Posted September 15, 2014

     On December 2, 1956, Fidel Castro and 81 armed guerrillas, having trained in Mexico and having traveled by sea for seven days, disembarked from the yacht Granma in a remote area of eastern Cuba, with the intention of establishing an armed struggle in the mountains known as the Sierra Maestra.  It was a total disaster.  The Granma arrived two days behind schedule, thus undermining the strategy of a simultaneous uprising in Santiago de Cuba, intended to distract Batista’s army.  As the rebels disembarked, they encountered swampland so difficult that they had to abandon most of their weapons.  Three days later, they were surprised and routed by Batista’s army, dispersing in small groups and in different directions. When twelve of them were able to regroup under the protection of a local peasant, Fidel was jubilant.  “We will win the war,” he declared. “Let us begin the struggle!”  As described Universo Sanchez, one of the twelve, it was “faith that moves mountains” (Vitier 2006:195-97).

     The faith of Fidel is not, observes Cintio Virtier, “a religious faith in supernatural powers, but a revolutionary faith in the potentialities of the human being.”  It is an “uncontainable force” that “sees in history what is not yet visible” (2006:197).

     Virtier maintains that such faith proceeds from and is fed by three sources: “a moral conviction that defends the cause of justice; profound confidence in the human being; and the highest examples in human history.”  And such faith is integrally tied to a dynamic view of human history and human being: “for the revolutionary, it is not a matter of history been but of history being, where the highest examples continue acting; not of a stagnant and fixed human being but of the human being becoming, in evolution.”  And this becoming is above all “oriented toward duty” (2006:198; italics in original).

      The unshakable faith of Fidel, “contagious, irradiating and attracting with the moral magnetism of heroism, . . . became a live experience in the terrain of the struggle itself.”  Whereas the skepticism of the theoreticians could see only the objective conditions and the correlation of forces, revolutionary faith sees the possibility of changing the objective conditions and the correlation of forces, following the highest examples in human history.  And this faith would be fed by the evolving social dynamics in which it was acting: the rebel army in the mountains and the clandestine struggle in the cities were creating new objective conditions (Vitier 2006:197-98).

      Vitier believes that the revolutionary faith of Fidel saved the revolution from falling once again into the abyss of the impossible, in which its fulfillment seemed impossible.  Fidel was driven by a faith that was “nurtured by analysis” and that therefore could discern the reality hidden by the perception of the impossibility of things, and it could discern that what appeared to be impossible was, in reality, possible and attainable (2006:198).

     After the imposition of the neoliberal project on the world, the collapse of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe, and the advent of the “special period” in Cuba, Fidel would frequently proclaim: “No one has the right to be indifferent to the suffering of others;” and “No one has the right to lose faith in the future of humanity.”  These declarations go against bourgeois democratic concepts of freedom of thought and freedom of expression.  Fidel believes that people do not have the right to think and say anything they want.  The freedoms of thought and expression, for Fidel, are intertwined with duty: a duty to be concerned with the well-being of others, and a duty to have faith in the possibility of constructing a better world.  To live any other way is not really to live; it is a debasement of our humanity.  For Fidel, conformity to duty is the essence of human life and human fulfillment, not the possession of property, material things, and consumer goods.  In his view, the kind of human being that capitalism seeks to create is a degradation of the human being; socialism, in contrast, seeks to create a new kind of person, who lives in solidarity with others, a kind of person that up to now has been exemplified by a minority and has existed in the majority in the form of human potentiality. 

     We have seen in previous posts that revolutionary processes are characterized by the emergence of charismatic leaders (see various posts on charismatic leaders).  These charismatic leaders possess gifts that are recognized by the people.  In the case of Fidel, we have seen that these gifts include an extraordinary intellectual capacity and exceptional moral commitment, which enabled him to formulate, on a basis of intellectual work and political practice, a dynamic perspective that possesses both general theoretical understanding and concrete common sense understanding and that discerns the movement of the revolution through stages (see “The Moncada program for the people” 9/5/2014; “Reflections on “History will absolve me” 9/8/2014).  We can now add the gift of an unshakable revolutionary faith that, based on observation of the unfolding correlation of forces, sees the possibilities for the creation of new objective conditions, on a foundation of courageous action, in the tradition of the highest examples in human history.  The “highest examples in human history” are the charismatic leaders of the past, who are still present, for their teachings, their example, and their spirit of struggle are an integral part of our reality.  In this sense, Fidel will be with us always. 


References

Vitier, Cintio.  2006.  Ese Sol del Mundo Moral.  La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel, University of Havana

Posted September 17, 2014

     During the Cuban revolutionary war of 1957 and 1958, there were organizational, tactical and ideological divisions.  The revolution was able to triumph and sustain itself by virtue of its capacity to overcome these divisions.

      When the 26th of July Movement (M-26/7) was established on June 12, 1955, a national leadership consisting of a small group of trustworthy and capable leaders was formed, under the direction of Fidel Castro.  When Fidel went to Mexico to organize the armed struggle, and later, when Fidel was directing the armed struggle in the Sierra Maestra, the national direction of M-26/7, located in Havana, was responsible for organizing all its activities throughout the country. Two types of activities emerged: a clandestine struggle in the cities, characterized by sabotage and the formation of secret cells among workers and the radicalized sector of the petit bourgeoisie; and the guerrilla struggle in the Sierra Maestra, which as it evolved would increasingly have peasant participation.  Many of the urban leaders of M-26/7 saw the guerrilla struggle in the mountains as of secondary importance.  Using the Revolution of 1930 as their guide, they believed that a combination of mass action and sabotage in the cities would bring down Batista.  But the leaders and soldiers of the rebel army believed that they would acquire the military capacity to defeat Batista’s army and force the surrender or flight of the dictator.  At the same time, there was an ideological division within M-26/7: some were Marxist-Leninists who favored an alliance with the communist party, whereas others were anti-communist, an ideological division that existed both in the urban front and among the guerrillas (Castro 1985:229-31; Arboleya 2008:123-25).

     Although the 26th of July Movement was by far the organization with the most popular support, as a result of its heroic action on July 26, 1953, it was not the only revolutionary organization.  The second most important was the Popular Socialist Party (PSP, the communist party), which was strong particularly among urban workers, and it possessed a significant capacity to organize urban workers.  In general, the PSP membership had far more experience and political consciousness than the members of the M-26/7.  Many of the PSP had a distrustful attitude toward M-26/7, due to its diversity of ideological viewpoints, including an element of anti-communism, and its relative political immaturity. Another important revolutionary organization was the Revolutionary Directorate, a student organization led by José Antonio Eceheverría.  The Revolutionary Directorate experienced the same tactical and ideological divisions that were found in the M-26/7 (Arboleya 2008:125; Castro 1985:235-38) 

     Events during 1958 would demonstrate the greater viability of the guerrilla struggle as against the urban front, and they would solidify the dominance of the 26th of July Movement within the revolution and would strengthen the authority of Fidel within the M-26/7.  The leaders of the urban front of M-26/7 called for a general strike and actions of sabotage for April 9, with the intention of provoking the fall of Batista. But as a result of the lack of cooperation between the communist party and the urban M-26/7, the general strike failed.  The PSP, with its network among urban workers, had the capacity to mobilize workers, but the PSP was not participating in the mass action.  Although the M-26/7 had enormous prestige among the people, it lacked organizational structures to mobilize the people.  The leaders of the urban M-26/7 had mistakenly believed that a general call would bring the people to strike and acts of sabotage, in spite of its lack of organizational strength, because of its high prestige (Arboleya 2008:126).  

