, greater efficiency in state companies, and more flexible rules with respect to foreign investment.  The new Constitution of 2019 provides a statutory foundation to these steps, while it maintains the role of the state as the formulator of the development plan, the regulator of the economy, and the principal proprietor of economic enterprises.  At the same time, the new Constitution points toward a more inclusive Revolution, more clearly affirming the rights of persons regardless of religious beliefs, and affirming for the first time the rights of persons regardless of gender orientation or gender identity.  With these formulations of a more economically pragmatic and socially inclusive socialist project, the Party has recaptured the people, bringing them back on board in full support and active participation in the revolution and in the construction of socialism, which includes full and enthusiastic affirmation of the teachings and example of Fidel, defined as the historic leader of the Cuban Revolution.
 
       The aggressive and disrespectful language of Trump and his team only reinforces and strengthens the revitalization of the Cuban revolutionary project.  One could hardly expect otherwise.  Universally, people identify with their nation or ethnic group, and an external foreign threat will provoke the closing of ranks, as occurred in Cuba in the early 1960s and is occurring in Venezuela today.  The Cuban people will not be intimated by aggression; they are prepared to sacrifice, in the future as in the past, in defense of their socialist revolution.

September 22, 2015 (revised April 25, 2019)

      When capitalism entered the stage of imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century, the foundation was being laid for the passing of the torch of leadership of the global socialist revolution from Russia and Western Europe to the colonized and semi-colonized peoples of the Third World.  So writes Cuban scholar and former diplomat Jesus Arboleya (2008:3-24) in his insightful book, La Revolución del Otro Mundo (The Revolution of the Other World), which analyzes the parallel histories of the United States and Cuba. 

     Cuba indeed is emblematic of the revolutions of the Third World.  One finds in Cuba the dynamics that everywhere are present in the Third World: colonial conquest and peripheralization, anti-colonial movement, transition to neocolonial republic, and anti-neocolonial revolution.  But furthermore, it can be said that one finds these dynamics in their most advanced expression.  As a result, from Cuba, one can obtain a profound grasp of the meaning of domination, revolution, and socialism.

     In this section of the blog, Cuban History, are found fifty blog posts that were initially published from June 12 to September 29, 2014.  They point to seven important lessons to be learned from the Cuban Revolution, understood as a project of popular social reconstruction that has been continually evolving from 1868 to the present.

     (1) Third World revolutions are defined fundamentally by the colonial/neocolonial situation.  They seek to transform those structures that have been imposed by colonialism and sustained by neocolonialism, particularly economic structures that ensure the super-exploitation of labor and the exploitation of natural resources by the colonial/neocolonial powers.  They therefore above all seek true independence and the development of a just and democratic world-system that respects the equal sovereignty of all nations.

     (2) Whereas Western historians have retreated from “great man” interpretations of history, careful observation of unfolding revolutionary processes cannot avoid recognition of the importance of charismatic leaders in revolutionary processes, leaders with an exceptional capacity to understanding structures of domination and the road to liberation, and with a gift for the art of politics.  In the case of Cuba, these charismatic leaders have included José Martí, Julio Antonio Mella, Rubén Martínez Villena, Anontio Guiteras and Fidel Castro.

     (3)  Whereas classical Marxism emphasized the role of the proletariat in the vanguard of socialist revolutions, careful observation reveals that revolutionary leaders emerge principally from the radical wing of the petit bourgeoisie.  Moreover, popular organizations central to mass action and movement include not only workers’ organizations but also those of students, women, and peasants.  The socialist revolution is not exactly a workers’ revolution, but more precisely, a popular revolution.

      (4) Cuba was the first US experience in neocolonial domination.  The Cuban Republic of 1902 to 1959 was the model for US neocolonial domination on a world-scale following 1946.  When neocolonial domination is functioning well, direct military intervention is not necessary.  However, with the relative decline of the United States since 1968 and the re-emergence of Third World movements since 1995, the United States has had to increasing turn to neofascist military interventions.  Neocolonialism is eroding, and the neocolonial world-system confronts a profound crisis that it cannot resolve.  But an alternative world-system, more just and democratic, is emerging in the Third World.

      (5)  Third World revolutions are integral and comprehensive.  Their charismatic leaders appropriate from different social and historical contexts, including the bourgeois and proletarian revolutions of the West.  They have a tendency to incorporate new insights as they emerge, such as the principle of gender equality and the need to respect nature.  Third World revolutions have accomplished the integration of issues of race, ethnicity, class, gender and ecology; and they have done so on a foundation of both theory and practice.

     (6) Third World revolutions have expanded and deepened the meaning of democracy.  For the Third World, political democracy is popular, and not merely representative.  And democracy includes social and economic rights as well as the rights of nations to sovereignty and development.  Western “democratic” governments accuse Third World revolutionary governments of being undemocratic and violating human rights, basing the claims on the fact that they have developed alternative structures.  But this is mere demagogy, designed to confuse the peoples of the North, and to some extent, the South.

     (7) Third World revolutions today have reached their most advanced stage.  They are constructing an alternative world-system is theory and practice precisely at an historic moment in which the world-system is experiencing terminal structural crisis and is spiraling toward chaos.  Therefore, Cuba and the Third World revolution is showing humanity the way.  We intellectuals and activists of the North have much to learn from Cuba, Latin America and the Third World.  

       This category of Cuban History also includes two more recent posts.  (1)  The first of two posts occasioned by the proclamation by Raul Castro of the new Cuban Constitution at an Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly on April 10, 2019.  The post reflects on the influence of the historic Cuban struggle for national liberation and social transformation on the remarkable generation that led the Cuban Revolution for six decades.  (2)  A post on the Cuban “Special Period” of the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc.  It was published on August 1, 2016, as part of a series of posts on the Third World project (found in the category Third World).  These two more recent posts appear first, followed by the fifty posts of June 12 to September 29, 2014, which are in chronological order.


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.