     The failure of the general strike had two consequences.  First, priority was given to the guerrilla struggle.  At a meeting of the national leadership of M-26/7 on May 3-4, it was decided to transfer headquarters to the Sierra and to place the organization under the direct control of Fidel.  Henceforth, all resources and arms were to be sent to the guerrilla forces.  Secondly, Batista was emboldened, and on May 24, he launched an offensive against the rebel army, seeking to totally annihilate it.  Ten thousand soldiers were sent against the guerrilla forces, which at the time consisted of no more than 300. There were 30 battles in 76 days during the offensive, and the rebels were forced to retreat to an area of twenty kilometers from the highest point of the Sierra Maestra.  But the rebel retreat to some extent was strategic.  As the Batista army advanced, it was more vulnerable to guerrilla attacks and more isolated from its bases of support.  By the end of the offensive, the Army had suffered one thousand casualties, and the guerrillas had taken 400 prisoners, turning them over to the Red Cross with great publicity.   They captured arms from Batista’s forces, and they increased their numbers threefold.  The Batista army was exhausted and demoralized.  On August 18, Fidel announced on Radio Rebelde that the offensive had failed and that the guerrillas would soon begin a counteroffensive.  The rebel army expanded from its base, and battles began to acquire characteristics of conventional war.  Che Guevara and Camilio Cienfuegos commanded columns that marched to the West, supplementing the front to the east that Raul Castro had established prior to the army offensive.  Fidel moved M-26/7 headquarters from the mountains to the plains.  The tide had turned; the guerrillas were occupying towns at a dizzying pace, and Batista’s army was in disarray (Arboleya 2008:126-28; Buch and Suarez 2009:17-18, 25-26; Castro 1985:232).

     The spectacular march toward victory by the guerrilla forces during the second half of 1958 brought to an end all tactical debates within the revolutionary movement.  Clearly, the guerrilla army, expanding in numbers and moving west and east, was the force that was bringing down the dictatorship.  As often occurs in revolutionary movements, differences within the movement are resolved in practice as the revolution evolves.

     Batista fled Cuba just past midnight on January 1, 1959, and the revolutionary army occupied Santiago de Cuba and Havana, with an enthusiastic and celebratory popular reception.  The complete ascendency of the 26th of July Movement within the revolution was established.  Fidel has estimated that the M-26/7 had the support of 85% or 90% of the people, with 10% or 15% supporting other parties and organizations, including both other revolutionary parties as well as counterrevolutionary parties.  In these political conditions, it would have been possible to establish the M-26/7 as the party to lead the revolution.  But Fidel considered it important to establish the organizational unity of the revolution, to establish a single organization that would function as a party leading the revolution, including the various factions within the revolution.  He spoke with leaders of all of the organizations and parties, including those of the old and discredited political parties of the “democratic” period of 1940-52.  He was able to bring on board the Popular Socialist Party (the communist party) and the Student Directory, which were the two principal revolutionary organizations other than the M-26/7.  He considered the participation of the communist party to be important, because of the greater experience and the greater political consciousness of its members.  The three organizations thus dissolved themselves and formed a single organization, Integrated Revolutionary Organizations, which after some difficulties in its evolution, later would become the reconstituted Communist Party of Cuba (Castro 1985:233-39). 

      In addition, Fidel also sought to overcome a prejudice within the triumphant revolution in favor of the guerrillas, diminishing the contribution of those who had participated in the urban clandestine struggle.  He taught that there were different roads of struggle against the dictatorship; not all were in the guerrilla struggle, but those in the urban clandestine struggle also took great risks.  This teaching was a dimension of his effort to overcome divisions within the revolution and to forge unity, to include all who are committed to the basic principles of the revolution, to prevent the emergence of resentments and disappointments as the revolution unfolds (Castro 1985:234).

      In forging an organizational unity that included the communist party, the revolution took the ideological decision to reject anti-communism and to overrule the exclusion of the communist party from the revolution.  This caused some who had an anti-communist orientation to break with the revolution and to join the counterrevolution.  However, to exclude communists would have caused division among the most active of the popular sectors, given the significant influence of the communist party among urban workers and the important role that it had played in the Cuban revolution since the 1920s. 

      The forging of organizational unity among the principal organizations that had struggled against Batista was an important step in unifying the revolution and preparing it to do battle with powerful national and international forces whose interests could not permit the taking of power by a popular organization that gives first priority to the needs of the people and that places the sovereignty of the nation above international corporate interests.  Fidel’s awareness of this need for unity, and his capacity to persuade the principal actors to strive for unity, is another one of his charismatic gifts, another indication of his exceptional capacities for understanding and leadership.


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Buch Rodríguez, Luis M. and Reinald Suárez Suárez.  2009.  Gobierno Revolucionario Cubano: Primeros pasos.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Castro, Fidel. 1985.  Fidel y La Religión: Conversaciones con Frei Betto.  La Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado. [English translation: Fidel and Religion: Conversations with Frei Betto on Marxism and Liberation Theology.  Melbourne: Ocean Press].


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel, 26th of July Movement, Communist Party of Cuba

Posted September 18, 2014

     Fidel Castro is a man of firmly held principles: the right of nations to be truly independent and sovereign; the rights of all persons to education, health care, nutrition, and housing; and the right of all nations to defend themselves against aggression, interventionism, and terrorism.  And he is a person of convictions: the resolution of the social problems generated by the capitalist world-economy and the neo-colonial world system cannot be resolved without a structural transformation to a socialist world-system.  But he has never been dogmatic.  His absorption of Marxism-Leninism was characterized by a creative interpretation and adaptation of its insights to Cuban reality and to the Cuban struggle for national liberation, and thus he forged in theory and practice a form of Marxism-Leninism that was a synthesis with the ideas that emerged from the Cuban struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism (see “Fidel adapts Marxism-Leninism to Cuba” 9/9/2014; “Fidel becomes revolutionary at the university” 9/11/2014).  Thus, in his formation as a Marxist-Leninist, Fidel placed himself in opposition to the established dogmas of Marxism-Leninism.  His way of thinking was diametrically opposed to dogmatism, that is, to fixed doctrines, concepts and plans of action that are applied universally, regardless of particular national conditions.

      Dogmatism leads to sectarianism, which involves the refusal of popular organizations with common goals to cooperate, because of differences in tactics or concepts.  When revolutionaries adhere to fixed doctrines, they have a tendency to believe that those who do not accept these doctrines are outside the revolutionary process and are allies, consciously or unwittingly, of the counterrevolution.  Thus, there emerges the lack of cooperation and division within the revolutionary movement, rendering it unable to take power or to implement a deep political, economic, social and cultural transformation.  We have seen, for example, that in the early 1930s, sectarianism among popular organizations in Cuba created division within the popular revolution and facilitated Batista’s rise and consolidation of power (“The lesson of sectarianism” 8/15/2014). 

     In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Fidel worked to overcome sectarianism in the Cuban popular revolution, and his success in this effort made possible the survival and sustainability of the Cuban Revolution.  He sought to forge unity on the basis of a common commitment to an anti-imperialist project that would transform neocolonial structures (Arboleya 125).  He sought to include all who had participated in the struggle against Batista, regardless of organizational affiliation or whether they had been in the guerrilla struggle or the urban front.  In spite of a political situation overwhelmingly in favor of the organization that he founded, the 26th of July Movement, he dissolved this organization and established a new unifying revolutionary organization that would include the communist party and the Student Directory, which eventually led to the establishment of a reconstituted Communist Party that would be the only party to lead the revolution (“Unifying the Cuban revolutionary process” 9/16/2014). 

     Thus, Fidel sought to create unity on a foundation of commitment to common principles and acceptance of a diversity of views with respect to the implementation of these principles, a diversity concerning concepts, strategies, and tactics.  These differences would be debated within the context of an organizational unity of a single political party, which would permit the maintenance of political unity of the face of the opposition of the counterrevolutionary forces.

      The Cuban revolutionary project has been criticized for developing a single political party and not following the multiple party model of representative democracy.  Structures of representative democracy, however, were developed in a social and historical context defined by the need of the revolutionary bourgeoisie to enlist the support of the popular classes, but also to constrain the full expression of popular interests (see various posts on the American Revolution and the French Revolution).  As a result, structures of representative democracy often function to protect elite interests rather than the interests of the people.  In a neocolonial context, representative democracy is even more dysfunctional with respect to popular interests.  For in a neocolonial context, the denial of popular rights and needs is more profound, the capacity of the government to make concessions to popular demands is less, and the popular movement must contend with both the international and national bourgeoisie.   In the neocolonial context, when a popular revolution triumphs, it needs a political structure that promotes unity, in order to defend the revolution for national liberation and social and economic transformation against the various strategies and maneuvers of powerful national and international actors.  Such a need is not provided by a system characterized by multiple political parties, for it promotes competition for power rather than the seeking of consensus.  For this reason, the African nationalist movement and the movement for African socialism in the 1960s developed a concept of one-party democracy, as we will see in future posts.

       Following the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, a political process developed in the context of Cuban conditions was required.  Given the historic problem of division and sectarianism, which had undermined the Cuban revolution in three historic moments (1873-78, 1898-1902, 1933-35), Fidel sought to develop a political structure that would permit internal debate and discussion but would facilitate unified action on the basis of consensus.  In developing this approach, he took into account, on the one hand, the historic problem of division within the revolution; and on the other hand, the fact that the revolution must proceed in an environment characterized by the opposition of powerful actors that have an economic interest in preventing the structural transformation that the revolution intends.  The single revolutionary party does not intend to stifle debate, but to permit debate and respect diversity in a form that does not undermine necessary revolutionary unity.

     At the international level as well, Fidel has possessed a pluralist conception of revolutionary unity that is opposed to dogmatism and sectarianism.  Speaking in 1987, Fidel maintained that there had been a tendency in the international communist movement to “seek an impossible unity, an absolute homogeneity of thought” that “ignored the diversity of situations existing in the world,” and that does not take into account the particular conditions of each nation.  This tendency had emerged as a result of the prestige and authority of the Soviet Union in the international communist movement.  Fidel discerned, however, that there was beginning to emerge within the international communist movement “a greater understanding of the diversity of situations and of the need for pluralism within socialism.”  He saw this emerging principle of pluralism as a remedy for the problem of sectarianism.  In the case of the Third World nations, he observed, many theoretical concepts had emerged that reflected Third World situations (Castro 1988:125-28).  In this respect, Fidel was anticipating what would become a principle in the Third World revolutions after 1995 and a principle of socialism for the twenty-first century: respect for the diversity of situations in the various nations, recognition of the pluralism of socialism, and avoidance of a sectarianism that excludes and divides.

     In the same vein, speaking at a time in which Muammar Qaddafi and the Ayatollah Khomeini had been labeled as devils by the transnational mainstream media, Fidel described both as revolutionaries, even though they were not Marxist-Leninists and had philosophical and political concepts different from those of Fidel.  Qaddafi, he noted, had played an important role in liberating Libya from colonialism and from the military bases of NATO.  His government had established national control over petroleum, had developed important programs in economic and social development, and had made an effort to provide food for the people.  Fidel noted that he had read Qaddafi’s Green Book, which expressed advanced social ideas; although he did not agree entirely, Fidel expressed respect for Qaddafi’s point of view.  The aggression and hostility of the United States toward Qaddafi, Fidel noted, is simply a consequence of his anti-imperialist policy and his defense of the sovereignty of Libya.  Similarly, Khomeini had played a central role in overthrowing the Shah of Iran, who had been a tyrant and an ally of imperialism (Castro 1988:118-21).

     In his comments with respect to Qaddafi and Khomeini, Fidel was anticipating attitudes in Latin America today, where socialist and Leftist governments are developing relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.  In spite of religious and cultural differences, the need for mutually beneficial economic and commercial relations, cultural interchange, and unity in opposition to US and European imperialism is recognized.
 

References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Castro, Fidel. 1988.  Un Encuentro con Fidel: Entrevista realizada por Gianni Miná.  La Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado.  [English translation: Mina, Gianni.  1991.  An Encounter With Fidel.  Translated by Mary Todd.  Melbourne: Ocean Press]. 


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, neocolonial republic, Fidel, Communist Party of Cuba

Posted September 24, 2014

     Beginning in May 1958, Fidel had begun to take steps toward the establishment of an anti-Batista coalition of organizations and parties. On July 20 in Miami, representatives of the 26th of July Movement established the Civic Revolutionary Front, which was a coalition of various parties and organization that publicly affirmed their opposition to Batista and their support of his overthrow by means of armed struggle. Aside, however, from this common commitment to armed struggle against Batista, the coalition included personalities and organizations representing a variety of views.  They included, for example, those that were committed to the preservation of the neocolonial order, who wanted to restore representative democracy but did not have an interest in breaking the core-peripheral economic relation that was at the heart of US neocolonial domination of the island.

     With the triumph of the revolution, the strategy of coalition with anti-Batista forces continued.  In spite of the political and moral authority that Fidel held at the time of the triumph, he opted not to take power and not to establish political control by the 26th of July Movement. Instead, he formed a coalition government of anti-Batista forces that included conservative lawyers who were organically tied to the national bourgeoisie (see “The Provisional Revolutionary Government of 1959” 9/19/2014). 

      Fidel’s strategy was to attain a transition to a new government in which the 26th of July Movement had oversight, but not direct power, and with a composition that would calm the bourgeoisie and the United States, thus giving the 26th of July Movement time.  Fidel used this time, from January through early May of 1959, to meet with the people, deepening his understanding of their concerns and hopes; to feel out representatives of various Cuban political parties and currents of thought; to assess the reaction of the United States; to travel internationally and to test the international climate of opinion; to promise the people that decisive steps in their interests were soon to come, and to warn them that they should be ready to defend their interests; and to formulate the specifics of the agrarian reform plan.

     Fidel understood the fundamental facts of the neocolonial order. He understood that the attainment of true Cuban sovereignty and the protection of the social and economic rights of the people would require a deep social and economic transformation, which inevitably would provoke the hostile reaction of national and international interests that benefitted from the established order.  And he understood that such a transformation required an agrarian reform and land redistribution program of substance.  In the first months of 1959, he was preparing himself, his party, and his people for the inevitable confrontation with the powers that be.  He understood the negative reaction that an agrarian reform program with substance would provoke, but he nonetheless was committed to this necessary and decisive step.  Ever mindful of Cuban history and the frustration of the Cuban Revolution in 1878, and again in 1898, and again in 1933, he was determined that, this time, the aspirations and hopes of the Cuban people will be attained.

     By the end of April, Fidel was ready with the Agrarian Reform Plan, and it was presented to the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Revolutionary Government on April 28 (see “The Agrarian Reform Law of 1959” 9/23/2014).  And the plan was promulgated with the kind symbolism that would characterize Fidel’s political actions throughout his long career: it was promulgated on a date that commemorated the martyrdom of a heroic peasant who had struggled for land, and it was signed in the headquarters of the guerrilla movement that was victorious only because of the participation, support, and heroic sacrifices of peasants.  No one could miss the message:  “Let the world know that this is a revolution by and for the humble.”

     The enactment of the law in such symbolic manner was followed with another action that also would characterize Fidel’s career.  An international forum was convoked, seeking to explain to the United States, Canada, and Latin America that revolutionary Cuba desires positive relations with all and respects the opinions of all. Nevertheless, the Agrarian Reform Law must be adopted, because the Cuban nation can no longer surrender its sovereignty to foreign interests, nor can the Cuban national leadership continue to be indifferent to the suffering of the dispossessed.

     The agrarian reform law was a radical step that constituted a definitive break with the bourgeoisie, both Cuban and international. But it was a necessary step.   In a neocolonial situation, any government that seeks to overcome underdevelopment and poverty must bring to an end two patterns that are integral to the neocolonial world-system: the unequal distribution of land, and the use of land to provide cheap raw materials for the core of the world-economy (see various posts on the origin and development of the modern world-system and on neocolonialism).   A government committed to the people must take land from the estate bourgeoisie and transnational corporations and establish alternative land-use patterns and alternative patterns of land distribution that are able to promote and sustain national development. 

     The Agrarian Reform Law of 1959 was and is the defining moment of the Cuban Revolution.  From that date forward, the radical anti-neocolonial character of the Cuban Revolution was made manifest.  As Cuban scholar and diplomat Jesus Arboleya would write nearly a half century later, the Agrarian Reform Law “showed that the balance was inclined irremediably toward the most radical sectors,” and it “defined the anti-neocolonial character of the revolution” (2008:144).  The triumphant revolution was not seeking a return to representative democracy in a neocolonial context, but a transformation of the neocolonial structures that had defined the Cuban situation since 1902.

     With the anti-neocolonial character of the revolution made manifest, the stage was set for the mobilization of powerful national and international forces that had an interest in defending the neocolonial world system.  From the point of view of the beneficiaries of the neocolonial order, the Cuban Revolution was a dangerous example.  It struck with courage and insight at an essential dimension of the neocolonial world-system.  If a small island nation with limited natural resources could challenge the world-system in this way with impunity, what lessons would be drawn by the people of large neocolonized nations that possessed important natural resources for manufacturing and energy and significant markets for surplus manufactured goods?The world must know that any nation that seeks genuine sovereignty will be made to suffer.

      From the vantage point of the Cuban Revolution, the manifestation of its essential anti-neocolonial character and the mobilization of powerful forces against it meant that the coalition government no longer was functional.  In the battle with powerful actors, the most important arm of the revolution is the support of the people, and maintaining the support of the people requires responding effectively to their needs.  Thus, the Council of Ministers replaced conservative ministers with radicals more committed to structuring their ministries to respond to the needs of the people, as we will discuss in the next post. 


References

Arboleya, Jesús.  2008.  La Revolución del Otro Mundo: Un análisis histórico de la Revolución Cubana.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, Fidel, Agrarian Reform Law of 1959

Posted September 25, 2014

    With the decisive step of the revolution in support of agrarian reform, the anti-neocolonial character of the revolution was defined (see “The defining moment of the Cuban Revolution” 9/24/2014).  The revolution was now headed toward confrontation with the national bourgeoisie and the United States.  This situation required replacement of some government ministers who were less than enthusiastic about the agrarian reform, and who, in the view of the eight “vanguard ministers,” were not developing their ministries in an effective and dynamic manner.  On June 11 and 12, five ministers (State, Agriculture, Government, Health and Social Assistance, and Social Welfare) were replaced (Buch and Suarez 2009:117-21, 198-99).

     The President of the Republic, Manuel Urrutia, was out of step with the radicalized Council of Ministers.  The vanguard ministers had been unsatisfied with the conduct of the President from the beginning.  He possessed what they considered an “absurd radicalism,” which expressed itself with respect to three issues.  First, his refusal to conclude his taking of the oath of office with the phrase “so help me God,” thus provoking criticism of the revolution from religious groups, who mistakenly believed that the removal of the Supreme Being from the Cuban constitutional process was ordered by Fidel.  Secondly, he was opposed to the granting of safe-conduct to hundreds of persons who had entered Latin American embassies seeking political asylum, thus provoking problems for the Cuban revolutionary government in its diplomatic relations with Latin American governments.  Thirdly, he made public statements calling for a full and immediate suppression of gambling, in spite of the effects that such a measure would have on employment.  Although an extreme radical on these matters, he was conservative or opportunistic concerning important issues, including agrarian reform.  In addition, he invoked a clause of presidential exemption from the reduction in salaries for ministers, and thus received the same excessive salary as Batista.  In conjunction with his pension as a retired judge, this enabled him to purchase a new house in an exclusive neighborhood.  And, after the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Law, he delayed in signing laws and measures that were approved by the Council of Ministers (Buch and Suarez 2009:66-67, 124-30, 141, 202, 205, & 216).

      But the issue that provoked a governmental crisis was Urrutia’s anti-communist rhetoric.  After the passage of the Agrarian Reform Law on May 17 (see “The Agrarian Reform Law of 1959” 9/23/2014), the phantom of communism was invoked by the United States and the counterrevolution, as we will discuss in the next post.  In this context, anti-communist declarations by the President, expressing concerns for communist infiltration in the revolutionary government, were undermining the revolutionary process.  Urrutia, for example, declared to the press, “I believe that the communists are doing terrible damage to Cuba, and I openly declare here that they want to create a second front in the revolution.  Therefore, I always have said that I reject the support the communists, and I believe that true Cuban revolutionaries ought to reject it openly also” (quoted in Buch and Suárez 2009:210).   

     The anti-communist public declarations of Urrutia placed Fidel in a difficult position, inasmuch as Fidel was engaged in ideological battle with the maneuver of the communist phantom.  As Prime Minister, Fidel was under the formal authority of the President; indeed, the Prime Minister was appointed by the President.  On the other hand, with the real power that Fidel possessed, it would not have been difficult to have the President removed from office.  But any such display of power would be viewed by the world as a coup d’état, yet another example of political intrigues and conflicts in Latin American politics.  At the same time, if Fidel, as Prime Minister, had criticized the President publically, such criticism of a higher official would have been disloyal and not proper.  In this situation, Fidel on July 16 submitted his resignation from the position of Prime Minister.  He explained his reasons to the people in a television address on the evening of July 17, describing his disagreements with the president with respect to the issues noted above, and giving particular emphasis to the anti-communist public statements of the President.  The reaction of the people was overwhelming: the President should resign, and the Council of Ministers should not accept Fidel’s resignation.  In the face of this public reaction, Urrutia immediately resigned, and the Council of Ministers quickly named Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado as President.  Prior to his television statement, Fidel had communicated secretly to three Council members that, if Urrutia resigns, Dorticós should be named to take his place as president (Buch and Suarez 2009:124-46, 201-19).

     Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, at the time of his call to serve as President, was a member of the Council of Ministers, holding the position of Minister in Charge of Review and Study of Revolutionary Laws.  A lawyer by profession, he was responsible for ensuring the legal validity of the new laws and measures proposed by the ministers. He had been born in a middle class family in the city of Cienfuegos.  His father was a well-known surgeon, and his mother was a teacher.  He attended private Catholic schools in Cienfuegos and Santa Clara, and he later studied law at the University of Havana.  He became a leader in the revolutionary student movement in Cienfuegos in the 1930s, but with the turn to representative democracy in the late 1930s and the subsequent emergence of the politics of corruption, his revolutionary hopes were dashed.  He settled in to a career in law in Cienfuegos; he continued to read widely, but without political participation.  He became a prestigious lawyer, respected for his studious nature and his well-developed knowledge of law and culture.  With the attack on the Moncada military garrison on July 26, 1953, his submerged revolutionary fervor was awakened, and he began to read Marxist-Leninist works.  Beginning at the end of 1956, he became actively involved in clandestine activities, and he became coordinator of Civic Resistance Movement in Cienfuegos in July 1957.  Following the failure in April 1958 of the July 26 Movement (M-26/7) general strike (see “Unifying the Cuban revolutionary process” 9/17/2014), Dorticós was named coordinator of the M-26/7 in Cienfuegos.  He was arrested and tortured in December 1958.  The chief of the provincial military forces of Batista negotiated an agreement with M-26/7, in which Dorticós would be released, if he left the country.  He was transported to Miami; denied entry by the US government, the M-26/7 arranged for his transport to Mexico, where he was granted political asylum.  With the triumph of the Revolution a short time later, he immediately returned to Havana.  He was named to the Council of Ministers on January 5 (Buch and Suarez 2009:221-42).

       Upon assuming the office of president on July 17, Dorticós joined with the people in calling for Fidel to return to the position of Prime Minister.  Fidel’s resignation never had been accepted by the Council, so technically he was still Prime Minister.  But Fidel had made the resignation publically, and he was reluctant to return.  The popular demand for Fidel’s return continued for days, including work stoppages and the suspension of the chiming of church bells.  The popular call culminated in a mass act on July 26 in the José Martí Civic Plaza (today the Plaza of the Revolution), in which one million peasants arrived to defend the Agrarian Reform Law and support the revolution.  During the act, speakers and the assembly repeatedly called for the return of Fidel to the government, including Dorticós, who declared, “the people order Fidel to comply with his duty.”  Later in the act, Dorticós took the microphone from Raúl Castro in order to proclaim, “In the most emotional moment of my life, I am able to announce that today our companion Fidel, before our mandate, has agreed to return to the office of prime minister” (Buch and Suarez 2009:146-50, 244-55).

     With the reincorporation of Fidel as Prime Minister, the designation of Osvaldo Dorticós as President, and the replacement of five conservative ministers with radicals, the Provisional Revolutionary Government was now prepared to push forward with the revolutionary transformation of the neocolonial order and to wage battle with the national and international forces that were mobilizing to defend that order.


References

Buch Rodríguez, Luis M. and Reinald Suárez Suárez.  2009.  Gobierno Revolucionario Cubano: Primeros pasos.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.


Key words:  Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Cuban Revolution, Fidel, Provisional Revolutionary Government, Osvaldo Dorticós

     For Ho Chi Minh, there was never a question of having to decide between nationalist and class revolutions, or between nationalism and socialism.  His instincts were clear from the first moment of his encounter with French socialism in Paris:  both traditions and movements were valid.  The fulfillment of the one would require the fulfillment of the other.  Although the two traditions had different assumptions and concepts, with different understandings of structures of domination and different proposed projects for human liberation, he believed that both had formulated self-evident truths.  For a philosopher, this situation might have created an epistemological dilemma, requiring the study of philosophers of knowledge.  But Ho Chi Minh, a political activist emerging as a known political leader on an international level, worked through the epistemological dilemma by developing a program of action, thus forging what we might call a “practical theoretical synthesis” of the two traditions.  His program of action was straightforward: national independence and national reunification, establishing the political independence of the nation and control over the territory of the empire of Vietnam prior to French colonialism; agrarian reform, taking land from the landholders and distributing it to the peasants; popular assemblies and popular democracy, establishing structures of popular authority over the political process; a vanguard formed by the most politically conscious intellectuals, peasants and workers, in order to educate the people in the correct path; decisive state action to protect the social and economic rights of the people; and the formation of strategic alliances both within the nation and on an international plane, so that necessary support can be obtained as the revolutionary process unfolds.  It was a program of action that incorporated the insights of both socialism and nationalism.

     Such is the style of the formulations of charismatic leaders.  Their insights are formulated in the context of the need to address practical situations, such as the need to formulate a program of action in a call to the people, or the need to define a strategy or program in response to internal debates in the movement.  Thus, the formulated understandings of charismatic leaders can be described as “practical intellectual formulations” or “practical theoretical formulations.”  They have a style that from an academic point of view may appear to be overly succinct.  Or they may be formulated piecemeal, partially expressed in one context and further developed in another.  But their style, a consequence of their being formulated in political practice, should not prevent us from appreciating their insight.  Indeed, the fact that the insights of charismatic leaders are formulated in the context of political practice is the key to their wisdom.  Advances in human understanding of social dynamics are attained when charismatic leaders, drawing upon a received political-intellectual-moral tradition and committed to universal human values, arrive at new insights as they seek to understand what to do in the context of problems, dilemmas, and new situations confronted by the on-going social movement.  

     As we reflect on the intellectual development of Ho Chi Minh,  what is of most importance is that Ho, when he first encountered socialist currents in Paris, did not reject Western socialism for its prevailing Eurocentrism, in spite of Ho’s formation in the nationalist perspective of the colonized.  Rather, he embraced Leninism as the current within European socialism that most fully affirmed the validity of the anti-colonial struggles in the colonies, and at the same time, he adapted Leninism to the colonial situation.  Through this process, he was able to reaffirm the basic principles of the nationalist movement, while at the same time appropriating for the nationalist movement important insights of the European socialist movement, thus enabling the nationalist movement to become more theoretically advanced and therefore more politically advanced.  And he endeavored to push European socialism toward encounter with the Third World revolutions and to a greater level of consciousness of the significance of the Third World revolutions for the global socialist revolution.  He thus sought to bring both communism and Third World nationalism to a more advanced theoretical and political stage. 

     Ho’s creative synthesis of Marxism-Leninism and a Third World anti-colonial perspective was appreciated by Fidel Castro.  As we will see in future posts, Fidel also would formulate a synthesis of Third World nationalism and Marxism-Leninism in the practical context of social struggle.  In an address in Vietnam on September 12, 1973, four years after Ho’s death, Fidel declared:

     Ho’s practical theoretical synthesis of two revolutionary intellectual-moral-political traditions that emerged in different social and historical contexts illustrates the exceptional intellectual capacity of the charismatic leader.  And his role as the historic leader of the Vietnamese Revolution illustrates the pivotal importance of the charismatic leader, who is able to creatively formulate the necessary direction of the revolutionary movement, and as a consequence, possesses widely recognized moral authority, thus making possible the political unification of the revolutionary movement and the people. 


References

Castro, Fidel.  2008.  “Discurso de Fidel Castro en Vietnam" in Agustín  Prina, La Guerra de Vietnam, Pág. 173-80.  Mexico: Ocean Sur.


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh

     In concluding his thorough biography of Ho Chi Minh, William J. Duiker, a US historian who specializes in East Asian Studies, writes: 

     I have maintained in previous posts that charismatic leaders emerge in revolutionary processes and that the charismatic leader is necessary for the success of the revolution (“Toussaint L’Ouverture” 12/10/2013; “Reflections on the Russian Revolution” 1/29/2014; “Lessons of the Mexican Revolution” 2/19/2014; “The dream renewed” 3/6/2014; “Is Marx today fulfilled?” 3/20/2014).  Drawing upon the formulation of the early twentieth century German sociologist Max Weber, I use the term “charismatic” not only to refer to a capacity to persuade and influence, but also to refer to an exceptional capacity to understand, particularly to discern structures of domination and the necessary steps for liberation.  In accordance with this definition, Hitler was influential, but he was not charismatic; he was a false prophet.  But there exist in our era charismatic leaders who stand in the tradition of the ancient prophet Amos, leaders who discern injustices and who denounce the complacency of the powerful and the privileged, and who sacrifice a normal personal life in order to dedicate themselves to lead the people in the quest for an alternative and more just social system.  Ho Chi Minh was one of them.

     The underlying social forces to which Duiker refers indeed are present.  Charismatic leaders do not act in a social vacuum.  When social structures contradict cultural values, and when the objective conditions for social movement exist, social movements emerge.  These underlying social conditions have been present in the modern world-system since the last decades of the eighteenth century: the ideology of the world-system has proclaimed democratic values, but it has maintained colonial and neocolonial structures that negate democratic rights; and among the colonized and neocolonized, the human and material resources for the organization of social movements have been present.  But the social movements have been full of contradictions and confusions, which is to be expected, given the complex nature of social dynamics.  The gift of the charismatic leader is to discern, in the midst of the confusions and contradictions, the correct way from the wrong path and to unify the movement on the basis of the correct direction, thus bringing the movement to a more advanced stage.

      We in the societies of the North have gone down the path of cynicism.  We distrust authority in any form, including charismatic authority.  We doubt anyone’s capacity to discern the correct way from the wrong path, and we prefer self-expression to discipline.  But let me mention an example.  In the mass demonstration against the Vietnam War in 1969 in Washington, some demonstrators were dancing nude and smoking marijuana, a celebration that was recorded by television cameras.  A celebration of this form was an error.  The goal of the protest ought to have been the building of a sustained popular movement, and this would require bringing on board people of all ages and religious values, which cannot be accomplished with behavior that is insensitive to the values of many of the people.  The goal ought to have been the political education of the people, focusing on the imperialist character of US foreign policy.  If some felt the need to raise cultural issues pertaining to sexual mores and drug usage, the movement can arrange for such discussion, conducted responsibly in an appropriate context.  But the movement at that historic moment lacked a charismatic leader who could discern the correct path and lead the movement in the correct direction, bringing it to a more advanced stage.  The revolution of the 1960s did not succeed.

     In revolutionary processes that succeed, we observe a charismatic leader, teaching and exhorting the people with respect to issues ranging from concrete strategies to grand theoretical analyses.  In case of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh possessed the capacity to discern the correct path for the Vietnamese Revolution and to lead the people toward the fulfillment of its mission.  Ho’s most important contribution was to adapt Marxism-Leninism to the colonial situation of French Indochina.  He discerned that it was not a question of class exploitation versus national domination, and that there is a double axis of domination, in which both class exploitation and national domination are intertwined.  Accordingly, liberation requires the transformation of both forms of domination. Unlike Marxism-Leninism, Ho was not suspicious of the peasantry, for he saw the revolutionary spontaneity of the peasant.  But he recognized that the peasants needed organization and leadership, and he thus grasped the need for the formation of a vanguard political party composed of enlightened members of the various popular sectors of intellectuals, peasants, and workers.  He understood that revolutionary steps could be taken only when national and international conditions are present, and he therefore paid careful attention to these conditions and was flexible in the implementation of the revolutionary program, often holding back militant members of the party who were anxious to proceed quickly.  And although he led his people in two wars of national liberation against global powers, and although he never wavered in his commitment to the principles that made the wars necessary (namely, Vietnamese national independence and reunification), his search for a peaceful resolution was constant. 

     We will be looking at subsequent posts at the son of a Confucian scholar who was born in 1890 in the French protectorate of Annam with the name of Nguyen Sing Cung, who was given the name of Nguyen Tat Thanh (meaning “he who will succeed”) at age 11 by his father, who took the name Nguyen Ai Quoc ( “Nguyen the Patriot”) at the age of 29 in Paris, and who became known to the world as Ho Chi Minh (“He Who Enlightens”).


References

Duiker, William J.  2000.  Ho Chi Minh.  New York:  Hyperion.


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Vietnam, Confucian scholars, Vietnamese nationalism, Ho Chi Minh

Posted March 6, 2014

     There has emerged in the first years of the twenty-first century what Luis Suárez Salazar has called “independent and multicultural integration” in Latin America (2008:104).  Suárez notes that this integration is integrally tied to the call for “Socialism for the XXI Century,” and its proponents have been influenced by the most progressive currents in the development of Latin American social thought, including Simón Bolívar, José Martí, Julio Antonio Mella, and Ernesto Che Guevara.  It is a form of integration that seeks to construct what Fidel Castro has called the “true and definitive independence” of Latin America and the Caribbean (Suárez 2008:104-8).  

       The new independent integration is different from the integration of the developmentalist project of the twentieth century, which reached its height in the 1960s and 1970s.  Led by the Latin American industrial bourgeoisie, the developmentalist project sought ascent within the structures of the world-system.  It confronted various obstacles, including the weak domestic market as a consequence of the superexploitation of labor, the resistance of the national estate bourgeoisie to necessary reforms, and the subordination of the national industrial bourgeoisie to the interests of transnational capital.  As a result, although it had some positive consequences for the people, it was unable to bring about the social transformation that the needs of the people required (Cobarrubia and Quirós 2006:50-55; Pérez 2006:256-61).

     The developmentalist project was replaced by the neoliberal project following 1980.  Neoliberal integration is an imposed integration, consistent with the interests of the United States and supported by subordinate national bourgeoisies.  Neoliberal integration strengthened the orientation of the Latin American economies toward the core and weakened commercial relations among Latin American nations.  Increasingly dependent on the core, each Latin American nation had to negotiate terms of exchange, resulting in costly concessions.  The imposition of the neoliberal model has resulted in limited economic growth, financial instability, and a deterioration of social conditions (Cobarrubia and Quirós 2006:50-55; Pérez 2006:256-61). 

      There emerged during the 1990s objective factors that favored a reorientation toward an independent Latin American integration and a retaking of the nineteenth century dream of La Patria Grande (see “The Dream of La Patria Grande” 3/4/2014).  Three factors have been identified by Julio García Oliveras.  First, there is the evident failure of the neoliberal model, occurring in the aftermath of the limitations of the developmentalist project.  Social movements emerged that focused on concrete problems caused by the neoliberal model, such as the declining value of the national currency and the increasing costs of food, utilities, transportation, and education.  

      Secondly, in spite of the constraints of neoliberal policies, there emerged during the 1980s some intra-regional commercial organizations that sought to strengthen intra-regional commerce. These include the Latin American Association of Integration (ALADI) as well as sub-regional organizations, such as the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).  Although these associations in some cases functioned as a mechanism for U.S. directed integration, and in other cases were characterized by competition among the member nations, giving the advantage to the stronger partner; they nevertheless included the utilization of the natural comparative advantage of each country.  For example, Brazil can buy wheat and milk products from Argentina, while Argentina buys coffee and cocoa from Brazil.  In this regard, the Cuban journalist Jorge Gómez Barata has observed that Latin America has an impressive industrial capacity as well as important energy reserves that enable it to develop a variety of mutually beneficial exchange relations.  But for the potential relations based on comparative advantage to be developed effectively, there must be a strengthening of the domestic markets of all of the nations.  Thus all nations of the region have an interest in supporting a more equal and just distribution of income for the entire region, and to seek to develop a form of integration that is not merely commercial and based solely on economic competition, but also attends to the social needs of the people.

      Thirdly, to the extent that Latin American nations need products manufactured in the core, its negotiating position would be improved by developing a cooperative relation with the European Union, thus reducing its dependency on the United States.  This provides the Latin American nations with an interest in opposing the FTAA, which is in part a U.S. plan to eliminate competition from the European Union and give the U.S. greater access to the Latin American markets for its manufactured products.  The FTAA and its failure will be the subject of the next post.

     Revolutionary transformations occur when both objective and subjective factors are present.  The history of successful revolutions teaches us that the subjective factors become present when: (1) some movement intellectuals begin to discern the possible and necessary transformations established by emerging objective conditions; and (2) in the context of this dynamic situation characterized by confusion and contradictory opinions and currents of thought, there emerges a charismatic leader who is able to formulate a coherent project that unites the principal social movement leaders and organizations.  Hugo Chávez was a career military officer, reader of books, a political activist, and a man of humble social origins who was sensitive to the needs of the people.  Arriving to understand the objective possibilities for Latin American union and integration, Chávez was able to lead the region toward a retaking of the dream of “La patria grande,” as we shall see in a subsequent post.  (To read more about Hugo Chávez Frías, go to Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela).


References

Cobarrubia Gómez, Faustino and Jonathan Quirós.  2006.  “Integración y Subdesarrollo,” in  Libre Comercio y subdesarrollo.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Pérez García, José A.  2006.  “La economía de América Latina y el Caribe en las últimas cuatro décadas: Algunas reflexiones críticas” in Libre Comercio y subdesarrollo.  La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.

Suárez Salazar, Luis.  2008.  “La integración independiente y multidimensional de Nuestra América” in Contexto Latinoamericano: Revista de Análisis Político, No. 7, Pp. 103-9.


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Latin American integration

Posted March 20, 2014

      Encountering the proletarian movement in Paris in 1843-44, while simultaneously studying British political economy, Marx formulated a penetrating and moving understanding of human history.  He interpreted the social action of workers, artisans and intellectuals connected to the working class movement as the first steps in a revolutionary process that would forge a transition from capitalism to socialism.  The future socialist society, Marx believed, would be built on a foundation of automated industry, and it would be characterized by the abolition of class divisions, inequality and exploitation, because there would not be a functional need for them.  Marx thus envisioned the creation of what we would today call a just and democratic world-system, established by the political action of the exploited class.  (See various posts on Marx in January 2014, particularly “Marx and the working class” 1/6/2014; “Marx illustrate cross-horizon encounter” 1/7/2014; “Marx on the revolutionary proletariat” 1/14/2014; and “The social and historical context of Marx” 1/15/2014).

       We have seen that the process of change occurring today in Latin America and the Caribbean can be interpreted as the beginning of the emergence a post-capitalist/socialist/civilizational project that seeks the establishment of an alternative more just and democratic world-system (see “A change of epoch?” 3/18/2014).  Thus we are able to see in our time the possible fulfillment, at long last, of the transition envisioned by Marx from capitalism to socialism. 

     But the possible transition to socialism of our time has characteristics that Marx did not, and given the time in which he wrote, could not fully anticipate.  The social movements that are its foundation are not the working-class movements of the core but movements of multiple popular classes and sectors of neocolonized regions of the world, which have included students, peasants, women, workers, and indigenous peoples, and movements in which the principal leaders have come for the most part from the petit bourgeoisie.  (I have discussed this phenomenon and its implications in different contexts; see: “The social and historical context of Marx” 1/15/2014 “The proletarian vanguard” 1/24/2014; and “The proletariat and the Mexican Revolution” 2/14/2014).

      Another dimension, not anticipated by Marx, has been the role of charismatic leaders, and this also is a phenomenon that I have discussed previously (see “Toussaint L’Ouverture” 12/10/2013; “Reflections on the Russian Revolution” 1/29/2014; “Lessons of the Mexican Revolution” 2/19/2014; “The dream renewed” 3/6/2014).  In the case of the process of Latin American unity and integration, Hugo Chávez has assumed this indispensable function of charismatic leadership.  Discerning that the objective conditions for integration were present, and possessing faith in the Bolivarian vision of sovereign Latin American nations united in La Patria Grande; Chávez was constantly present, proposing and exhorting.  (To read more about Hugo Chávez Frías, see “Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela”).  It is a question of objective and subjective factors being present, from which emerges a charismatic leader who is able to discern what is possible and to lead the people toward its fulfillment.  As we continue in the development of this blog to review various revolutionary processes in various nations, we will see that this combination of objective and subjective factors and charismatic leadership is a recurring phenomenon.

      In addition to the important role of charismatic figures with exceptional gifts of understanding and leadership, another characteristic of the new Latin American and Caribbean political phenomenon, also a characteristic not anticipated by Marx, is the central role of patriotism.  Not the distorted form of patriotism that has a tragic history in Europe and the United States, in which elites manipulate popular sentiments in order to enlist the people in wars against other nations, for the disguised purpose of protecting elite interests.  But a form of patriotism that values the protection of the sovereignty and the dignity of the nation, and that proclaims one’s own nation’s right to sovereignty on the basis of the principle of the sovereign rights of all nations.  In this new form of patriotism, the enemies of the nation are not the peoples of other nations, but the national elite who have dishonorably betrayed the nation in the pursuit of particular interests.  It is a kind of patriotism that would propel Hugo Chávez to proclaim, with reference to the traditional political parties in Venezuela: “They were on their knees, there is no other way to say it, they were on their knees before the imperial power.” 

     The new form of patriotism, which I call “revolutionary patriotism,” is intertwined with a spirit of internationalism and international solidarity (see “Revolutionary patriotism” 8/15/2013).  The new patriotism proclaims the right of all nations to true independence and sovereignty, and it condemns the imperialist policies of powerful nations that seek to maintain the neocolonial world-system.  It expresses solidarity with all nations and peoples that seek true sovereignty and independence.  In his 1982 essay, in which he was contemplating the possible transition to an alternative world-system, Wallerstein wondered, “What kind of ‘nationalism’ is compatible with the creation of a socialist world order” (1982:52)?  The revolutionary patriotic discourses that at the same time are expressions of international solidarity, formulated by Chávez, Morales and Correa, are responses to Wallerstein’s question.

     Revolutionary patriotism is not new.  It has been an integral component of anti-colonial and anti-neocolonial revolutions of the twentieth century.  Patriotism would compel a young Vietnamese socialist in Paris in the 1920s, who later would become known to the world as Ho Chi Minh, to take the name of Nguyen Ai Quoc, which means “Nguyen the Patriot.”  Although clearly a committed communist who believed in a global revolution, Ho was above all a patriotic nationalist.  And patriotism would prompt a young Fidel Castro in the 1950s to conclude a public statement with a phrase from the Cuban national anthem: “To die for the nation is to live.”  When the triumphant revolutionary army entered Havana on January 8, 1959, the comandantes at the front were bearing huge Cuban flags. Subsequently, the revolutionary government did not change either the national anthem or the flag, a decision that was explained by Fidel, in response to a question from a foreign journalist, by saying, “There is a lot of glory under that flag.”  The Cuban Revolution took power in 1959 in the name of popular aspirations for a truly sovereign nation, accusing the established political elite of having violated the dignity of the nation.

      Thus the socialist revolution of our time is developing in a way that Marx did not fully anticipate.  It is a popular revolution formed by various popular classes and sectors, with a principal social base in the neocolonized regions of the world, led by charismatic leaders with exceptional gifts who for the most part have social origins in the petit bourgeoisie, although the leaders have included workers (Nicolás Maduro) and peasants (Evo Morales).  These charismatic leaders have aroused and channeled the anger and the hopes of the people, in part by sound analysis of global dynamics, but also in part by touching the patriotic sentiments of the people, and by naming the treasonous conduct of the national bourgeoisie, for its collaboration with the interests of international capital at the expense of the people, many of whom were already impoverished and ignored by centuries of colonial and neocolonial domination.  Driven by faith in the future of humanity, the charismatic leaders have proclaimed that a better world is possible, and they have found the audacity to lead the people in its quest for a more just and democratic world, in which all persons are treated with dignity, and the sovereignty of all nations is respected. 

     Although the socialist revolution of our time does not have the characteristics that Marx fully anticipated, it is in a broad sense the realization of the socialist revolution that Marx foresaw.  Marx envisioned a socialist revolution on the basis of observing the contradictions of the capitalist system from the vantage point of the exploited class, and from this vantage point, he recognized that the contradictions cannot be resolved without structural transformations that imply the end of the system itself and its transition to something else.  From this vantage point from below, Marx also could discern that one possible outcome was the transformation of the system in a form that would protect the rights of all, and that such a resolution would be consistent with human progress and with advances in natural and social scientific knowledge, thus making such a resolution all the more likely.  In our time, we can see such a possibility unfolding:  A resolution of the contradictions of the capitalist world-economy, which can be discerned from the vantage point from below, through the decisive and informed political action of the exploited and neocolonized, who seek a more just and democratic world-system.

       The post-1995 resurgence of revolution by the neocolonized peoples of the earth provides a clear choice for humanity: a choice between, on the one hand, a neocolonial world-system that places markets above people and the privileges of the powerful above the rights of the humble; and on the other hand, a dignified alternative being led by charismatic leaders whose gifts of discernment, commitment to social justice, and denunciations of the powerful  remind us of the prophet Amos, who condemned the structures of domination and privilege of the ancient Kingdom of Israel as violations of the Mosaic covenant, a covenant that was a sacred agreement between a homeless and marginalized people and a God who acts in history in defense of the poor.

     We intellectuals of the North have the duty to observe and discern what is happening, and to explain it to our people, so that the people, freed from the distortions of the media, can decide what they ought to do.  I believe that, if the people were to know, a consensus would emerge to do what is right.  But the people need the help of intellectuals.  In no national revolutionary context have the people figured things out by themselves.  The role of intellectuals, who created a subjective context from which emerged charismatic leaders, was essential, and charismatic leadership was decisive.


References

Wallerstein, Immanuel.  1982.  “Crisis as Transition” in Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein, Dynamics of Global Crisis.  New York and London: Monthly Review Press.


Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Latin American unity, Latin American integration, CELAC, Chávez

      In various posts since February 3, I have sought to formulate an understanding of the Mexican Revolution, utilizing as a principal source the classic work by Adolfo Gilly, The Mexican Revolution, originally published in 1971 as La Revolución Interrumpida.  The book has been adopted as a textbook by many departments of history in Mexico.   

     Revolutions do not inevitably lead to the ultimate frustration of the popular interest in taking power and governing in its own name.  The failure of the Mexican Revolution to triumph as a popular revolution was rooted in particular disadvantages.  Its principal charismatic leader, Emiliano Zapata, lacked the experiential foundation for the formulation of a national program that could unify the various popular sectors.  Moreover, the working class struggle was developing in a manner separate from the peasant revolution, making difficult the forging of a peasant-worker alliance from below.  In addition, the revolutionary sector of the petit bourgeoisie was not sufficiently advanced to lead a peasant-worker alliance from below.  The current most prepared to do so was led by Ricardo Flores Magón, who was isolated and in exile at the time of the triumph of the revolutionary army in 1914.  At the same time, the ascending petit bourgeoisie was able to offer a coherent national project.  All of these factors contributed to the inability of the revolution to maintain popular direction at the critical moment of its triumph. 

      As we have seen, in the October Revolution, when armed militias took control of the capital city, Lenin immediately convoked the establishment of new political power, which immediately issued decrees that responded to popular demands, including the demands of the peasantry (“The Russian Revolution (October)” 1/23/2014).  In future posts, we will see that, similarly, in the cases of Vietnam and Cuba, when popular armies took control of capital cities, the leaders of the people in arms took immediate steps toward the implementation of popular programs, thus establishing that the revolutions would triumph as popular revolutions.  In both cases, the revolutionary movements were led by a leadership cadre that was overwhelmingly petit bourgeois in composition.  In the two cases, charismatic leaders emerged who were nourished and formed by both petty bourgeois Third World nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, and they forged a synthesis of these two currents of thought, providing a solid ideological foundation for the consolidation of the revolution as a popular revolution.

      Classical Marxism taught that the proletariat is at the vanguard of the revolution.  But the unfolding of revolutions in the twentieth century teaches us a different lesson.  Popular revolutions are characterized by the active participation of peasants and the petit bourgeoisie as well as workers.  And in the second half of the twentieth century, other popular sectors would emerge to identify themselves as actors independent of their class: Afro-descendants, women, and indigenous peoples. 

     In this mixture of popular classes in movement, we can see that the role played by the petit bourgeoisie is critical.  When revolutions failed to be consolidated as popular revolutions, one finds a petit bourgeoisie in which confusion, division and opportunism prevails.  On the other hand, when popular revolutions are able to sustain themselves, one sees the emergence of a petit bourgeoisie that conducts itself in an informed and dignified manner and in accordance with universal human values, led by a charismatic leader who is lifted up by the people, and who leads the people to the consolidation of the popular revolution.  Examples of the former include the Mexican Revolution and the US Revolution of 1968 (which we will discuss in future posts).  Examples of the latter include the October Revolution, the Vietnamese Revolution, and the Cuban Revolution.

     Revolutions, whether or not they are able to sustain themselves as popular revolutions, are exceptional moments that call persons to action and self-sacrifice, and therefore they produce heroes and martyrs.  The Mexican Revolution produced three of universal significance: Emiliano Zapata, Pancho Villa, and Ricardo Flores Magón.  All three dedicated their lives to the better world that they envisioned, and all three were killed by the forces that correctly perceived them as a threat to the established order.  We today have the duty to remember them in a form that recognizes their limitations but that also appreciates their exceptional qualities.  We must do this not only because they deserve it, but also because we must overcome the cynicism, rooted in a consumer society, that seeks to induce us to believe that there are no heroes.

       All popular revolutions have their imperfections, even those that have been able to sustain themselves as political and cultural projects dedicated to the protection of the interests and needs of the people.  We must seek to understand why this is so, and we should be aware that those who seek to preserve privileges for the few will exploit these imperfections to induce us to think that revolution is not possible.  There are various factors in each national case that contribute to limitations and contradictions in the revolutionary project.  The single factor that pertains to all national cases is the fact that, in the context of a political economic world-system that has global structures, revolutionary transformation in a single country is not possible, and any effort to do so will necessarily have its limitations.

     Thus let us understand the Mexican Revolution as a particular heroic moment in a global process of revolutionary transformation, a transformation that continues to unfold, and that ultimately will triumph, because of the unsustainability of the world-system itself, and because of the demonstrated heroism of those who seek a better world.

     

Key words: Third World, revolution, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, democracy, national liberation, sovereignty, self-determination, socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Cuba, Latin America, world-system, world-economy, development, underdevelopment, colonial, neocolonial, blog Third World perspective, Mexican Revolution